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ABSTRACT 
The Cabora Bassa Dam regulates the discharge of the lower 
Zambezi. Its principal output, hydroelectric energy, sold under 
a bulk supply contract with the Republic of South Africa, brings 
little direct benefit to the people of Mozambique. The Mozambican 
authorities are limited in their ability to influence the operation 
of the dam both by the terms of the power contract and by various 
technical, economic and political constraints. Hydrological models 
indicate the practical effects of such constraints and show the extent 
to which the project's operation is influenced by river regulation 
upstream. The difficulty of optimizing its operation to provide 
additional outputs would be increased by the construction of the 
North Bank Power Station. The characteristics of the scheme, and of 
the surrounding regions, restrict the establishment of alternative 
markets for Cabora Bassa's energy within Mozambique and in neighbouring 
countries. In the long -term, the accumulation of sediment in Lake 
Cabora Bassa and the project's social and environmental impacts are 
likely to become increasingly significant in determining the value of 
the project. 
The complex and far -reaching changes induced by the construction 
of the Cabora Bassa Dam will have considerable influence over the 
future development of the lower Zambezi valley. The options open to 
Mozambique are restricted by the constraints of the system and the 
information and resources available, but some benefit could be gained 
through co- operation with other basin states. The general lessons 
provided by the Cabora Bassa Project are applicable to large water 
regulation projects in other under -developed regions. 
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load factor (1.f.) 
- communal village (established by Frelimo). 
- fortified or strategic village (established 
by Portuguese authorities). 
- the value of the highest discharge occuring 
in a given time (say a one -day, ten -day or 
one -month period) in a given hydrological 
year. 
- a data series comprising the annual 
maximum floods in a succession of hydrological 
years. 
- monetary value equal to one thousand 
Portuguese escudos. 
- curves showing cumulative totals of a given 
parameter, from a given date, against time. 
- a set of values of a given parameter 
measured at a given location. 
- a continuous set of values of a given 
parameter which may include values derived 
from one or more record and values obtained 
by such techniques as data generation and 
catchment modelling. 
- the most severe flood event which the project 
has been designed to withstand without 
excessive damage being sustained. 
- the volume of water passing a given point 
in a river or channel in a given period 
of time. 
- the shoreline zone of a reservoir bounded 
by its highest and lowest operating levels. 
- the power output from a hydroelectric 
project which can be provided continuously 
with a relatively high level of certainty 
(strictly the level of probability should 
be stated). 
- the ratio of the mean power output, from an 









run -of -river 
secondary energy 
sediment rating curve 
target power output 
threshold discharge 
- the estimated values of river discharges 
which would have occurred if no river 
regulation had taken place. 
- a parcel of land over which the Portuguese 
state granted wide powers of jurisdiction 
to individual settlers. 
- a graph showing an assumed or measured 
relationship between river discharge and 
river level at a particular river gauging 
station. 
- a common means of expressing the estimated 
probability of occurrence of a given hydro- 
logical event - an event which has a 
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- the proportion of the precipitation over a 
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surface flow. 
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- energy generated by a hydroelectric power 
station in excess of that provided by its 
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- a curve showing the assumed relationship 
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electric scheme are seeking to achieve as a 
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- a term used by RPT, in reference to a 
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Bassa Dam, for the maximum discharge which 
may be made from the dam without causing 
significant flood damage downstream. 
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A NOTE ON GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES AND UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 
Names of countries: The name Mozambique is, for convenience, used 
throughout this thesis rather than the Portuguese spelling, Moçambique, 
or the country's full name since independence, the Republique Popular 
de Moçambique (People's Republic of Mozambique). Similarly the 
shortened English names of other countries with independent majority 
governments are used, for example, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. Their 
colonial names, Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, are 
occasionally used in historical sections where use of their present 
names would have been misleading. The Republic of South Africa (RSA) 
has been so named throughout the thesis in order to avoid confusion 
with the regional name 'southern Africa' and to emphasize the fact 
that the government which has adopted this name represents only the 
white minority. 
Other place names: The names of a number of towns and cities in 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe have been changed since the countries became 
independent. The new names, for example Maputo and Harare, are used 
except where their use would have been confusing. In other cases, 
where two or more alternative spellings have been used in the past, an 
attempt has been made to select the form most widely used at present. 
The spelling of Cabora Bassa causes particular difficulties. A large 
number of forms, both hyphenated and unhyphenated, have been published. 
These include Caoura -Bassa, Karcabassa, Cahourabassa, Queruabassa, 
Camala -Bassa and numerous others. The form adopted throughout this 
thesis, Cabora Bassa, is the spelling used most widely in the English - 
speaking world and is also found in many Portuguese publications and 
reports. Nevertheless, there are indications that the authorities in 
Mozambique have recently chosen to adopt the spelling Cahora Bassa or 
Cahora -Bassa in preference. 
Names of rivers: As with other names the principal objective in 
selecting a particular spelling has been to avoid ambiguity rather 
than to adhere to a strictly logical naming system. In many cases 
rivers running through more than one country have been given different 
xix 
names in each country and, in some cases, variations of spelling also 
occur within a single country. In general, the form used in this thesis 
is that used most widely in the country which contains the largest 
proportion of the river's catchment. Thus, Zambezi is used in place 
of the Portuguese Zambeze or the alternative English spelling Zambesi. 
Similarly, the names Shire (Portuguese, Chire), Hunyani (Portuguese, 
Panhame) and Luangwa (Portuguese, Aruangua) have been adopted. The 
Luangwa presents particular difficulties because of the existence of 
other rivers with similar names in the Zambezi basin and because various 
archiac spellings are used in older documents. The term 'the lower 
Zambezi basin (or valley)' is not applied with precision in the thesis 
but is generally used to refer to the valley downstream of Cabora Bassa. 
Units of measurement: Metric units are used throughout the thesis 
following the S.I. system. Where original sources have used other units 
the writer has made the appropriate conversions. An indication of 
where such conversions have been necessary has generally been given in 
the text. The letters k, M, G and T have been incorporated into units 
to indicate factors of 103 in the normal way: kilo (103), Mega (106), 
Giga (10e) and Tera (1012). However, for clarity, their use has been 
avoided for areas and volumes. ('One million square metres' is written 
'106 m2'). 
The decimal point: A single point placed on the line indicates the 
decimal place (eg. 1.25). No punctuation is used to indicate thousands 
although appropriate spaces have been left (eg. 12 500). This notation 
is used to avoid confusion between the system generally used in Britain 
and that used in Portugal and Mozambique where the decimal place is 
indicated by a comma and thousands by a point. 
Currency: Monetary values are given in the currency used in original 
sources. In order to provide a means of comparison they have also 
been converted to American dollars using exchange rates in operation 
at the time of the particular transaction. These values are given in 
parentheses. No attempt has been made to convert them to present or 
constant prices. Prior to 1975 the currency used in Mozambique was 
the Portuguese escudo, one thousand escudos being equal to one conto. 
xx 
After Independence the Mozambican escudo was no longer tied to that 
of Portugal. It has since been renamed the metical. 
Hydrological years: In regions which show a clear seasonal rainfall 
pattern it is general practice to define a 'hydrological year' and 
to use this rather than the calendar year, as the basis for hydro- 
logical calculations. The start of the hydrological year is chosen 
to coincide with, or slightly precede, the beginning of the wet 
season. In the present work, as in most previous studies of the 
Zambezi basin, a hydrological year starting on 1 October is used. 
Thus, 'the year 1963/4' indicates the hydrological year from 1 October 
1963 to 30 September 1964. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The civil engineer should recognise the many factors which 
may defy expression in direct money values, particularly 
those which arise from effects on a community's way of life. 
(Institution of Civil Engineers, London: 1973 statement on 
social responsibilities). 
The entire works under study in the River Zambezi, along its 
banks and in its delta are extraordinarily complex even if 
the hydraulic aspects alone are considered ... They become 
still more complex when other related aspects are considered 
for the development of the region, such as minerals and 
agriculture. 
The object of the works planned is to build a logical and 
ordered whole which permits the best possible benefit from 
the economic potential of the region of the Zambezi, an 
integration which is difficult to plan given the vastness 
of the problem and the number of factors to be considered. 
(Esquema Geral, 22.1, p1 *). 
On 4th December 1974, sixteen years after the completion of the 
Kariba Dam, a dam in the narrow and remote Cabora Bassa Gorge in 
Mozambique was finally closed and a vast new reservoir began to fill. 
The creation of this second major impoundment on the Zambezi marked 
the culmination of a long period of planning and preparation. The 
idea of constructing a dam at Cabora Bassa had been suggested possibly 
as much as a hundred years earlier although it was not until 1956 
that the first direct measures were taken to implement the idea. The 
detailed investigations which were undertaken from 1956 onwards were 
directed not only towards plans for the dam itself but also towards 
the economic development of the whole Zambezi valley. Nevertheless, 
despite the size of this project and the extent of the preparation which 
had taken place, few people outside Portugal had heard the name Cabora 
Bassa before 1968. Furthermore very little had been written about the 
project beyond what was contained in multi -volumed reports prepared 
by the Portuguese planners and engineers. 
By contrast, between 1968 and 1975 the Cabora Bassa Dam was the 
focus of considerable publicity. In the war that was then taking place 
between the guerrillas of Frelimo ** and the Portuguese armed forces, 
* For details of references taken from the volumes of Relatório 
Preliminar, Esquema Geral and Plano Geral see Bibliography 1. 
** Frente de Libertacao Mocambique (Mozambique Liberation Front). 
s 
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the Cabora Bassa Dam came to be seen, by many, as a symbol and an 
instrument of Portugal's continuing domination of the people of 
Mozambique. Opposition to the project was expressed through direct 
military action, through diplomatic pressure on governments associated 
with the financing and construction of the dam and through the writings 
of academics and others sympathetic the idea of an independent 
government in Mozambique. 
In Portuguese publications an attempt was made to counter these 
political arguments by pointing to development work which was being 
undertaken in the basin and, in particular, to the benefits which, 
they believed, would accrue to all the people of the region once the 
completed dam had begun to act as the intended driving force behind 
economic development. Such arguments even persuaded a few of those 
opposed to the project on political grounds to venture the suggestion 
that the dam could be an undoubted asset once the people of Mozambique 
had gained their independence. 
Technical publications, during this period, gave the project 
considerable publicity in language which, at times, verged on the 
euphoric. Writers concentrated on the project's technical merits - the 
choice of location for the dam, the skill shown in overcoming various 
difficulties in construction (including those resulting from the armed 
conflict), the size of the power installation (ranking fifth in output 
in the world at the time), the relative cheapness of the electrical 
energy and the possibilities offered by the newly developed technology 
using -high voltage direct -current transmission which could carry power 
economically over the 1400 km which separated it from the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA), a distance which, ten years earlier, would have been 
virtually unthinkable. 
The impoundment of Cabora Bassa Lake began barely six months before 
Mozambique's Independence Day. Thereafter, for a time, the Cabora Bassa 
Project returned to relative obscurity in the outside world. Even in 
Mozambique, the Government appears, at first, to have been prepared to 
allow the project to continue under the provisions for its operation and 
control which had been laid down in agreements made with Portugal at the 
time of independence. Such a policy would have enabled Mozambique to 
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concentrate its limited resources of technical and administrative 
personnel in solving the more immediate economic and political problems 
with which it was faced. At the same time, in major political speeches, 
the Government's attitude towards the Cabora Bassa Dam was clearly 
stated; the dam would be transformed from a symbol of oppression to a 
symbol of liberation and it would enable the people of Mozambique, 
in due course, to achieve economic prosperity and independence. 
This, in brief summary, was the situation at the beginning of 
1978 when the writer began the work on which this thesis is based. 
The period of relative inactivity seemed to offer an ideal opportunity 
for careful evaluation of a number of important questions concerning the 
Cabora Bassa Dam and the regulation of the Zambezi. Mozambique's 
complete dependence on energy sales to a powerful neighbouring country 
and the contrast between the political motivations and expectations 
of the people who planned and executed the project and those who, in 
the event, inherited it provided the possible basis for an interesting 
case study into the extent to which the choice of a particular technology, 
in this case a large hydroelectric project, might be influenced by, or 
exert an influence over, political factors. Moreover, the Cabora 
Bassa Dam provided the opportunity to study in detail the problems 
faced by an underdeveloped country in Africa in regulating the discharge 
from a large international river basin. The questions were by no means 
purely academic: sooner or later plans to expand the consumption of 
electrical energy in Mozambique and to develop agriculture in the Zambezi 
valley would compel the authorities to look more closely at the 
implications of the present reservoir operating procedures which were 
geared soley towards the production of power for the RSA. It was 
intended that this work would provide a foundation which might assist 
the authorities in Mozambique in resolving practical questions of this 
nature and alert them to the difficulties which might face them. In 
addition, it was hoped that some of the conclusions reached might find 
practical application in the regulating of river basins elsewhere. 
Since January 1978 a series of largely unforeseen events has 
served to awaken new interest in the Zambezi valley and the Cabora Bassa 
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Project. In March and April 1978 severe flooding occurred downstream 
of the Cabora Bassa Dam. As a result the Mozambican authorities 
commissioned the British firm of consulting engineers, Rendel, 
Palmer and Tritton (RPT), to investigate the possibility of controlling 
floods and of installing a flood warning system downstream of the dam. 
At the other extreme, a period of drought in 1979 and 1980 affected 
many people in the Zambezi valley and awoke concern over dependence on 
rain -fed agriculture. 
On the alluvial plain, a Soviet team of experts started invest- 
igations into the possibility of constructing five large irrigation 
projects and, in addition, a United Nations consultant undertook a 
study of the possibility of integrated development of the natural 
resources of the Marromeu Reserve. Ambitious plans to expand the 
output of coal from the mine of Moatize led to renewed interest in 
the possibility of developing the Zambezi as a navigable waterway. 
The British firm of accountants, Coopers and Lybrand, was commissioned 
to undertake an economic study of various transportation alternatives. 
In July 1980, international consortia were invited to submit preliminary 
tender proposals for the construction of Cabora Bassa Stage Two - the 
North Bank Power Station (see Appendix 5). Subsequently, SWECO* 
was commissioned, by Electricidade de Mopmbique, to undertake 
feasibility studies for the project. Meanwhile, a French and Italian 
consortium had won a contract to build electrical transmission lines 
linking Cabora Bassa with principal urban and industrial centres in 
northern Mozambique. Future energy planning was complicated, first by 
the repeated sabotage, from December 1980 onwards, of the transmission 
lines from Cabora Bassa to the RSA and, secondly, by the announcement 
towards the end of 1981 that Zimbabwe would build the second stage of 
the Wankie Thermal Power Station rather than buy power from a new 
power station at Cabora Bassa. The construction of a road bridge 
across the Zambezi at Caia, State intervention in the Sena Sugar Estates 
and the creation, with Bulgarian aid, of a flotilla company on Cabora 
Bassa Lake are among the other significant events which have occurred 
in the Zambezi basin during the course of the present study. Finally, 
* SWECO: Swedish Consulting Engineers and Architects (comprising eight 
member firms). 
Zimbabwe's Independence, in April 1980, and the new political and 
economic possibilities offered through Mozambique's participation in 
the newly- formed Southern African Development Co- ordination Conference 
(SADCC) have brought fresh dimensions to the international relationships 
governing the development of the Zambezi basin's resources. 
Although the changes, which occurred since 1978, did not 
radically alter the original objectives of the present study they 
served to awaken fresh interest in the development of the basin and 
brought to the fore questions which had previously been regarded as 
being only of long -term interest. The changes have, on the one hand, 
added to the complexity of the work in hand by increasing the number 
of areas for which issues of immediate relevance have demanded detailed 
consideration. These have frequently had to be accommodated within, 
and have influenced, the conclusions reached in research already 
completed. On the other hand, the changes have brought considerable 
benefit by providing additional information which has enabled results 
and conclusions of a more specific and less speculative nature to 
be reached. The additional information is contained in various 
official reports prepared since 1978, the majority of which were 
undertaken by foreign consultants. A brief description of these 
official reports is included as part of the review of the principal 
information sources which is included later in this introduction. 
The geography of the Zambezi basin 
The catchment of the Zambezi, covering an estimated area of 
1.3 x 106 km2, forms the third largest river system in Africa. The 
largest proportion of the basin lies in Zambia but appreciable areas 
also lie in Angola, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In addition, 
small parts lie in Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and, according to 
some sources, Zaire, see Figure 1. Table 1, based on approximate 
calculations made by the writer, indicates the basin's main political 
sub -divisions and the proportion of each of the principal basin states 
lying within the basin. The precise figures may be open to dispute, 
particularly with regard to the inclusion of the Chobe catchment which 
some authorities have suggested makes no significant hydrological 
contribution to the Zambezi system2. 
ts 
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Table 1: Main political sub -divisions of the Zambezi basin 
Approximate area covered % of total % of country 
Country by Zambezi basin (km' x 103) basin area within basin 
Angola 150 12 12 
Malawi 120 9 98 
Mozambique 140 11 18 
Zambia 580 45 77 
Zimbabwe 220 17 56 
Nevertheless, the figures serve to illustrate the extent of the 
political fragmentation of the basin and the dominance by rivers of the 
Zambezi system over the surface water resources of three of the basin 
states - Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The river is also of considerable 
importance to the economy Mozambique both by virtue of the Cabora Bassa 
Project and as a result of the revenue from sugar production on 
plantations near its mouth. Furthermore, optimistic predictions have 
been made about the potential output from further irrigation projects 
planned for the valley. 
The climatic characteristics of the basin are determined by its 
position in the southern equatorial belt between the 10th and 20th 
parallels3. The southern edge of the inter -tropical convergence zone 
begins moving across the basin from the north in about November of 
each year, bringing behind it low pressure which causes extensive 
rainfall. The zone begins retreating northwards again in about March. 
As a result, rainfall over the basin has a marked seasonal pattern; the 
rainy season lasting approximately six months in the north of the basin 
and from three to four months in the south. Mean annual rainfall is, 
therefore, highest in the north of the basin and lowest in the south, 
see Figure 2. In the east of the basin this pattern of rainfall 
distribution is disrupted by the influence of local topography, the 
proximity of the Indian Ocean and the circulation patterns associated 
with the monsoons which approach the basin from the north -east. 
Nevertheless, a well -defined rainy season still occurs during the 
warmest months. 



















































































































































































































































































































development is annual evaporation. Figures for the Penman potential 
annual evaporation vary from below 1600 mm on the northern and southern 
edges of the basin and in the Malawi highlands, to over 1800 mm in the 
trough of the main river valley. In combination with rainfall data 
these figures indicate that much of the basin lies in climatic zones 
within the range sub -arid to sub -humid. The natural vegetation is, 
therefore, mainly mixed woodland although in the drier regions of 
Zimbabwe and the lower valley in Mozambique this gives way to savanna 
grassland. Cultivation of a single annual crop, maize for example, is 
possible in most parts of the basin during the rainy season, but 
partial or complete failure of crops sometimes occurs due to drought. 
Cultivation of a second annual crop almost invariably requires irrigation. 
The seasonal pattern of rainfall over the basin gives rise to 
large differences between maximum and minimum river flows during the 
year, indeed, some of the smaller rivers dry up completely during the 
winter. At Cabora Bassa Gorge the average ratio between the maximum 
and minimum flow of the Zambezi before the Kariba Dam was built was 
roughly 40:1. (This may be compared with a value of roughly 3:1 for 
the Zaire River at Inga4) The ratio for the Zambezi would be still 
higher but for the influence of the extensive areas of swamp on the 
plateau, including the headwater dambos of Zambia, which store water 
from the rainy season and discharge it gradually throughout the rest 
of the year. 
The runoff characteristics in different parts of the basin are 
not uniform. At one extreme the tributaries from the more arid parts 
of Zimbabwe show a rapid response to rainfall producing short -duration 
flood peaks of large magnitude but, since they drain areas of high 
potential evaporation in which there are few natural storage features, 
many cease to flow during the dry season. At the other extreme, large 
areas of floodplain and swamp in the Kafue basin and in the Zambezi 
catchment upstream of the Victoria Falls act as natural regulators 
attenuating and delaying flood peaks and sustaining dry season flows. 
However, the annual evaporation from these swamps is high. The runoff 
characteristics from the geologically 'mature' valley of the Luangwa 
are intermediate between these extremes. 
The seasonal variation in river discharge is an important 
factor in the design of hydroelectric schemes for the basin. These 
generally require some means of annual storage and the ability, at 
times, to discharge, rapidly, large quantities of excess flood water. 
The most important topographical feature of the Zambezi is that 
a large part of the basin lies on the central African plateau. The 
constraints which this imposes on the design of hydroelectric schemes 
may be illustrated by reference to the main schemes at present in 
operation. Most of the headwaters are found at an altitude of about 
1000 m. After a slow passage through the swamps and floodplains of 
the plateau the water begins its descent to the coastal plain, and it 
is during this descent that hydroelectric generation may be possible, 
see Figure 3. 
The sheer drop of just over 100 m at the Victoria Falls is unique 
in the basin. The relatively simple technology required to tap the water 
at the top of the falls and lead it through penstocks to a power -house 
in the gorge at their base, together with the large annual flow of 
water over the falls, marked this as an obvious site for power generation 
certainly as early as 1906. At present the installed capacity of 108 MW 
on the Zambian side is limited by the minimum dry season flow, but it 
is unlikely that this will be increased by the provision of storage 
reservoirs because there are no good reservoir sites on the plateau 
above the falls; such reservoirs as might be created would flood areas 
of agricultural and ecological importance and, being shallow, would 
suffer condiderable water loss through evaporation. 
Two plateau reservoirs do exist, behind the Itezhitezhi and 
Kafue dams, for the Kafue Gorge scheme although the annual river flow 
and the storage capacity required are considerably less than for schemes 
on the main Zambezi. The hydroelectric potential, in excess of the 
900 MW already installed, arises from the river's very rapid descent 
through a narrow gorge from the plateau to the Zambezi trough. In a 
distance of about 20 km the river falls 600 m. The tapping of this 
potential required the excavation of a 10 km long headrace tunnel and 
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Longitudinal profile of the Zambezi, Kafue (part) and Shire Rivers. 
Below the Victoria Falls, the main Zambezi flows to the sea in 
a series of troughs and gorges which cut a wide valley through the 
plateau. Dams built in these gorges provide the main potential for 
water storage and hydroelectric generation in the basin. 
At Kariba Gorge it was possible to produce a head of about 100 m 
by building a relatively short concrete dam thus flooding the Gwembe 
Trough with a man -made lake which, for a time, was the largest in the 
world. Underground power stations in each bank of the gorge provide 
a total installed capacity rated at 1266 MW with ultimate provision 
for a further 300 MW. 
The principle is the same at Cabora Bassa Gorge where a maximum 
head of over 120 m has been obtained by flooding the Chicoa Trough. 
The nominal installed capacity of the underground power station in 
the south bank is 2075 MW, but the original proposals included a plan 
for a similar station in the north bank. If implemented this would 
increase the total installed capacity to 3825 MW. 
Although the two most suitable gorges were exploited first a 
number of potential dam sites have been proposed both downstream of 
Cabora Bassa and along the Zambia /Zimbabwe border, where investigations 
are currently being made at three sites. At each the purpose of the 
dam would be to develop, simultaneously, a hydraulic head and a storage 
reservoir. 
Population densities in rural areas of the Zambezi basin are 
generally below 10 people /km2 except in Malawi. Transport and 
communications links in many of these areas are poor. The economic 
development of Zambia and Zimbabwe has been heavily concentrated 
along the railway and road which run from Harare (formerly Salisbury) 
south -west along the basin's watershed to Bulawayo, then north -west, 
through Wankie, to the Victoria Falls, where they cross the Zambezi, 
north -east to Lusaka and finally north to the Copperbelt. This transport 
route links the principal urban and industrial centres of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe as well as the Zambian copper mines, the coal mines aróund 
Wankie and the mining centres of the Zimbabwean Midlands. Downstream, 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































railway which connects Malawi with the port of Beira. Road and rail 
links between other parts of the basin are poorly developed. The 
majority of the rivers are not suitable for navigation and, consequently, 
the river system acts primarily as a barrier to communication. At 
present the Zambezi is bridged in four places from the Victoria Falls 
downstream: the rail and road bridge at Victoria Falls; the road bridge 
at Chirundu, which provides a shorter route between Lusaka and Harare; 
the road bridge at Tete which provides a link between Malawi and Harare, 
although this road has been unusable for much of the last ten years 
during periods of conflict; and the rail bridge at Mutarara on the 
line from Malawi to Beira. In addition, a new road bridge is currently 
nearing completion further downstream, at Caia. The road across the 
crest of Kariba Dam is also used for crossing the river although it 
involves a considerable detour from the direct route between Lusaka 
and Harare via the Chirundu bridge. The principal means of access to 
the basin are by road and rail from various ports in the RSA, from the 
Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo, from the Tanzanian port of Dar es 
Salaam and from the Angolan port of Benguela through Zaire, although 
this route has been closed for much of the last ten years. 
The development of primary electrical transmission networks has 
followed a similar pattern to that of transportation routes. A single 
330 kV a.c. transmission network links the principal power stations and 
load centres of Zambia and Zimbabwe. Developed initially to transport 
power from Kariba to the Zambian Copperbelt, and to other urban and 
industrial consumers in the two countries, the network has been expanded 
to include the hydroelectric schemes at Kafue and Victoria Falls, see 
Figure 4. There is also a link with the grid system which serves the 
Shaba Province in Zaire, although this link is now rarely used. Malawi 
has a separate 132 kV a.c. transmission network serving the southern half 
of the country including the new capital city of Lilongwe. Hydroelectric 
schemes on the Shire River provide a substantial part of the Malawian supply. 
Although power from Cabora Bassa is supplied primarily to the 
Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (Escom), by means of twin 
high voltage (± 533 kV) d.c. transmission lines, there is also a 220 kV 
a.c. transmission line linking the dam with the hydroelectric schemes 
on the Revus, which serve the city of Beira. In addition, a 220 kV 
a.c. transmission line is being built to link Cabora Bassa with 
various towns in northern Mozambique. 
The economy of Mozambique 
Accurate and up -to -date statistics on the economy of Mozambique 
are not readily available; the Government does not publish statistics 
on a regular basis and Mozambique is not a member of the IMF. The 
World Bank (1981), however, included the following statistics for 1979 
in its report on world development: 
Area: 783 x 103 km2; 
Population: 10.2 x 106 (life expectancy: 47 years); 
GDP: US $ 2.36 x 109 (approximately $250 per head of population); 
Distribution of production: 44% agriculture, 16% industry (9% 
manufacturing), 40% services; 
Mean annual growth in GDP: 1960 - 70, +4.6 %, 
1970 - 79, -2.9 %; 
Trade: no statistics given; 
Mean annual growth in trade 1970 - 79: Exports, -16.6% 
Imports, -14.4% 
According to the World Bank's statistics, the country's GDP per 
head of population placed it twentieth in rank of the world's poorest 
countries; the large annual drop in production form 1970 to 1979 was 
only exceeded by one country in the world (Angola), and the dramatic 
decline in trade, both exports and imports, was worse than that of any 
other country. It is not known how these figures were obtained or how 
accurate they are. The population figure is almost certainly too low 
as, according the preliminary results of the First National Census, the 
population of Mozambique, in 1980, was 12.1 million5. Nevertheless, 
the overall picture arising from these statistics, of a relatively poor 
economy which has suffered considerable disruption during the last decade, 
is valid. 
Two factors, in particular, have had considerable influence over 
the development of Mozambique's economy: its geographical location and 
its colonial history. Mozambique lies along the east coast of Africa, 
between latitudes 10° and 27° south, and has a coast line of over 2000 km. 
During its early colonial history Portuguese influence did not stretch 
far beyond the immediate vicinity of a number of important ports. As 
Portuguese influence increased in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the economy of the southern part of the country became shaped 
to the needs of South Africa, in particular, in the supply of migrant 
labour for the mines. The economic character of the centre and north 
of the country has been largely determined by chartered land companies, 
based on foreign capital, to which Portugal had granted access to the 
region's economic resources and had delegated administrative responsibility. 
Certain ports retained their importance being developed for the benefit 
of South Africa as well as Mozambique's land- locked neighbours. 
Transportation and labour supply subsequently retained their importance 
in the national economy as indicated by the high proportion of the GDP 
attributed to services in the 1979 statistics. 
When the land companies were displaced by direct administration, 
in the 1930s, the Portuguese authorities began to exert a more direct 
influence over the economy of Mozambique. The colony came to be regarded 
as an important source of raw materials for Portuguese industries in 
Europe as well as providing vast areas of potential agricultural land 
on which to settle umemployed European Portuguese. Thus, no attempt 
was made to create a balanced or self- sufficient economy in Mozambique. 
Historical factors, such as these, in combination with certain 
geographical features hinder Mozambique's development as an integrated 
economic unit. In particular, the dissection of the land by numerous 
east -flowing rivers and the location of the capital city, Maputo 
(formerly Lourenv Marques), at the extreme south of the country, have 
helped to create enormous economic, political and administrative 
problems for the post -independence government. Communications within 
the country are extremely poor with few of its principal centres of 
production linked directly by rail or tarred road. The construction 
of a trunk road running the full length of the country was begun 
before independence and has been continued as a priority project since 
but, because of the technical difficulties involved, including that of 
bridging the Zambezi and many smaller rivers, it is still not complete. 
Agriculture is of primary importance in both the monetary and 
non -monetary sectors of Mozambique's economy. The Portuguese authorities 
placed considerable emphasis on the expansion of commercial agriculture, 
particularly in the last decades of their administration. Their 
objectives were to provide raw materials for Portuguese industry 
(notably cotton), to produce goods for export, or for import substitution 
in Portugal, (such as cashew nuts, sugar, tea and copra) and to 
establish the conditions for a market economy in order to attract 
European settlers and to increase the pressure on the African population 
to relinquish its subsistence economy and provide the labour sought by 
colonial enterprise. In order to achieve these objectives, large 
plantations, estates and irrigated settlement schemes were established. 
The importance of these centres of production has been recognised since 
independence although their control and ownership has now largely been 
taken over by the State or by co- operative groups. There has also been 
an attempt by the authorities to stimulate the subsistence sector 
through the formation of aldeias comunais.* It is beyond the scope 
of the present work to discuss in detail many important aspects of the 
development of Mozambique's agricultural economy. Further details may 
be obtained from references6 regarding such questions as the social, 
political and environmental effects of colonial labour recruitment and 
forced cotton production; the role of agriculture during the struggle 
for independence; and the debate which has taken place since independence 
over the allocation of resources between large- scale, mechanized, 
state enterprises and small -scale, collective, rural development projects. 
The following selected statistics provide an outline of the 
characteristics of commerical agricultural production in Mozambique 
since 1960. According to estimates provided in successive FAO Yearbooks, 
the Portuguese authorities during the 1960s classified only 3% of 
Mozambique's land area as arable and 0.3% as being under permanent crops 
against 58% pasture and 25% forest. Only a small proportion of the 
country was, therefore, under intensive cultivation. Nevertheless 
agricultural production provided the country's principal source of 
export earnings. Total exports for 1961 and 1968 were recorded as 
2.7 x 106 contos and 4.5 x 106 contos respectively7 (US $ 95 x 106 
and US $ 155 x 106). In 1961, 77% of the total was provided by 
agricultural products 58% being provided from only four crops, cashew 
nuts, cotton, sugar and -tea8. In 1968 these figures had fallen to 65,, 
* Singular, aldeia comunal: communal village. 
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for the proportion of export earnings provided by all agricultural 
products, and 47% for the contribution from the four principal crops. 
The importance of agricultural production to trade immediately 
following independence changed very little. Of the country's total 
export revenue of 4.4 x 106 contos (US $ 170 x 106) recorded for 1976, 
53% was provided by the four agricultural crops listed above9. Official 
projections, at that time, of the expansion of Mozambique's exports 
indicate that the authorities foresaw the same four crops providing 
between 40% and 50% of export earnings throughout the following five 
years. 
Dependence on a limited range of agricultural products to provide 
such a large proportion of export revenue renders the national economy 
exceedingly vulnerable both to changes in output resulting from the 
effects of climatic changes (or attack by pests and disease) and to 
changes in the prices paid in world commodity markets over which countries 
such a Mozambique have little influence. 
Statistics about the extent of, and output from, subsistence 
agriculture are, at best, only approximate but the following figures 
10 
give some indication of the contrast between the commercial and subsistence 
sectors in Mozambique in 1967. The total area covered by each was 
approximately the same, 22000 km2, but whereas the subsistence sector 
comprised 1.5 x 106 units, with a mean area 1.4 ha, in the commercial 
sector there were only 4 x 103 units, with a mean area of cultivation 
of 520 ha. In the lower Zambezi basin the difference was even greater 
with commercial holdings averaging between 1000 and 1500 ha. 
Wuyts (1978) undertook a detailed study of the role of peasant 
production during the latter years of colonial rule. He concluded that, 
over the country as a whole, subsistence production accounted for 55% 
of agricultural output. Of the remaining 45 %, which was sold commercially, 
one third was also derived from peasant production, one third was 
produced on plantations and the final third was produced by other farms 
and estates owned by Europeans. On this basis, 70% of all agricultural 
output derives from peasant production. 
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Both in terms of total agricultural output and in terms of 
commercial production, the central region of Mozambique, Manica /Sofala 
Tete and Zambézia (a large part of which lies in the Zambezi Basin), 
is of considerable national importance. According to Wyuts, 
commercial output from this region in 1967 accounted for 57% of the 
national total although Tete Province contributed less than 3 %, to the 
region's agricultural revenue, the remainder being provided almost 
equally between the other two provinces. In Manica /Sofala and Zambézia 
the ratios between commercial output from peasant production and from 
plantation and other European -controlled production were amongst the 
lowest in the country, 10 to 20 %, whereas in Tete the peasants provided 
about half the commercial agricultural production. Such figures indicate 
the commercial importance, in the late 1960s, of agricultural production 
in the plantations of the floodplain and coastal regions of the Zambezi 
basin. They also indicate the relatively underdeveloped state of 
agricultural production in Tete Province. 
From general studies of agricultural potential, such as that of 
Gouveia (1969), based on investigations into physiography, climate, soils, 
natural vegetation, fauna and demography, the Zambezi basin provides 
the most diverse and some of the richest agricultural conditions of any 
region of similar size in Mozambique. Such studies support the widespread 
belief of previous Portuguese administrations as well as the casual 
observations of visitors to the region, including nineteenth century 
British explorers, that the Zambezi valley has a vast unexploited or 
underexploited agricultural potential. This belief had an important 
influence over the establishment of the MFPZ and over the type of project 
which it subsequently proposed. Recently it has prompted the renewed 
investigation of large -scale irrigation projects in the lower valley 
which is currently being carried out. 
Output from the industrial sector of Mozambique's economy is 
small relative to that from agriculture. Nevertheless, the characteristics 
of established industrial production have an important influence over the 
future development of the national economy. 
At the time of its independence, official statistics indicated 
that Mozambique had a relatively high level of industrial development 
compared to many other African countries. In 1973 the value of 
production from manufacturing industry placed it within the top eight 
most industrialized countries in Africa11. Furthermore, production 
was predominantly directed towards the domestic market with only about 
one third being exported. This pattern had been established only towards 
the end of the colonial era. According to Torp (1979), the structure 
of the Mozambican economy had changed from that at the end of last 
century when it had been dominated by non -Portuguese companies geared, 
almost exclusively, to exports. New industries had been gradually 
introduced to meet the needs of Portuguese settlers although it was 
not until about 1960, at the start of a rapid phase of industrial growth, 
that the export orientation was finally overtaken by the expanding 
production of domestic consumption goods. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to provide a detailed analysis of the various industrial sectors 
which were created but a general picture of the size and relative 
importance of the different sectors may be obtained from a study of 
employment statistics (for 1962, 1969 and 1973) and gross output 
statistics (for 1973) presented in Table 2. These figures indicate 
that agriculturally based industries (food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, 
leather goods), accounted for over half of the gross output from 
manufacturing. Nevertheless, a range of other industries was being 
created which, at first sight, appear to offer a good basis for balanced 
industrial development in the future. These include fertilizer production, 
cement, vehicle and machine assembly and repair, metal fabrications, 
furniture making and tyre manufacture. 
Following independence the shortcomings of this industrial base 
became increasingly apparent. Apart from food, cotton and other 
agricultural processing units, industries are heavily concentrated 
around Maputo and, to a lesser extent, Beira. The resulting 
concentration of the skilled workforce, the relatively advanced infra- 
structure development of these regions, and the difficulties in 
transporting the final and intermediate products to other parts of the 
country provide major obstacles to achieving regionally balanced industrial 
production. Even within the present industrial zones, however, integration 
of the different production units is poor. Many are totally dependent 
on the import of certain key inputs or spare parts for machinery with 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































since independence, have frequently resulted in lost production. 
The most traumatic effect on Mozambique's industry was, however, 
the departure of Portuguese personnel during the transition to 
independence. Within a very short period industries lost not only their 
managerial and technical staff but also many of their skilled workers. 
(In addition, before their departure, many adopted a policy of 
mismanagement or, in some cases, the deliberate removal and sabotage of 
capital equipment12). Serious inadequacies in Portugal's educational 
provision for African children left few Mozambicans equipped to fill 
the positions left vacant by the fleeing Portuguese. 
The political and economic policies of the Mozambican Government 
The Frelimo Party, which had its origins in 1962 in a broadly 
based amalgamation of three political groups enabling Mozambicans to 
unite in armed opposition to Portuguese colonialism has evolved into 
a vanguard party adopting the ideology and theories of scientific 
socialism13. The party continues to lay great emphasis on the unity of 
all Mozambicans, workers and peasants, whatever their race, culture or 
creed, and on the continuing revolutionary struggle against all forces 
of oppression and exploitation in whatever form they may appear. Such 
ideals are repeated frequently in major speeches. For example, in his 
Independence Day speech on 25 June 1980 President Samora Machel said: 
We are engaged in the struggle to build socialism because we 
know that socialism is synonymous with happiness, well- being, 
justice, progress and peace. We want to build socialism because 
we want to free outselves for ever from injustice, exploitation, 
hunger, lack of clothing, misery, illness and ignorance14. 
Faced with the enormous problems of underdevelopment which affect the 
bulk of the population Frelimo has imposed centralized control over the 
development of the economy in an attempt to ensure a just and efficient 
use of available resourses15. At the same time it has attempted to 
stimulate the creative initiative of the population through education 
and the spreading of co- operative ideals in order that the vast untapped 
human resources of the country might be developed16. The formation of 
local dynamising groups17 during the period of transition to independence 
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and the emphasis which has been placed on co- operative production and 
marketing are examples of practical attempts to increase popular 
participation. Nevertheless, because of the need to rebuild the 
disrupted economy, the Government has encouraged enterprises based 
on private and external capital to continue operating in Mozambique 
provided they do not violate Frelimo's economic and political 
policies. In practice, however, capitalist goals have often proved 
irreconcilable with these policies and state intervention has ensued. 
In the short -term the economic objectives of the Government 
have been stated as follows: 
Let us reach 1990 with a developed industry, with primary 
industry in operation and with agriculture relatively mechanized. 
By 1990 the problems of food, clothing, shoes, unemployment, 
illiteracy, the endemic diseases which decimate our People, have 
to be resolved and conquered18. 
The application of these policies, particularly in the agricultural 
and industrial sectors, and their implications for the development of 
the Zambezi 'valley are discussed below. 
Mozambique's agricultural policies have been chosen to fulfil both 
political and economic objectives. Three major objectives, which are 
primarily economic, have been set out as follows: to produce sufficient 
food to feed the rural population and provide a surplus in order to 
supply urban areas with maize, groundnuts, rice, vegetables, fruit, 
meat and eggs; to provide raw materials for manufacturing industry, 
including oils, cashew nuts, textiles, meat and vegetable derivatives 
and fruit juices; and to provide export revenue19. The specific economic 
objectives defined for the period 1977 - 80 were: to guarantee the supply 
of the principal agricultural products in order to reduce imports; to 
improve the diet of the population (including greater crop diversity); and 
to give special attention to supplying food to urban areas; and to re- 
establish production at the highest pre- independence levels to provide 
both export revenue and the products necessary as inputs to established 
industrial units in the country20. As a first step in realizing these 
objectives the Government took over the farms abandoned by Portuguese 
settlers who had fled the country at the time of independence. The 
establishment of state farms was seen as the quickest way to re- establish 
output. At the same time it was hoped that, in Future, these farms would 
become centres for research and places where training and education in 
agricultural techniques could take place. 
The creation of state farms was also designed to serve the 
Government's political objectives, particularly in providing a base for 
the creation of an organized and politically educated rural proletariat. 
However, at present, state farms affect only a small proportion of the 
rural population the majority of whom remain as peasant producers. The 
Government's political policies for the subsistence sector envisage its 
transformation by collectivization and the formation of communal 
villages. Collectivization, it is believed, will lead to peasant 
control over production and, eventually, to the socialization of 
agriculture. It will also enable surpluses to be generated which can 
be invested in machinery. In the long -term, it is believed that this 
will lead to the 'industrialization' of rural areas through the formation 
of agro- industrial complexes which will reduce the differences between 
the rural and urban populations21. The strategy was summarized by 
Samora Machel as follows: 
Our agricultural development is founded on small and large 
projects, on small and large endeavours. Our development is 
based above all in the organization and mobilization of the 
peasants, in the correct organization and mobilization of the 
agricultural workers, in the development of their scientific 
understanding and skills, in their identification with the 
mentality of the working class22. 
In their practical application, Frelimo's economic and political 
policies in the agricultural sector have led to ambiguities and conflicts. 
To develop a rural working class the Government has sought rapid 
mechanization but, with the country's present lack of human skills and 
financial resources, this has involved heavy dependence on foreign 
capital and skills thus reducing the control which Mozambicans have over 
their economy. At the same time the authorities have had to direct their 
limited resources into selected projects which, of necessity, benefit 
only a small proportion of the population. Thus, new inequalities are 
created. The Government has attempted to reduce these problems through 
collectivization which prevents local inequalities and gives the rural 
population greater control over their means of production. Such a 
course, however, leads to very slow growth in agricultural output and 
so does little to reduce wider inequalities. Finally, conflicts exist in 
the allocation of resources between the three aspects of Frelimo's 
economic policy for agriculture: food production, supply of industrial 
inputs and production of export commodities. 
With its present resources the Government can do little to resolve 
such conflicts. Its initial response has been to re- establish production 
as it was under Portuguese rule but under the control of new political 
and organizational structures designed to increase worker participation. 
In allocating money for new projects an attempt has been made to benefit 
all sectors - family units, collective units and mechanized state farms - 
although the large- scale, mechanized projects appear, up until now, to 
have received the major share. As with the previous Portuguese 
administration, lack of resources has not prevented the Government from 
authorizing a number of detailed surveys of the country's natural resources 
and agricultural potential. These have resulted in outline plans for a 
number of projects many of which are well beyond the country's present 
capabilities. 
Torp (1979) has interpreted Frelimo's policies regarding industrial 
development as follows: 
In brief, FRELIMO's objectives in the industrial sector, during 
the first three years of independence, have been on the one hand 
to create the basis of socialist relations of production, directed 
by the state and led by the workers, and on the other hand to 
increase the production of consumption goods, means of production 
for the agricultural sector and export earnings. (p30) 
Within the framework of these objectives the Government's initial aim has 
been to provide adequate food, clothing and housing for the people; the 
production of so- called 'basic needs'. Clearly, the achievement of this 
aim depends largely on successful agricultural development as indicated 
above. In the long -term, however, it is hoped that industry will make 
its own contribution to Mozambique's development, enabling a fairer 
distribution of resources through the implementation of industrial 
projects in such areas as the hitherto neglected region north of the 
Zambezi. In addition it is hoped that industrialization will transform 
the country's external trade, by making Mozambique more self -sufficient 
in consumer goods, and that it will bring revenue which will enable the 
Government to pay for new development projects. 
As with agricultural policies, conflicts have arisen in their 
application as a direct result of the limited resources at the 
Government's disposal. One of the principal areas of debate has 
been how far the authorities should promote grandes projectos (large 
projects) which require large initial capital inputs and large numbers 
of foreign technicians as opposed to alternatives such as small industrial 
units, simple technologies and rural workshops. As far as one can tell 
at present, an attempt is being made to promote the two approaches 
simultaneously although, as with agriculture, the large projects appear 
to be receiving a larger share of the available resources. 
Some of the industrial plans which have received the closest 
attention have been as follows: textile mills at various locations, 
including Manica, Mocuba, Namupla, Cuamba, Montepuez and Pemba; a 
paper mill near Chimoio; industries around Beira including heavy vehicles, 
pharmaceuticals, furniture and, possibly, steel production based on the 
iron ore deposits at Honda; petro- chemical industries, including fertilizer.: 
production from the natural gas field south of Beira; cement and other 
chemical industries at Nacala; light industries including shoes and 
clothes; and numerous processing units based on agriculture and 
fisheries. In addition, development of the coal at Moatize and the 
pegmatite minerals of Alto Molócué, the smelting of aluminium at Caia, 
electrification of the railways and agro- industries assocaited with 
extensive irrigation developments, particularly in the Zambezi and Revus' 
basins, have all been proposed23. The co- ordination of development between 
the SADCC countries may, in future, add a new factor in the formulation 
on industrialization policies in Mozambique. 
As regards the present study, policy decisions, such as those 
described above for the agricultural and industrial sectors, will have a 
major influence over water resources development in the Zambezi valley. 
In particular, the extent to which large -scale irrigation is promoted 
will influence decisions concerning the operation of the Cabora Bassa Dam 
and the allocation of surface water resources. In addition the distribution 
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and growth of heavy industry will be closely related to the supply of 
electrical energy and will, therefore, influence decisions concerning 
the design of Mozambique's electrical transmission networks and its 
future energy sources, including the proposed North Bank Power Station 
at Cabora Bassa. 
International aspects of water resources engineering in the Zambezi basin 
The political sub -division of the Zambezi basin, described above, 
leads to international problems in the planning and operation of all 
major river regulation projects. The Kariba Project lies on the stretch 
of river which forms the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. Co- operation 
between the two Governments has been necessary for the operation of 
Kariba and will be necessary for any future hydroelectric project along 
that stretch of the Zambezi. At present Angola has no major river 
regulation works within its part of the catchment and, therefore, has 
very little direct influence over the hydrology of the Kariba Project 
although the operation of the dam has been made more difficult since 
Angola ceased to supply upstream hydrological information. 
For Mozambique, by contrast, international problems concerning 
other basin states arise primarily from the upstream regulation of river 
flows. In particular, discharges from the Kariba Dam have a considerable 
influence over the inflows to Lake Cabora Bassa. Also, downstream of 
Cabora Bassa, Malawi and Zimbabwe have considerable influence over 
the discharges of two of the largest tributaries, the Shire and the 
Luenha /Mazoe. Within Mozambique this problem is not unique to the 
Zambezi basin. On the basis of inforrnation,obtained from Servicos 
Hidráulicos (1972) over 30% of the area of Mozambique lies within 
international river basins whose major part is beyond the country's 
borders. Apart from the Zambezi, these basins include the Maputo, 
Incomati, Umbeluzi, Limpopo and Save which provide some of the country's 
most important urban and agricultural water supplies. Adding the Rovuma 
to this list, since its channel forms the border with Tanzania, although 
only 35% of its catchment is outside Mozambique, increases to approximately 
45% the proportion of the country covered by basins in which Mozambique's 
activities are significantly influenced by international factors. 
Nevertheless, the former Portuguese administrators obtained no formal 
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treaties with the authorities in neighbouring countries over the 
regulation of these basins. The only treaty which they concluded 
with reference to the Zambezi basin was one signed in 1881 with the 
United Kingdom which opened the Zambezi, the Shire and their tributaries 
to navigation under all flags24. More recently, Moreno (1967) noted 
that Portugal was seeking to establish agreements with upstream basin 
states with a view to improved utilization of the water of Mozambique's 
international basins. However, no formal agreements were reached. 
The one notable attempt to obtain international agreement over 
the regulation of the Zambezi arose from a British initiative which 
resulted in a conference, in 1950, between technical representatives 
of the principal basin states, to discuss the implications of the 
proposed Kariba Dam (see Chapter 2). Suspicious of British intentions, 
Portugal's politicians appear to have resisted efforts to enter 
diplomatic, rather than simply technical, discussions and to have rejected 
the idea of establishing some form of Zambezi River Authority. Once the 
Kariba Project had been implemented, the former colonial authorities in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia also lost interest in wider international co- operation 
although a joint power company (later to become the Central African. Power 
Corporation) was established between them to operate the Kariba Dam and 
the high voltage transmission lines to the load centres in the two 
countries. Co- operation between these two countries in the generation 
and supply of electrical power continued throughout the years preceding 
Zimbabwe's independence despite political and practical difficulties, 
which arose from the imposition of international economic sanctions on 
the white Rhodesian government, and the increasing armed conflict occuring 
within and around that country. Since Zimbabwe's indepedence considerable 
interest has been shown in further co- operation between the two countries 
on new hydroelectric projects which have been proposed on the Zambezi 
along their common border. But, so far, no attempt has been made to 
involve Angola and Mozambique in the planning of these or other projects. 
To a large extent this is unnecessary as far as Mozambique is concerned 
since additional upstream regulation at new hydroelectric projects would 
probably bring net benefits for both power production and flood control 
at Cabora Bassa. Increased evaporation losses from new storage reservoirs 
would not, at present, be critical to Cabora Bassa's operation without a 
massive increase in water consumption upstream. This could only arise 
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in the unlikely event of Zambia or Zimbabwe undertaking vast irrigation 
projects or effecting large inter -basin water transfers. Nevertheless, 
Cabora Bassa's output cannot be optimized without constant exchange of 
data and operating information with projects upstream. 
The operation of the Cabora Bassa Project introduces other problems 
of an international nature amongst which the agreement to sell electrical 
energy to the RSA is of particular significance to the present study. 
The implications of this agreement are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
The Cabora Bassa power agreement was only one aspect of the heavy 
dependence of the Mozambican economy on the RSA at the time of independence. 
Other aspects included transportation and trading links as well as labour 
migration to South African mines. With the Cabora Bassa Project, as 
with many other aspects of their dependence on the RSA, the authorities 
in Mozambique have very little ability to influence the relationship. 
Attempts by Mozambique to sever its links with the RSA would cause 
considerably more damage to the economy of Mozambique than to that of 
South Africa. As Olivier (1975) argued in reference to Cabora Bassa: 
The dam will not be used as a weapon against South Africa in 
the same way that the Arabs have used their oil. Who else 
would buy the power? The choice of market is limited and the 
income is vital for the future development of the project. 
(p143) 
He might also have added that, whereas the electricity grid of the 
Electricity Supply Commission of the RSA (Escom) is now so large that 
loss of supply from Cabora Bassa would cause only minor disruption, the 
supply to Mozambique's capital, Maputo, a large proportion of which, 
'comes from Cabora Bassa' via the Escom grid, would be severely 
disrupted if the RSA retaliated by cutting that link. 
For a number of years certain prominent white South Africans 
have emphasized the advantages to the apartheid regime of increasing the 
economic dependence of neighbouring states on the RSA. The established 
system of rail and road transport already serves that end. The creation 
of an inter -connected electricity supply system in southern Africa would 
increase dependence. Norman (1969) predicted that: 
the 1980s may well see a completely inter -connected system 
in southern Africa using the latest technology regarding 
high voltage a.c. and d.c. links and large conventional, 
nuclear and hydro- electric power stations. (p19) 
Olivier became a leading advocate of such a system which would be capable 
of bringing cheap hydroelectric power from as far away as the Inga 
Project, in Zaire, to the power- hungry mines and industry of the RSA. 
In an address delivered in 1973 he demonstrated, convincingly, the 
benefits to the RSA of such an arrangement but was less convincing in 
his analysis of the benefits to the countries in which the projects 
would be sited despite assuring his audience that: 
history has shown how durable are the ties between nations 
which are connected by an electrical transmission grid which 
could be used to export and import power as may be required 
thus optimizing the economic benefits for all parties. 
Olivier entitled subsequent elaborations of these proposals, whose primary 
effect would be to strengthen the apartheid system, as 'engineering for 
peace'25 and 'engineering for detente'26. 
In an attempt to weaken their dependence on the RSA, by greater 
interdependence amongst themselves, the Heads of State of the nine 
'front line' states, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, together with representatives 
from Namibia, met in Lusaka in April 1980 and committed themselves to 
co- ordinate their development planning as proposed at the first SADCC 
Conference in Arusha in July 1979. Initially, priority was given to 
seeking international financial aid for selected projects which would 
help to free the countries from their dependence on the transport system 
of the RSA. However, it is intended that greater co- operation will in 
future be achieved in all aspects of their economic activity. SADCC 
may, therefore, among other things provide a forum in which problems 
associated with the management of international basins, such as that of the 
Zambezi, could be resolved and in which regional co- operation in planning 
the supply and consumption of electrical energy could be achieved. 
Finally, Portugal's involvement in supervising the repayment of 
the capital invested in the Cabora Bassa Project provides an additional 
international dimension to the regulation of the Zambezi. Portugal 
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acts through the agency of Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa (HCB), a 
Portuguese registered company responsible not only for managing the 
financial repayments but also, through a lease arrangement, for the 
entire physical operation and maintenance of the project. HCB, therefore, 
has an important influence over the benefits which Mozambique might 
obtain from the project. The fact that the company is based in Lisbon 
and that it is in Lisbon that all decisions concerning the project are 
taken, including day -to -day decisions concerning its hydrological 
operation, is a matter of concern in Mozambique: 
We do not accept that decisions concerning Mozambique should 
be taken outside Mozambique27. 
Administrative constraints on water resources planning in the lower Zambezi 
As an administrative unit the Zambezi valley in Mozambique has had 
a varied history. By the mid -fifteenth century, before the arrival of 
Portuguese settlers, the powerful Mutapa empire had extended its authority 
over a large area including the whole of the Zambezi valley south of the 
river as far upstream as Kariba Gorge. As the Mutapa's authority declined 
Portuguese settlers were gradually able to assume jurisdiction over tracts 
of land and to control trading fairs. Since their numbers were relatively 
small and since many subsequently inter -married and rejected Portuguese 
authority, setting up African -style kingdoms, the Portuguese State was 
not able to fully assert its dominance in the region until the early 
twentieth century. Nevertheless, Portugal regarded the lower Zambezi as 
lying under its fiscal administration. During the seventeenth century 
it was administered as a single region under the supervision of Goa. 
Thereafter, it was placed under the supervision of Ilha de Mozambique 
but with a considerable degree of autonomy. In the nineteenth century 
various attempts were made to sub -divide the region including the 
separation from it of the area lying in present -day Zambézia and, at one 
time, the granting of separate status to the region around Zumbo in an 
attempt to extend Portuguese claims of jurisdiction upstream of the 
Luangwa confluence. By the beginning of the twentieth century the present 
administrative divisions of the lower Zambezi into Provinces had been 
more -or -less determined. With the establishment of the Missáo de Fomento 
e Povoamento do Zambeze (MFPZ) by the Portuguese authorities, in 1956, the 
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lower Zambezi basin was once more treated as a single unit although 
the MFPZ's terms of reference were, at that stage, limited to the work 
of investigation and planning. Later the MFPZ was reformed and given 
executive authority over the implementation of the Cabora Bassa Project 
and its ancillary works, including the resettlement of those displaced 
by the reservoir. Following independence, the Mozambican Government 
disbanded this body and assumed the responsibility for planning in the 
Zambezi valley within the national planning agency. The activities 
of HCB, formed to operate the Cabora Bassa Project, were placed under 
the scrutiny of other central government agencies. 
In its early stages, parallels were drawn between the MFPZ and 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the USA. From comparison of the 
details of the TVA, discussed in Chapter 1, with the description of the 
MFPZ, given in Chapter 2, it is apparent that the two cases were very 
different. The MFPZ operated in only a small part (11 %) of the Zambezi 
basin; this region lacks many of the physical and economic features 
which contributed to the TVA's success; politically, there were considerable 
differences between the TVA's ideals of democracy and the plans of the 
MFPZ which were designed to support a colonial economy, and to benefit the 
mainly white 'civilized' settlers who would be introduced to the region 
rather than to benefit the existing population; and, finally, the MFPZ 
had no guaranteed source of finance nor did it have executive authority 
to implement its proposals. Only in its adoption of a unified approach 
to natural resources development was the MFPZ similar to the TVA. The 
MFPZ, in fact, showed closer similarity to the river basin planning 
commissions,also referred to in Chapter 1, which were set up in the USA 
to produce co- ordinated development plans for such basins as the 
Columbia than to the TVA. Like these commissions, once the plans were 
produced it rested with central government or private enterprise to 
determine whether a particular project would be implemented. On the 
lower Zambezi one project took precedence over all others - the Cabora 
Bassa Dam. Politicians in Lisbon finally agreed to give this project 
their support but, in order to attract Western and South African finance, 
the details of the original plans were modified in order to increase 
economic returns. The result was that the final installation was less 
adaptable to the multiple purpose operation envisaged by Portuguese engineers 
and more suitable to meet the single purpose objective of supplying power 
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to the RSA. 
The idea of river basin planning and administration has not 
been widely canvassed in Mozambique since independence. A National 
Water Plan28 prepared for the period 1977 -2000 undertook analyses of 
irrigation, flood control and hydroelectricity over the country as a 
whole without reference to the integrated development of separate 
river basins. Planning and administration appear to be undertaken 
at a national level or within established political regions. However, 
the establishment of a State Secretariat for the Planning of Accelerated 
Development of Irrigation in the Limpopo and Incomati Valleys29, by 
Presidential Decree in October 1979, indicated that, in this case, the 
Government recognized the importance of adopting a new, geographically 
defined, region. Nevertheless, in rural development, the authorities 
have adopted a 'vertical' approach to planning as regards their aldeias 
comunais programme. The programme, planned and co- ordinated from 
Maputo, is an attempt to achieve homogeneous development in which no 
area is given priority. This approach is criticized by Friedmann (1980) 
mainly on the grounds of Mozambique's shortage of resources and skilled 
personnel. He proposed, instead, a decentralized, territorial approach 
to rural development with resources concentrated in key centres. 
However, he did not consider river basins as possible planning or 
administrative regions. 
Effective management of the resources of Mozambique is at present 
restricted by the lack of effective co- ordination between different 
government agencies. The national planning agency co- ordinates matters 
related to the planning of the national economy but detailed planning 
of individual projects is undertaken by separate government agencies. 
In the case of the lower Zambezi the lack of a co- ordinating body, for 
such matters as physical planning and project operation, was seen as an 
obstacle to co- ordinated development at the time of the writer's visit 
to Mozambique in 1979/80. At that time, HCB's operation of the Cabora 
Bassa Dam was monitored primarily by the Direcç o Nacional de Energia, 
which was concerned with the project's power output and with energy 
planning in the region. The Direcÿáo Nacional de Aguas (DNA)* was 
* National Water Directorate 
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engaged in studies of flood alleviation and flood warning downstream of 
the dam, and with the exchange of hydrological information with HCB. 
The Ministery of Agriculture was involved in the planning of agricultural 
production and, in particular, in studying proposals for large -scale 
irrigation projects on the alluvial plain. Other government agencies were 
concerned with fisheries production and possible weed infestation in 
Cabora Bassa Lake. Finally, the managers of the sugar estates at 
Marromeu and Luabo, the ferry operators and bridge builders at Caia and 
the authorities in the municipalities along the river were all concerned 
with rapid changes in river level arising from changes in the rates of 
discharge from the dam. Since no agency was in a position to fully 
assimilate and respond to the often conflicting demands of the parties 
involved (although HCB had apparently attempted to assume that position), 
it was not possible either to achieve efficient management of the region 
or to ensure that HCB would not use the conflicts and ambiguities to its 
own advantage. 
In studying water resources planning it is particularly important 
to consider the time horizon in which different agencies are working. For 
its first years of independence the Mozambican authorities have had to 
concentrate on solving many immediate problems not least of which being 
those associated with ensuring national security. In such circumstances 
long -term questions, including the potential problems of resource depletion 
and environmental degradation, could not be given adequate consideration. 
Even the preparation of national economic five -year plans has presented 
difficulties. 
The Mozambican authorities face particular constraints on their 
ability to choose the form of water resources planning and administration 
which they will adopt and the relative priorities which they will place 
on long -term and short -term considerations. These constraints, as 
discussed below, arise from the lack of adequate data and information 
and the lack of qualified personnel. 
Prior to 1950, the Portuguese administrators did relatively little 
to obtain hydrological, meteorological and topographical data and other 
information relevant to the development of natural resources over large 
areas of Mozambique. Thereafter, the establishment of recording stations 
was given higher priority with the result that the network of stations 
were relatively well developed by the time of independence30. Nevertheless, 
many of the stations had such short series records that they were of little 
practical value. The need for, and cost of, establishing and maintaining 
an adequate network of hydrological stations in respect of the operation 
of the Kariba Project was considered in the discussion of the paper by 
Reeve and Edmonds (1965). Such a system is necessary for the purposes 
of both planning and operating water resources projects. In the lower 
Zambezi basin many hydrological stations fell into disuse during the 
armed conflict preceding independence and others were subsequently 
neglected because the departure of Portuguese personnel left few qualified 
hydrometrists in the country. 
Even the existence of a large number of records is of limited value 
without detailed studies of their accuracy and validity, particularly 
in the many instances in which records exist only for short or intermittent 
periods. For the lower Zambezi, studies of statistical data were included 
in the investigations of the MFPZ and published in the Plano Geral. Similar 
Planos Gerais were also prepared for other river basins in Mozambique. 
Because of their present importance as the primary sources of information 
for water resources planning careful consideration of the quality of these 
reports is desirable. Some reservations about the technical quality of 
parts of the MFPZ's work and about the applicability of its proposals to 
the present situation in Mozambique are expressed in this thesis. Such 
conclusions serve to indicate the extent of the problem, now facing 
Mozambique, in obtaining reliable data and information and in the 
interpretation of this information for water resources planning. 
The preparation for, and implementation and operation of, large - 
scale water resources projects or integrated river basin development 
plans demands considerable technical and administrative resources, 
including large numbers of suitably qualified personnel. The lack of 
qualified personnel at all levels in Mozambique, following the exodus 
of Portuguese nationals at independence, has been identified as one of 
the country's most acute problems. Portuguese personnel had filled not 
only the top administrative and technical positions in Mozambique but 
also the majority of the positions requiring artisan or clerical skills. 
This, together with the lack of educational opportunities available to the 
majority of the black population, prevented many Mozambicans from gaining 
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the necessary education and training to take over these positions*. 
The implications in terms of water management policies are considerable. 
On the one hand, strong emphasis has been placed on the training of 
Mozambicans (see the conditions stipulated in Appendix 5 for the North 
Bank Power Station). On the other hand, in the short -term, attempts 
are being made to limit the demand for qualified Mozambicans by using 
foreign advisors and consultants. As a result increasing emphasis is 
being placed on large single -purpose projects which can be built with 
foreign technicians and operated with small numbers of highly specialized 
personnel. The impossibility of providing a sufficient number of 
qualified Mozambicans to staff an integrated river basin development 
programme may be seen from a study of the large number of staff 
employed by the MPFZ. In 1968 the agency, as well as making considerable 
use of the consultants Hidrotechnica Portuguesa, employed its own technical 
staff of 115 of whom 32 were graduates31. Nevertheless, even the MPFZ, 
in its early years, had had problems obtaining suitably qualified staff. 
Even in 1958, after publication of Relatório Preliminar, only about one 
half of the higher technical posts were filled. In addition, of the six 
hydrometrists then employed only one had previous experience of the work, 
whilst none of the engineers had practical experience in hydrology32. 
Inadequate information and data together with shortages of skilled 
personnel make it extremely difficult for the authorities in Mozambique 
to utilize the techniques of mathematical modelling and systems analysis, 
which are currently being applied elsewhere to improve efficiency in 
water resource planning and the operation of multiple purpose reservoir 
projects. 
Outline of the thesis 
The literature survey of Chapter 1 gives some indication of how 
broad a field of study water resources engineering has become. Inevitably 
the scope of the present thesis has had to be restricted although in the 
initial investigations material from a wide variety of discipline sources 
was consulted in order to identify the more important factors which govern 
* Subjective estimates of the number of Mozambican graduate engineers, 
of all types, remaining in the country after independence suggest that 
the total may have been no more than twenty. 
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the alternatives available to Mozambique in the management of the lower 
Zambezi. The principal purpose of the thesis has not been to consider 
whether the Cabora Bassa Dam should have been built nor to undertake 
a definitive post -audit of its costs and benefits, for which there is 
at present too little information available, but to consider the 
implications for Mozambique of the operation of the project as it now 
stands, and, further, to consider the possible implications of attempting 
to modify its operation or to undertake further projects in the valley. 
It is clear that the operation of the Cabora Bassa Dam poses many 
problems for the Mozambican authorities. As Leonard (1974) predicted 
following the coup in Lisbon which preceded Mozambique's independence: 
Cabora Bassa ... may be an important resource for liberated 
Mozambique, but it is one that poses problems and challenges 
and it cannot be viewed simply as an intrinsic asset. (p41) 
More recently in a journalistic account of the project by Gunnell (1980) 
the implication that the Cabora Bassa Project is, at present, more of 
a liability than an asset was conveyed in the blunt question of her title: 
'When will Cabora Bassa benefit Mozambique ?' 
In order to achieve a more objective analysis it has been necessary 
to consider in detail certain technical aspects of the project's operation 
and to evaluate its social and environmental effects. These questions 
form the basis of separate chapters of the thesis. Questions related 
to the political and administrative aspects of water resources 
engineering in the lower Zambezi, discussed above, are not included 
in separate chapters but are considered throughout the thesis wherever 
relevant. In addition, discussion of these aspects is drawn together 
in the Summary and Conclusions. Throughout the thesis particular 
attention is paid to the possible implications of a north bank power 
station, at Cabora Bassa, in view of recent indications that the 
authorities in Mozambique intend to proceed with such a project. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis provides a broad review of the literature 
on water resources engineering. Special attention is paid to studies 
of the TVA and to relevant case studies from around the world and, in 
particular, from sub- Saharan Africa. 
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Much of Chapter 2 is devoted to discussion of the historical 
background of the Cabora Bassa Project together with that of other water 
resources developments both in the lower Zambezi and further upstream. 
In addition, the chapter provides an introduction to the more important 
technical, social, political, economic and environmental characteristics 
of these developments. 
Chapter 3 is a detailed discussion of the hydrology of the Zambezi 
and the operation of the Cabora Bassa Dam. The results from previous 
hydrological studies and the quality of available hydrological data are 
examined. Results from some original hydrological calculations are also 
included. The principal objectives are to identify conflicts and trade- 
offs which would result from operation of the Cabora Bassa Dam as a 
multiple purpose project, to examine the range of possible operating 
alternatives available to the authorities under different assumptions 
about the physical and operational constraints on the reservoir system, 
and to determine the sensitivity of predicted results to hydrological 
variations or to errors arising from the inadequacy of the original data. 
Chapter 4 is an examination of the role of mining and industry 
in plans for the economic development of the Zambezi valley and of the 
influence of river regulation on these proposals. Particular attention 
is paid to the pattern of electrical power consumption in Mozambique, 
in the RSA and in other neighbouring countries. This is related to 
present arrangements for the financing of the project, including the 
contractual agreement to sell power to the RSA. The implications for the 
hydraulic operation of Cabora Bassa Dam of the present power contract, 
together with the economic and operational implications of possible 
changes in the arrangements for power generation and supply are also 
considered. 
Chapter 5 is a broad review of the available information on soil 
erosion, sediment transport and reservoir siltation in the Zambezi 
basin. Comparisons are made between estimates of the siltation rates 
for Lakes Kariba and Cabora Bassa and predictions are made as to how soon, 
and in what way, siltation in Lake Cabora Bassa will affect the project's 
operation. In addition, the influence of Cabora Bassa Dam on sediment 
transport downstream and its possible effect on floodplain agriculture 
and river navigation are discussed. Original results obtained from 
the analysis of a limited number of sediment samples are incorporated 
in this part of study. 
Chapter 6 is an investigation of the social and environmental 
effects of the Cabora Bassa Project using the results of a limited 
number of direct investigations which have been published and supported 
by comparisons with observations recorded from the effects of other 
projects, including Kariba. Here the principal objectives are to 
examine the changes which might result from adopting different operating 
procedures for the project, to predict the impact of any new projects 
which might be undertaken and to identify ways in which harmful effects 
resulting from the existing project, or from future projects, might be 
reduced. 
Principal Sources 
The broad scope of the thesis, mentioned above, has required that 
material be drawn from a wide variety of sources. It is not possible to 
review all of these in detail in this introduction but the prinicpal ones 
are discussed below. Other material is referred to in the Notes and 
References in the text. 
Sherlock (1963) has provided a short bibliography of historical 
and non -technical references for the Zambezi up to the time of construction 
of the Kariba Dam. This proved useful in the preparation of Chapter 2 
as few other researchers have treated the basin as a whole. Material 
has, however, been drawn from geographical and historical studies of 
separate basin states. 
Amongst general works on Mozambique that of the Centre of African 
Studies, of the University of Edinburgh, (1978) is of particular value 
comprising, as it does, papers on the colonial history of Mozambique and 
on its post- independence economic and political development. An extensive 
bibliography, prepared by Chris Allen, of publications in languages other 
than Portuguese for the period since 1920 is also included. 
The pre- independence history of Mozambique has been recorded in 
various English language publications including those of Duffy (1961 
and 1962), Chilcote (1967), Henriksen (1978), and Newitt (1978 and 
1981). The part of the Zambezi basin lying in present -day Mozambique 
is an area to which particular attention has been paid because of the 
important role of the prazos and, later, the plantation companies in 
its development. The following works were of value in the preparation 
of the material for Chapter 2: Head (1978), Isaacman (1972 and 1976), 
Ishemo (1978), Newitt (1969 and 1973) and Vail and White (1980). 
The most significant study of the Cabora Bassa Project published to 
date is that of Middlemas (1975). As a source of factual information and 
as an account of the sequence of events leading to the dam's construction 
this work has proved invaluable for the present study. As a historical 
work its principal importance lies in Middlemas's ability to draw on the 
texts of numerous personal interviews which he undertook with the main 
participants although this has led to strong emphasis being placed on 
individual, subjective interpretations of events. His analysis of the 
personal and political factors which shaped the construction consortium 
provides a case study of particular interest to students of large 
international civil engineering construction projects. Middlemas does 
not, however, undertake a detailed discussion of the costs and benefits 
of the project nor does he foresee many of the problems of the project's 
operation posed for the new Government of Mozambique following 
independence. 
Possibly the broadest analysis which has been attempted of the costs 
and benefits of the project is that contained in a short pre -impoundent 
study by Hall and Davies (1974). Being written by natural scientists, 
the paper places considerable emphasis on predictions about the 
environmental consequences of the dam. Possible social and economic 
issues are also referred to but political questions are largely neglected. 
Furthermore, the paper contains no detailed discussion of the technical 
factors which govern the project's operation. 
The majority of technical and academic publications which refer to 
the Cabora Bassa Dam fall into one of two categories: descriptions of 
the technical features of the project, contained in technical journals 
or news magazines, and evaluations of the political aspects of the initial 
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decision to build the dam. The former category will not be discussed 
here since none of the references contain original material or analyses: 
they are derived from a number of official pamphlets based on the 
technical reports described below. The latter category includes 
contributions by a number of prominent political scientists. The 
following, albeit written prior to Mozambique's gaining independence, 
are of particular interest: Davidson (1972), Grohs (1974), Henderson 
(1972), Radman (1974 a and b) and Programme to Combat Racism (1971). 
The three multi- volumed reports prepared by the MFPZ, Relat6rio 
Preliminar, Esquema Geral and Plano Geral, of which details are given 
in Bibliography 1, together with supplementary reports undertaken for 
the MFPZ /GPZ, have provided much of the technical material for this 
study. For its sheer bulk the information contained in these reports 
is impressive although closer study reveals appreciable duplication 
and, in some instances, significant errors and omissions. Additional 
details about the technical aspects of the project are provided in 
various reports published by the Labat6rio Nacional de Engenharia Civil, 
in Lisbon, and in various papers published in the Portuguese journals 
Electricidade and Fomento. These journals also contain a number of 
papers which elaborate aspects of Portugal's colonial development 
policies. All the foregoing Portuguese reports and papers were written 
by technical advisors or administrators in the direct employ of the 
Portuguese authorities. 
Very little independent research has been undertaken in Mozambique 
either before or after independence. Apart from the work of Middlemas 
the only pre- independence academic studies related to the Cabora Bassa 
Project, were a small number of anthropological and scientific 
investigations of the impact of the project. Even these, however, were 
commissioned by the MFPZ /GPZ and undertaken by staff of the university 
in Louren90 Marques. (For further details see Chapters 5 and 6). The 
writer knows of no academic study of the project, apart from the 
present work, which has been undertaken since independence. 
Reference was made at the start of this introduction to a number of 
official technical reports published since work on this thesis commenced. 
The reports of the consulting engineers Messrs Rendel, Palmer and Tritton 
lxv 
and of Direccäo Nacional de Águas are referred to extensively in 
Chapter 3 but it has not been possible for the writer to consult some 
of the other consultants' reports. In most cases, however, where access 
to the documents was not possible, an outline of the conclusions reached 
has been obtained. The reports of SWECO were, unfortunately, only seen 
by the writer when he was completing the final draft of his thesis and 
it has, therefore, only been possible to make limited reference to them. 
These reports deserve credit as the first published studies to investigate 
the relationship between hydrological operation and environmental effects 
downstream and the first post- independence studies of potential markets 
for Cabora Bassa's electrical energy. In a number of places the SWECO 
reports have reached similar conclusions to those reached in this thesis. 
The fact that they were commissioned as part of the feasibility study 
for the proposed North Bank Power Station gives them particular relevance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL LITERATURE SURVEY 
The study of water resources engineering 
Over the last fifty years the regulation of rivers and the 
utilization of water resources have become subjects of study for 
workers from increasingly diverse disciplines. This reflects the 
growing awareness amongst academics, and, to a lesser extent, planners 
and engineers, of the complex interdependence between technical, 
political, social, economic and environmental factors in the implementation 
of water resources projects. The quantity and breadth of published material 
now available prevents an exhaustive review of this literature from being 
undertaken in a work such as this. Nevertheless, a careful selection of 
the more important publications which were consulted whilst preparing 
this thesis, and which provided some of the concepts and ideas on which 
the research was based, are reviewed below. 
In addition to the references provided in the bibliographies of 
many of the works cited below, the following bibliographic works have 
proved useful sources for a broad range of water resource development 
publications: Giefer (1976) covers many technical and non -technical 
aspects of water management using literature predominantly from the USA; 
International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (1974) includes a 
wider range of sources although the subjects covered are more restricted; 
Hamilton (1966) concentrates on references of a socio- economic nature 
published between 1955 and 1956 in the USA; whilst Pickford (1977), 
focusing on developing countries, is concerned primarily with small 
scale water supply and sanitation works. 
In considering water resources engineering it is useful to contrast 
two distinct approaches although, in reality, these form the opposite 
extremes of a continuous spectrum of possibilities. The first, which 
characterises almost all the water resources work undertaken before the 
present century, and which arises from consideration of a fairly limited 
set of technical and economic objectives, is the single project approach. 
Each project, whether a reservoir, water wheel, irrigation diversion or 
navigation canal, is designed to fulfil a single specific purpose, its 
'economic' justification being derived from fulfilling that purpose and 
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the technical details of its design being chosen in order to meet that 
objective. The majority of the old dams described by Smith (1972) fall 
within this category as do many of the ancient irrigation schemes and 
the innumerable small -scale works which have been built throughout 
the world for power, irrigation or water supply. Nevertheless, in 
certain cases, although projects have been planned singly, the subsequent 
interaction of separate projects has resulted in the creation of a 
complex interdependent system of water regulating works. Such a system 
may appear, in practice, to be similar to that which would result from 
the opposite planning approach, referred to as 'river basin planning' 
(also, as 'integrated' or 'comprehensive' river basin planning), which 
arises from a geographical or ecological view of development. In this 
approach the boundaries of the catchment area of a river basin are 
selected as the most logical limits for a coherent planning unit. The 
choice is made not only for technical reasons (the inevitable inter- 
dependence of all activities influencing or influenced by a single river 
system) but also for social, political and environmental reasons. Thus, 
project planners, although being responsible for achieving specific 
objectives of a hydraulic nature, seek, primarily, to co- ordinate water 
resources development with the whole economic and physical planning 
of the resources of the river basin including agriculture, forestry, 
industry, mining, navigation and fisheries, as well as with various 
social and political objectives. The theory of river basin planning 
received its most broad and vigorous trial some fifty years ago when, 
in 1933, the Tenessee Valley Authority (TVA) was established in the USA. 
(Details of the TVA and a discussion of its relevance to the present 
study are contained in a separate section below). 
History provides examples of ancient water -based civilizations in 
many parts of the world in which the social and environmental effects of 
water resources engineering were of considerable importance. This was 
particularly true for those regions in which, without irrigation, 
permanent cultivation would have been impossible. (Bennett (1974) 
provides a penetrating discussion of the role of water regulation in 
various civilizations together with a useful review of the relevant 
literature). Nevertheless, the dramatic increase which has taken place 
in the present century in the number and the scale of river regulation 
works has strengthened public awareness of the social and environmental 
significance of water resources engineering and has awakened concern over 
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their possible harmful effects. The formulation of the concept of river 
basin planning was, in part, a result of this concern. 
The large man -made lakes which have been created in many parts of 
Africa since the 1950s as well as similar projects in other parts of the 
world provide a dramatic illustration of the vastly increasing power 
which technology now provides for influencing the physical environment, 
and human society, through the regulation of surface water resources. 
There are very few published texts or symposia proceedings which 
treat the planning for, and impact of, water resources development in a 
truly integrated and comprehensive manner. Furthermore, only a small 
proportion of these make specific reference to the problems encountered 
in underdeveloped or tropical regions. A single writer is rarely capable 
of writing with authority on the full range of disciplines necessary for 
such work. On the other hand the collected papers of individual 
specialists generally lack the necessary cohesion. Kneese and Smith (1966) 
provide a stimulating collection of papers albeit with a rather heavy 
bias towards economics to the neglect of the environmental and biological 
sciences. Furthermore, the majority of papers are directed towards 
experience in the USA. The scope of Biswas (1978) is broader, in both 
these respects, but the sheer bulk of contributions adds immensely to the 
difficulty of assimilating and applying the material. Its value as a 
research tool is also reduced by the poor referencing of many of the papers 
and the lack of a comprehensive index. Saha and Barrow (1981) restrict 
themselves to the subject of river basin planning, the majority of papers 
being directed towards experience in underdeveloped countries. However, 
even in this work, although some of the individual case studies are of 
general interest, an overall lack of cohesion is apparent. 
Where individual writers have prepared texts of a more technical 
nature describing the principles of hydrology, geomorphology, engineering 
and economics which together govern the management of water resources 
they have generally achieved a more coherent result. Although written 
almost twenty years ago two such works, Kuiper (1965) and Linsley and 
Franzini (1964), remain useful works of reference. More recently 
Dunne and Leopold (1978) have published an excellent study of the application 
of the principles of hydrology and geomorphology to the problems of 
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environmental planning. None of these books, however, is directed 
specifically towards the management of water resources in either tropical 
or underdeveloped regions. 
Collected papers of a technical nature are also likely to result 
in a more coherent presentation particularly where there is evidence of 
firm editorial direction. Chorley (1969) has produced a technical work 
of broad scope which provides a useful introduction to the study of water 
resources engineering. Diverse contributions to symposia on specific 
topics may also provide valuable sources for water resources research. 
The International Association of Hydrological Sciences (1974) has 
published papers from a symposium on the design of water resources 
projects in the face of inadequate data. Many of these papers are of 
particular relevance to underdeveloped regions. 
Various writers have confined themselves soley to those technical 
aspects of water resources management which relate to land use and 
agriculture. Of these, a number direct a part, or all, of their discussion 
specifically towards the problems encountered in tropical or underdeveloped 
regions. Jackson (1977) and Pereira (1973) give such topics detailed and 
scientific treatment supported by good bibliographies. A rather less 
comprehensive work, but one which includes discussion of engineering and 
economic practice in the design of irrigation projects, is that of 
Olivier (1972). 
A large number of technical papers and texts concern only specialized 
topics. Those which are relevant to a discussion of the hydrology, sediment 
transport characteristics or environmental and social impact of water 
resources projects are referred in the introductions to Chapters 3, 5 and 
6, of this thesis, respectively. 
Before considering in greater detail the contribution which individual 
disciplines have made to the understanding of the problems of water 
resources engineering reference is made to two publications which seek 
to put forward policy formulations to guide government officials in 
developing countries in their management of water resources. 
Papers presented by the United States Agency for International 
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Development (1962) include a number which seek to relate water management 
experience in the USA to possible problems in developing countries. A 
paper by Weber and Hufschmidt is of particular interest. They contend 
that: 
In the early years of our country, we had to deal with much the 
same problems now faced by the developing nations - problems 
of economic growth and nation -building in the context of a 
rapidly growing population. (p299) 
Later in their paper they discuss important differences between experience 
in the USA and in developing countries thus demonstrating the limitations 
of such an analogy. Nevertheless the history of river basin planning in 
the USA, which they provide, and the conclusions drawn from this experience 
deserve consideration. Large scale, multi -project river regulation works 
in the USA were, from an early stage, undertaken by one of two Federal 
agencies: The Army Corps of Engineers was responsible for navigation and 
flood control works whilst the Bureau of Reclamation was responsible for 
irrigation developments. Because of the powerful position of the 
privately owned electricity supply utilities and coal mines, hydroelectric 
power was always given a subsidiary role in water resource planning. As 
the study below shows, the position was changed with the creation of the 
TVA; cheap electricity supply became a principal objective although, 
ironically, the success achieved by the TVA became an important factor 
in preventing the establishment of similar river basin authorities in 
other parts of the USA by provoking the powerful private utility lobby 
to join others opposed to such ventures. Weber and Hufschmidt also 
note that: 
By 1950, the principles of integrated planning of river basin 
development had been worked out in considerable detail. Following 
the work of the National Planning Board, a Federal interagency 
committee had developed an excellent statement of the principles 
and procedures of economic analysis for application to river 
basin planning. Yet practice lagged behind principle. Most 
river -basin plans were mere inventories of unrelated projects. 
(p304) 
Such conslusions, together with the fact that the TVA model was 
not emulated, serve to emphasize that, even in the USA where ideas of 
integrated river basin development have been most vigorously propounded, 
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water management policies have been determined more by political factors 
than by arguments of a technical nature. Moreover, the water management 
problems now being faced in the USA are very different from those which 
were being faced fifty years ago when the ideas of river basin planning 
were initially formulated. For these reasons comparisons drawn between 
experience in industrialized countries and proposed schemes in developing 
countries may be misleading. 
The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1970) prepared 
a revised edition of its earlier paper (1957) in which an attempt is made 
to review 'the administrative, economic and social implications of 
integrated river basin development'. These papers present a comprehensive 
and detailed 'textbook' for policy makers and planners. Although not 
specifically directed towards developing countries the document contains 
frequent references to the specific problems which such countries face. 
Technical details are, however, discussed only in the most general terms. 
A number of attempts have been made to describe the specific 
contribution which particular disciplines can make to the study of water 
resources engineering. James (1974) provides an informative collection 
of papers which reveal the different perceptions and insights from 
various branches of the social sciences. The contributions of selected 
disciplines, from the social and the physical sciences, to the study of 
water resources engineering are outlined below. Such comparisons are 
of particular interest in relation to the conflict between the two 
planning approaches outlines above - project planning and river basin 
planning. Interdisciplinary exchanges frequently centre around 
particular manifestations of this conflict. The disciplines selected 
have, on occasion, each been put forward as providing a basis for the 
co- ordination of water resources planning. 
Geographical studies 
In the past, geographers made an important contribution to the 
understanding and knowledge of man's use of rivers in all parts of the 
world, particularly in the nineteenth century., through the writings 
of explorers and travellers. Such documents often form the principal 
historical sources on which studies of the origins of water resources 
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development in Africa and in many other parts of the world are based. 
More recently geographers have provided case studies of specific projects 
or of the use of water resources within selected geographical regions or 
countries. For example, Harrison Church (1963) wrote a useful introduction 
to irrigation projects in Africa in which he compared the economic, social 
and physical characteristics of different types of project. Geographers 
have also been engaged in more detailed studies of such subjects as 
hydrological and geomorphological processes,communications networks and 
transportation systems, demographic changes, agricultural development, 
urbanization and the establishment of industry, all of which are 
influenced by, or influence, water resources planning. Surprisingly, 
in view of their earlier contributions towards the development of the 
concept of river basin planning, relatively few geographers are now 
actively engaged in broad studies of the effects of different water 
development strategies. Nevertheless, geographers continue to make 
important contributions to many interdisciplinary river basin studies. 
The work of G J Williams in the Kafue Basin is a pertinent example. 
In recent years, Gilbert F White and his research associates have 
provided the most prominent and sustained contribution from geographers, 
to the study of water resources engineering. In one paper, White (1963a) 
examined the possible contribution of geographical analysis to river basin 
development. Among his various recommendations and conclusions he placed 
particular emphasis on the need to consider 'the full range of possible 
uses of water management', before the construction of projects, in order 
that the best choice might be made. Water management, as he sees it, is 
a highly complex process of optimization: 
Every change in landscape or resource use on a large scale 
disturbs a complex set of relationships. To do so is not 
necessarily wrong by upsetting a 'natural equilibrium'; the 
existing situation may in fact be out of equilibrium ... or 
a new more productive relationship may be established ... 
The decision to change may, however, go far wide of the 
intended goal of lasting human betterment if the strategy of 
development is built upon narrow and distorted models of 
these relationships. Nothing less than a systems analysis 
of the whole complex of natural and social processes at work 
will yield in the long run a sound basis for decision, and 
it is towards that we should work. (p420 - 21) 
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A more recent collection of papers, White (1977), has given more 
detailed consideration to the environmental effects of river development. 
In an informative introductory paper, White also traced the development 
of ideas of water resource management into the 1970s. He noted four 
important changes in earlier approaches to integrated river development 
in order to take account of the use of both engineering and social 
modes of management, the greater recognition of biological and physical 
effects, the problems of water pollution and the problems associated with 
regions with special characteristics such as urban areas or areas 
dependent on a common groundwater resource. He also identified three 
areas where further scientific research was particularly necessary; the 
effects of long -term climatic change, the identification of the broadest 
possible range of alternative strategies of development and the assessment 
of environmental impacts. 
Finally, White, has been intimately involved in another area of 
study relevant to the management of river basins: the investigation of 
human response to the risk of natural hazard. An important collection 
of papers, White.(1974), considers a wide range of hazards. The bulk 
of the work is, however, closely related to river regulation and, in 
particular, the risk of floods. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
need for further research into the way in which people at risk from a 
certain hazard perceive that hazard and respond to it. In an earlier 
paper ena similar subject, White (1965), placed emphasis on the divergence 
between the modern analytical approaches to water management and their 
practical application: 
the gap between scientific knowledge of optimal methods and 
their practical application by farmers, manufacturers and 
government officials is large and generally widening. (p251) 
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that geographers, 
besides having provided an important contribution towards the original 
concept of river basin planning, have attempted to develop the links 
between the physical and the social aspects which are necessary for 
successful river basin planning. 
Economic studies 
Economists, having developed certain theoretical and analytical 
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techniques, have been predisposed towards undertaking studies which 
are susceptible to such analysis. In the field of water resources the 
limitations of their techniques restricted them, initially, to studies 
related to single project planning. Although such a limitation would 
appear to place a considerable constraint on the usefulness of their 
work economists have for many years taken a prominent role in the 
management of water resources. This has been true both in industrialized 
and underdeveloped countries as a result of the great importance which 
is given to 'economic efficiency' in the organisation of most present - 
day societies. A number of economists have presented detailed discussions 
of the application of economic theories to water resources development. 
Eckstein (1958) provided an introduction to the application of 
benefit -cost analysis to water resources projects which has become a 
classic in the evaluation of single purpose projects. Krutilla and 
Eckstein (1958) showed how such an analysis might be adapted for the 
evaluation of multiple purpose projects. Others such as Clark (1967) 
have attempted to refine the methodology for a specific aspect of water 
resources development; in this case, irrigation. James and Lee (1971) 
have provided a detailed and comprehensive review of the theory and 
practice of economic analysis as applied to water resources projects. 
They attempt to lay the basis for rational water management and planning 
taking account of social welfare objectives. 
Although other publications might also have been cited, those 
referred to above provide a broad introduction to the economic analysis 
of water resources projects and serve to illustrate some of the inherent 
problems of such analysis. On the one hand, Clark maintains not only 
that economic analysis is fully capable of providing direct comparisons 
between alternative projects but also that the results of such analysis 
should be the sole basis on which investment decisions be based. Rejecting 
earlier attempts to make allowances for 'secondary effects' of projects 
he asserts: 
Irrigation schemes must now be judged on their direct economic 
costs and returns. (pviii) 
Eckstein, on the other hand, acknowledged the limitations of the 
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benefit -cost methodology. He states that: 
A benefit -cost ratio of 1.0 does not mean that a project will 
actually produce more benefit than its cost even if the forecasts 
of prices prove to be correct, and hence the analysis is not yet 
a proper means of determining how much money should be spent on 
the various programmes. Nor is it possible to assume that 
projects in different fields with equal benefit -cost ratios have 
the same economic merit, thus restricting the technique primarily 
to the comparison of projects in the same field. (p273) 
Further problems arise when more complex developments are envisaged. 
Krutilla and Eckstein have drawn attention to some of the difficulties 
involved in analysing multiple purpose water developments even in countries 
such as the USA where considerable quantities of economic data are readily 
available. As a final note they state: 
... this study may serve to emphasize that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to generalize as to what constitutes the most 
efficient approach to the development of water resources. Our 
conclusions have varied significantly, depending upon the specific 
conditions in the individual cases. Moreover, it is desirable to 
re- emphasize that an efficiency solution to a water resource 
development problem need not necessarily be the socially 
desirable solution ... (p277) 
Maass (1965) provides a graphic illustration of the shortcomings of the 
type of economic analysis in which desirable social effects resulting 
from a project are included only as 'secondary benefits': 
If the objective function for a public program involves more 
than economic efficiency - and it will in most cases - there 
is no legitimate reason for holding that the efficiency benefits 
are primary and should be included in the benefit -cost analysis, 
whereas benefits in support of other objectives are secondary 
and should be mentioned, if at all, in separate subsidiary 
paragraphs of the survey report. Using the current language and 
current standards, most of the benefits to the [North American] 
Indians of the Indian irrigation project are secondary benefits. 
How silly! (p314) 
Undoubtably economic methodology is being continually refined, as 
demonstrated by James and Lee, but, as in all types of mathematical 
modelling, the use of a more complex multi- function model is no automatic 
guarantee that the results will approximate more closely to the reality 
of the social and physical system. In many cases the complexity of the 
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model makes it more difficult to identify its limitations. 
Despite the central position economic analysis has been given 
in the evaluation of water management schemes there remain serious 
difficulties in relying solely on its methodology, particularly in the 
assessment of multiple purpose projects or river basin development 
plans. Practitioners and critics alike have suggested that the 
results of economic analysis are unlikely to provide an objective 
basis on which to compare alternative projects unless those alternatives 
have similar characteristics and have a limited range of impacts. 
Assessment of the full range of alternatives, as demanded by G F White 
and others, has rarely been attempted by economists despite the fact 
that the concept of the 'opportunity cost' of particular capital 
investments is now widely recognised. One of the few published studies 
which attempts to compare, by economic analysis, two radically different 
alternatives in the use of available resources is that of Davidson 
(1969). His retrospective analysis of investments in irrigated agric- 
ulture in Australia compares the present returns with possible returns 
had the same investment been made in dry -land agriculture. Were it 
possible to broaden still further scope such 
would undoubtedly show that the previous narrow interpretation of 
'economic efficiency' rarely resulted in the most rational and effective 
overall use of available resources. Moreover, economic analysis 
remains poorly equipped to evaluate the 'secondary' or 'side' effects 
of projects. Maass highlighted the problems in the treatment of social 
effects. His criticism is equally applicable as regards environmental 
effects. In both cases the effects are complex and far -reaching and 
are, as a result, unlikely to be readily susceptible to formal economic 
analysis. 
Ecological studies 
In recent years ecologists and environmental scientists have become 
increasingly involved in studies of the impact of water resources projects. 
Their response to the environmental changes which have resulted from 
human interventions in river basins have been diverse. At one extreme 
Black (1973) regards all hydraulic works as polluting the environment: 
11 
It is impossible to insert into a stream /watershed system 
anything as gross as a major flow obstruction and not have 
adverse, far -reaching, irrevocable, and usually permanent 
consequences. (p253) 
The study of the Kariba Project by Balon (1978) appears to have been 
undertaken on this premise. At the other extreme there are ecologists 
who see ecology, which in itself is an interdisciplinary science, as 
capable of being broadened to include analysis of the place of the 
human species within the dynamics of a changing environment. Rz6ska 
(1978) adopts this approach as indicated by the broad scope of his case 
studies of the Nile, Zaire and Amazon rivers. For him 'one of the new 
formulations of theoretical ecology' derives from a paper by Curry (1971) 
who is himself a geologist. Curry's attempt to define a river is worth 
quoting at length: 
The equilibrium of river systems is manifest in the tendency 
of the river to maximise the efficiency of the energy received 
and utilized, balanced against its tendency to make the 
efficiency of this use constant through time. These opposing 
tendencies which ... are fundamental to all natural physical 
systems such as biotic communities, define the conditions 
of balance in river systems, or ecosystems, and are time 
independent ... 
The two opposing tendencies are considered by geomorphologists 
under the theories of minimum variance and minimization of work. 
Biologists may be most familiar with these opposing tendencies 
through Garrett Hardin's theorem which states that one cannot 
simultaneously maximise efficiency and stability in biologic 
systems. These concepts and their inter -relations define river 
systems in as fundamental a way as the second law of thermodynamics 
defines quantifiable closed physical systems. (p11 -12) 
Curry uses these concepts to describe the natural hydraulic processes 
which govern the channel form and profile of a river system. He also 
shows how attempts by engineers to modify a channel produce results 
which are governed by these relations. The concepts have wider application 
which could include natural hydrological and ecological processes as well 
as the effects of other types of human intervention in river systems. 
For example, in the operation of a retention system the greater the 
attempt to maximize one output, such as electrical power production, 
the greater will be the risk of long -term instability not only in the 
production of that output but also in other parts of the environmental 
system influenced by the flow regulation. That economists overlook this 
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fundamental behaviour of natural systems in their quest for 'economic 
efficiency' lies behind much of the criticism levelled at them by 
ecologists. 
In fact, ecologists rarely present the problems of environmental 
management in such fundamental terms. Many are concerned, soley in 
identifying the inter -relationships which exist in small areas selected 
from the complexity of the total environmental system, or those affecting 
a limited number of species, for example, fish fauna. As a result, 
although ecologists have contributed useful case studies on effects of 
river regulation works, they have frequently failed to enlarge the 
understanding of their full environmental impact. In tropical and under- 
developed regions there is a further difficulty in that ecologists have 
rarely been able to evaluate the influence of a particular project 
because of the lack of adequate information about the environmental 
system before the construction of substantial works. Two of the. more 
comprehensive collections of papers relating to the environmental effects 
of the regulation of river systems are those of Oglesby et al. (1971) 
and Ward and Stanford (1979). Neither of these, however, gives adequate 
consideration to the requirements of man as part of the environmental 
system. 
A number of useful collected writings by ecologists have been 
published which are specifically relevant to large reservoir projects 
in tropical regions. They are reviewed in Chapter 6. It may be noted 
that in these the human element is generally excluded except as regards 
the resettlement of people displaced from the inundated parts of the 
basin. 
Social considerations have, however, been inlcuded in a number of 
general statements, which ecologists have helped to formulate, concerning 
the need to increase the scope of current pre- construction evaluating 
procedures for water resources projects. The statement published by the 
UNESCO Programme on Man and the Biosphere (1976 ) in reference to all 
major engineering works is typical: 
Major engineering works - such as river basin projects and!new 
communications routes - are favoured instruments of development, 
and can result in considerable economic and social benefits to 
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the peoples of the countries concerned. However, the anticipated 
levels of benefits of particular engineering schemes have some- 
times proven illusory, in part because the environmental and 
social costs attendant with any such scheme were either ignored 
or not anticipated ... 
While the primary effects of an engineering scheme can usually 
be predicted with an acceptable degree of probability, the 
secondary and tertiary effects remain obscure and subtle. These 
effects may, however, affect society more profoundly than the 
primary effects. (p5) 
Nevertheless, ecologists have so far failed to achieve more than a 
subjective and fragmentary assessment of such secondary and tertiary 
effects in the majority of cases. This is one of the principal reasons 
why their warnings are, in general, still ignored by planners. Even in 
North America, where 'environmental impact assessments' (which also 
include assessments of social impact) are prepared for all major projects, 
there have been few occasions when constructive exchanges between ecologists 
and planners have occurred. 
Social, political and legal studies 
Various disciplines have contributed to the study of the social, 
political and legal aspects of the planning and administration of water 
resources engineering. In reviewing this work it has been necessary to 
restrict the discussion to those areas which are directly relevant to 
the present study. 
Few detailed studies have been undertaken of the social and political 
significance of water resources planning within particular national 
economies although students of government have undertaken studies of the 
different administrative measures adopted. Generally the development of 
water resources, from small -scale supply projects to large -scale regulation 
works on rivers, is under the control of central government. Where water 
is considered a critical resource, as in the RSA, water resources 
management becomes a high priority for the government and a strong national 
policy may be formulated. In many underdeveloped countries, where water 
is also in critically short supply both in rural and urban areas, the 
management of the resources is made more difficult by the shortage of 
finance and of technical and managerial skills. At the same time there 
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is frequently a desire, on the part of political leaders, to undertake 
large -scale water resources projects for their prestige value. Clearly 
the problems vary from country to country. Vohra (1975), for example, 
criticized previous water management policies in India for their lack 
of administrative co- ordination, for heavy concentration on large -scale 
projects which took all the available technical and financial resources, 
for not considering the possible implications resulting from environmental 
degradation, for neglecting an important part of the available water 
resources (groundwater) and for underutilization of the capacity of 
existing projects. In China, according to Shan -Kuei (1975), large projects 
continue to be built but there has also been considerable priority placed 
on the building of small projects, adapted to local conditions, for the 
conservation of soil and water. One of China's strengths has been its 
ability to mobilize vast numbers of people, in the agricultural slack 
period, to build the necessary projects. 
Whilst such studies concentrate on the formation and significance 
of government policies, at the other extreme many research workers have 
been concerned with the degree of popular participation, at local level, 
in project planning and with the social effects of project implementation. 
Chief Bright Nalubamba (1978), speaking of the Kafue Basin Project, made 
an eloquent statement of the attitude of many rural communities to large 
dam projects, planned by government officials without local participation, 
in these terms: 
Whatever a government does in an area for the benefit of the 
people, it must involve the people, no matter how small the 
involvement. In Tonga we have a saying, 'even if you can't 
contribute much you should give what you can'. If the 
government comes in with a project but does not involve the 
people, then my fear is that they will shun it, saying that 
it is a government thing, let them organize it. You then have 
to import labour, to import everything, even if there are things 
that the villagers could do for themselves. This is a false 
way of development, for the people must be involved, and must 
contribute ... 
It may be true that when you brought your machinery, etc., to 
Namwala to put up the dam you didn't need their labour and you 
didn't need any technology. from them: but you should have taken 
them in to account, because sooner or later they will be involved, 
even if they were not involved right at the beginning. (p51) 
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A particular aspect of the local impact of reservoir projects, which 
has been studied in detail by social anthropologists, is the process and 
effect of resettling the people displaced from the reservoir basin. The 
literature on this subject is studied in detail in Chapter 6. Since 
much of the literature on political and social effects of water resources 
management has centred around discussion of various types of administrative 
authority, in particular the autonomous river basin authority, further 
reference is made to such questions in the subsequent section on the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. 
Legal aspects of water resources have been studied in considerable 
detail and throw light on political questions both at national and 
international level. Utton and Teclaff (1978) provide a valuable 
collection of papers which address a broad range of legal and administrative 
questions the majority being directed towards experience in North America. 
The papers edited by Nanda (1977) are of similar scope. Teclaff (1967) 
produced a meticulous and informative study of the river basin as a 
legal and political concept. His work covers both the historical origins 
of the concept and its role in the management of water resources in many 
countries of the world as well as on international rivers. Le Marquand 
(1977) has considered the political and legal problems resulting from 
attempts to achieve international co- operation in the management of river 
basins. His theoretical overview and detailed case studies are primarily 
concerned with international environmental and development problems in 
North America and Europe. Fox and Le Marquand (1976) attempted to 
generalize this experience for application in other parts of the world. 
Menon (1975) was also concerned with the development of international rivers 
throughout the world. He drew attention to the fact that the legal 
principles had, in general, been established, with regard to the development 
of shared rivers, but that the formulation of those principles into 
global conventions of international law was weak. He stated that: 
International water law is a relatively less developed branch 
of the law of nations. Only two general international conventions 
deal with international rivers. One is the 1921 Bareclona 
Convention on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International 
Concern, which is mainly concerned with navigation. Forty -two 
states signed the convention; it is only in force in twenty states 
now ... most of these states ... have no rivers to which the 
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convention can apply. The second international convention 
is the Geneva Convention Relating to the Development of 
Hydraulic Power Affecting More than One State, 1923. The 
guiding principle of the convention is that of facilitating 
the exploitation and increasing the yield of hydraulic power. 
Out of the eleven states ratifying the convention, 'there are 
scarcely two of them which may be called riparian states ...' 
(p444) 
A particular problem associated with the management of international 
rivers is that the complex legal problems related to environmental 
protection and the control of pollution are transferred into the 
international sphere. Teclaff (1978) sets the problems of legislating 
for environmental protection within the context of water resources 
management. 
Before concluding this review of the literature on political aspects 
of water resources management the importance of studies into colonial and 
post -colonial political and economic systems, economic dependency and 
world trade, multi -national companies and the transfer of technology 
should be noted although no detailed references will be presented here. 
Such studies are of particular significance in cases where a large capital - 
intensive project is built in a poor country using foreign capital. A 
particular feature of certain hydroelectric projects is their dependence 
on a single or principal market for electrical power which is under foreign 
control, for example a multi- national company's aluminium smelter (as 
in the case of the Volta River Project in Ghana) or a more developed 
electrical power network in a neighbouring country (as in the case of 
Cabora Bassa). Large irrigation projects, on the other hand, often 
depend on unstable world commodity markets for their economic success. 
Technical studies 
In general, engineering and technical expertise has been protrayed, 
in recent years, by politicians and planners simply as a tool which can 
be directed towards the realization of whatever objectives they have 
selected. Scientists and engineers have largely accepted this interpretation 
of their role although some have argued that a greater appreciation of 
the social, political, economic and environmental effects of technology 
is needed within the technical professions. In particular, where 
developing nations are involved, there have been attempts to discover 
17 
'appropriate technologies'. For many this term implies a particular 
type of technology: usually simple, small -scale, locally produced, low 
cost and non -polluting; see, for example, many of the examples provided 
in such works as Cook, Dickinson et al. (1973), Congdon (1977), Jéquier 
(1976) and Dunn (1978). Others maintain that it is meaningless to talk 
of 'an appropriate technology' except within a particular social, 
political, economic and environmental context. Dickinson (1974) has 
used the phrase 'socially appropriate technology' to emphasize this 
distinction. In his study of water supply in developing countries 
Pacey (1977) also made this distinction. Nevertheless, many engineers 
continue to regard the study of social, political, economic and 
environmental factors as outwith their legitimate area of concern. 
In the regulation of river systems, engineers were-initially 
predisposed towards the single project approach because it provided 
clearly defined, albeit limited, technical objectives. Nevertheless, 
with the establishment of river basin development schemes and multiple 
purpose reservior projects new ideas evolved. The earliest papers which 
discussed multiple purpose reservoir operation emphasized its advantage - 
the achievement of additional benefits for the same initial investment - 
without fully discussing the technical difficulties. The TVA engineers 
were able to devise operating procedures for their system of reservoirs 
which demonstrably reduced flood discharges downstream whilst achieving 
the required power generation and navigation objectives. In addition, 
through a carefully controlled cycle of drawdown, considerable success 
was achieved in eradicating the local species of malarial mosquito. In 
describing these successes, Blee (1945), although emphasizing the need 
for careful co- ordination within the system and the use of operating 
rule curves to ensure the required level of electrical power output, 
does not explicitly refer to any conflict or trade -off between the 
operating procedures required to achieve the different objectives. 
There is evidence of an increasing awareness of possible conflicts 
in the operation of multiple purpose reservoirs, and a desire to place 
their study on a more rational basis, amongst a number of the engineers 
who contributed to a symposium organized by the American Society of 
Civil Engineers (1950). A paper by Malcolm Elliott on multiple purpose 
reservoirs in relation to flood control and navigation noted that the 
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two would probably be in conflict. Moreover, he maintained that unless 
floods are of a strongly seasonal nature reservoir capacity allocated 
for flood control must not be used for any other purpose. As he put it: 
It is particularly important that the public not be assured 
flood control benefits from a reservoir unless the storage 
capacity for that purpose is kept available. (p796) 
R A Hill in a paper summarizing the proceedings made a similar point 
noting that unless reservoir storage is 'pyramided' - specific parts of 
the available storage being reserved soley for specific purposes - then 
conflicts are bound to arise. Such an operating system is, however, 
equivalent to a series of single purpose reservoirs operating independently. 
The delegates could not, in fact, agree about a suitable definition for 
a multiple purpose reservoir. The preparatory committee had suggested 
that: 
the term 'multiple -purpose reservoirs' should include all 
reservoirs actually designed and operated to serve more than 
one function and that it should exclude those whose design 
and operation are controlled by a single function, even though 
other beneftis accrue as by- products. (p790) 
Hill in his concluding remarks, however, maintained that the latter 
should be included. Subsequent writers have never satisfactorily 
resolved this difference. Another point to note from the symposium 
was the widespread belief in the capability and suitability of economic 
methods (benefit -cost analysis) to resolve questions of storage 
allocation in the design and operation of multiple purpose reservoirs. 
Nevertheless, in the reported discussions delegates appear to have 
considered the formal papers to be too narrow in scope. Questions 
which they thought had been neglected included the operation of reservoirs 
with inadequate hydrological data, discussion of the 'economic life' of 
a project, the effects of siltation, health implications and administrative 
aspects. Certainly these engineers were not constrained by any narrow 
technical interpretation of their legitimate area of involvement. 
Incidentally, the questions which they raised are among the principal 
questions considered in this thesis in respect of the Cabora Bassa Project 
and are also important in the operation of reservoir projects in many 
developing countries. 
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Since 1950, there has been a more general acceptance amongst 
professional engineers that the operation of multiple purpose reservoirs 
involves conflicts and trade -offs. For example, Thomas (1976) lists 
the following as the most common usages of multiple purpose reservoirs: 
(i) water supply, (ii) irrigation, (iii) silt retention, (iv) transportation, 
(v) flood mitigation, (vi) electricity generation, and (vii) recreation 
and beautification. He continues: 
For (i), (ii), (iv) and (vi) the aim is to keep the reservoir 
full to ensure continuity of supply in dry periods; for (v) the 
reservoir level should be kept low in order to have storage 
available for part or whole of the flood inflows; whilst for 
(vii) the public desire a constant level in the reservoir. 
Resolution of these conflicting requirements is involved. 
(V1, p10) 
In practice the significance of such conflicts is rarely appreciated 
before the project is completed and inadequate provision is made for 
their resolution. Where different aspects of a project's operation are 
under the control of different government agencies the conflicts may 
polarize into inter -departmental disputes. Benedick (1979) describes 
such a situation in the case of irrigation, power generation and 
flood control requirements from the Aswan High Dam: 
There is evidently a constant pull- and -tug between the ministries 
concerned in drawing up the annual water release budget. To 
some extent, it involves a trade -off between agriculture and 
industrial development. Up until now, at least, irrigation 
requirements have been deemed pre -eminent. (p129) 
Engineers have been engaged in investigating techniques to find an 
objective way of resolving such conflicts through optimization procedures. 
A common method used is to analyse the effect on the benefit /cost ratio 
of various operating procedures. The shortcomings of such a method are 
clearly illustrated by reference to a paper by Lotti and Pandolfi (1978) 
which presents a typical design study for a large river in an undisclosed 
part of Africa. First, optimization methods become considerably more 
complex where more than two variables are considered; in the study by 
Lotti and Pandolfi only the optimum combination of irrigated area and 
hydroelectric generator capacity is investigated. Second, considerable 
simplification of the physical system is generally necessary; the most 
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significant simplification in this and many other studies is in the 
representation of the hydrological input data. Few models are capable 
of handling the stochastic character of hydrological events in a realistic 
manner or of incorporating functions which adequately represent the 
economic and social risks which rare events (either floods or droughts) 
may bring. Lotti and Pandolfi use only the mean annual discharge as 
their primary hydrological parameter and, although they repeat their 
analysis using discharges from a 'poor' year, no estimate of the probable 
frequency and significance of such extreme events is given. Young (1968) 
has shown how simple probabilistic functions may be used to represent 
hydrological inputs to a reservoir management model. However, in his 
model he does not attempt an optimization of output, as such, but rather 
the evaluation of an operating rule curve which will enable a primary 
output (flood protection) to be maintained whilst also providing a 
secondary output (increased flows in the dry season to improve water 
quality) More recently, multi- function optimization models have been 
developed for use with electronic computers and have been applied, in 
particular, to problems involving water quality; see, for example Haimes 
et al. (1975). The work by Loucks et al. (1981) provides an up -to -date 
and detailed assessment of mathematical models as applied to both 
water quality and water quantity problems. In the latter category 
stochastic variations of river discharge have been incorporated into 
certain models by the generation of synthetic streamflow data showing 
similar statistical properties to those of the recorded data. Nevertheless, 
despite all these advances Loucks et al. are at pains to stress the 
limitations of modelling which they regard: 
very much as an art ... Stochastic models ... both for 
reservoir operation and for river basin project design and 
operation, are relatively crude compared with the real 
prototype. (p374) 
Engineers have also become involved in the planning of integrated 
river basin development. Much of the work of the TVA was planned and 
supervised by engineers and other technical specialists. However, the 
engineers view of integrated river basin development is frequently 
narrower than that of the geographer or ecologist. For example Olivier 
(1969) has written about integrated river basin development with particular 
reference to the RSA. His paper covers a broad range of technical and 
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economic issues, including the problems of erosion and siltation, and 
argues the need for inter -disciplinary co- operation, multiple purpose 
rather than single purpose projects and a basin -wide view of development. 
However, he makes no specific reference to the important environmental, 
social and administrative issues involved in such development. Furthermore 
he believes that systems analysis and economic evaluation, by themselves, 
provide 'a sound basis for meaningful forward planning' for developing 
river basin potential. 
The adverse environmental effects of their work have provided the 
basis for much of the criticism directed at engineers over the years, in 
the design of water resources projects. Such criticism is often valid 
although in isolated cases, where special attention has been paid to 
minimizing certain adverse ecological effects, it has been claimed, with 
some justification, that projects have actually improved the environment. 
The neglect, by engineers, of environmental considerations has arisen, 
according to Thomas, because: 
during the last half century the dominant concern in water 
resources development has been engineering feasibility ... 
Intangibles - whether good or bad - were omitted from studies 
because no one was prepared to put a monetary value on them. 
(V1, p13) 
Nevertheless, Thomas suggests that there was a move away from reliance on 
the rigid application of economic criteria during the early 1970s which 
resulted in an increased willingness on the part of engineers to discuss 
environmental questions. This resulted in the inclusion of a question 
about environmental effects of dams in the Eleventh International Congress 
on Large Dams; in Madrid in 1971, which drew a total of fifty -nine papers. 
The Tenessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
The inception of Portuguese plans to exploit the resources of the 
Zambezi valley has been described in the following terms: 
The multiplicity of questions linked to the river, and their 
relationship with economic development, was found to provide 
a parallel with the case of the development of the Tennessee 
River region of the USA, known as the TVA scheme. This 
inspired the Government - through the then Minister and 
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Undersecretary of Overseas Territories, Prof. Raul Ventura 
and Engineer Carlos Krus Abecasis - to constitute, in 1957, 
the Missáo de Fomento e Povoamento do Zambeze with a view to 
'undertaking a systematic survey of the resources of the 
hydrographic basin of the River Zambezi within Mozambique, 
to organize plans for their exploitation and development and 
to design the necessary projects'33. 
Although rarely acknowledged in subsequent reports it is clear, 
both from this quotation and from a study of the contents of the library 
which was assembled in Tete, that the Portuguese planners who authorized 
and undertook the studies of the Zambezi valley were strongly influenced 
by the experience of the TVA. Similar influence on a wide variety of basin 
development schemes throughout the world has been recorded. This influence 
is considered in more detail below following a discussion of the Authority's 
principal characteristics and achievements. 
A relatively large number of books and papers have been written about 
the TVA. Each provides a slightly different view of the Authority 
although the majority have been written either by employees of the TVA 
or by strong supporters of its ideals. A good general history of the TVA is 
provided by Owen (1973). Her work is also more recent than many of the 
major texts. Interesting monographs have been written by at least two 
of the former Chairmen of the TVA Board of Directors, see Lilienthal (1944) 
and Clapp (1955). Both writers lay emphasis on political aspects of the 
TVA; the former on its potential for increasing decentralized democratic 
participation and the latter, amongst other functions, as an instrument 
for regional development and as an initial step towards the implementation 
of a national energy policy. Huxley (1943) wrote a short introduction 
which concentrates on the principal achievements of the TVA in physical 
planning and the architectural aspects of its engineering works. Three 
studies provide a more analytical approach. Pritchett (1943) studied the 
organization and administration of the Authority. The detailed study by 
Finer (1944) was undertaken with the specific aim of identifying those 
features of the TVA, in particular its administrative features, which 
might serve as a model for similar development schemes elsewhere. Finally, 
Selznick (1949) undertook a careful investigation of how far the TVA's 
social and political ideals were put into practice, in agricultural 
development at a local level. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority Act, passed by Congress on 
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18 May 1933, was entitled: 
An Act: To improve the navigability and provide for the flood 
control of the Tennessee River; to provide for reforestation 
and the proper use of marginal lands in the Tennessee Valley; 
to provide for agricultural and industrial development of said 
valley; to provide for national defense by the creation of a 
corporation for the operation of Government properties at and near 
Muscle Shoals in the State of Alabama, and for other purposes.34 
To achieve these broad objectives the act established a river basin 
authority with wide powers and a high degree of autonomy. Its three -man 
board of directors was appointed by, and directly responsible to, the 
President of the USA and its work was financed by large appropriations 
from the Federal budget approved on an annual basis by Congress. 
Within ten years of its establishment, the TVA was exciting considerable 
interest both within the USA and in other countries; its achievements 
and ideals were already being regarded by many as providing a symbol and 
model for widespread application in the future. Pritchett (1943) summed 
up this euphoric view: 
No other public instrumentality of our times has seemed to 
have more symbolic meaning, more usefulness as a tool, more 
promise for the future. (p314) 
Yet, reading through the many tributes to the TVA which have been written, 
there appears to be no consensus on which of the TVA's ideals or 
accomplishments have constituted the principal elements of its success 
nor on the preconditions necessary for such success. 
For some, the core of the TVA's early success is to be found in the 
technical and environmental achievements which resulted from its ability 
to develop the Tennessee river catchment as a single unit. The TVA 
exercised control over the resources of the basin in a rational manner 
'governed', according to Lilienthal,35 by the unity of nature herself'. 
Elliot (1973) has provided a useful introduction to the achievements and 
environmental effects of the impressive programmes of engineering works 
for which the TVA is responsible. In a catchment area of 106 x 103 km2, 
from which the mean annual discharge is approximately 57 x 109 m3, a total 
of thirty -three major dams now regulate the river. Together their 
reservoirs provide a guaranteed flood storage capacity, during critical 
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months, of 15 x 109 m3 and, through centralized control of this system, 
significant downstream. flood alleviation has been achieved. Nine of the 
dams, located on the main river, have created a navigable channel 1050 km 
in length, with a minimum depth of 2.75 m, stretching from Paducah to 
Knoxville. Although operated, principally, for flood control and navigation 
the dams, which together have an installed capacity of over 3600 MW, also 
provide large quantities of electrical energy. In addition requirements 
for municipal water supply, for mosquito and aquatic weed control, and 
for recreation and wildlife are incorporated into the operating procedures 
for the reservoirs. In the catchment areas serious problems of degradation 
and erosion, which previously caused great loss of agricultural land and 
resulted in heavy sediment loads in the rivers, have been arrested and 
reserved. This has been achieved partly as a result of agricultural 
improvements stimulated by the TVA, including the use of super triple 
phosphate fertilizer produced by the TVA using an electro- chemical process 
developed by its own scientists, and partly through a concerted afforestation 
programme as a result of which 58% of the basin is now wooded. To add 
emphasis to the importance of the TVA's technical and environmental 
achievements it should be noted that the first two Chairmen of the TVA 
Board of Directors had technical rather than administrative backgrounds; 
A E Morgan (1933 -8) was a civil engineer and H A Morgan (1938 -41) was an 
agricultural scientist. Some subsequent chairmen have also been engineers. 
More recent developments in the technical and environmental spheres 
have, however, clouded the TVA's image. Critics such as Branscome (1975) 
have condemned the TVA's decision, taken in the late 1940s, to begin 
generating electrical power from coal. Thermal generation has resulted 
in atmospheric pollution, in thermal pollution of the rivers and in large 
scale strip mining operations which have scarred parts of the basin. Many 
people now believe that the TVA should have shown a greater commitment to 
environmental protection, land reclamation and energy conservation at 
that time. Further criticism has arisen from concern over the possible 
environmental dangers of the TVA's heavy involvement in nuclear power 
stations from the early 1970s onwards. 
Without denying the reality of the TVA's technical and environmental 
achievements, some observers consider that the Authority's most significant 
achievements lie in the social and economic spheres. Federal interest in 
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the Tennessee Valley centred, initially, around a single project for 
the production of nitrates for munitions (or, in peacetime, fertilizers) 
at Muscle Shoals but it was in response to the serious economic depression 
which affected the USA in general, and that region in particular, that the 
TVA was, finally established. Like other New Deal ventures it was designed 
to create employment and to provide the necessary conditions for economic 
growth. These objectives were achieved in dramatic fashion. The steady 
depopulation of the region was halted and then reversed through the creation 
of employment opportunities in construction and forestry, in the manufacturing 
industries, attracted to the region by cheap power and cheap transportation, 
and in the related service industries. Agricultural development, together 
with access to cheap electricity by the rural population, also contributed 
towards a sharp rise in private incomes and in the general standard of 
living (although these have remained below average for the USA). The 
disruption_ caused to the 15 000 families who had to be resettled from 
reservoir basins and to those displaced more recently by the strip- mining 
of coal is considered by many to have been far outweighed by these benfits. 
The TVA's policy of providing abundant supplies of cheap electricity on 
a tariff scale which decreased markedly as consumption increased has 
been identified as the single most important factor in the economic 
transformation of the region. McCraw (19 76) and Street (1980) have 
provided useful introductions to the role of electrical power in the 
history of the TVA. Street's paper shows how, initially, industries 
demanding large quantities of energy were attracted by the TVA's low 
tariffs. This has changed with time and much recent industrial growth 
has been in less energy- intensive industries. McCraw provides information 
about the TVA's relationship with the Federal Government and with privately 
owned electrical power utilities. In particular, he has shown the strong 
influence which World War Two had over the TVA's development in that it 
brought a rapid increase in the demand for aluminium and also the 
establishment of the Government's Oak Ridge plant for processing nuclear 
materials. This plant subsequently grew into the TVA's largest single 
consumer. 
Finally, some observers have placed considerable emphasis on the 
political and administrative aspects of the TVA. The TVA was established 
as a public corporation with a high degree of legitimacy (its three -man 
board of directors being appointed directly by the President), with a high 
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degree of autonomy in its use of the large financial resources available 
to it (receiving in its first nine years, almost US $700 million in 
appropriations from. Congress36) and with an extremely broad sphere of 
responsibility within a clearly defined region (having, in addition to 
its responsibilities for the physical development of the basin, 'the 
explicit mandate to achieve specific, if perhaps not wholly clear, 
economic and social goals'37). Teclaff38 concluded that 'the TVA enjoys 
greater independence and flexibility than any other government department 
or agency' in the USA. Furthermore, having been established in the inter- 
war years when concern was being expressed in the USA with political 
developments in both Germany and the Soviet Union, many people came to 
see the TVA as an instrument for renewing and preserving democratic 
government. In particular, the establishment of the TVA achieved a 
transfer of national resources to a seriously depressed region, it over- 
came the problems of inter -agency disputes and frequent political changes 
in development planning, it enabled an entirely new administration to be 
created for a particular task free from the established system of 
bureaucracy and patronage and, because of its decentralized nature, it 
provided a unique opportunity for local participation in decision -making. 
Lilienthal (1944) placed considerable emphasis on the last of these. An 
enthusiastic and capable team of staff was created which was dedicated to 
'TVA ideals' and showed a large measure of responsibility towards its work. 
It is not surprising, in view of the large number of established 
interests upon which the TVA has impinged, that the Authority has been the 
centre of considerable controversy. Those within existing state and 
federal agencies criticized the TVA, amongst other things, for being a 
superstate with too much power and too little public accountability. For 
example Stephens and Horner (1945), of the Corps of Engineers, wrote: 
The 'Authority' principle is decidedly undemocratic, since all 
development is in the hands of a small group appointed by the 
President, with no direct responsibility to the people of the 
basin. 
More recently environmentalists have also criticized the TVA's lack of 
accountability. Branscome (1975) found evidence for this in the TVA's 
contracts with strip -mining companies for the supply of coal, in its 
timber harvesting operations, in its nuclear power station programme and, 
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ironically, in its freedom to raise its electricity tariffs without 
reference to Congress. In its early years, it was the cheapness of 
the TVA's electricity tariff which brought some of the fiercest criticism. 
Private utilities complained that the TVA undermined the free -market 
economy by using federal funds to subsidize its tariffs. Whilst, in 
this and other controversies which have surrounded the TVA, it is 
difficult to make clear judgments in the face of considerable political 
rhetoric, the work of Selznick (1949) has provided the basis for a more 
objective analysis. He identified significant problems in the attempt 
to combine democracy and planning concluding, amongst other things, that, 
despite a real commitment to democratic principles on the part of the 
TVA's staff, grass -roots participation in the agricultural programme: 
represents a sharing of the burdens of and responsibility for 
power, rather than of power itself. (p264) 
Nevertheless, in the Tennessee Valley the TVA won a degree of public 
respect and support, during its first two decades, which has been matched 
by few public agencies. Furthermore, in many small -scale development 
programmes, the degree of local initiative and control remains high. 
Before considering the possible application of the TVA experience to 
other situations it is worth examining the particular circumstances which 
contributed towards the successes of the TVA. Kraenzel (1957) identified 
some of the circumstances discussed below in a comparison he made between 
the TVA and a proposed Missouri Valley Authority. First, the Tennessee 
Valley possessed several physical features which made it particularly 
suitable for river basin development: it is a relatively small river 
basin with suitable topography; the region possesses valuable reserves 
of several minerals; the mean annual precipitation is relatively high 
(1300 mm) and strongly seasonal; the majority of reservoir sites covered 
low value land but afforded flood protection to high value land downstream; 
and the reservoirs did not create any new health hazards partly because 
the breeding cycle of the local species of malarial mosquito could be 
disrupted by careful reservoir operation. Secondly, the Tennessee Valley 
possessed several features which favoured its rapid economic development: 
there was a relatively dense, albeit declining, population; there were 
several important urban areas already established in the valley; the 
valley has easy access to the urban /industrial complex of the eastern 
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USA; and the stimulus to production provided by World War Two occurred 
when the TVA had become established and was ready for rapid expansion *. 
Thirdly, circumstances were favourable for the TVA's political and 
administrative success; the depression and war years prepared people for 
experiments with new instruments of government and to accept the risks 
involved; commitment to the war effort also allowed the TVA to purchase 
land for reservoirs with much less opposition than in peacetime; the TVA 
was supported by individual politicians, particularly Senator Norris and 
President Roosevelt, who were strongly committed to its success; it also 
owed much to the talents and dedication of its early staff, in particular 
the three members of the first Board of Directors; and, finally, no other 
agency had previously undertaken substantial development work or planning 
within the basin. Bain (1965) stresses that importance of this last point: 
a late- arriving federal or state agency which attempts 
multipurpose river basin development in a basin which is 
pretty well settled and developed encounters multiple legal 
and physical disabilities which deter it from approximating 
to its theoretical potential. (p66) 
The two principal vested interests in the Tennessee Valley before the 
arrival of the TVA were the agricultural agencies (State Extension 
Services and Department of Agriculture) and the private electricity 
supply utilities. With the former the TVA reached a working relationship 
and against the latter the TVA won a protracted legal battle. 
Application of the TVA model and other case studies 
Scarcely ten years after the TVA's formation Lilenthal (1944) 
claimed that: 
Among the more than eleven million people who have visited 
the TVA in recent years have been representatives of almost 
every country in the world ... 
This same world -wide interest is reflected in thousands of 
letters from many nations. (p173 -4) 
* In studies of the TVA's economic development it is worth noting the 
important distinction drawn by Kraenzel between the area of the basin 
proper, the area served by TVA's electricity and the area comprising the 
seven states which have territory in the Tennessee Valley. 
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Lilienthal was one of the strongest advocates of the TVA as a model for 
others to follow. For him the principal lessons to be learned from the 
TVA's experience were to be found in the level of local participation 
achieved and in the physical concept of river basin development. Develop- 
ment of resources following the TVA model, he contended, would not only 
bring benefits to individual regions but would stimulate national and 
international economies: 
in any perspective of time, unified resource development 
anywhere helps everyone everywhere39. 
Amongst the many who acknowledged Lilienthal's influence over their 
ideas of water resources planning was the general manager of the Gezira 
Scheme, Arthur Gaitskell40. Similar interest in the TVA model has 
continued through its history. In 1981 the Chairman of the TVA made a 
speech calling for the establishment of institutions similar to the TVA 
on an international basis41. One of the more detailed studies which 
has been undertaken of the TVA as a model for international application 
is that of Finer (1944). Finer considered that the essence of TVA -type 
management lay in the creation of a single authority with responsibility 
for a specific underdeveloped region. He maintained that the region need 
not necessarily be a river basin but stressed the need to recognize that 
existing political frontiers are inadequate since they do not, in general, 
enclose potentially self -sufficient economic units amenable to comprehensive 
planning. For him the application of the TVA model to the international 
situation not only involved transcending existing frontiers and institutions 
but also involved the transfer of capital from developed to underdeveloped 
regions. The TVA had the financial support of the budget of the USA. 
Few other underdeveloped regions could command such substantial resources 
except through international co- operation. 
A comparison between the administrative structures of river basin 
authorities established in various countries since 1940 was included in 
the study by Teclaff (1967). Although his work is descriptive rather 
than analytic it serves to demonstrate the weakness of many of these 
authorities in comparison with the TVA. Few, if any, river basin 
authorities have the, same degree of administrative and financial autonomy 
or the same wealth of natural resources under their control as the TVA. 
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El Tayeb (1977) undertook a more restricted comparison of different 
types of comprehensive water resources development as part of his study 
of the Gezira scheme in Sudan. His work is of interest because, by 
comparing selected examples of successful and less successful schemes 
with similar administrative structures, he showed that the creation of 
a TVA -type autonomous public corporation was neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the successful management of water resources. 
The TVA remains the most frequently quoted example of a successful 
venture in river basin development not only because of the limited success 
enjoyed by many of the other ventures but also because few of the other 
ventures have been adequately studied and documented. 
One of the earliest overt attempts to imitate the TVA was that 
of the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) in the Indian States of Bihar 
and West Bengal. Although relatively few studies of the DVC have been 
published, a detailed study undertaken by Hamilton (1966 and 1969), 
which concentrates primarily on the administrative aspects of the 
enterprise provides a realistic analysis of its achievements and short- 
comings. More recently Saha (1979) has provided a paper which discusses 
the planning objectives and achievements of the DVC. Jain et al. (1973) 
describe, in general terms, some of the environmental changes which the 
DVC has brought. From a study of these sources it is apparent that 
significant differences between the DVC and the TVA exist. The DVC 
was conceived primarily in response to flood hazards in the basin 
although the TVA engineer who formulated the initial plans stressed the 
potential for comprehensive river basin development. The basin, which 
has an area of 24 000 km2, is less than a quarter the size of the 
Tennessee basin but, with dense established populations along the river 
banks, considerable resettlement was needed when the four dams of the 
first phase were built (approximately 100 000 people were affected). 
Thus, although it has been possible to provide downstream flood protection 
this has been at the expense of habitation and agricultural production 
in and around the reservoir sites. Recently these flood benefits have 
been eroded by channel deterioration and by increasing population densities 
in areas of risk. The DVC's main success has been in electrical power 
generation and distribution although the hydroelectric component of this 
is small (104 MW installed) and is reserved for periods of peak demand. 
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A big expansion of industrial and mining activities has occurred in the 
region. Irrigation has also expanded although the system has not been 
efficiently planned or maintained. Against this the DVC has failed to 
arrest soil erosion, with the result that rapid siltation of the reservoirs 
is occuring, an expensive navigation canal has not been fully utilized 
and problems created by an ever -increasing population, including health 
hazards such as that from malaria, are now becoming acute. The DVC's 
major handicap has been in its relations with the Central and State 
Governments. Initially, the DVC's creation resolved a conflict between 
the states which made possible the building of four dams. Since then, 
however, there has been a steady erosion of the DVC's power by these 
governments which has left it as little more than a public power utility 
and has prevented the building of further dams as originally proposed 
for the DVC's second phase of development. 
The experience of the DVC is very different from that of the 
Khuzestan Water and Power Authority in Iran, also, supposedly, modelled 
on the TVA. There, regulation is provided by a single reservoir formed 
by the Dez Dam which was created initially for irrigation and for hydro- 
electric power generation. Ghazi (1977) provides a critical analysis 
of the scheme based on the results of a socio- economic study which is 
relatively broad in scope. Her conclusions highlight social and 
political aspects of the scheme which are in marked contrast to those 
of the TVA. At the time of her study the inequitable system of land 
tenure in the region and the project's dependence on highly mechanized 
agro- industrial corporations ensured that the majority of the local 
population had little influence over, and derived few benefits from, 
the project. 
Following the success of the TVA a number of attempts were made 
by Roosevelt and others to introduce similar river basin authorities 
into other parts of the USA. Teclaff (1967) cites the American part of 
the Columbia Basin as one region in which, dispite presidential backing 
and the introduction of Bills to both Senate and Congress, attempts to 
create an autonomous public corporation failed. Prior to this the Corps 
of Engineers had already undertaken surveys for a 'comprehensive plan' 
of the region, described by Tudor (1945), and at approximately the same 
time the Bureau of Reclamation was preparing a separate 'comprehensive 
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plan'. Although the Federal Government succeeded in co- ordinating the 
work of these two agencies in the formulation of a single comprehensive 
plan, described by Whipple (1951), it was incapable of overcoming the 
opposition of these agenices to the formation of a TVA -type river basin 
authority. Events in the Columbia Basin were mirrored elsewhere, for 
example in the Missouri Valley, where according to the account of Terral 
(1947), even the formulation of a single development plan involved 
considerable controversy which was only 'resolved' by assuming the 
discharge of the river to be greater than in fact it was. A further 
complicating factor in certain basins has been the existence of fierce 
inter -state conflict or conflict between basin states and the Federal 
Government. According to Leuchtenburg (1953), both of these played their 
part in preventing the formation of a TVA -type administration for solving 
the flood problems of the Connecticut River. 
One of the other basins in which President Roosevelt proposed to 
establish a TVA -type authority was the Colorado. The early development of 
this basin was marked by the establishment of several large irrigation 
projects, planned individually, and reclaiming otherwise unproductive land. 
The Federal Government became increasingly involved in the management of 
the Colorado valley as the problems of allocating limited water resources 
between different irrigation projects, of combatting increasing levels of 
salinity in the river and of reconciling the demands of alternative 
water uses and those of downstream uses in Mexico became more acute. The 
history of the management of the waters of the Colarado and of attempts 
to resolve these conflicts are discussed in a collection of papers, edited 
by Peterson and Crawford (1978), which provides one of the most informative 
multi -disciplinary studies of the problems of river basin development on 
an international river currently available. A study by Day (1970) of an 
adjacent river basin, the lower Rio Grande (Rio Brave), with very similar 
problems is also broad in scope. Day's study is particularly creditable 
and unusual in view of the fact that it was prepared by a single person. 
In both these river basins the principal problems arise from over -demand 
for irrigation water and from poor water quality resulting from saline 
drainage. As neither of which are problems which will affect the Zambezi 
in the foreseeable future, few of the conclusions from these studies are 
directly applicable to the present work. 
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In the Columbia, Colorado and lower Rio Grande basins a part of 
each region lies within countries other than the USA and, therefore, 
international aspects of the management of the resources are important. 
The problems of international co- operation feature prominently in the 
management of many large river basins; from information published by the 
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1970), fifteen of the world's 
nineteen river basins with areas greater than 106 km2 cover more than one 
country as do over half the basins from 100 x 103 to 1 x 106 km2. Teclaff 
(1967) discusses the small number of cases in which international agreement 
has been reached in the development of the water resources of such basins. 
Frequently such agreements have been preceded by periods of conflict 
which have been resolved only when commitments have been given either by 
one or more of the countries involved, or by external agencies, to invest 
large amounts of capital in new projects within the basin. Several basins 
in the USA provide examples of the former case, (see Krutilla (1967) for a 
discussion of the economic aspects of the Columbia River Treaty), whilst 
the Indus basin, in which the World Bank made substantial investments, 
provides an example of the latter (see Michel (1967)). Where no formal 
agreement has been made basin states generally proceed more or less 
independently. For example, on the Euphrates there has been very little 
co- ordination between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. As a result, according to 
Catakli et al. (1973), there is a danger that an unnecessarily large number 
of reservoirs will be created causing unnecessarily high evaporation losses, 
that reservoir impoundment and operation will not be planned to the optimum 
benefit of downstream users and that problems will arise over water rights 
and water quality. Crow (1981) has undertaken one of the few detailed 
studies available of the origins and effects of political conflict, in the 
use of water resources, between underdeveloped countries. His case study 
of the conflict between India and Bangladesh over the division of waters 
from the Farakka Barrage illustrates the way in which technical ambiguity, 
which is frequently unavoidable in hydrological studies, has been used 
by different parties to further their own objectives with the result that 
decisions have been made less from technical, social or economic merit 
than as the result of the play of political forces. His work also demonstrates 
how, in situations of unresolved conflict, the governments of countries in 
the upstream parts of a basin are generally in a stronger position than 
those downstream and may choose to ignore protests from downstream unless 
other factors compel them to seek a resolution of the conflict. 
34 
The number of cases in which nations have shown themselves willing 
to co- operate both in the planning and execution of river basin development 
schemes is relatively small. White (1963 a and b) has provided details 
of one of these - the Mekong River Plan - which, in the early 1960s, 
offered the basis for co- operation between the four basin states but 
was later abandoned as military conflict in the area intensified. The 
Mekong River Plan was the first attempt to achieve co- operation under the 
auspices of the United Nations and, in addition, was one of the few cases 
in which a serious attempt was made to undertake detailed multi- disciplinary 
studies of the whole basin before undertaking any construction. The 
Mekong Commission still exists but is largely ineffective, yet some 
bilateral discussions of river management have taken place under its aegis. 
The study of water resources engineering in Africa 
Within the growing literature relating to problems of development in 
sub -Saharan Africa are some useful studies of water resources engineering. 
As a general bibliography for sources of technical information and data, 
Rodier (1963) remains invaluable. Bederman (1974) has also provided a 
bibliography directed specifically towards Africa which contains useful 
references on subjects relevant to the water resources engineer. Balek 
(1977) has used information and data from many parts of the continent 
as the basis for a description of African hydrology and the problems of 
water resources engineering. The result is disappointing partly because 
large gaps in available information and data have resulted in an uneven 
treatment for different parts of the continent, partly because of the 
large number of typographical and arithmetical errors which the volume 
contains and partly because of the omission of reference to information 
sources from many of the tables of data. 
African rivers have also provided material for some interesting case 
studies in water resources development, see papers presented by 
Rubin and Warren (1968). Amongst the studies of single projects 
planned and executed by a single country, that by Hart (1980) of the 
Volta River Project in Ghana deserves particular note. Following a 
discussion of the motives of project's instigators and the political 
processes by which it came to fruition, Hart undertakes a careful analysis 
of the effects of the project on the Ghanaian people and on their national 
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economy. The study is of particular interest in that it demonstrates 
the hazards to a country with a relatively underdevloped electricity 
supply system of undertaking a large hydroelectric project whose output 
is many times greater than the current level of energy consumption in 
that country. In Ghana's case this led to dependency on a multi- national 
aluminium company, over which the government has very little influence, 
as the major consumer of the project's power output. Furthermore, because 
the energy demands of this one consumer are high and the tariffs which it 
obtained low, the remaining electricity consumers in Ghana are subject to 
high tariffs and are, in effect, subsidizing the aluminium smelter's 
supply. As a result cheap 'Volta' electricity has not been the anticipated 
stimulus for economic growth. A similar failure to stimulate rapid 
industrialization occurred with the Owen Falls Project in Uganda, according 
to work undertaken by Wilson (1967). In this case the initial excess 
generating capacity at the dam was only absorbed when the Ugandan Government 
entered into a long -term commitment to supply power, at low tariff rates, 
to the industries in neighbouring Kenya. In this respect the project is 
similar to Cabora Bassa although on a much smaller scale. However, the 
nature of the Owen Falls Project ensured that virtually no changes occurred 
in the existing hydrology or ecology of the region, since storage is 
provided by a natural lake, Lake Victoria, with the result that, unlike 
Cabora Bassa, Owen Falls can be regarded solely as a hydroelectric project. 
By contrast, ecological changes are of considerable importance for the 
operation of the Kamburu Dam in Kenya. The study of this project edited 
by Odingo (1979) constitutes the first attempt in Kenya, and one of the 
first in the whole of Africa, to undertake a comprehensive, multi- 
disciplinary study prior to construction. 
Africa also has a large number of international river basins. 
According to information provided by the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (1970) there are 55 international basins on the continent 
and of the twenty basins with areas over 100 x 103 km2 only two are not 
international. In certain cases, such as the Zaire, a single country 
covers the major part of the basin and, therefore, international aspects 
of river development have not featured prominently. In other cases, such 
as the Nile, agreements have been necessary to enable the basins.' water 
resources to be fully exploited. A useful introduction to the history 
of agreements on the division of the Nile waters between basin states 
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is given by Dickinson and Wedgwood (1980). Egypt, with its established 
dependence on irrigation water from the Nile has, from the earliest 
agreements to the present, exerted considerable influence over the 
details of arrangements for regulating and sharing the river's discharges. 
Taken as a whole the influence of the Nile's waters on the physical and 
economic characteristics of the basin states is far -reaching and complex. 
It includes changes in the delta region resulting from regulation of 
the discharges, development of the irrigation and electricity supply 
systems of Egypt and Sudan, development of irrigation and the problems of 
soil erosion in Ethiopia, development of the electricity supply system 
of Uganda, environmental changes produced by the Aswan High Dam and 
possille changes which will occur with the construction of the Jonglei 
Canal. Some of these aspects have been studied in detail (studies of 
environmental effects are referred to below, in Chapter 6) although, to 
date, no studies have been published which have attempted a comprehensive, 
multi -disciplinary analysis of river basin development for the Nile. 
Hydrological questions have, however, been considered for the basin as a 
whole in as far as Egypt's and to a lesser extent the Sudan's, irrigation 
requirements have been considered in the design of most major projects 
including the Aswan High, Owen Falls, Sennar and Roseires dams and the 
Jonglei Canal. 
The Senegal valley is unique in the world in that an attempt has 
been made to establish there a TVA -type authority in an international 
river basin. The Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal 
(OMVS) was established, in 1972, by three of the four basin states - 
Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, see Parnall and Utton (1976). The primary 
purpose was to provide irrigation in a region affected by serious problems 
of drought, but the provision of hydroelectricity and navigation, and the 
need to push back the salt wedge in the delta are also included among its 
objectives. Watt (1980) provides an informative discussion of the 
alternative options facing the OMVS and the problems which may arise. 
He sets this in the context of the region's history and the economic and 
social distortions which have resulted. A significant problem in any 
development of the valley is that of persuading farmers to adopt irrigation 
techniques in place of the traditional floodplain agriculture. Such action 
would reduce their risk from drought but increase their financial risk. 
Problems also exist in replacing the existing system of land ownership 
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and privileges. The OMVS has recognised that such social factors are 
as important as the economic factors on which international agencies, 
such as the World Bank, base their investment decisions but its present 
terms of reference prevent it from exercising the full powers of a 
regional planning agency. Nevertheless, OMVS proposals stress the need 
to establish decentralized management of irrigation projects and co- 
operative maintenance of irrigation works. The powers of the OMVS may 
also be insufficient to resolve differences between member states in the 
allocation of water if, as Watt predicts, conflicts arise during periods 
of drought. 
From this brief account the vast differences between the OMVS and 
the TVA are readily apparent. Similarly, Kokot (1949) identified important 
aspects of economic and hydrological differences between river basins in 
the RSA and the Tennessee Valley and, on that basis, argued that the idea 
of multiple purpose reservoir development in southern Africa was inap- 
propriate. He did not, however, consider, whether or not political and 
administrative aspects of the TVA were applicable. 
To conclude this summary of experience in water resources engineering 
in sub -Saharan Africa studies of three projects of particular significance 
to the present work are examined. The first two projects in the Kariba and 
Kafue gorges, are within the Zambezi Basin and detailed discussion of their 
characteristics is included in various chapters of this thesis, the third 
project, on the Kunene.(Cunene) River in Angola, is included because of 
the political links between it and the Cabora Bassa Project. 
Although a large number of papers, together with a number of mono- 
graphs, have been written on aspects of the Kariba Project, no single work 
provides a comprehensive analysis of its impact and influence in the region 
and no co- ordinated and sustained attempt has been made to undertake 
multi -disciplinary studies of its effects. The technical details of the 
project and its construction have been well documented (see Chapter 2). 
Furthermore, numerous studies were made of ecological changes during the 
period of impoundment and of the effects on the local population of the 
initial resettlement (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, few attempts have been 
made to monitor the dam's influence on the local population, on the 
environment and on industrial and mining development in Zambia and 
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Zimbabwe since the mid 1960s. Nor have serious studies been published 
on the dam's political and economic importance, particularly during the 
period of increasing conflict following the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) by the white government in Rhodesia. Of the available 
scientific publications, the work edited by Balon and Coche (1974) provides 
the most detailed introduction to the project, albeit from a rather narrowly 
defined ecological view -point. The work does contain, however, an extensive 
bibliography. Of the monographs which have been published, Clements 
(1959) provides the broadest description of the preparation for, and 
construction of, the project whilst Howarth (1961) describes the experiences 
of a small group of people during the resettlement programme. Both are 
written in popular journalistic style shortly after the events which they 
describe had occurred and neither attempts an objective analysis of the 
project. At least two monographs42 have been entirely devoted to popular 
descriptions of the operation mounted to save some of the animals stranded 
by the rising water of the reservoir which received considerable publicity 
at the time. 
By contrast the Kafue Project has been the subject of extensive 
studies including a creditable seven volume pre- construction survey under- 
taken by the FAO (1968). The Kafue Basin Research Committee was set up 
within the University of Zambia to supervise a research project directed 
towards multi -disciplinary research in the basin. Quartermain (1974) 
provided a useful bibliography for that project and the Committee, as well 
as providing research fellowships, has sponsored two important wide ranging 
seminars the proceedings of which have been edited and published as 
Williams and Howard (1977) and Howard and Williams (1982). In the second 
seminar considerable dialogue occurred between research workers, engineers 
and government officials. From this it became evident that despite the 
long history of research in the basin considerable ignorance still existed 
about the hydrological and ecological response of the basin to various 
forms of regulation. The resulting technical ambiguity was exploited to 
different ends by the various participants. There appears, at present, 
to be no agency capable of resolving the conflicting demands on the basin's 
hydrological resources and of formulating a co- ordinated policy which would 
take account of the diverse social, economic, political and environmental 
expectations that have been expressed. As a result electrical power 
generation has assumed priority. 
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Comparisons have been made between the Cabora Bassa Project and 
the Kunene Project in southern Angola. Both were built in former 
Portuguese colonies in the early 1970s with considerable South African 
participation in finance and personnel. In each case the prinicpal 
outputs were to be directed south over considerable distances for the 
benefit of industrial, agricultural and mining interests of the RSA. 
In addition, evidence suggests that the RSA made its co- operation over 
Cabora Bassa conditional upon Portugal's co- operation in the Kunene 
schemes (see Chapter 2). In physical terms there are some important 
differences between the two; whereas the Cabora Bassa Project consists 
of a single dam, creating a vast reservoir, together with a power station 
supplying transmission lines to the RSA, the Kunene Project consists of 
a storage dam in the headwaters at Goya, a small dam at Matala, a 
regulatory dam at Calueque, from where water supplies can be diverted 
south, and a weir at the Ruacana Falls to supply a hydroelectric station 
from which transmission lines lead to the main load centres in Namibia. 
All parts of the project, except the dam at Matala, were built entirely 
for the benefit of the RSA which withheld its support from other schemes 
which Portuguese engineers had originally proposed. By contrast, Portuguese 
engineers believed that the Cabora Bassa Project as built, whilst primarily 
supplying power to the RSA, would also fulfil an important role in their 
plans for the development of the Zambezi valley. Christie (1975 and 1976) 
provides a detailed study of the political and economic significance to 
the RSA of the Kunene schemes. He showed the strategic importance of these 
schemes in enabling the RSA to strengthen its economic and political control 
over Namibia in the face of international pressure to grant that country 
its independence. To achieve this, South African -controlled mining and 
agricultural activities in Namibia had to be supplied with water, electrical 
power and cheap labour. It was for this purpose that the Kunene schemes 
were designed. In addition, water was to be supplied to Ovamboland in 
order to enable 'black homelands' to be established to supply the necessary 
migratory labour and to reinforce the apartheid system by reducing the 
danger of black settlements encroaching upon areas of Namibia reserved 
for whites. Other aspects of the project, particularly its effects within 
Angola and the effects on it of political developments since 1975 have 
yet to be reported in detail. 
The individual case studies referred to in the latter part of this 
chapter illustrate the difficulties which arise in attempting to formulate 
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general conclusions about large scale water resources projects. Each 
project is set in a unique context with its own physical, environmental, 
social, economic and political characteristics. The relative importance 
of these aspects also differs from project to project. Nevertheless, 
there are certain characteristics which have been observed in a large 
number of the cases considered and are particularly relevant to projects 
in Africa. Firstly, such projects are frequently situated in remote or 
underdeveloped regions, from which little initial information and data 
are available, and in which little attention is paid to possible 
adverse social and environmental effects. Secondly, there are generally 
diverse and conflicting demands made of the project. Invariably the 
activity which gives the most immediately quantifiable returns assumes 
priority. In many cases this results in the operation of so called 
'multiple purpose' projects solely for the benefit of hydroelectric power 
generation. Thirdly, the local population is generally given little 
opportunity to participate in the planning or operation of large -scale 
projects because of concern by governments and financial agencies to 
secure a rapid return on investments. Fourthly, many governments have 
placed undue faith in the ability of a large project, particularly a 
large hydroelectric project, to stimulate rapid growth of the national 
economy without paying adequate attention to the other factors necessary 
for such growth. Fifthly, although the problems of operating large water 
resources projects are to be found in river basins lying within a single 
state or nation, many large basins lie across several independently 
governed territories. In such cases, the difficulty of obtaining inter- 
state or international agreement on a co- ordinated policy for the 
development of the basin considerably increases the complexity of the 
other problems to be resolved. Finally, many hydroelectric projects 
have been built with installed capacities far larger than could be 
justified by the current demand for electrical power in the country 
in which they are located. In such cases long -term agreements have been 
made to sell power at very low tariffs to neighbouring countries, which 
are more industrialized, or to energy- intensive industries (particularly 
aluminium smelting) located in that country but controlled by foreign 
interests. Such arrangements add further political and economic complex- 
ities and, in general, limit the freedom of the country to obtain the 
maximum benefits from the project for its own population and industry. 
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The Cabora Bassa Project illustrates, graphically, many of the 
problems listed above as well as exhibiting several unique features which 
arise from its historical origins during the final years of Portuguese 
administration and the period of transition to independence. It is 
believed that the conclusions drawn from the present study will be of 
value not only to those who are responsible for determining operating 
policies for the Cabora Bassa Project but also to those who are planning 
other water resources projects, both in Mozambique and elsewhere. It 
often arises that a government's freedom to determine the design details 
and operating policies of a project are relatively limited once the 
initial decision to build a dam has been taken. Reference to critical 
studies of other projects would undoubtedly assist in identifying possible 
short -term and long -term consequences of the operation of established 
projects and also help in determining the most effective form for their 
administration. Acquaintance with such studies might also prevent planners 
from dismissing too lightly the potential conflicts and possible 'secondary 
effects' which might arise from the operation of a project under consider- 
ation, factors which, experience has shown, are often seriously under- 
estimated in the initial planning phase. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORY OF WATER RESOURCES ENGINEERING ON THE ZAMBEZI 
The history of the Zambezi valley in Mozambique before 1948* 
Iron implements were probably first used in the Zambezi valley as 
early as 300 AD. By the fourteenth century a relatively sophisticated 
civilization had developed, in which the cultivation of crops, the 
construction of large stone buildings and the production of appreciable 
quantities of gold were achieved. Muslim traders from the Swahili cities, 
further north, began to inhabit the coastal regions from about the eighth 
century onwards. By the fifteenth century they had established trading 
fairs at many inland locations where gold was purchased from African 
producers. In the Zambezi valley such fairs existed at Sena, Tete, Otonga 
(30 km north of Lupata), Zumbo and, probably, elsewhere. The traders' 
ships are reported to have travelled 500 km up the Zambezi paying tolls for 
passage to African chiefs. Although the international trade in gold was 
paramount, other products were important in the commerce of the coastal 
settlements. Their variety serves to indicate the range of skills which 
were practised, including the manufacture of goods from metal, bone, stone 
and leather as well as the building and repair of boats. Iron working was 
particularly important for tool manufacture, in areas where suitable ores 
were found, and the production of cotton cloth was also of considerable 
economic importance. 
Following the visit of Vasco da Gama, in 1498, the Portuguese began 
establishing settlements in the region, the first being at Ilha de 
Mocambique. Their arrival signalled the end of the commercial dominance 
which had been achieved by the Muslim traders. The principal objectives 
of the original Portuguese settlers have been interpreted as: first, 
to provide supply posts for their ships; second, to control the trade in 
gold and, later, ivory; and third, to acquire personal wealth. Although 
trade with the local Africans was inevitable, the Portuguese did little 
to stimulate innovation or increased production. 
The Zambezi valley and the escarpment to the south attracted particular 
interest from the Portuguese because of the reputed mineral wealth. In 
1505, they established a settlement at Sofala to control an existing 
* This account is based on the sources listed in the Introduction. 
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trading outlet but, as Muslim and African traders sought to avoid this 
monopoly, the Portuguese were forced to move further inland. One of 
their first settlements in the Zambezi basin was at Sena, in 1531, on 
the site of an existing Muslim fair. Within a few years a similar 
settlement was established at Tete. Both sites were located close to 
the Zambezi to enable river transport to be used. The gold was carried 
to the ports of Mocambique and Sofala, but by 1625 the latter was in 
decline having been displaced by the port established at Quelimane . 
during the sixteenth century. The Portuguese settlers continued to 
press inland, establishing a fair at Massapa on the Mazoe River, in 1550, 
close to an important mining region and building two forts at Chicoa, 
in 1614, close to where rich silver deposits had been reported. By the 
end of the seventeenth century their traders had even passed beyond 
Kariba Gorge, although the furthest inland that a permanent fair was 
established was at Zumbo, in about 1716. 
The region's mineral output, however, did not meet the high 
expectations of the Portuguese. Although the gold trade was undoubtedly 
important the settlers failed to locate or control the output from any 
outstandingly rich deposits. African chiefs succeeded in preserving 
control over mining operations and were secretive about their locations. 
Moreover, much of the gold was obtained from alluvial deposits and, where 
veins of ore existed, they were generally shallow and rapidly exhausted. 
Silver proved to be extremely illusive and was never obtained in large 
quantities. Similarly, the trade in copper never achieved great importance. 
High expectations of mineral wealth in the region persisted throughout 
its colonial history despite the unpromising yields. More recent proposals 
for mineral exploitation are discussed in Chapter 4. 
The first Portuguese settlements, based on trading fairs, had a 
limited area of jurisdiction which did not extend to the adjacent lands 
and people. There were generally no more than ten settlers at each fair 
and their presence would have been impossible without the agreement of 
the local African chief. Their position was, however, strengthened by 
the decline of the powerful Karanga empire of Mwene Mutapa from the end 
of the fifteenth century. North of the Zambezi, the expanding Malawi 
kingdoms did not reach their peak until the mid -seventeenth century but 
were, in part, responsible for limiting Portuguese penetration into such 
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areas as Maravia until the late eighteenth century. 
On a number of occasions the Portuguese authorities assembled 
armies with the intention of asserting their dominance in the Zambezi 
valley, the first being in 1571. Their almost invariable failure 
resulted from strong African resistance, inability to maintain adequate 
supplies, inappropriate equipment and the effects of diseases such as 
malaria (the valley earned a reputation for being one of the most unhealthy 
regions in Africa). 
Military failure led to attempts to control the region by 
alternative means, principally through the prazo system. Prazos were 
parcels of land over which individual settlers were granted wide powers 
of jurisdiction on behalf of the crown. Although in some cases this was 
done with the agreement of African chiefs, large areas were forcibly 
expropriated. By the 1640s, almost the entire area of the south bank of 
the Zambezi, in a strip running from the delta 500 km upstream and 
extending up to 200 km in width, had been occupied in this way. Prazo 
holders were empowered to raise taxes and tributes from the Africans 
living'on their land, exerting their authority by maintaining slave 
armies. The system back -fired on Portugal when prazo holders increasingly 
began to assert their independence and, in many cases, to assume 
characteristics similar to those of African chieftaincies. Newitt (1969) 
summarized the development and influence, of the prazo system as follows: 
Historians are familiar with seeing African societies break up 
under the influence of prolonged contact with Europeans. On the 
Zambezi it was the European society which dissolved, while the 
African ... developed new institutions and a new type of organ- 
ization which proved better able than almost any other African 
society to resist European imperialism. Europeans and Indians 
came to the Zambezi in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
in search of land and gold. Their descendants, the prazo 
holders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, became 
absorbed in the African population and provided dynasties of 
chiefs for new tribal groupings. (p67) 
Histories of the Zambezi valley in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
concentrate on the various attempts by Portugal to regain authority over 
the rebellious prazos and on the long and bitter feuds which occurred 
between the different prazo dynasties. It was this feuding which weakened 
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their resistance and finally allowed Portugal to gain control in the 
early twentieth century. 
The region of 'The Rivers', which comprised the Zambezi valley 
and the adjoining coastal plain, was established by the Portuguese, in 
1635, and administered from Goa. In 1752, an administrative capital 
was established within the region, at Sena. Fifteen years later the 
capital was moved to Tete. The Administration's primary concern was 
the problem of controlling the prazos - a problem which became progres- 
sively more acute as fewer Europeans chose to settle in the region and 
existing prazo holders intermarried with Indian traders and African royal 
families. Proposals were made to stimulate renewed European settlement, 
for example in 1646, but were ineffective. It has been estimated that 
at no time before the twentieth century did the Portuguese population 
of the valley exceed a thousand; for much of the time it was considerably 
lower. Thus, concern to stimulate European settlement became a key 
feature in Portuguese plans to develop the region and remained so up to 
the time of Mozambique's independence. 
Although gold was originally bought from African producers, during 
the eighteenth century mine operation by prazo holders became more common, 
especially in the area north of Tete. Female slaves were used to perform 
the mining operations. Similarly, ivory was bought, from independent 
hunters, but prazo holders frequently organized their own hunting 
expeditions. By the start of the nineteenth century, trade in both 
gold and ivory was in decline with accessible deposits of ore exhausted 
and elephant herds seriously depleted. It was at this point that the 
slave trade began to expand. It has been estimated that, at its peak, 
over ten thousand slaves a year were taken from the valley. Attempts to 
ban slave trading in the mid -nineteenth century provoked further resistance 
towards Portuguese authority from the prazo holders. 
Agricultural production was, in general, of little economic 
importance on the prazos except in providing food for the prazo holder, 
his slaves and the African inhabitants. Cultivation was undertaken by 
the African population using traditional methods the main crops being 
sorghum, millet and,maize43. The prazo holder levied taxes from the 
African 'residents' which were generally paid in the form of such produce. 
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Although new crops, such as sugar and coffee, were occasionally 
introduced many prazo holders preferred to import these commodities. 
In periods of famine, caused by drought or locust attack, staple foods 
were also imported. 
Many observers believe that the Portuguese administration and the 
establishment of prazos in the Zambezi basin not only failed to increase 
agricultural production, before the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
but actually caused its decline. The extensive depopulation of the area 
produced by the slave trade, and by African migration to avoid the harsh 
conditions on many prazos or the effects of the increasingly bitter 
conflicts between prazo clans, had a considerable impact on rural 
production. For example, Ishemo (1978) suggests that, in the districts 
of Macanga, Angônia and Marávia, Africans were forced to flee from the 
fertile valleys which they had previously cultivated and to seek refuge 
in the much less fertile hills. Depopulation proceeded most rapidly 
during periods of harsh drought, such as that from 1823 to 1830, when 
many Africans were faced with the alternative of either dying of hunger 
or being taken into slavery. 
Nevertheless, many Portuguese believed that the agricultural potential 
of the Zambezi valley was high although, according to Newitt (1969): 
only in the eighteenth century did the idea of increasing the 
population of the Zambezi become more closely associated with 
the idea of developing the area agriculturally. (p73) 
Increasingly this idea became linked with that of establishing plantations 
so that: 
by the end of the nineteenth century most writers on Portuguese 
affairs assumed that prazos were intended to be plantations. 
(p74) 
In the late nineteenth century plantations were established in the 
coastal region, around Quelimane, but elsewhere in the basin few 
successful plantation schemes were created. In a later work, Newitt 
(1973) argues that prazo holders had neither the resources nor the 
inclination to develop plantation agriculture and likens Portuguese 
hopes of agricultural wealth with their equally unrealistic hopes of 
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mineral wealth: 
The prazo -holders could not have developed their estates into 
thriving plantations even had they wished, while the dreams 
of Eldorado in central Africa were totally unfounded - and 
were known to be unfounded ever since Vasco Homen found that 
the mines of Manica were only small river -side washings, and 
that the silver of Chicoa had no existence at all. Homen left 
the Zambezi in 1576, and from then until 1969, when the contracts 
for the building of Cabora Bassa dam were signed, there has never 
been any scheme for the economic development of the Zambezi 
valley which has had the slightest chance of success. (p153) 
The widely publicized writings of European explorers and the thirst 
for imperial possessions by European powers awakened increasing interest 
in many parts of Africa, including the Zambezi basin, in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. David Livingstone44 became the most celebrated 
explorer in the English speaking world although it is now recognized that 
in many of his journeys he was preceded, by decades if not centuries, by 
Portuguese explorers. Livingstone was an outspoken critic of the life- 
style of the Portuguese settlers whom he met in the lower Zambezi, of 
the continuing slave trade and of the failure of the Portuguese Admin- 
istration to achieve economic and social improvement in the region. Again, 
Livingstone was rarely breaking new ground. From time to time prominent 
Portuguese, including many inhabitants of the region, had expressed 
similar dismay at the lack of substantial development after three hundred 
years of colonial influence. For example, in 1827, during one of the 
severe droughts, eight citizens of Tete sent a report45 to the Governor 
of Mozambique advocating: 
a) abolition of the slave trade; 
b) widening of the Zambezi river bed to promote trade; 
c) making Quelimane into an international port; 
d) creating public works to improve the prosperity of Africans; 
e) setting up a properly staffed hospital in Tete for Africans; 
f) building a new elementary school; 
g) building a new municipal chamber; 
h) building a new prison; and 
i) arranging for the training of artisans and the establishment 
of workshops. 
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The authorities appear to have lacked both the resources and the 
inclination to invest in the region in this way. Interest in the mineral 
potential, however, persisted. For example, in 1857, the President of 
the Commission of Mines in Tete was asked to prepare a report on gold, 
iron and coal deposits in the Tete area for the Governor of 'Quelimane 
e Rios da Sena'46. 
For the present study, the most interesting parts of Livingstone's 
findings are those which concern the navigation potential of the lower 
Zambezi. Livingstone believed that navigation from the river's mouth 
would provide the basis for the establishment of British colonies on the 
Batoka Plateau (Zambia) where he intended to prove that 'enough sugar 
and cotton could be grown to make the area a commercial paradise'47. 
Neither he nor his government sponsors had acquainted themselves with 
the nature of the intervening rapids at Cabora Bassa Gorge, despite the 
fact that they had been reported as early as 1616, by the explorer Caspar 
Boccaro48, nor had they asked themselves why, if the advantages of such 
a project seemed so obvious, the Portuguese settlers in the area had not 
established the proposed navigation link long before. 
During his expedition of 1858 Livingstone discovered five serious 
obstacles to his plan to open the Zambezi to navigation: 
(i) it took him almost three weeks to locate a navigable channel 
through which to enter the mouth of the river from the Indian 
Ocean; 
(ii) his ocean steamer, the Pearl, could only penetrate the river for 
about 80 km; 
(iii) his intention to chart a navigable channel along the river proved 
unrealistic when it was discovered: 
that shifting sandbanks altered all the channels dozens of times 
within a single year49; 
(iv) even his shallow steamer the Ma- Robert, which drew less than a metre, 
could not navigate certain stretches so that they: 
spent days aground on sandbanks while all of them sweated with winches 
and cables to get the Ma Robert off. Sometimes 150 miles (250 km) 
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from the sea the river was less than 2 feet (0.6 m) deep *50; 
(v) finally, having reached Cabora Bassa Gorge Livingstone discovered 
the true nature of the rapids and realised that even his suggestion 
of blasting a navigable channel was completely unrealistic. 
Livingstone's attention then turned towards the Shire River and 
the highlands of present -day Malawi. He discovered that navigation up 
the Shire was easier than up the Zambezi, except that the steamer's 
paddles became choked with aquatic vegetation. Thereafter, until the 
Trans -Zambezia Railway bridge was completed in 1935, navigation along the 
Zambezi and Shire rivers became the principal means of access for the 
British settlers who followed Livingstone * *. 
Despite the difficult conditions, the trading network along the 
Zambezi was dependent on river navigation until well into the twentieth 
century. Until the end of the nineteenth century river transport was by 
canoes paddled by Africans although in places, notably at the delta and 
between Tete and Chicoa (past Cabora Bassa Gorge), teams of porters carried 
the goods by land. Following Livingstone's introduction of a steamer onto 
the Zambezi, the Portuguese began operating two steamers despite the fact 
that transport by canoe remained considerably easier. 
Navigation through the delta region was a particular hazard because 
of the speed with which channels became choked with silt or with trees 
and other vegetation. In the period from the 1770s to the 1830s prazo 
* Livingstone made five trips from the mouth to Tete between May and 
November 1858. He was, therefore, experiencing the worst of the dry 
season conditions. 
** The development of water resources in Malawi and, in particular, 
the hydroelectric development of the Middle Shire and the agricultural 
development of the lower Shire would form an interesting subject for 
further study. Livingstone, himself, had extravagent visions of how 
the region might be developed as Jeal (1973) records: 
'As they steamed north, it was not long before Livingstone began 
to imagine rice, cotton and sugar -cane growing on the flat plains that 
extended for miles on both sides of the river. Soon he had even 
persuaded himself that the Shire's potential might be as great as the 
Nile's. But since the country was flat and has a tendency to flood, 
Livingstone had to admit that there was a fair chance that it would 
be unhealthy.' (p215) 
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holders in the delta region were required, by the authorities, to use 
their slaves to maintain clear navigation channels but many failed to 
do so. The delta and lower river were also used by British boats 
following the establishment of settlers on the Shire highlands. The 
Portuguese attempted, in 1875 to establish a monopoly over navigation 
but were forced to withdraw, following British protests. The dispute 
subsequently became the subject of a treaty with Britain. 
D J Rankin51 was another British traveller who followed Livingstone 
to the Zambezi. In his journeys, which took him as far inland as the 
Luangwa basin, Rankin was impressed by what he believed to be the 
considerable commercial prospects of the region for agricultural and mineral 
production. In his attempts to stimulate the navigation necessary to develop 
this potential he discovered a hitherto little used channel in the delta 
which appeared to provide a substantial draught for boats and, in 1887, he 
established the port of Chinde at its mouth. Although the port prospered 
for five years, it declined subsequently because of heavy siltation of 
the channel. 
It was, in part, the activities of such people as Livingstone, Rankin 
and the British settlers on the Shire which forced the Portuguese to give 
greater consideration to the economic development of the Zambezi basin. 
Later, Rhodes' imperial designs on central Africa, threatening to drive the 
Portuguese out of the region south of the Zambezi, increased the pressure 
on them to assert their presence. In the 'scramble for Africa' in the 
1880s Portugal found itself in an extremely vulnerable position. The 
Portuguese claim over large areas of the Zambezi basin, including regions 
within present -day Zambia and Zimbabwe, was contested by stronger European 
powers. Ultimately, the international boundaries which were imposed at the 
1888 Berlin Conference reflect the balance of politial forces and interests 
at that time rather than a rational division of the region into geographically 
or economically defined units. Yet these boundaries remain a strong 
determining factor in the development of the region. 
Attempts to reform the prazo system continued as the main pre- 
occupation of the Portuguese authorities throughout the nineteenth century. 
Following failure to achieve reform by legislation (the radical laws of 
1854 being ineffectual) or by force (the military campaigns of the 1860s 
ending in disaster), Portugal eventually began to gain control by 
economic means. In the 1870s improvements were made to the port 
facilities at Quelimane and, thereafter, a new type of concession was 
introduced in which short -term leases were granted, on a commercial basis, 
over the prazos in Zambézia. This led to an expansion of plantation 
agriculture in that region. The first such concession, in 1874, was for 
growing poppies on a 20 000 ha prazo near Mopeia together with the 
granting of a monopoly over opium exports for a period of twelve years. 
The concession eventually fell under the control of J P Hornung, a 
British citizen of Hungarian descent, who changed to sugar production 
when the opium business failed and, in due course, established the Sena 
Sugar Estates *. 
During the 1870s commercialization of non -plantation production also 
expanded, particularly in the region downstream of Lupata Gorge. Copra 
sesame and groundnuts became increasingly important as European demand 
for vegetable oils grew. A demand for wild rubber led to high levels of 
production for a short period in the 1880s. The level of production may 
be gauged by a report, by Rankin (1893), that, in 1892, 5 000 t of ground- 
nuts and 200 t of sesame seeds were exported from the valley whilst, in 
1891, 20 t of rubber was exported. 
Rankin and Kerr (1886) reported a wide diversity of crops being grown 
in the valley although in the region upstream of Lupata Gorge they painted 
a picture of commercial stagnation and agricultural decline. The neglect 
of Tete Province continued well into the twentieth century, as information 
gathered by the MFPZ52 from contemporary reports confirms. Almost the 
entire output was derived from peasant production. Newitt (1973,p365) 
cites evidence to suggest that, within Tete Province, the entire area 
under European cultivation in 1914 was only about 2 600 ha. The principal 
estates, in the Revúboé and Mavuzi basins, had been planted with such crops 
as sisal, coconut, rubber, kapok, sesame, groundnuts, potatoes, coffee, 
tobacco, citrus fruits and cassava, but there is no record of any significant 
* The Mopeia plantation was irrigated, at first by ditches and later by 
iron pipes which carried water pumped from the river. This system largely 
overcame the problem of drought, which had previously affected plantation 
agriculture, but the land remained vulnerable to flood damage in wet, 
years (for example, 1889). This problem was later overcome by dike 
construction. 
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or sustained commercial output from these plantations. 
By contrast, the plantations in Zambézia Province covered 25 000 ha 
by 1914 and were producing 10 000 t /yr of copra and 25 000 t /yr of sugar. 
These plantations continued to expand in the 1920s when sugar exports 
reached a sustained level of 70 000 t /yr. Their expansion was, however, 
dependent on obtaining an adequate and cheap supply of labour for which 
recruitment took place over a wide area, including large areas of Tete 
Province. 
The first attempts to obtain labour for the new plantations of the 
delta region were confined to coercing the Africans living on the concession 
area to work within the plantation. The natural response of many was to 
flee. As a result plantation owners sought to acquire ever larger concession 
areas simply to provide labour for their existing plantations. The State 
became increasingly involved in the process of labour recruitment, at first 
by allowing Africans to provide labour in leiu of taxes and later by 
becoming more directly involved in the process of coercion. However, until 
the 1930s, Portugal was unable to provide direct administration for the 
whole of Mozambique and, as a result, introduced, for a period, a new type 
of regime based on a development of the system of indirect administration 
under the prazos. The new system involved granting wide powers of 
administration over large areas of the country to land companies supported 
largely by foreign capital. 
The Mozambique Company, formed in 1888 and granted a charter in 1891, 
was given control over much of the present -day Manica and Sofala Provinces 
including the south bank of the Zambezi valley. Smaller companies, 
including the Campanhia do Boror, the Société du Madal, and the forerunners 
of the Sena Sugar Estates, were granted concessions in the richer lands 
of the coastal plain north of the river where they established, or 
continued, plantation production. The remaining lands north of the river, 
together with much of Tete Province, were controlled by the Campanhia da 
Zambézia. This company was established for speculative mineral prospecting 
and had little interest in agriculture beyond that of recruiting labour, 
from its concession area, for plantations elsewhere. Large areas were, 
however, offered as sub -concessions to other companies or individuals, some 
of whom undertook agriculatural production. 
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In the early twentieth century the plantation companies expanded 
rapidly. Boror established very large coconut plantations along the coast 
near Quelimane. Sena Sugar began production at Mopeia, Sena, Marromeu 
and Luabo although production ceased at the first two during the recession 
of the 1930s. Further inland a number of sisal and tea plantations were 
also established. Generally speaking, all these plantations had a low 
productivity in terms of both land and labour. Very little mechanization 
was used and the introduction of fertilizers or new crop varieties was 
rarely attempted. Even draught animals were not introduced on a large 
scale until the late 1930s. 
Even in those concessions where plantation agriculture was practised, 
peasant production of food crops remained important. Surpluses were 
purchased to feed the plantation workers but, since the companies had a 
monopoly over commercial acitivites within their concession area, there 
was a tendency for them to impose low prices on producers and high prices 
on consumers with the result that production declined. Continuing African 
migration away from concession areas, and the introduction of forced 
cotton and rice production within many concessions after 1938, led to a 
further decline in peasant production of food. In this way, the Zambezi 
valley was increasingly transformed into a labour reserve not only for 
the plantations but also for mining and agricultural interests in South 
Africa and Rhodesia. 
In 1930, with the establishment of Salazar's Estado Novo in Portugal, 
the State replaced the indirect administration of the land companies by 
direct administration over the whole of Mozambique for the first time. 
In the Zambezi valley this included a direct involvement in labour recruitment 
for the plantations. Newitt (1973) suggests that the system which was 
developed was more efficient and, therefore, less humane leading to 
increasingly harsh exploitation of African labour and, at the same time, 
producing a decline in economic activity and production. He concluded: 
Since 1930 there has probably been no more depressed and inert 
area of Africa than Zambesia, Barue and Sofala, and the great 
river is probably more silent now, more devoid of traffic and 
bustle than at any time for a thousand years. All may well be 
transformed by the building of the Cabora Bassa dam, but that 
is still in the future. (p376) 
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Statistics for agricultural production in the valley, which were 
collected as part of the MFPZ's investigations, provide an indication 
of the stagnant state of agriculture in the region throughout the whole 
period from 1930 to 1960. For example, in 1963, only about 2.3% of the 
basin area within Mozambique was included in forestry or agricultural 
concessions (363 concessions covering 330 x 103 ha)53. Of the area 
covered by concessions, 76% lay in Zambézia Province whilst only 7% lay 
in Tete and 17% in Manica /Sofala. Five large concessionaires accounted 
for 58% of the total area: the Zambézia, Sena Sugar. Madal and Boror 
companies together with Sr. R B P Lopes. Even within concession areas 
only a small proportion of the land was cultivated in any one year. Thus, 
in 1958, only about 13% of the total concession area was under cultivation: 
approximately 400 ha in Tete, 7 000 ha in Manica /Sofala and 31 000 ha 
in ZambéziaS4. Cotton production had expanded under the system of forced 
cultivation to reach a total of 87 000 t /yr in 195555, but the system, 
which was highly inefficient and inhumane, provoked such strong resistance 
from the African population that it was dropped in the 1960s. 
Livestock, principally cattle and goats, were kept by the local 
people in parts of Tete and were reared commercially in the floodplain 
by a number of the plantation companies. The MFPZ56 was extremely 
critical of indigenous stock rearing and claimed that serious over -stocking 
resulted. The number of cattle around the city of Tete in the early 
1960s was reported to be about 60 000 and in Angola about 50 000. Else- 
where in the Tete Province tse -tse fly infestation limited cattle numbers. 
In the years between 1930 and 1948 the Portuguese authorities did 
little to promote the economic development of the Zambezi valley; an 
inadequate transportation system remained one of the principal constraints. 
Consideration was given to the possibility of damming the gorge at Cabora 
Bassa and providing locks in order to improve downstream navigation and 
enable boats to reach the middle Zambezi *. In 1927, Sousa e Silva57, 
suggested that such a dam could also generate hydroelectric power. 
Nevertheless, the authorities undertook no surveys or investigations 
either of a topographical or hydrological nature. 
* See, for example, the 1911 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica. 
55 
Relatively large cargoes were transported at that time in the 
delta region and along the Shire but river transport on the Zambezi was 
slow and hazardous58 with the result that the volumes transported upstream 
of Mutarara were small. For example, in 1908, vessels powered by steam 
or sail carried a total of only 1 000 t of cargo upstream to Tete, 
returning with approximately 300 t. By 1940, the combined upstream and 
downstream cargoes totalled about 8 000 t /yr59 a large part of which 
presumably comprised the exports of coal from the mine at Moatize. 
Within ten years the completion of a rail link to Moatize largely displaced 
navigation upstream of the Shire confluence, although, as late as 1958, 
seven vessels were reported to be operating on this section of river 
(the largest had a capacity of 9 t and a draught of 0.55 m; and all but 
one were powered by sail). 
The construction of the railway may, indeed, be regarded as an 
important economic development but it arose not from a Portuguese 
initiative but from the demands of British interests in Nyasaland (Malawi). 
In 1922, a line had been constructed from Beira to Sena with the intention 
of transporting goods from the rail head by boat to Port Herald (Chiromo). 
This became increasingly difficult as a result of progressive siltation of 
the Shire. Attempts were made to resolve the difficulties by extending 
the Nyasaland railway downstream but problems were still encountered until 
the river link was eliminated by building a bridge over the Zambezi, at 
Mutarara, in 1935*. The Sena Sugar Estates quickly took advantage of the 
link between Beira and Sena by constructing a line from Sena to Marromeu 
and agreeing to transport all the sugar from that factory by rail in 
return for very favourable rates. It was not until 1950, however, that the 
Portuguese authorities took advantage of the Mutarara bridge by building 
the line along the north bank of the river to Moatize. No new lines have 
been constructed since 1950 apart from an improved route to Marromeu from 
Inhaminga. 
* It would have been more logical to have built the railway from Quelimane 
rather than Beira in the first place but, at the time, Britain feared a 
collapse of Portuguese authority in Mozambique and under an earlier 
agreement between Britain and Germany the northern half of Mozambique, 
including the port of Quelimane, would have fallen under German control. 
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The development of the basin upstream of Cabora Bassa 
Before proceeding to a discussion of more recent developments in 
the Zambezi basin within Mozambique it is necessary to study, in rather 
less detail, the historical origins and principal characteristics of 
river regulation works upstream. The Kariba and Kafue Projects, discussed 
in a separate section below, provide the only reservoir storage at 
present capable of exerting an appreciable degree of direct influence 
over the inflows to Lake Cabora Bassa. Nevertheless, a more general 
description of water resources development in Zambia and Zimbabwe is 
included so as to set the present study within the broader context of 
river regulation and development in the basin as a whole. 
It is only during the last hundred years that European settlers have 
had a significant influence in the Zambezi basin, upstream of Cabora Bassa. 
Prior to this over much of the region, where population densities were 
relatively low, the inhabitants largely depended on shifting agriculture 
supplemented by hunting, gathering and fishing60. In the floodplains of 
the major rivers, higher population densities were supported through the 
cultivation of permanent or semi -permanent gardens close to the river. 
Cattle were also kept in certain regions, particularly around the Kafue 
Flats, where the annual cycle of flooding provided large areas of grassland 
which supported the large herds through the dry winter months. Floodplains, 
such as the Kafue Flats and Lukanga Swamps, were also rich fishing grounds. 
Fishing continues to provide an important source of protein in Zambia; in 
many areas fish is eaten in far greater quantities than meat. 
During, and prior to, the nineteenth century individual explorers, 
hunters and missionaries had penetrated the upper basin from both the east 
and west coasts, but the routes did not afford ready access for permanent 
settlement. Thus, it was not until Cecil Rhodes, and his companions of 
the British South Africa Company, began forcing their way north through the 
region of Zimbabwe that the upper basin was finally opened to exploitation 
by European settlers. Coming from the south, they encountered the 
Zambezi as an obstacle to their easy penetration of the region north of 
the river. It was for this reason that the river was eventually chosen 
as an inter -territorial boundary. Had navigation along the river been the 
initial means of access to the region partition in this way would have 
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been extremely unlikely. 
The first bridge over the Zambezi was built in 1904 in a location, 
chosen by Rhodes, to give a commanding view of the Victoria Falls. It 
had been intended to incorporate this in the proposed Cape to Cairo 
railway. The other major crossing point at that time was at Chirundo 
where a ferry existed for passengers and, later, vehicles. This was 
replaced by a road bridge in the 1940s. Navigation along the river was 
attempted by a number of explorers in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries but, despite repeated suggestions that commercial navigation 
could be developed, the waterway was never used61. This resulted, in part, 
from a British preference for developing communication links with South 
Africa but, more importantly, from the realization that developing the 
Zambezi as a transport route would be both difficult and expensive 
because of the rapids at Cabora Bassa and Kariba Gorges and the shallow 
sandy reaches in the Mozambican plain. Upstream of the Victoria Falls 
attempts were also made to develop navigation but, here too, the 
maintenance of a transport route would have been too expensive relative 
to the likely volume of traffic 
The first proposals for major water engineering works concerned the 
hydroelectric power potential of the Victoria Falls. At the time these 
plans were conceived, the power demand of the newly developed mines in 
Zimbabwe was relatively modest and the minerals of Zambia lay unexploited. 
In consequence, there was no local demand for energy comparable with the 
potential supply. It was proposed, therefore, that the electrical energy 
would be transmitted to the Transvaal to meet the rapidly increasing demand 
of the gold mines. As early as 1905, Esson wrote: 
The utilization of the Victoria Falls for the purpose of transmitting 
power electrically to the Rand is no new scheme, though only 
recently has it been brought prominently before the public6S. 
It is interesting to note the similarity between this early proposal 
for hydroelectric development in the Zambezi basin and the eventual 
Cabora Bassa Project. Both incorporated transmission lines of exceptional 
length designed to carry virtually all of the generated output to the 
Transvaal. The Victoria Falls Scheme had twin transmission lines 1 100 km 
long carrying three phase alternating current at a phase voltage of 60 kV 
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with an extremely low frequency, either 3.5 or 7 Hz64. Each line could 
have carried the full load should the other have been unavailable. 
The initial installed capacity of the project was to have been 22.5 MW, 
very modest by present standards. 
The project sparked off considerable controversy in the technical 
press. For example, it was argued, by Hammond (1905), on the basis of 
Esson's calculation of capital costs together with an assumed value for 
total line and transformer losses of 33 %, that thermal power generation 
located at the head of coal mines in the Transvaal would have considerable 
economic advantage. Nevertheless, the supporters of the Victoria Falls 
Scheme managed to maintain interest in the proposal and to attract 
speculative capital. As a result, in 1906, they were able to launch a 
company with monopoly rights to power generation at the Victoria Falls - 
The Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company. Although, not 
surprisingly, the original scheme was never implemented, the rights 
granted to operate as an electrical power utility in the Transvaal enabled 
the company to gain a foothold and to begin supplying the mines with 
power from local coal -fired stations. From this beginning it developed 
to become the largest and most lucrative private power utility in the RSA. 
It was finally incorporated within the national electricity supply 
organization, Escom, in 1948. 
Meanwhile the power potential of the Victoria Falls was neglected 
by the company. In fact, when, in 1906, a source of electrical power 
was sought for the nearby town of Livingstone (which served as the 
administrative capital of Northern Rhodesia from 1889 to 1924) a small 
thermal generating unit was installed. 
Southern Rhodesia's public and industrial supply of electrical 
energy was based, almost exclusively on thermal generation from the time 
of the earliest installations until 1959. The substantial reserves of 
coal, at Wankie, which became the principal source of fuel for this supply 
were also used to provide power for the initial exploitation of minerals 
at the Broken Hill mines of Northern Rhodesia. In 1925, however, a dam 
was constructed above a gorge on the Mulungushi River (a tributary of the 
Luangwa) and a 2 MW hydroelectric generator was installed65. Subsequent 
additions, in 1927 and 1945, brought the scheme's total installed capacity 
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to 20.6 MW. In 1945, the mining company began a new project on the 
nearby Lunsemfwa River. Initially, this was a run -of -river project 
with an installed capacity of 12 MW but, with completion of the Mita 
Falls Dam in 1958, reservoir storage was provided which allowed the 
installed capacity to be increased to 18 MW. Nevertheless, the power 
demand of the Broken Hill mines was small compared with that of the copper 
mines which were rapidly expanding in the northern part of the Kafue 
catchment. Because of their distance form the Victoria Falls (500 km) 
it was initially considered more economical to import coal by rail from 
Wankie to the Copperbelt, than to use hydroelectric power. At a later 
stage this decision had important political and economic repercussions 
when the Copperbelt began to suffer power shortages as a result of 
difficulties in hauling an adequate supply of coal along the congested 
railway line. 
The installation of the first hydroelectric generators at the 
Victoria Falls was completed in 1938. The project was a simple run -of- 
river scheme, of 2 MW, designed solely to meet the growing demand around 
Livingstone. The station's installed capacity was increased in stages 
and reached 8 MW by 1955. With the construction of the CAPC high voltage 
transmission network, to carry power from Kariba, it became feasible for 
the first time to connect the Victoria Falls to the areas of heavy energy 
demand in the Zambian Copperbelt and in Zimbabwe. A second run -of -river 
power station was built in 1969, with six 10 MW generating sets, and a 
third was added in 1972, (with four 10 MW sets)66. The Victoria Falls 
schemes have been operated throughout by the authorities in Zambia; 
there has been no power development on the Zimbabwean side of the falls. 
The present installed capacity is thought to be the maximum which could 
be justified for a run -of -river project. Proposals have been made, at 
various times, to provide upstream storage so that the firm power 
potential might be increased. However, there are few suitable sites for 
dams. Furthermore, any reservoirs which could be formed would have large 
surface areas and be relatively shallow and would, therefore, suffer 
large evaporation losses. The social and environmental implications of 
such projects are also significant (see Chapter 6). 
Upstream of Cabora Bassa large -scale hydroelectric installations 
are feasible only on the main Zambezi and on the Kafue. Nevertheless, 
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some suitable sites exist for smaller projects on tributary rivers; 
such as those on the Mulungushi and Lunsemfwa rivers described above. 
In Zimbabwe there are a number of small private and industrial generators 
in operation on tributaries of the Zambezi but their individual capacity 
is generally below 1 MW. In Zambia, the most suitable sites are those 
on tributaries of the Luangwa. As well as the Mulungushi and Lunsemfwa 
projects there is also a hydroelectric station on the Lusiwasi, built 
in 1971, with an installed capacity of 6 MW; and expanded, in 1974, 
to 12 MW. 
An important aspect of water resources development in the Zambezi 
basin, particularly in Zimbabwe, has been the introduction of European 
style agriculture and the use of irrigation. Initially European settlers, 
in both Zambia and Zimbabwe, practised either dryland arable cultivation 
or stock rearing. In Zimbabwe, where European agriculture was initially 
concentrated along the broad plateau which marks the watershed of the 
Zambezi, the expansion of irrigated agriculture has been relatively recent. 
The increase in total reservoir storage in Zimbabwe from 1958 to 1973, 
shown in Figure 5, indicates the extent of this expansion, although the 
data include dams in parts of Zimbabwe outside the Zambezi basin, and 
also include Lake Kariba. They, nevertheless, show the rapid increase 
that occurred in the number of both large and small impoundments during 
the 1958 to 1973 period. As a result the total irrigated area in 
Zimbabwe increased from approximately 10 x 103 ha to five times that 
area in the same period. Projects in the Limpopo and Sabi basins, in 
the south and east of the country accounted for a large proportion of this 
increase but on at least one tributary of the Zambezi, the Mazoe*, 
significant development of irrigation has taken place. The first large 
dam was constructed there as early as 1918. when the British South Africa 
Company began a 2.4 x 103 ha citrus estate. This dam was heightened, in 
1961, to increase the storage capacity67. Elsewhere in the Mazoe basin 
the Wengi Dam, begun in 1968, was designed with an initial capacity of 
12 x 106 m' and an ultimate capacity of 43 x 106 m3 to provide irrigation 
for up to 4 x 103 ha68. 
Irrigation on a much larger scale was the objective of those who 
* This triburary joins the Luenha, the largest south bank tributary of 
the Zambezi downstream of Cabora Bassa. 
62 
proposed one of the earliest schemes to regulate the Zambezi. The 
proposals, which were based on major surveys undertaken in 1925 and 
1945, entailed a major diversion to the south of water from the Zambezi 
upstream of the Victoria Falls in order to irrigate the Okovango Delta 
in Botswana. Following the decision to build the Kariba Dam it was 
concluded that the hydrological requirements of the Kariba Project would 
not allow such.a diversion to be made. Nevertheless, Wellington (1950) 
reassessed the previous reports and concluded that, even without water 
from the Zambezi, it would be possible to irriagte 800 x 103 ha of former 
swamps; although he did not discuss the possible environmental effects 
of such a scheme. He supported the view of a former colonial official 
that the Okovango Delta was 'a potential Egypt in Southern Africa'. 
Phrases such as 'the breadbasket of Africa' occurred.frequently in 
the writings of Wellington's contemporaries as they studied the Zambezi 
basin. Two areas to which this phrase was particularly applied were the 
Barotse Plain and the Kafue Flats, both of which are extensive, seasonally 
inundated, floodplains in Zambia. Of the two, the agricultural development 
of the Kafue Flats is under more active consideration at present. In 
either case, however, the far -reaching hydrological and environmental 
changes which would result from implementing such proposals will have to 
be carefully considered if the overall result is to be wholly beneficial. 
Water extraction for industrial and municipal consumption is not 
a major factor in the management of water resources in most parts of the 
Zambezi basin. Groundwater is used extensively in both Zimbabwe and 
Zambia and, even where surface water is used, the quantities are relatively 
small. For example, part of Lusaka's supply is carried from the Kafue 
along a 60 km pipeline which has a capacity of 90 x 103 m3 /day (33 x 106 
m3 /yr)69. Kitwe draws slightly greater quantities from the Kafue. But 
together these two cities consume less than 1% of the river's mean annual 
discharge. The largest reservoir for municipal supply in the Zambezi basin 
is at Darwendale, on the Hunyani tributary in Zimbabwe. This reservoir, 
which is one of five built to supplement the original groundwater supplies 
to Harare, has a capacity of 490 x 106 
m370. 
Other changes in the catchment of the Zambezi have had important effects 
on its runoff characteristics and on the transport of sediment. These 
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include processes such as the replacement of natural vegetation by 
European agriculture, the felling of trees for timber and the increase 
in population densities around urban centres and in certain rural areas 
such as the 'tribal lands' to which the local people were displaced by 
settlers. The implications of such changes for the management of water 
resources downstream are discussed in later parts of the thesis (see 
Chapter 5 and Appendix 6). 
The Kariba and Kafue Projects 
Proposals for engineering works in Kariba Gorge were first put 
forward at the end of the nineteenth century although its hydroelectric 
potential was not formally considered until 1925. The principal 
investigations and proposals for projects in the gorge may be summarized 
as follows71: 
1891: a survey of the gorge by W K Steer who reconnoitred the route for 
a possible railway crossing; 
1898: Sir Charles Metcalfe considered bridging the Zambezi at Kariba 
to take the Cape to Cairo railway; 
1912: a report by H S Keigwin, who considered that the country offered 
attractive irrigation possibilities; 
1914: the flow of the Zambezi was measured at Kariba to determine the 
irrigation potential of the area; 
1925: the comprehensive study entitled 'Water Power Resources in Southern 
Rhodesia' prepared by the Hydrographic Engineer of the Southern Rhodesia 
Government considered the power potential at Kariba and Mpata gorges as 
well as at the Victoria Falls; 
1927: a report by P H Haviland to the Rhodesia Base Metals Syndicate 
on possible hydroelectric development at Kariba (His opening remarks 
stated that, with the amount of power available at the Victoria Falls, 
power production at Kariba need not be considered); 
1937: a South African periodical suggested that a hydroelectric dam, 
60 m high, at Kariba was capable of revolutionizing the economies of 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia; and 
1941: investigations by the Electricity Supply Commission of Southern 
Rhodesia at the Kariba Gorge for power development, including survey 
work in the gorge until 1944. 
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Despite this long history of interest in Kariba Gorge there had 
been very little systematic survey work carried out before 1941. This 
was largely because of the remote location of the gorge and its position 
on the inter -territorial boundary. Moreover, there were no hydrological 
stations on this section of the Zambezi until 1943 when gauge records 
were begun at Chirundu, downstream of the gorge72. No gauge was 
established in the gorge itself until 1949. 
In the 1940s the proposed project at Kariba became the centre of 
increasing political controversy. In 1945, the British Government set up 
a co- ordinating body, the Central African Council, which became the fore- 
runner of the Federation which was later established between the colony 
of Southern Rhodesia and the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. This council, in 1946, appointed an Inter -Territorial Hydro - 
Electric Power Commission: 
to study the possibilities of the Kariba and Kafue hydro- electric 
power projects and an other large sources of power available 
for joint development/ 3. 
bitter debate was soon underway over the relative merits of the Kariba 
and Kafue Projects; a debate which closely reflected the attitudes of 
politicians from different parts of the region to the whole idea of a 
Central African Federation. 
Despite its broad terms of reference, politicians in Southern 
Rhodesia regarded the Hydro -Electric Commission solely as an instrument 
through which the Kariba Project could be implemented. Their aim was to 
build, within ten years, a dam at Kariba; this was considered to be the 
only site, wholly or partly within their territory, which could produce 
sufficient energy to meet their predicted demand over the next twenty 
years and, thereby, avoid further investment in thermal plant. They wished 
to avoid an expansion of thermal generation in order to conserve their 
coal deposits for metallurgical processing and to prevent further congestion 
on the railway network which transported the coal to the power stations. 
However, it was not possible for Southern Rhodesia to proceed with the 
Kariba Project by itself because the reservoir would flood parts of 
Northern Rhodesia; because the cost would have been too high for one 
territory to have borne by itself; and because the predicted energy demand 
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in Southern Rhodesia, although increasing rapidly, would not have been 
high enough to justify the building of a hydroelectric project of Kariba'a 
size. 
By contrast, the authorities in Northern Rhodesia were not interested 
in co- operating in the construction of Kariba Dam but were interested 
solely in the Kafue Project. Their arguments were that the Copperbelt 
needed power as soon as possible (the proposed Kafue Project could begin 
generating sooner than that at Kariba), that the Kafue Project would 
require a smaller financial investment and might even prove to be cheaper 
per unit output, that its site was more accessible and would require 
shorter electrical transmission lines, that the Kafue basin also offered 
the possibility of large -scale irrigation development, and, finally and 
of considerable importance, that the Kafue Project would be located wholly 
within Northern Rhodesia and would enable the territory to achieve greater 
economic independence from Southern Rhodesia than had hitherto been 
possible. 
In purely technical terms the Kafue Project seemed, at first, to 
be preferable. The technology required - tunnels and pipes leading water 
from a small diversion dam to a surface power station further down the 
gorge - was well developed whereas few dams of the size proposed for 
Kariba had been constructed at that time. Hydrological records had 
been kept over a long period at a point close to Kafue Gorge whereas 
no records of adequate length were available for a site close to Kariba 
Gorge, hydrological calculations for this project being based on records 
at the Victoria Falls. In addition, the Kafue Project involved no major 
impoundment whereas a large displacement of population would be caused 
by the reservoir created by the Kariba Dam. However, the creation of 
this reservoir was an important factor in Kariba's favour since the 
storage capacity it provided would make the calculations of guaranteed 
power output less dependent on values for the minimum discharges of the 
river and, therefore, less vulnerable to poor hydrological forecasts 
arising from the inadequacy of the available data. 
The debate reached its height in the early 1950s as the following 
summary of events indicates74: 
December 1950: a report on the Kariba Project, prepared by a team of 
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consulting engineers appointed by the Inter -Territorial Commission, 
recommended that the Kariba Dam should be built because the hydrological 
and topographical information for the Kafue Project were considered to 
be inadequate and because forecasts of electricity demand indicated 
that Kafue could only provide a short -term solution to energy 
requirements; 
October 1951: the authorities in Northern Rhodesia instructed the same 
consultants to prepare a report investigating the possibility of a 
smaller scheme (200 MW) on the Kafue to be completed as soon as possible, 
but allowing for extension and integration into a Federal power 
network at a later date; 
1952: temporary arrangements were negotiated between the mining companies 
on the Copperbelt and the Union Minière du Haut Katanga to import energy 
from La Marine' hydroelectric scheme on the Lualaba River (at least 
450 GWh /yr with a maximum power of 50 MW to be made available for a 
minimum of five years from 1957); 
29 January 1953: the report from the consultants on the amended Kafue 
Project indicated that its energy would initially be cheaper than that 
from Kariba but that the latter would be cheaper once its ultimate capacity 
was reached (it was also suggested that the first stage hydrological 
potential at Kafue Gorge in the driest year had been over estimated 
and should be reduced to 186 MW at 80% load factor); 
7 September 1953: the authorities in Northern Rhodesia with the full support 
of the mining companies including the Anglo- American Corporation, 
allocated £1 million for preliminary civil and geological works at 
Kafue on the understanding that the Federal Government would continue 
the project after the passing of the Act of Federation later in the same 
year; 
March 1954: in a debate on the Hydro -Electric Power Bill in the newly 
created Federal Parliament, Prime Minister Huggins contradicted an earlier 
assurance by his Minister of Commerce and Industry and asserted that 
promises made by the Northern Rhodesians to finance Kafue could no 
longer be fulfilled since finance could only be made available through 
the Federal Government; 
June 1954: Sir William Halcrow, one of the original consultants, made 
a speech in which he argued that both Kariba and Kafue should be 
built but that the argument for Kafue to be built first, based on 
the urgent need for power in the Copperbelt, had been weakened by the 
67 
Katanga power deal; 
28 June 1954: Huggins announced that the World Bank was prepared to 
provide a loan but that revised reports on the two projects would first 
be prepared by a team of French experts - these reports were published 
three months later and André Coyne was invited to help evaluate them; 
January 1955: Coyne advised whole- hearted support for the Kariba Project, 
which required an arch dam of the type developed by Coyne and on which 
he was later to be appointed chief design consultant, and suggested a 
means to accelerate the construction programme for the Kariba Dam; 
March 1955: the Kariba Project was formally approved by the Federal 
Government, with power to be available by 1960, although negotations 
about finance had not been completed; 
July 1955: the World Bank, which had previously refused to undertake its 
own assessment of the relative merits of the two projects, announced 
its decision to provide finance for the Kariba Project and formalized 
the agreement in January 1956 with a loan of an unspecified amount; 
1956: a bitter debate took place in the Federal parliament in which 
back -bench members from Northern Rhodesia, annoyed both by the rejection 
of the Kafue Project and the decision to site the first stage power 
station on the south bank at Kariba, called for work at Kariba to be 
stopped (there were also protest meetings in Lusaka and a petition 
was sent to the Queen); and 
December 1958: the impounding of Lake Kariba began. 
A summary of the technical details of the Kariba Project may be 
found in Appendix 1. Full details may be found in the references75. 
Other aspects of the project, including its hydrological and siltation 
characteristics and its social and environmental effects, are discussed 
in later chapters of this thesis. 
A federal power authority, which later became the Central African 
Power Corporation (CAPC), was established to operate the 600 MW* project 
and the associated high voltage transmission network. This arrangement 
was continued despite the break -up of the Federation in 1963, the 
independence of Zambia in 1964 and the UDI declaration by the white 
minority in Southern Rhodesia in 1966. Within a year of UDI, the Zambian 
* The installed capacity of the South Bank Power Station was later up- 
rated by over 10%. 
68 
authorities, fearing that their power supplies might be endangered, 
since neither the control centre for the power station nor that for the 
transmission network were within Zambia, obtained financial support 
from the World Bank for a resumption of work on the Kafue Project; the 
Bank refused to support Zambia's alternative proposal to build the 
North Bank Station at Kariba. Even before this, interest in the Kafue 
Project had continued despite the construction of the Kariba Dam. In 
1962, a team formed under the FAO began work on a multi -purpose survey 
of the entire Kafue basin. The findings were published as a seven volume 
report in 1968. By then, construction had begun on the first stage of 
the project; the building of a 50 m high dam in the gorge which would 
create a small storage reservoir as well as diverting water into the 
headrace canal and penstocks of the power station. Unlike the plans 
proposed for the earlier scheme, the power station,with an installed 
capacity of 600 MW, was not built on the surface but at a considerable 
depth within the mountain on the south bank of the gorge. 
For a summary of the technical details of the Kafue Project see 
Appendix 1. Full details may be seen in the references76. The 
environmental impact of the Kafue Project and the conflicts which have 
arisen over possible multiple purpose utilization of the basin's 
hydrological resources are referred to in later chapters of this thesis. 
The reservoir at Kafue Gorge could not provide sufficient storage 
capacity to maintain the required output throughout dry years, even 
when its water level was allowed to rise so high that prolonged, and 
ecologically harmful, flooding occurred over vast areas of the Kafue Flats. 
A second dam was, therefore, constructed between 1973 and 1976 at 
Itezhitezhi Gorge, upstream of the Kafue Flats, to provide additional 
storage capacity. This second phase of the Kafue Project may also 
incorporate a 50 MW power station in due course. A third stage to the 
project has been proposed, involving the construction of a power station 
lower down Kafue Gorge to utilize the remaining 200 m of head and thus 
provide a further 300 MW. 
The Zambian authorities expanded their country's electrical generating 
capacity extremely rapidly during the first decade of Zambia's independence. 
Apart from the Kafue Project they built two new power stations at Victoria 
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Falls, between 1969 and 1972, with a combined capacity of 100 MW. 
Furthermore, in 1971, work commenced on the delayed North Bank Power 
Station at Kariba. Although the construction period was prolonged, by 
rock falls in the underground machine hall and the subsequent liquidation 
of the principal civil engineering contractor77, a further 600 MW was 
added to the capacity of the Zambian network by 1977. In the period from 
1964 to 1977, Zambia moved from being a net importer of electrical energy, 
consuming considerably more than its allocated half share of the output 
from the Kariba Project, to being a net exporter. For example, in the 
year ended June 1977, despite the political tensions between the two 
countries, Zambia exported to Rhodesia over 45% of the energy consumed 
in that country. In effect, the energy exported comprised not only the 
whole of Zambia's share of the output from the two stations at Kariba 
but also a contribution from Zambia's other hydroelectric sources78. 
The authorities in Zimbabwe, both before and after its independence 
in 1980, have been concerned about this dependence on imported energy. 
Although interest has been focussed primarily on projects for thermal 
power generation at Wankie, investigations are being undertaken into 
the possibility of installing a further 300 MW at Kariba and of building 
additional dams on the Zambezi at Batoka and Devil's Gorges, upstream 
of Kariba, and Mpata Gorge, downstream of Kariba. Full details of these 
projects have not been published but their locations and approximate 
capacities may be seen in Figure 6. Further discussion of the electrical 
power situation in Zimbabwe may be found in Chapter 4. 
The Zambezi Conference 
In June 1948 the Portuguese authorities were invited to send 
representatives from Mozambique and Angola to an inter -governmental 
conference to take place in October of that year in Salisbury (Harare)79. 
The conference was to have the following agenda80: 
1. To consider the establishment of a Zambezi River Authority 
having inter alia the following functions: 
(i) the continuous accumulation of all hydrographical and 
hydrological information pertaining to the River from its source 
and tributaries to its final discharge in the Indian Ocean; 
(ii) the determination and initiation of measures necessary to 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































(iii) the equitable appointment of the waters of the River, 
in accordance with its potentialities, between countries 
riparian to it; 
(iv) all other matters affecting common interest in and common 
usage of the River by all countries riparian to it, including 
navigation and transport. 
2. To consider the appointment of an interim commission: 
(i) to recommend the constitution and powers of the proposed 
Zambezi River Authority; 
(ii) as a matter of urgency to: 
a) review the proposals to construct a large dam at the Kariba 
Gorge for the generation of electric power to supply 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia and for irrigation of lands 
for the production of food and other crops; 
b) carry out necessary investigations to determine and recommend 
a water quality basis on which construction of the Kariba 
dam might proceed without impairment of or embarrassment 
to the hydro -electric potentials by subsequent action of 
any country riparian to it; - 
c) the recommendation under 2.(ii) b) to have full regard to 
1.(iii); 
d) assess the probable effect of the proposed Kariba dam on 
the River downstream; 
e) consider navigation and transport matters on the Zambezi 
and its tributaries particularly in Bechuanaland and the 
Caprivi Strip. 
3. To apportion the cost of the Interim Commission. 
It appears that the authorities in Southern Rhodesia who, as early 
as June 1948, gave this clear declaration of their intention to proceed 
with the Kariba Project, were chiefly concerned to gain access to 
hydrological information from the catchment in Angola and also to prevent 
any diversion of, or extraction from, Angolan tributaries which would 
prejudice the future operation of the project. By contrast, the Portuguese 
authorities were concerned initially, and almost exclusively, in ensuring 
that navigation in the lower Zambezi would not be prejudiced and that 
their international rights would not be violated. 
From the beginning concern was expressed, by the authorities in 
both the British and Portuguese colonies, that insufficient was known 
about the regime of the Zambezi River and, in particular, about its 
hydrological characteristics, for delegates to be ready to take part in 
negotiations at ministerial level by the date proposed. Nevertheless, 
the Portuguese authorities resolved to improve the situation by making 
an urgent request to all governmental and other agencies operating in or 
around the Zambezi basin in Mozambique and Angola for relevant information. 
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This, almost certainly, marked the first occasion on which an attempt 
was made by the Portuguese authorities to gather comprehensive 
information about the development of the Zambezi. Certainly the 
documents sent in response to the request indicate a profound ignorance 
about many of the more important physical, environmental and economic 
characteristics of the basin. In particular, it became clear that almost 
nothing was known at the time about its hydrology. 
The documents were assembled by the Director General of Public 
Works and Communications and circulated, as Proceedings 261 -5 -2, under 
the title Conferência do Zambeze. Resumo do processo e observaçdes: 
Documentos (August 1948 to 23 July 1951) *. By the date originally 
suggested for the conference thirteen short documents had been received 
of which five concerned navigation and one discussed agricultural 
potential. The only hydrological information was a record of annual 
maximum river levels at Luabo received from the Sena Sugar Estates. 
The two bibliographic contributions listed twenty -two relevant reports 
of which nineteen concerned geology (eleven for Angola) and three 
concerned navigation around Chinde. 
It is by no means certain that the British authorities were any 
better informed about many of the relevant issues. At the end of 
October, 1948, they announced a postponement of the conference: 
because of the lack of certain technical information especially 
about the effects on the Lower Zambezi81. 
Later, it was proposed that a technical team from Southern Rhodesia 
should meet a similar team from Mozambique to discuss these issues. 
The conference proposal, in this way, became transformed from inter- 
governmental to technical negotiations. The reason for this change 
may, in part, have been the serious misgivings expressed by certain 
Portuguese officials about the political implications of a Zambezi 
River Authority and the possible loss of sovereignty which its creation 
might entail. 
* Herein referred to as Conferência do zambeze. A copy of these 
documents was consulted by the writer in the offices of the SPA in Tete. 
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The date of the conference of technical personnel was finally 
arranged for the end of May, 1950. This delay provided the delegations 
with a further year- and -a -half to assemble relevant information. The 
Chief Inspector of Public Works in Portugal, Castro Cabrita, became 
increasingly involved in these preparations and finally led the Portuguese 
delegation. In August, 1949, he proposed the establishment of a 
hydrological network in the lower Zambezi basin comprising at least two 
discharge gauging stations on the main Zambezi and one each on the Shire 
and Luenha rivers. He also proposed sediment sampling at the same 
sections and a topographical survey to establish accurate levels from 
Quelimane to Zumbo. His proposals were adopted, apart from that of 
undertaking regular sediment sampling, and, as a result, the first 
official river gauges were established in the lower Zambezi valley 
and the first accurate profile of the river obtained82. "Meanwhile, a 
certain amount of climatic and other information was obtained from 
Angola83 and, in addition, a detailed description of the lower Zambezi 
River was submitted by Frederico Cruz, a former Captain of the Port of 
Chinde84. Cruz concluded that the Zambezi provided the basis for a 
very good means of communication which could be developed relatively 
easily to serve the vast rich international hinterland. He also 
suggested that the Port of Chinde should be developed but that the channel 
to Quelimane could be opened up at least as an outlet during the flood 
season. In addition, Cruz supported the idea of creating a special 
mission to undertake the necessary studies. 
Formal invitations to the conference were issued to the authorities, 
in both Mozambique and Angola, but, in a revealing communication, President 
Salazar85 stated that he had been informed by the Governor General of 
Mozambique that neither Mozambique nor Angola had experts who were 
competent to undertake such negotations and that they would have to be 
provided from Lisbon. By contrast, the British delegation did not draw 
on any expertise from London (see Appendix 2). 
After Cabrita took charge of the Portuguese delegation he became 
increasingly frustrated with the lack of adequate information. Two months 
before the conference, he wrote to the Director General of Colonial 
Development complaining that the information he had so far received gave 
little basis upon which to formulate opinion86. Nevertheless, he had 
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already begun to take a keen interest in the Zambezi valley. He 
circulated, to officials in Lisbon, copies of a paper, Aproveitamentos 
de fins múltiplos*, in which he argued the benefits of multiple purpose 
river development. His opinions on this subject left their mark not 
only on the conference but on the subsequent Portuguese interest in 
developing the resources of the Zambezi basin. 
It is clear that before his involvement in the conference Cabrita 
had apparently had little experience of the Zambezi. In 1948, therefore, 
he flew from its mouth to Zumbo and later helped to determine the dry 
season discharge at Tete. Immediately before the opening of the 
conference he arranged for the Portuguese delegation to be flown over 
the Zambezi, and some if its tributaries, in Angola and from its mouth 
to the Victoria Falls landing at various places along the river in 
Mozambique87. Nevertheless, valuable though such reconnaissance was, 
it provided a poor substitute for the detailed first -hand experience 
of the British delegation. 
The agenda for the conference and a transcript of the agreed 
conclusions are given in Appendix 2. 
The two delegations appear to have left the conference well 
satisfied with the conclusions, although almost certainly with different 
conceptions of the purpose and outcome of their deliberations, conceptions 
which probably also differed from those of their own politicians. Cabrita 
had already formed a clear opinion of the benefits which could be 
achieved through multiple purpose development of the basin (hydroelectricity, 
navigation, irrigation and flood control), especially in Mozambique, and 
of the need for international co- operation (see Appendix 2, conclusions 
1 and 5 proposed by him). Portuguese politicians were, however, suspicious 
of the idea of a Zambezi River Authority. By contrast the British 
politicians, who originally proposed the idea of a Zambezi Conference, 
presumably supported the establishment of such a body. However, nothing 
has been published by any member of the British technical delegation 
which suggests that they were interested in anything more than a piece- 
meal development of the basin's resources which, for the most part could 
* Given as his inaurgural speech to a chair in hydraulics at the 
Instituto Superior Technico in Lisbon. 
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be achieved through co- operation simply between Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia. 
Had Cabrita realised this difference of approach he might have 
sought stricter guarantees, over the downstream effects of the Kariba 
Project, other than those contained in Item 2 of the Conclusions. The 
wording he proposed for this item indicates a lack of understanding 
both of the short -term effects of the dam's construction and of the 
long -term effects of its operation. In the short -term, the British 
committed themselves only to maintain a mean annual discharge in excess 
of 283 m3 /s. This would have permitted them to reduce the discharge to 
zero for part of the year if they had so wished. The provision would 
not, therefore, have guaranteed the flows necessary for downstream 
irrigation. Furthermore, zero discharge from Kariba would have caused 
dramatic downstream environmental effects including salt intrusion at 
the delta; such effects were not, apparently, considered by Cabrita. 
The clause guaranteeing minimum flows for navigation through the dry 
season might have prevented such consequences, but it is so imprecise 
that any dispute which might have arisen over its application would have 
been virtually impossible to resolve. It appears that, for the long -term, 
Cabrita did not anticipate unseasonal discharges from the dam. The 
rather puzzling clause specifying that at no time should outflow exceed 
inflow applied, in any case, only to the construction period. The 
procedure for the dam's operation after its completion does not appear 
to have been discussed in detail, probably because the Portuguese believed 
that the dam would provide complete regulation of the river resulting in 
constant discharges throughout the year. This belief persisted through 
many of their early hydrological investigations of the river. 
Cabrita appears to have been happy to accept the allocation for 
consumptive water use in Angola. The amount allocated, 1.5 x 109 m3 /yr 
or a mean consumption of about 50 m3 /s, was very large compared with 
Angola's current consumption and would have been sufficient to irrigate 
up to half -a- million hectares. On the other hand it represented only 
about 3% of Kariba's mean annual inflow whereas the total runoff from 
Angola probably provides 20% or more. The conference delegates had few 
precedents on which to base their recommendations and wisely made provision 
for a review of the allocation at a later date. 
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The British delegates appear to have been equally satisfied with 
the conference's conclusions. They had obtained a commitment to install 
river gauges in Angola and Mozambique, and an agreement that the Central 
African Council should act as collator of climatic and hydrological 
data and other relevant information until such time as an international 
river authority would be established. Furthermore, they had ensured, 
as far as possible, that there would be no Portuguese objections raised 
to the building of the Kariba Dam, that Angola would not undertake works 
that would prejudice its operation and that no onerous restrictions 
would be demanded in respect of maximum or minimum downstream discharges. 
Following this technical conference the conclusions were referred 
to the respective governments but no further action appears to have been 
taken. Portugal remained suspicious of the idea of a river authority, 
despite the fact that Mozambique might have stood to gain most from its 
creation. Meanwhile, British interests were adequately safeguarded 
through the Portuguese agreement to co- operate with the Central African 
Council. Nevertheless, the idea was kept alive for a time as further 
documents were appended to those of the Conferencia do Zambeze, which 
indicated that the spirit of co- operation was continuing between the 
British and Portuguese authorities. In May, 1951, the report published 
by the Inter -Territorial Hydro -Electric Commission, entitled Kariba Gorge 
and Kafue River Hydro -Electric Projects, repeated the initial call for 
the establishment of a Zambezi River Authority. The arguments were 
further rehearsed by Debenham, the Professor of Geography at Cambridge, 
in August 195288, but, thereafter, the idea was largely forgotten. Kariba 
was placed under the control of a body which is international in nature 
but concerned only with power generation and distribution. Mozambique 
created a river authority with much broader powers which appears to have 
enjoyed good relations with the operators of the Kariba Project. Never- 
theless, the activities of the two were never integrated into an international 
river basin authority. The most recent initiative in that respect appears 
to have been a reference made by Prime Minister Barrow of the Central 
African Federation, following the devastating floods of 1957 and 1958, 
to the possible benefits that such a body might have provided in gathering 
and disseminating information89. 
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The Missäo de Fomento e Povoamento do Zambeze* (MFPZ) 
Rather surprisingly Cabrita's name does not appear to have been 
linked directly with subsequent Portuguese initiatives in the Zambezi 
basin. For a time, the name of Professor A Abecasis Manzanares became 
prominent and, in March, 1956, he became involved in discussions with 
the Minister of Overseas Territories on the possible development of the 
Zambezi valley. They had before them the report from an exploratory 
survey made by members of the team which had recently completed a detailed 
hydrological study of the Revué basin. The text of the dispatch issued 
after this meeting appears in Appendix 3. This initiative reveals a 
new priority in Portuguese plans for the river - the generation of 
hydroelectric power. This may, to some extent, have been a reflection 
of the interests of the survey team whose previous work, in the Revué 
basin, was primarily concerned with hydroelectric potential. On the 
other hand, the dispatch issued in March, 1956, emphasized one project, 
the proposal to dam Cabora Bassa Gorge, which was equated with the Kariba 
Project. It would not be unrealistic, therefore, to suggest that the 
rapid progress which was, at that time, being made in the construction of 
the Kariba Dam was a major factor in the awakening of Portuguese interest 
in the hydroelectric potential of the lower Zambezi. A further point of 
interest in the dispatch of March, 1956, is that it indicates that the 
authors had a keener awareness of the possible downstream effects of 
the Kariba Dam than was shown in the published conclusions of the 1950 
conference. The dispatch notes, in particular, the need for 'constant 
and complete knowledge of the development of the Kariba project'. 
In May and June, 1956, Manzanares undertook a visit to the Zambezi 
and published his own report on its potential for development (see 
Appendix 4 for an abridged version of his report). This report had 
considerable influence over the investigations and planning undertaken 
in the lower Zambezi Valley for the following ten years or more. Its 
importance is acknowledged in the introduction to the Plano Geral where 
it is extensively quoted. A number of features in Manzanares' report 
are of particular interest: 
a) he continued to give priority to the Cabora Bassa Project but sought 
* The Zambezi Development and Settlement (Colonization) Authority. 
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to demonstrate that if it were developed as a multiple purpose project, 
in association with European settlement and the exploitation of the 
valley's mineral resources, it would bring far greater benefits than 
simply as a single purpose project; 
b) he suggested that the British Central African territories would 
provide markets for the hydroelectric energy and would make considerable 
use of a navigation channel along the river; 
c) he emphasized the similarity between the Kariba and Cabora Bassa projects 
but failed to recognize important differences between the hydrological 
operation of the two reservoirs. 
d) his failure to recognize these differences led to an over -optimism 
in the capabilities of the proposed project which persisted throughout 
much of the subsequent period of investigation and planning (for example, 
Manzanares believed that the discharge would be 'totally controlled 
inter -annually' and that floods would be 'readily controllable'); 
e) he recognized that the hydroelectric potential at Cabora Bassa Gorge 
was many times greater than the current level of consumption in Mozambique 
and consequently suggested that a programme of phased construction for 
the power stations should be adopted; and 
f) he recognized that Lake Cabora Bassa would trap virtually all incoming 
sediments, but he considered the implications of this only in terms of 
the increased power of erosion of the discharges downstream. 
The report by Manzanares, in emphasizing the potential for multiple 
purpose development of the Zambezi, was repeating the earlier ideas of 
Cabrita and also reflecting the world -wide interest in multiple purpose 
river basin development which had been awakened by the success of the 
TVA. The TVA was also recognized, at the time, by the Portuguese 
authorities as providing a possible administrative model for the 
development of the lower Zambezi90. On 16 March, 1957, they established 
a form of river basin authority for the Zambezi entitled the Missáo de 
Fomento e Povoamento do Zambeze (MFPZ). Like the TVA, the MFPZ cut 
across existing forms of administration being established by ministerial 
decree within the Ministry of Overseas Territories and, therefore, 
directly responsible to, and financed by, Lisbon rather than the provincial 
administration in Mozambique. Its terms of reference, set out below, 
were, however, narrower than those of the TVA being restricted to 
investigation and planning: 
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to undertake systematic investigation of the resources of 
the hydrographie basin of the Zambezi River in the territory 
of Mozambique, to organize plans for their exploitation and 
development and to prepare designs for the projects which would 
be selected91. 
The MFPZ adopted the procedures which had been developed for 
studying the resources of other river basins in Mozambique and in other 
Portuguese territories. In the case of the Zambezi these entailed the 
production, in three stages, of a large number of reports over a period 
of eight years. The first three volumes, which appeared within two 
years of MFPZ's formation, were entitled Relatório Preliminar (Preliminary 
Report). These volumes contained a summary of available information 
about the resources of the basin, an outline of possible strategies for 
development, a programme for the final two stages of the MFPZ's 
investigations and cost estimates for this work. 
By 1961 the first of these two stages was ready for publication. 
Entitled Vale do Zambeze: Esquema Geral de Fomento e Ocupacáo (Zambezi 
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Valley: General Scheme for Development and Colonization - referred to, 
herein, as Esquema Geral), this work appeared in twenty -three separate 
reports (thirty -one volumes) *. From general surveys of climatic, hydro- 
logical, topographical and ecological information the MFPZ investigators 
identified fifty -seven possible sites for hydroelectric development on 
the Zambezi's tributaries, four sites for possible dams on the main river 
and forty zones for potential agricultural development within the valley. 
The Esquema Geral also contained geological information and reports of 
the region's social and economic characteristics. 
The final stage of the MFPZ's investigations was completed in 1965 
with the publication of Vale do Zambeze: Plano Geral de Fomento e 
ocupaF5o (Zambezi Valley: General Plan for Development and Colonization - 
referred to, herein, as Plano Geral). The Plano Geral comprised a 
main text with forty -one appended reports, making up a total of fifty- 
* The details of these reports are given in Bibliography 1 of this thesis. 
Hereafter, reference will be made using the report numbers which appear 
in this bibliography; for example, Esquema Geral, 10. Multi- volumed 
reports are referred to in the following way: Esquema Geral, 7.1 and 
Esquema Geral, 7.2. 
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two volumes *. The Plano Geral appendices summarized and elaborated 
the information gathered for the Esquema Geral and, in addition, contained 
detailed plans and information for certain selected priority projects. 
The main text provided a synopsis of the entire study with recommendations 
for a detailed strategy of development for the basin. The principal 
elements of the Plano Geral are as follows: 
(i) the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam, and other mainstream 
dams, primarily for generation of hydroelectricity and development of 
navigation on the river; 
(ii) other works necessary for establishing a navigable channel along 
the river and for trans -shipment to a deepwater port; 
(iii) selected agricultural projects of various types, both in tributary 
basins and in the main alluvial plain; and 
(iv) mining and industrial projects, in particular, the establishment 
of an iron and steel industry based on deposits of coal and iron ore 
in the basin. 
The authors of the Plano Geral amplified the view, expressed by 
Manzanares, that Cabora Bassa should be a multiple purpose project. 
They believed its construction would fulfil the following objectives: 
to regulate the flows of the Zambezi River in order to guarantee 
minimum flows sufficient to make the section downstream of 
Mepanda -Uncua navigable; 
to reduce, very considerably, the intensity and frequency of 
floods downstream of Cabora -Bassa Dam; 
to provide total or partial control over the eventual irregularities 
in discharge arising from possible abnormalities or errors in 
the operation of the Kariba Project; 
to trap sediment discharges associated with a hydrographic basin 
which, including that regulated by Kariba, is of the order of 
900 000 km2; 
to produce large quantities of electrical energy at exceptionally 
low cost; 
to establish navigation over a distance of 300 km between Zumbo 
and Cabora -Bassa, using the reservoir itself, and thus to 
improve the flow of products from the 'hinterland', in particular 
of coal and iron bearing minerals; and 
* Details of the appendices are given in Bibliography 1. References 
to individual volumes are made in a similar format to that adopted 
for the Esquema Geral (see above). The main text is referred to as: 
Plano Geral, Texto. 
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to lead to the establishment of fishing and tourist 
industries92. 
Nevertheless, in the succeeding paragraphs of the Plano Geral Texto 
it becomes apparent that in the practical application of these objectives, 
at least in the short -term, the authors were proposing the development 
of Cabora Bassa rather more as a single purpose than as a multiple 
purpose project: 
The most important objectives are the regulation of liquid 
and sediment flows and the production of electrical energy. 
In fact the most important objective for the Cabora -Bassa 
Project, in the short -term, could become the ability ... 
to transform the Zambezi River downstream of Mepanda -Uncua 
into a very profitable navigation route through its effects 
on the economic development of the region. 
With the publications of the Plano Geral the initial work of the 
MFPZ was complete although it continued working on a number of studies. 
Without substantial public investment, however, none of the development 
proposals could proceed. In particular, the plans, as formulated, 
demanded the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam as a pre- requisite 
to further development, because of the importance that had been placed 
in the Plano Geral on the establishment of a navigation system to 
provide the necessary transport and communications and, to a lesser 
extent, cheap electrical energy. 
On 15 January, 1966, the Ministry of Overseas Territories, in Lisbon, 
created a new body, Grupo de Trabalho para o Zambeze (Working Party for 
the Zambezi). Its terms of reference were to complete the technical 
and financial studies which would be necessary before international tenders 
could be sought for the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam and, also, 
to direct the continuing work of the MFPZ. Apart from commissioning 
various detailed theoretical model studies of the dam structure, the 
power houses and the spillways, the main concern of this new body was to 
obtain the necessary finance for the dam's construction. It was clearly 
apparent, by this time, that the sale of modest amounts of energy in 
Mozambique and the levying of tariffs from navigation would not provide 
sufficient revenue to attract the necessary captial for such a large 
project. It was inevitable, therefore, that the possibility of bulk 
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energy exports, in particular to the RSA, would be investigated and 
that, as a result, the generation of hydroelectric power would become 
the primary purpose of the project. 
The Portuguese Government awarded the contract for construction 
of the Cabora Bassa Dam to the Paris based consortium ZAMCO (Zambeze 
Cons6rcia Hidro- el6ctrico), on 4 September, 1969. On 27 February, 1970, 
the MFPZ and the Grupo de Trabalho para o Zambeze were replaced by a 
single body the Gabinete do Plano do Zambeze (GPZ - Bureau of the Zambezi 
Plan) whose initial and principal purpose was to supervise the execution 
of the dam construction work and other associated works such as the 
resettlement of people displaced by the lake. 
In the period from 1966 to 1974 the majority of thé reports and 
investigations on the Zambezi concerned the Cabora Bassa Project. These 
included, at a very late stage, a number of investigations of the possible 
environmental effects of the project. In addition to work directly 
relevant to the dam, a number of studies were also undertaken of mineral 
and industrial projects, agricultural potential and navigation. Reference 
is made to these studies in subsequent sections of the thesis. 
The construction of Cabora Bassa Dam: political background 
... it is necessary to ... expand the real guide -lines of the 
great Portuguese realities in Africa, in this particular case 
of the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam ... Portuguese 
overseas policy ... is, above all, concerned to further the 
systematic enhancement of the land and its people, without 
colour bars, guided by the sense of collaboration which has 
always been offered to neighbouring countries, even those 
which cause Portugal constant problems on the international 
scene. The Cabora Bassa project cannot be viewed in isolation 
as a mere system for the production and distribution of electrical 
power; it should be seen as the basic infra -structure of a 
vaster, more ambitious plan, the General Plan for the Development 
of the Zambezi Valley which, when carried out, will bring the 
population affected by it extraordinary social and economic 
benefits, which can hardly be paralleled by any other African 
country. 
Taken from an official Portuguese Publication in English93. 
The Portuguese are engaged in a colonial war against the people 
of Mozambique. The establishment of a mass of white settlers 
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is part of a strategic plan. The aim is to create a human 
barrier along the Zambezi to prevent FRELIMO forces from 
advancing further south. At present the Portuguese colonial 
government has little more than a superficial economic hold on 
Mozambique. The realization of the dam would more firmly 
implant the Portuguese industrial interests in the colony - 
a situation which will make more difficult the wresting of 
independence from an otherwise notoriously backward European 
country. 
Taken from an offical statement, in English, by Frelimo 
The foregoing statements, each published in about 1970, present 
the opposing positions adopted in the intense political debate, which 
took place between 1968 and 1974, over the construction of the Cabora 
Bassa Dam. In reality, although the conflict between Frelimo and the 
Portuguese authorities dominated the political debate, there were other 
important facets to the political issues which surrounded the dam's 
construction; the power of many political and economic interest groups 
influenced the eventual course of events. Since the main purpose of 
the present discussion is to provide background material for the 
remainder of the thesis it will only be possible to discuss these 
political complexities in outline. More detailed analyses are available 
in the literature95. 
In the period from 1930 to 1970, Portugal's policy regarding its 
African colonies was neither static nor completely uniform. It was noted 
earlier in this chapter that from the beginning of the Estado Novo, in 
1930, until the 1950s there were few new Portuguese initiatives in Africa 
apart from the imposition of direct administration which achieved more 
effective exploitation of African labour. After 1950, however, Henriksen 
(1978, p134) suggests that Portugal became increasingly interested in 
obtaining wealth from Africa, in justifying to other European powers 
its retention of its colonies and in settling in them Portuguese 
immigrants. The Portuguese National Development Plans of 1953 -58 and 
1959 -64 made large allocations for expenditure in Mozambique. The money 
was used, primarily, in infrastructure requirements (transport) or in 
creating irrigation projects which would support white settlers *. By 
* It was during this period that the irrigation schemes for the Limpopo, 
which had been discussed for twenty years, were finally implemented. 
84 
contrast, very little money was allocated to education and social 
services; nothing in the first period and 14% of total expenditure 
in the second96. Large financial incentives were offered to 
Portuguese immigrants and, as a result, there was a rapid increase 




1930 20 000 
1940 27 000 
1950 48 000 
1960 97 000 
1970 150 000 (estimated) 
1973 200 000 (estimated) 
Throughout this period, the Portuguese authorities were divided 
between those who believed that Portugal's interest would best be served 
by rapid economic development of the African colonies, involving greater 
participation by foreign capital, and those who were intensely suspicious 
of any move towards a more open economy. By the late 1960s the arguments 
of the former group were gaining ground as is indictated by the growing 
foreign involvement in Mozambique, particularly in mineral prospecting 
and in industrial projects98. The political climate was, therefore, 
favourable to the implementation of the schemes proposed in the Plano 
Geral which could not have been considered without large amounts of 
foreign investment. 
One can only speculate on the principal motive, whether political 
or economic, of the Portuguese authorities when they established the 
MFPZ in 1957. Within a decade, however,a new factor had arisen which 
was to have a considerable influence on their policies in Mozambique 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s - security. 
Early in 1961 the first Angolan uprising had taken place. Its 
ruthless suppression marked the beginning of a period of increasing military 
involvement in Africa which, with its increasing cost in both human and 
financial terms, was a key factor in bringing about the overthrow of the 
government of President Caetano on 25 April, 1974. Furthermore, Portugal's 
African wars were not only a drain on the country's manpower and economy 
but also provoked strong international condemnation, particularly from 
the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations. When, in 1965, 
85 
the Cabora Bassa Project was first debated by the Portuguese Government 
the extent of their future military involvement in Mozambique was not 
foreseen, although the Frelimo uprising in northern Mozambique in 1964 
had already imposed uncomfortably high costs. 
For the Portuguese authorities the implications, as regards the 
Cabora Bassa Project, of the African wars were felt in various ways. With 
the rapidly escalating cost of the wars neither public opinion in Portugal 
nor the government exchequ( would have supported heavy public investment 
in such a project. Furthermore, international opinion and the worsening 
security situation would have prevented Portugal from obtaining inter- 
national loans (for example, from the World Bank) and made many governments 
and financial institutions cautious about investing in Mozambique. On the 
other hand, Portugal hoped to persuade western governments, and the 
governments of Rhodesia and the RSA, that it was in their own interests 
to support the Portuguese wars against 'communist insurgents'. The Cabora 
Bassa Project would help to consolidate their position by creating a 
physical barrier against further nationalist advances, a means of 
strengthening the European presence in the region and a symbol of 
Portuguese determination to retain control of Mozambique, which would 
inspire increasing western investment. As the information pamphlet from 
the GPZ (1971 a) candidly proclaims: 
... the Cabora Bassa project will establish, in the Province 
of Mozambique, an important monument to consolidate Portuguese 
policy in the provinces of Africa. 
In the event, it was the support of the RSA which proved crucial for the 
implementation of the project; that support is discussed below. 
The decision to proceed with the construction of the Cabora Bassa 
Dam provoked sharp international reaction and provided a focus for increased 
nationlist resistance. Jundanian (1974) reports that: 
many high ranking military officials [have remarked] that 
strictly from the point of view of military containment of 
the liberation groups, Cabora Bassa is a tactical error. The 
dam ... created a tangible symbol that bolstered nationalist 
morale at a time of sagging fortunes in Niassa and Cabo Delgado 
and rallied international support against what is preceived as 
a plot to ensure white domination in southern Africa. (p252, 
emphasis in original) 
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The activities of the guerrillas in Tete obliged the Portuguese 
authorities to provide heavy military protection for the dam builders 
and their supply routes. At the same time strong international 
condemnation obliged them to undertake a strenuous public relations 
campaign. The protracted discussions over the financing of the dam 
had caused it to be detached from other Plano Geral proposals and to 
be regarded as a single project, solely for power supply to the RSA. 
The principal argument used in Portugal's campaign, therefore, was 
that the dam was an integral part of the development of the Zambezi 
valley, as set out in the Plano Geral, and that such an ambitious 
development scheme could not fail to bring prosperity and vastly 
improved conditions to the African population of the region99. It 
was also argued that, in the short -term, the dam would bring local 
benefits through the villagization programme (which was being carried 
out both to resettle those displaced by the reservoir and as a counter- 
insurgency measure), through the wages of labourers on the construction 
project and through the stimulus provided to the local economy *. 
Henderson (1972) questioned the reality of these benefits even from a 
Portuguese perspective and suggested that a number of smaller projects 
would have brought greater benefits for a smaller total investment. 
The Portuguese answered such criticisms by pointing out that the capital 
which had been made available for Cabora Bassa would not have been 
available for alternative projects100. 
Undoubtedly the involvement of the RSA in the implementation of 
the Cabora Bassa project was of great economic and political significance. 
Davidson (1972) has suggested that 'The Cabora Bassa project has become 
... a predominantly South African one'(p41). He interpreted this 
involvement as part of white south Africa's plan to extend its economic 
and political hegemony over the territories of southern Africa in order 
to strengthen the apartheid system. As with Portugal, however, the 
attitudes of those within the RSA to the project were many- sided. 
According to a number of accounts101, there was initially considerable 
opposition within the RSA to its becoming directly involved in such 
* The construction contract stated that certain products, such as 
cement, had to be bought locally and that, in addition, 28% of the 
initial contract price had to be spent on Portuguese or Mozambican 
goods or services. Vidigal (1970, p19) estimated that this would 
total about 3 million contos (US $ 100 million). 
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a project. The principal debate centred around whether or not the RSA 
should commit itself to buying large quantities of energy from 
Mozambique. Without such a commitment the Cabora Bassa Dam would 
not have been built since there were no alternative markets in the 
region for large quantities of electrical energy. On the other hand, 
white nationalists in the RSA feared long -term dependence on an energy 
source beyond the country's borders, especially in view of the growing 
instability in Mozambique. 
The supply of cheap electrical energy is crucial to the economy of 
the RSA, where the rate of growth of consumption has been sustained at 
a higher level, and for a longer period, than in almost any other 
country in the world (see Chapter 4). Renfrew Christie* has developed 
the argument that abundant, reliable and, above all, cheap supplies of 
electrical power have been essential for the establishment and growth 
of the present system of mining and manufacturing industries in the RSA 
and, thus, for the creation of the apartheid system. White industrialists, 
Christie maintains, were able to increase the level of mechanization and 
displace labour, at times when labour organization amongst the black 
workforce had threatened industrial output, by making use of the country's 
highly developed electricity supply network. They were, therefore, 
very reluctant to allow the network to become dependent on imported 
supplies. Since 1948, when the large private utility, the Victoria and 
Transvaal Power Company, was taken over, the bulk of South Africa's 
electricity supply system had been controlled by a single public 
corporation. The corporation, Escom, has supplied energy predominantly, 
from thermal power stations using cheap, locally -mined coal. 
The views of Escom's personnel became influential in the debate 
about the Cabora Bassa Project. At first they were strongly opposed to 
any agreement to import power from Mozambique. There are a number of 
factors which may have caused them to reverse this decision. The utility 
was having difficulty raising the necessary capital for its expansion 
programme and was moving towards a policy of self- financing; it was 
having difficulty in providing sufficient numbers of skilled operators 
* Pers. comm. October 1978. It is understood that Christie has 
developed his ideas in a D Phil thesis prepared for the University of 
Oxford. 
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for its generating plant; and, it was moving away from its reliance on 
coal in order to conserve coal deposits and reduce the demand for cooling 
water. In addition, at that time, nuclear power was not considered to 
be a possible alternative. 
Undoubtedly, Escom's change of heart was not solely attributed to 
technical factors such as these but also reflected policy decisions by 
the Government. It reflected attempts which were being made to expand 
the markets for South African goods and services, to acquire new 
sources for raw materials *, to support neighbouring regimes which were 
not openly hostile to the apartheid system and to create a southern 
African water and power grid which would increase South African 
dominance in the region. The idea of a water and power grid in southern 
Africa, and Olivier's advocacy of such a scheme, have been referred to 
in the introduction to this thesis. 
That the cheapness of the power was a major attraction, was not 
as convincing a suggestion at the time of the decision as it subsequently 
became. Vidigal (1970, p10 -12), in a study of the characteristics of 
the Escom system, concluded that with the long transmission distance 
Cabora Bassa's power was barely competitive with Escom's cheap coal 
generation. It was only after the publication of a report which 
concluded that far larger quantities of power could be made available 
to Escom during the project's first phase, and after the feasibility 
of using high voltage direct current transmission had been established, 
that a price advantage could be shown to exist for Cabora Bassa's 
power. Subsequent price inflation, particularly since the 'oil crises' 
of the 1970s, has considerably increased that advantage and will continue 
to do so for as long as the price paid by Escom remains fixed. The 
advantage would be increased still further if the original agreement 
to cut the price by over 30% after twenty years were to be implemented. 
(Further discussion related to the advantages and disadvantages, to the 
parties involved, of the present arrangements to supply power to Escom 
is contained in Chapter 4). 
* The Anglo American Corporation was becoming increasingly involved in 
mineral prospecting in the Zambezi basin at the time. 
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After protracted discussions an agreement between Portugal and 
the RSA was reached which was acceptable to both sides. Portugal would 
get its dam and, moreover, the project would be self -financing. Provision 
was also made for Escom to help supply the power demand in southern 
Mozambique. In due course, it was hoped, the revenue earned by Cabora 
Bassa could be used to finance further projects in the region. 
The RSA, for its part, would have been well satisfied with the 
agreement reached. Escom's initial commitment had been fixed at the 
minimum required to finance the project. Fears that the agreement would 
make South Africa's electricity grid vulnerable to outside forces could 
be rejected because Cabora Bassa would never supply more than 8% of 
Escom's installed capacity, and any loss of supply could be made good 
from new installations within six months102. In negotiating the agree- 
ment the RSA was in a strong position since Escom had been, hitherto, 
self sufficient in energy and had very low tariffs; it was, therefore, 
able to insist on an extremely low rate for Cabora Bassa's power 
and to impose certain other conditions. Amongst these was a stipulation 
that the power should be supplied through an untapped d.c. line. 
Furthermore, the threat of withholding agreement over Cabora Bassa 
was used as a lever to persuade Portugal to agree to the Kunene Project, 
in Southern Angola, which the RSA hoped would supply water and power to 
Namibia and thereby strengthen South African control over that 
territory 
From the outset the leaders of Frelimo, together with many people 
around the world who supported the cause of Mozambican independence, 
were strongly opposed to the building of the Cabora Bassa Dam. As 
early as 1968, before its construction had been fully authorized, 
Frelimo's president, Eduardo Mondlane, had resolved that Frelimo's 
opposition to the dam would become a test of its strength against the 
Portuguese regime. 
If we do not destroy the Cabora Bassa scheme, or at least 
make it twice as costly, we shall have received our greatest 
setback104. 
So great did Frelimo's leaders consider the strategic significance 
of the dam project that they went against their stated policy of 
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avoiding the destruction of development schemes which Mozambicans 
would inherit once independence had been won105. Whether, as some 
have suggested, the complete destruction of the dam project was, in 
reality, never contemplated thus explaining, perhaps, why no successful 
attacks on the construction site were made can only be a matter of 
conjecture. Such a proposal appears unlikely since it was acknowledged 
that the completion of the project would almost certainly make Frelimo's 
task of winning independence from Portugal more difficult. 
Frelimo began its offensive in Tete in March, 1968, and claimed 
to have encountered South African troups operating in the region106. 
Attacks on road and rail transport disrupted supplies to the dam site 
which increased construction costs and forced the Portuguese authorities 
to strengthen their military presence, including the provision of armed 
convoys at all times. Frelimo's activities appear to have been responsible 
for some delays in construction but their effects were minimized by 
careful contingency planning by the contractors. On the other-hand, 
the work of the GPZ and of the mineral prospecting companies operating 
in the valley was badly disrupted since field survey teams were no longer 
able to operate unprotected in remote areas. For example, river gauge 
records for some of the remote tributaries show periods of interruption 
which were undoubtedly due to Frelimo's spreading influence. 
For supporters of Frelimo in other parts of Africa, in western 
Europe and the USA opposition to the Cabora Bassa project became an 
important focus in their campaign to win support for the cause of African 
liberation in Mozambique. This campaign achieved widespread publicity 
by bringing to the public attention the effects of Portugal's colonial 
policies in Mozambique, the extent of the involvement of other Western 
governments in supporting the project and the advantages which the 
Cabora Bassa Dam would bring to the apartheid system in the RSA as well 
as to the illegal regime in Rhodesia107. The diplomatic efforts of 
President Kaunda of Zambia, during 1970, caused the Italian Government 
to withdraw its pledges of financial support for the project. Furthermore, 
political pressure groups in Sweden caused their government to intervene 
to prevent the electrical company, ASEA, from participating in the 
project. Nevertheless, the overall achievements of the publicity 
campaign in support of Frelimo were no more effective than the military 
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campaign in halting the dam's construction. 
The political aspects of the project to which Middlemas (1975) 
devotes considerable discussion are those surrounding the formation of 
the construction consortium and the provision of investment captial *. 
This discussion is of interest becuase it illustrates the practical 
effects of political factors during the construction phase. Such 
factors included the desire by Portugal to have a largely self- financing 
project and, yet, to retain a significant Portuguese stake in the 
undertaking; the increasing importance of South African involvement; 
the reluctance of Portugal to allow British firms to participate 
following Britain's attempts to strengthen the UN's economic sanctions 
against Rhodesia, by placing a naval blockade on the port of Beira; 
and the effects of the diplomatic and political campaign -in support of 
Frelimo. Lists of companies which eventually formed the ZAMCO consortium 
may be found in the references108. 
The Lisbon coup, of April, 1974, removed the major strategic 
considerations from the debate and independence for Mozambique suddenly 
became a real and imminent possibility. The argument that the Cabora 
Bassa Dam would reinforce Portugal's hold over the colony, particularly 
if plans to settle a large number of Europeans in the Zambezi valley 
materialized, could now be discounted. Although Frelimo does not appear 
to have made any official statements, indicating a change of policy 
towards the project, a number of its sympathizers began to speculate on 
the role which the darn might play in an independent Mozambique. Some, 
such as Radman (1974 b), saw the project as a considerable asset* *: 
It is true that under present arguments, South Africa would be 
the major buyer of electricity generated by the dam as long as 
the energy requirements in the Zambezi valley are negligible. 
This need not always remain the case. The future rulers of an 
independent Mozambique will be in the position to make such 
decisions. The dam may prove to be a great asset in that surely 
* The two are closely related because the Portuguese authorities stipulated 
that the consortium must supply the bulk of the project's finance. 
** The paper from which this quotation is drawn was published in summer 
1974, as a re -draft of a seminar paper presented in November 1972. The 
main substance of, the paper was, therefore, written before the Lisbon 
coup, which indicates that such ideas were being discussed in academic 
circles even before the project's importance in the liberation war 
was removed. 
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not too distant future. To suggest that the dam should be 
built then rather than now is unrealistic because experience 
teaches that opportunities often vanish when ignored. Moreover, 
there is a certain irony in objecting to the efforts of a 
colonial administration to improve the permanent infra- 
structure of the colonial territory when so much criticism 
is directed at former colonial administrations for having 
failed to foster development while they were in control. 
(p90) 
It is clear that Radman believed, without question, that the dam 
would 'improve the permanent infrastructure of Mozambique' and that 
the government of an independent Mozambique would have considerable 
freedom in determining how the project would be operated. In this sense 
he considered the dam to be an apolitical technological artefact. The 
debate as to whether any piece of technology can be regarded as apolitical 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, but, as applied to the Cabora Bassa 
Project, it is of considerable practical relevance. In this thesis 
a number of important constraints on the freedom of Mozambique's political 
leaders to determine the way in which the project will be operated are 
identified. Of these Radman appears to have been unaware. They include 
technical constraints, such as those arising from the use of an untapped 
d.c. transmission line to the RSA, economic constraints arising from 
the lack of alternative markets for the energy produced, and political 
constraints, imposed by the complex relationship between Mozambique, 
the RSA and Portugal of which the Cabora Bassa Project is a small element. 
The construction of Cabora Bassa Dam: Technical details 
Estimates of the energy potential at Cabora Bassa and the capacities 
of the proposed power station changed considerably between 1956 and 1968. 
Manzanares (see Appendix 4) estimated the energy potential to be 22 TWh /yr, 
but gave little indication of how this figure was obtained. Two years 
later, in the Relatório Preliminar, 3, the potential was given as 22.8 
TWh /yr; from examination of the details provided it is clear that a 
considerable overestimation of the project's gross head had been made. 
Values of installed capacity were not, at that stage, suggested. 
In the Esquema Geral, 22.1, published in 1961, the guaranteed 
energy potential was reduced to 13.3 TWh /yr. A suitable value for 
total installed capacity was considered as 2 300 MW to be achieved in 
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three stages: a 100 MW (4 x 25 MW) surface station on the south bank; 
a 400 MW (4 x 100 MW) underground station, also on the south bank; 
and, finally, a 1 800 MW (6 x 300 MW) underground station on the north 
bank. 
Revised calculations for the Plano Geral, 55.1, in 1965, suggested 
that the guaranteed energy potential might be as high as 16.6 TWh /yr 
and that the total generating capacity which should be installed was 
about 2 800 MW. The sequential development of the project envisaged 
was for a 240 MW (4 x 60 MW) semi -excavated station, a 540 MW (3 x 180 MW) 
underground station, a 1 000 MW (4 x 250 MW) underground station, all 
in the south bank, and, finally, a second 1 000 MW station in the north 
bank. As an alternative, a 51 MW station was proposed should the 
240 MW station be too large for the initial demand. 
Within two years, the estimated energy potential was once more 
increased to 18.76 TWh /yr109. Few details were published of the basis 
for this new amendment, but it seems significant that it was made at 
a time when the Portuguese authorities were courting South African 
involvement in the project and were anxious to show that very large 
quantities of energy could be made available within a short period. 
The ultimate installed capacity envisaged at that time was 3 500 MW 
made up of five 400 MW sets (one of which would be held in reserve) and 
three 500 MW sets. It was proposed that either four of five of the 
400 MW sets should be installed in a single underground power station 
as the first phase. 
Further details were published later, in 1967, when the tender 
documents for the project110 were released following a tentative agreement 
with the RSA over the purchase of power. The final decision was that 
three 400 MW sets should be installed in a south bank power station in 
the first phase, entering production by 31 December, 1973, and that two 
further 400 MW sets should be installed there, entering production 
during 1977. The d.c. transmission line would be progressively upgraded 
enabling the maximum power capacity to be increased from 960 MW in 1973, 
to 1 440 MW in 1977 and, finally, 1 920 MW in 1980. In the event the 
line construction, and commissioning were completed at least a year ahead 
of schedule. 
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Delays in reaching final agreement over power sales to the RSA and in 
the selection of an acceptable construction consortium led to a two year 
delay on the construction programme. The result was that in the final 
contract the first three sets were not due to enter production until 
1975, with the fourth in 1977 and the fifth in 1979. In the event, 
although the dam was completed according to schedule, the first 
generating set was not ready to begin commissioning trials until August, 
1975, and commercial power was not available until March, 1977111. 
Nevertheless, by the end of May, 1979, all five sets were available for 
commercial power generation. The five sets were, thereafter, operated 
almost continuously for a period of about three months before the 
agreed operating pattern was established - four sets in continuous 
operation with one in reserve or under maintenance. 
A summary of the technical details of the Cabora Bassa Project may 
be found in Appendix 1. Further details of the hydrological aspects 
are contained in Chapter 3. For fuller accounts of other aspects, 
including the construction schedule and techniques used, reference should 
be made to the literature112. Caution is necessary, however, in the 
interpretation of certain published accounts. Many amendments were made 
to the design of the project, including an important change in the 
design of the spill gates made after initial tenders had been received, 
and the technical details in earlier accounts may differ from those of 
the completed project. 
In technical terms, the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam was 
far less remarkable than that of the Kariba Dam. By 1969, considerable 
experience had been gained in the execution of such projects and the 
dam's design introduced few innovations. Reports, in the technical press 
of the time, suggest that the site was ideal for a concrete arch dam. 
In noting the high energy potential, it was remarked that this could 
readily have been increased, by use of a higher dam, had it not been 
for the fact that the reservoir which would have been created would have 
flooded large areas of Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
As mentioned above, an important amendment was made to the design 
of the discharge gates at a relatively late stage following warnings, 
by one of the consortia which was tendering for the contract, that the 
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original design might lead to excessive scouring downstream of the dam 
and undermine the stability of the rock walls of the gorge113. The 
Plano Geral design had had six gates at an approximate level of 275 m 
together with a low -level vent at 225 m. The tender documents 
omitted the vent but, in addition to six gates (8 m x 8 m) at a sill 
level of 278.5 m, included ten weirs each 14 m wide at a crest level 
of 327 m. It was this configuration which the consortium questioned. 
Further hydraulic tests were carried out in Lisbon115 and, as a result, 
the present design was proposed with eight gates (7.8 m x 6 m at outlet) 
at the lower sill level of 231 m, inclined upwards to project the water 
well clear of the toe of the dam, together with a single weir at a 
crest level of 321 m. 
Although the dam design itself introduced few innovations its 
construction involved overcoming a number of technical and organizational 
difficulties. Because of the remote location of the gorge, considerable 
improvements in the existing transport network had to be made including 
the construction of new and improved roads, the creation of an airstrip 
at Songo and the building of a road bridge over the Zambezi, at Tete, 
to provide access to the railhead at Moatize. At the dam site a new 
type of rockfill cofferdam, designed to be overtopped by high floods, 
proved a satisfactory improvement on the temporary works used at Kariba 
and co- operation from the operators of the Kariba Dam over the timing 
of discharges also helped to reduce the chance of serious flood damage 
occurìng during construction. Initially the ZAMCO consortium had great 
difficulty in co- ordinating the activities of the member companies from 
different countries but the situation improved as work progressed. 
On the electrical side, the high voltage d.c. transmission system 
has drawn considerable attention. The use of d.c. transmission was an 
important factor in the decision by Escom to buy power from Cabora 
Bassa since it resulted in lower transmission costs and provided a 
greater degree of control over the supply. In technical terms, however, 
the use of d.c. transmission was not innovatory although it was still 
relatively untried at the voltages and over the distances involved in 
the Cabora Bassa Project. 
Technical journals and news magazines, many of which adopt the 
position that the discussion of 'political' questions should largely 
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be avoided by the engineering profession, could not avoid comment on 
the political implications of the Cabora Bassa Project, if only to 
note the effects of the guerrilla warfare on construction schedules and 
the costs. The engineering profession was, however, closely associated 
with the process of political decision making in a number of important 
ways. 
For the Portuguese people their engineering achievements, 
particularly in the construction of dams during the middle years of 
the present century, were a source of national pride and a potential 
source of international prestige. As a result, their more outstanding 
engineers rose to positions of considerable influence (Trigo de Morais 
is a notable example). Vidigal (1970) cites the project's prestige value 
as one of the benefits which would be gained from Cabora- Bassa: 
... the name of the country - and, in particular, the prestige 
of Portuguese engineering - will gain respect with the 
completion of such an exceptional undertaking. (p20) 
It appears that Portuguese engineers, aware of their country's image in 
Europe as poor and underdeveloped, wished to prove that they were as 
competent in the technology of large arch dams as were the French and 
British engineers who had designed Kariba. It is difficult to assess 
the influence which engineers ultimately had on the decision to build 
the Cabora Bassa Dam. Nevertheless, their desire to prove their 
competence in the design of big dams was reflected in an insistence 
that the designs for the dam, prepared by the consultants Hidrotécnica 
Portuguesa should be adhered to closely by the contractors and that all 
model tests on the structure and spillways should be undertaken by the 
staff of the Laboratbrio Nacional de Engenharia Civil in Lisbon. 
Portuguese engineers regarded themselves as pioneers in the development 
of techniques for the design of arch dams based on model tests116, and 
Cabora Bassa was heralded as a monument to their achievements. 
Worldwide, there are relatively few engineers with the expertise 
and experience necessary to design and build major dams. For this reason 
a particular consultant or contractor will frequently have been associated 
with more than one celebrated project. Individual engineers have 
occasionally played an important role in influencing politicians in 
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decisions regarding proposed projects *, a role which is obviously to 
their own advantage in so far as it increases the number of projects 
in which they and their colleagues are able to participate. 
One such engineer, Henry Olivier, is closely associated with the 
Cabora Bassa Dam. As a consultant with Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, 
Olivier had been associated with many dam construction projects including 
e 
the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda, dams in the Indus basin in Pakistan and, 
most notably, the Kariba Dam. He had hoped to play a major role in the 
Cabora Bassa Project as part of a consortium to which Gibb and Partners 
were acting as consulting engineers but, when the contract was awarded 
to the ZAMCO consortium, Olivier left Gibb and Partners and took an 
appointment with the South African contractors, LTA * *, so that he could 
continue to participate in the project. With H J van Eck, chairman 
of the RSA's Industrial Development Corporation and Iron and Steel 
Corporation, Olivier gave both public117 and private support to the 
Cabora Bassa Project. His arguments, based on the belief that there 
was a need for the RSA to conserve its water and energy resources, 
were probably influential in ensuring South African's support for the 
scheme. Subsequently, Olivier's repeated exposition of the inter- 
national benefits of a southern African power and water network (see 
introduction) suggests that he is continuing to seek ways of influencing 
politicians to undertake further dam projects in the region. 
Other aspects of the Portuguese plans for the Zambezi valley 
The Cabora Bassa Project formed only one element, albeit the most 
important, in Portuguese plans for the Zambezi valley. The principal 
feature of other plans may be grouped under the three headings of 
hydro -electric power, agriculture and navigation. Mineral extraction 
and industrial development, which also featured in the MFPZ's plans, 
are discussed in Chapter 4. Much of the following discussion is based 
on the contents of the Esquema Geral and the Plano Gera/.but a number 
* The influence of André Coyne which reinforced the position of those 
politicians who favoured the Kariba project is a possible example (see 
discussion earlier in the present chapter). 
** LTA, a subsidiary of the Anglo American Corporation, was a major 
contractor in the ZAMCO consortium. 
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of other publications have summarized the principal proposals of the 
several reports. Falco (1963) gives a detailed summary of the plans 
contained in the Esquema Geral. A number of official and semi -official 
Portuguese publications describe the contents of the Plano Geral. 
There are also some non -Portuguese sources119 which provide similar 
material, but no detailed analytical studies of the plans have been 
published. 
1. Hydroelectric Plans: The Esquema Geral, published only four years 
after the establishment of MFPZ, proposed four further hydroelectric 
projects on the main Zambezi, downstream of Cabora Bassa, together with 
fifty -seven possible projects located on the river's tributaries in 
Mozambique. On the basis of figures adapted from these proposals, and 
which were subsequently presented in the Plano Geral, it-is widely 
believed that the hydroelectric potential of the basin exceeds 50 TWh /yr 
of which 6.5 TWh /yr could be guaranteed from triburary projects and 
the remainder provided by projects on the main Zambezi. 
The belief that the Zambezi basin in Mozambique is rich in hydro- 
electric potential is, however, inaccurate and misleading as the following 
study of the relevant reports shows. 
Portuguese engineers have developed techniques for mapping the 
hydroelectric potential of remote areas for which the available hydro- 
logical data are inadequate. Moreno (1964) showed how such techniques 
could be applied, in Angola and Mozambique, to produce maps of mean 
annual hydroelectric potential per unit area (kWh /m2) from maps of 
topographical relief, mean annual rainfall and mean annual temperature. 
The work of Moreno is of particular interest for two reasons: the 
techniques which he used are similar to those employed by the MFPZ in their 
first studies of the Zambezi basin; and, his map shows the Zambezi 
basin to be amongst the areas of lowest hydroelectric potential in 
Mozambique (mostly below 0.1 kWh /m2 /yr). 
Results obtained by using techniques similar to those of Moreno 
require careful interpretation. Firstly, the hydroelectric potential 
thus calculated is confined to the component which derives from rainfall 
falling only on the catchment under study. Yet, in the case of the 
Zambezi basin in Mozambique the largest component of the hydroelectric 
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potential derives from river discharges in the Zambezi which enter 
Mozambique from upstream. Moreno's analysis cannot accommodate such 
discharges. It is, therefore, important to separate any study of 
hydroelectric potential into two components; that due to the discharge 
of the Zambezi and that due to rainfall over the tributary basins. 
Secondly, Moreno's type of analysis may lead to substantial errors 
as a result of inaccuracies in the available topographical and climatic 
maps and because, in regions such as the Zambezi basin, where rainfall 
is seasonal, the theoretical energy potential could only be translated 
into firm power output if adequate storage reservoirs could be provided. 
a) Projects on the main Zambezi: Reference has been made above 
to the amendments made to estimates of Cabora Bassa's energy potential 
over the period 1956 to 1968. Similar amendments were made with regard 
to other projects, as may be seen from the data presented in Table 3. 
The Relat6rio Preliminar proposed only two projects downstream of Cabora 
Bassa - at Boroma and Lupata. The values of energy potential given for 
these projects were considerably higher than those given in subsequent 
reports; largely because values of gross head were over -estimated. The 
Esquema Geral introduced two further projects - at Mepanda Uncua and 
downstream of Lupata; see Figure 7. The proposals contained in the Plano 
Geral are similar to those of the Esquema Geral except that use of 
higher values for guaranteed river flow has resulted in higher estimates 
of energy potenital. The combined potential is, therefore, close to 
that estimated in the Relatório Preliminar, 46 TWh /yr. Detailed 
examination reveals, however, that exploitation of the full potential 
would not, in practice, be possible as the following discussion reveals. 
The gorges at Mepanda Uncua, Boroma and Lupata are each wider 
than that at Cabora Bassa having mean channel widths at their narrowest 
points of approximately 180 m, 350 m and 250 m respectively. Designs 
shown in the Plano Geral (Texto, Fig. 46) indicate that the dam required 
at Mepandu Uncua would have a crest length of approximately 450 m. The 
Boroma and Lupato gorges would require dams of considerably greater 
length. Thus each of the three projects would require structures which 
would be significantly larger than the dam at Cabora Bassa. In addition, 
the temporary diversion works, required during the construction period, 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As a result, the construction of dams at any of the three downstream 
gorges would, almost certainly, cost more than the Cabora Bassa Dam. 
Since the values of energy potential at Boroma and Lupata gorges are 
significantly smaller than that at Cabora Bassa, 20% and 35% respectively, 
it is extremely unlikely that financially viable projects are possible. 
The project at Mapanda Uncua, with its shorter dam and higher energy 
potential, might become attractive, in the future, if a market for its 
output could be found within a reasonable transmission distance. (In 
the foregoing discussion the viability of the projects has been assessed 
solely on energy output. A possible contribution from navigation, 
suggested by the Portuguese planners, has been discounted because, even 
if river transport could be developed, any revenue it generated would 
be required to pay for by -pass locks at the dams and channel stabilization 
works). 
If the economics of hydroelectric projects in the three gorges 
downstream of Cabora Bassa is dubious, the proposed development down- 
stream of Lupata appears to be totally unrealistic. It would require 
artificial channels 400 km in length, with a combined capacity of 
approximately 3 000 m3 /s and with a gradient substantially less than 
that of the main channel120, in order to create the necessary head. 
The inclusion of potential revenue from navigational or irrigational 
uses of the channels is unlikely to enhance the financial prospects 
of such an undertaking. Moreover, diversion of a large proportion of 
the natural river flow into these channels would jeopardize existing 
irrigation and navigation in the lower river, and would bring the threat 
of considerable environmental damage as a result of sea water intrusion 
at the mouth. 
In conclusion, it would appear, at present, that of the four 
proposals considered the only hydroelectric project on the lower Zambezi 
which is likely to be implemented would be that at Mepanda Uncua. 
Together with Cabora Bassa, this project would provide a total energy 
potential for the river, in Mozambique, of approximately 27 TWh /yr 
(considerably less than the 46 TWh /yr previously suggested). More than 
half of this amount can already be generated in the south bank station 
at Cabora Bassa. 
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b) Projects on the tributaries in Mozambique: Published accounts 
of the hydroelectric potential on the Zambezi's tributaries show 
considerable discrepancies. Initially, the MFPZ engineers, using 
techniques similar to those of Moreno (1964), obtained the surprisingly 
high total of over 20 TWh /yr for the theoretical energy potential of 
these tributaries (published in the Relatório Preliminar). Of this, 
they believed that approximately 70% could be exploited by means of 
over fifty projects, the details of which are summarized in Table 4. 
In these projects hydroelectricity was regarded as a secondary output; 
in their proposals the planning engineers were concerned, primarily, 
with identifying suitable locations for irrigation schemes. Any energy 
output was seen as being mainly to meet local needs including that 
required for pumped irrigation. 
For the Esquema Geral the topographical information, which had 
previously been obtained from 1:500 000 scale maps, was improved and 
aerial photographs of some of the project locations were studied. Some 
refinements in the hydrological analysis, including an allowance for 
reservoir evaporation, were also made. But the primary data, derived 
from a limited network of rainfall gauges, remained the same. As a 
result of these changes the total estimate of exploitable energy was 
reduced to 7 TWh /yr. 
The results published in the Plano Geral are self contradictory. 
In one place121, the total potential is given as 6.5 TWh /yr* (firm power 
output, 800 MW). Elsewhere122, however, the value given is only 0.8 TWh /yr 
(firm power output, 195 MW). The lower value derives from an analysis 
of the minimum river flows which might occur one year in twenty. Such 
an analysis is necessary because the tributaries do not have suitable 
sites for reservoirs which could provide inter -annual storage. In a 
development of this analysis, the fifteen projects with the largest energy 
potentials (firm power greater than 4 MW) were studied in greater detail. 
When allowance was made for reservoir siltation, reservoir evaporation 
and loss of hydraulic head due to drawdown, only five projects remained 
viable. Their combined energy potential was calculated as 0.24 TWh /yr 
and their total firm power output (on the MFPZ's assumption of 4 000 
* This value, which appears to have been directly derived from the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































hours operation per year) as 57 MW. The MFPZ engineers concluded that: 
Working, therefore, with a broad safety margin, it is evident 
that of the projects chosen many would be rejected on second 
analysis either because they would not have reservoirs big 
enough to regulate totally the inflows of the critical [dry] 
year or, primarily, in the schemes with power stations at 
the foot of the dam, because of the substantial loss of head 
[resulting from the drawdown necessary to regulate the critical 
inflows]123. 
In fact only two schemes of the fifteen examined were considered to be 
worthy of further examination, at the time, by the writers of the Plano 
Geral. The schemes selected were Luia 6 (16.5 MW installed) and Luenha 
7 (13.2 MW installed) *. 
Thus, estimates of the energy potential of the tirbutaries in 
Mozambique vary by more than a factor of ten within the Plano Geral 
although part of this discrepancy may have arisen because the calculations 
on which the lowest estimates were based were taken from studies of 
isolated projects. Should more than one project be built on a single 
tributary the storage capacity of upstream reservoirs would bring 
additional benefits to downstream projects. On the other hand, because 
of inadequate data, there remains the real possibility of error even in 
the most conservative estimates of energy potential. The hydrological 
calculations were based on general formulae for runoff, which had been 
developed from studies of other river basins, calibrated by use of the 
limited river discharge records available. Of the tributaries under 
consideration the longest daLa record used was for eight consecutive 
years whilst some were as short as two years. Within the majority of 
records the hydrological year 1962/3 was included in the Plano Geral 
studies but, since this was one of the wettest of the last fifty years 
in the Zambezi basin, its inclusion in such short data records 
would introduce considerable bias into the results. Calculation of 
reservoir siltation rates were even more uncertain since no detailed 
sediment transport data were available. However, the assumed silt 
deposition rate of 200 m3 /km2 /yr aver 75 years does not, at first sight, 
* In the section of the Plano Geral (Texto,p101) referred to earlier, 
the installed capacity of Luia 6 is given as 477 MW. The Luenha 7 
scheme is not even listed. 
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appear to be unreasonable. Nevertheless, the Plano Geral studies for 
these tributary projects do not, as they stand, merit active consideration 
without further investigation of the hydrology and sediment characteristics 
of the rivers at each site proposed. In addition, careful assessment 
is necessary to determine if adequate storage could be provided to ensure 
that the required level of power output could be maintained. 
2. Agricultural Plans: The MFPZ planners considered the Zambezi valley 
as an area of virgin land on which vast agricultural schemes could be 
established with little difficulty. The basis on which the schemes were 
to be developed was set out in the Relatório Preliminar barely a year 
after the Agriculture and Forestry Brigade had been established within 
the MFPZ. Forty areas of high potential, called manchas*, were identified 
ranging in size from a thousand to half a million hectarés, see Figure 8. 
In total, these manchas covered 5.5 x 106 ha (40% of the basin in 
Mozambique). The areas of greatest interest were the tributary basins 
north of the Zambezi in Tete Province and the alluvial plain downstream 
of Mutarara. 
The proposals were given in remarkable detail considering the 
difficulty of access to much of the region and the poor information which 
would have been available. The Relatório Preliminar, 3, included 
descriptions of suitable crop types, annual demand for irrigation water, 
possible locations for dams and their reservoir storage capacities and, 
even, estimates of the energy requirements for irrigation pumps. Clearly 
much of this work was based on a study of the general characteristics 
of the region rather than on specific field investigations. Nevertheless, 
the conclusions which were published had a strong influence over 
subsequent agricultural planning in the region. 
A remarkable feature of this early work, as of much of what followed, 
was the almost total disregard for the indigenous population and their 
established patterns of cultivation. No attempt was made to estimate 
the number of people who would be displaced by a given project. Only 
in the areas of marginal interest, from the point of view of European 
commercialized agriculture, was any attempt made to study the existing 
distribution of population and their means of production. A number of 
* Literally 'fields'. 
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Figure 8 
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such areas were later designated as areas of 'community development' 
in which attempts were to be made to induce the population to adopt 
more modern methods of cultivation and to offer their surplus produce 
for sale *. 
Although the production of commercial crops was an important 
objective of the MFPZ, the colonization of the region with European 
settlers was also regarded as a major objective124. Two types of 
agricultural project were envisaged; settlement schemes, which would 
provide individual livelihoods for immigrants, and plantations, which 
would produce commercial crops. It was intended that the ratio of 
European to African workers on the former type of project would be 
about 1:2 and on the latter 1:15. The settlement schemes were intended 
for the tributary basins in Tete Province whilst the plantations 
would be located, mainly, on the alluvial plain. 
For the Esquema Gera1125 a more detailed investigation of sixteen 
of the forty manchas was undertaken. Amongst the factors considered 
were the number of workers required, the demand for inputs, such as 
fertilizer, and the industries which might be linked to the schemes. 
The projects considered covered about 0.5 x 106 ha, required a total 
public investment of 10 x 106 contos (Us $ 350 x 106) and would have 
needed 120 000 people, of whom 16 000 would have been European. The 
published figures are ambiguous in respect to the total number of 
immigrants required. This arises because for the settlement schemes 
each settler, whether European or African, was assumed to have three 
dependants whereas on the plantations it was assumed that African labour 
would be available on a migratory or casual basis without dependants. 
On this basis the Esquema Gera1 probably envisaged over 60 000 European 
immigrants,over 80 000 Africans associated with settlement schemes 
and approximately 90 000 African migrant labourers on the plantations. 
Financial restrictions alone would have made it impossible to 
proceed with the parallel development of all sixteen manchas and, 
therefore, six priority projects were selected126. The public investment 
needed for these was still formidable: 4.7 x 106 contos ** (US $ 160 x 106) 
* For further details of the effect of Portuguese projects on the 
indigenous population see Chapter 6. 
** At that time the total cost of the Cabora Bassa Project was estimated 
at 3.8 x 106 contos (Esquema Gera1, 22, Table 8). 
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over the five -year period 1965 -70. From the detail with which the 
projects were presented in the Esquema Gera1127 it appears that proposals 
for settlement projects were, at that time, receiving greater attention 
than those for plantation projects. If so, the bias may have resulted 
from a number of considerations: the difficulty that established 
plantations, such as Sena Sugar, were experiencing in obtaining adequate 
labour; the greater adaptability of settlement schemes to incremental 
and independent development ; and the larger number of Europeans who 
could be supported for a given public expenditure on settlement schemes. 
For the Plano Geral, 'semi -detailed' investigation, including soil 
surveys, of 2.6 x 106 ha revealed a total area of only 130 x 103 ha as 
being suitable for priority development, half of which would require 
irrigation, see Figure 8. The details of the agricultural schemes 
proposed fill fourteen volumes128 and include detailed consideration of 
plantation projects in the alluvial plain, and around Milange, as well 
as settlement projects in Tete Province. 
Forestry potential is also discussed both in the Esquema Geral and 
the Plano Geral although proposals were largely based on broad class- 
ifications of ecological regions. An area totalling 2.2 x 106 ha was 
identified as suitable for forestry development either through the 
planting of exotics (as in the northern parts of Tete Province) or 
through management of existing species. The cost of development and 
the number of people required were discussed129 but few other details 
were given. 
After 1965, the agriculture and forestry plans of the MFPZ were 
largely neglected. The efforts of the MFPZ /GPZ staff were concentrated 
almost exclusively on work associated with the Cabora Bassa Project. 
For the agriculturalists, this entailed the establishment, in 1968, of 
a research station in a resettlement region at Estima and other work 
associated with resettlement of those displaced by the new reservoir 
and of the many more gathered into new villages for security reasons 
* Although settlement schemes were largely designed to be independent, 
for example, in hydroelectric energy, they required cheap transportation 
to make them economically viable. Their development was, therefore, 
linked to the navigation proposals. 
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(see Chapter 6). 
The activities of Frelimo guerrillas made it impossible to 
implement agricultural settlement projects in the more remote regions 
previously considered and new zones of priority development were sought. 
The first three regions lay along the Zambezi downstream of Lupata 
Gorge and around the Shire, see Figure 9, blocks 4, 5 and 6. Outside 
contractors were invited to submit tenders for undertaking a 
comprehensive mapping of the land use potential of these regions to 
include 1:100 000 scale maps (1:50 000 in certain areas) of topography, 
ecology soils, arable potential, livestock potential, surface and 
ground water resources and recommended systems of land use130. The 
work was to be based on aerial surveys and to take place between 
September, 1971, and May, 1974. 
The group which won the contract for this work, and subsequently 
for blocks 9, 10 and 11 (also shown in Figure 9), was R F Loxton, 
Hunting and Associates (Johannesburg) in association with Empressa 
Técnica de Levantamentos Aeros (Lourenço Marques) and AOC Technical 
Services (Johannesburg) *. Hidrotécnica Portuguesa also collaborated 
in the interpretation of hydrological data. 
The results of the Loxton Hunting surveys are the most detailed 
available for any part of the lower Zambezi valley but, like many of 
the studies of the MFPZ, they have their limitations as regards their 
use in the planning of specific agricultural projects. The limitations, 
some of which Loxton Hunting acknowledged, are considered below: 
a) The surveys were based, almost exclusively, on physical and 
environmental reconnaissance on the apparent assumption, originating from 
the GPZ, that land use recommendations could be made without reference 
to social political or economic factors: 
We have not carried out economic feasibility studies; we 
have little factual information on the particular motivating 
factors and aspirations of the local people; we have not 
conducted export market research; we are not informed in 
detail of Government policy for the Zambezi Valley131. 
* The group is referred to as 'Loxton Hunting' throughout this thesis. 
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Figure 9 
Division of the Lower Zambezi Valley into 'blocks' for comprehensive 














1 -3 No studies undertaken 
4 -6 Studies completed by Loxton Hunting 1973 
7 -8 Preliminary studies only 
9 -11 Studies completed by Loxton Hunting 1975 
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b) No attempt was made to map existing patterns of land use or pop- 
ulation distribution. 
c) The absurdity of attempting to make land use recommendations 
without reference to social, political and economic factors, or to 
existing patterns of habitation and land use, is demonstrated in 
the reports by the marked change of emphasis following independence. 
In the pre- independence reports (blocks 4, 5 and 6) considerable 
stress was laid on the potential for estate and plantation agriculture. 
By contrast, areas in which low -cost, small -scale irrigation schemes 
could be developed largely for the benefit of the indigenous population, 
for example along the banks of the Zambezi, were marked on the maps 
as having a low irrigation potential. The reports published after 
independence (blocks 9, 10 and 11) showed a reversal which, Loxton 
Hunting believed, would bring their recommendations more in line 
with Frelimo's rural development policies: 
The present pattern of land use reflects a haphazard history 
of settlement and migration of people, and in some cases, 
past failures of large scale production projects. Small 
scale traditional cultivators must be resettled in 
villages for which water supplies and appropriate social 
services can be provided: arable areas must be located 
in the best soils: local roads and tracks must be aligned 
along the most favourable, well drained, positions and 
so on. Thereafter various programmes aimed at uplift 
of the people and local economy can be applied to 
resettled areas132. 
The change in emphasis has not, however, enabled them to gain further 
contracts for similar surveys elsewhere in Mozambique. 
d) Loxton Hunting's reports frequently display a euphoric optimism 
about the potential of what they consider to be virgin lands despite 
the past failures of European production in the region. For 
example: 
The untapped agricultural potential of block 6 is vast - so 
vast indeed that, as a unit, when fully developed, the 
region could become a major contributor to the agricultural 
economy of Mozambique133. 
e) The types of land use considered by Loxton Hunting are largely 
those employing 'modern' mechanized techniques, the most intensive form 
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of cultivation being suggested as the recommended land use for any 
given area. The long -term ecological effects of intensive mechanized 
agriculture, in particular in the alluvial plain and delta region, 
are not given adequate consideration nor are the possible advantages 
of adopting less intensive land use patterns. The possibility that 
salination and drainage problems might affect production, however, 
was noted. 
f) Despite the detail in which Loxtin Hunting's maps and reports 
were presented the authors acknowledged that much of the information, 
including climatic and soils data, was not sufficiently detailed for 
large investments to be undertaken without further investigations. 
The reports, therefore, made strong recommendations that pilot 
projects should be established. 
g) Pilot projects were also recommended because, apart from sugar 
cane, there was little experience of irrigated cultivation in the 
region. The projects would, therefore, allow experimentation with 
other crops and provide training for those who would continue the 
operations. Nevertheless, one of the principal recommendations 
made was that further sugar plantations, similar to the Sena Sugar 
Estates, should be created at an early- stage. 
h) Loxton Hunting acknowledged that the success of any agricultural 
project would depend on a considerable improvement being made in 
the provision of transport and other services in the region. 
3. Navigation Plans: American engineers in the 1950s showed 
considerable enthusiasm towards the development of, inland navigation: 
All the great civilizations of recorded history have 
been centred around mass transportation by. water. (...) 
Throughout the entire history of Western civilization, 
navigable waterways have provided the avenues for 
community growth. (...) 
The history of the development and utilization of our 
waterways [in the USA] is marked by three distinct periods: 
First, the development of the rivers for seasonal use of 
the keelboats, flatboats and rafts and later for the 
fabulous packet boats; secondly, the period of decline; 
and thirdly, the rebirth of the waterways system as a 
mass transportation artery134. 
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Such views of the potential for navigation to stimulate economic 
development in the USA were shared by the Portuguese planners of the 
MFPZ. As noted earlier, navigation on the Zambezi had been important 
for the establishment of the earliest Portuguese settlements in the 
valley and development schemes based on mass transportation by river 
had been proposed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The coming of the railway had, however, caused navigation to decline 
to the point where, by the late 1950s, it had virtually ceased on the 
river above Mutarara. The MFPZ planners clearly believed that the 
'rebirth' phase had been reached and that mass transportation by river 
would provide the basis for their other development projects in the 
valley. 
The largest bulk of goods requiring transportation would, it was 
believed, be minerals which would originate from two main areas of 
deposits; the region north of the city of Tete and the region near 
Mucanha part of which now lies under the north shore of Lake Cabora 
Bassa *. Bulk transportation of agricultural and forestry products was 
also envisaged. Navigation was, therefore, proposed from Cabora Bassa 
Gorge to the Zambezi's mouth as well as on Lake Cabora Bassa. 
In an attempt to increase the project's economic returns it was 
also suggested that goods from Zimbabwe and Zambia might be transported. 
For this purpose road or rail links would be provided to ports on Lake 
Cabora Bassa or at Tete. The initial response of the colonial authorities 
in these countries was, however, unfavourable when, in 1959, the MFPZ 
undertook a fact -finding mission135; they were informed that the 
proposed navigation system would be less economic than the existing 
railway network, it would require new investment in the road or rail 
links and it would be slower. 
This discouraging response does not appear to have reduced the 
enthusiasm within the MFPZ. For the Plano Geral, detailed studies were 
undertaken of alternative means for transporting 250 x 103 t /yr to 
3 x 106 t /yr of minerals from Mucanha to the coast. Although their 
calculations indicated that for the smaller totals a railway would 
* See Chapter 4 for further details of the plans for mineral 
exploitation. 
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provide the cheapest form of transportation it was argued that the 
river system should be given preference because tonnages were sure 
to increase. Nevertheless, attention was drawn to some of the technical 
difficulties which the project would create. These are among the 
problems which are discussed below: 
a) On Lake Cabora Bassa navigation is impeded by strong winds and by 
large fluctuations in water level. These problems were not discussed 
in the Plano Geral but have been elaborated by the GPZ in a more 
recent report136. Pre -impoundment studies indicated that the reservoir 
would experience strong winds from a predominantly south -easterly 
direction. Unless large boats capable of withstanding such conditions 
could be transported to the reservoir by road, which seems unlikely, 
they would have to be constructed locally. The main significance of the 
large fluctuations in water level would be in their effect on the 
location and design of port facilities. The GPZ report considered 
drawdown to a minimum level of 311 m (20 m below dam crest) although 
earlier plans had assumed the minimum drawdown level to be 295 m (36 m 
below dam crest). Even if port locations were chosen to provide the 
maximum shoreline slope, the cost of construction of facilities which 
could operate over such a wide range of reservoir levels would be high. 
In addition, navigation at the head of the lake would be under riverine 
conditions since the impounded water would move as much as 100 km 
downstream of Zumbo at maximum drawdown. The progressive deposition 
of silt in this region of the reservoir would further increase the 
difficulty of navigation. 
b) Transport past the Cabora Bassa Dam presents particular problems. 
Three alternative means of allowing loaded barges, of conventional 
design, to pass the dam were investigated in the Plano Geral: a system 
of locks cut into the gorge, a water slope of the type described by 
Aubert (1979) or a single hydraulic lift through a large diameter 
vertical shaft cut through the rock. The last of these was discounted 
because of the technical difficulties involved in resisting the great 
hydrostatic pressure at the lower gate and because of the high cost. 
Of the other two, the system of locks was preferred but was rejected 
because of the high capital cost (at least 50% greater than the cost of 
the dam itself) and because the maximum capacity of 6 x 106 t /yr was 
thought to impose too great a restriction on the future development of 
the system. As a result the method finally proposed in the Plano Geral 
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for by- passing the dam was the use of amphibious barges which could be 
lifted from the water and placed on bogies moving on a special track. 
c) The stabilization of the channel downstream of Cabora Bassa Gorge, 
either with or without further dams, would be a difficult and highly 
expensive operation. The details of this are considered in Chapter 5. 
d) Probably the most intractable problem in creating the proposed 
navigation system is that of a suitable ocean port near the mouth of 
the Zambezi. The technical aspects of this problem were discussed in 
one of the last GPZ reports to be published137. Sand bars prevent 
access, by all but vessels of the shallowest draught, to the existing 
port of Chinde or to alternative port locations in one of the other 
openings of the delta. The possibility of an offshore terminal was 
considered, but even this does not provide a ready solution since it 
would have to be located at least 16 km from the shore Co obtain the 
necessary depths for modern bulk mineral carriers. The possibility of 
using the existing ports at Beira and Nacala was also considered, with 
the latter being preferred because it allowed more room for expansion. 
If one of these ports were to be used, however, it would introduce 
problems in linking with the river navigation system. Vessels capable 
of undertaking the sea passage to Nacala would require a river channel 
depth of at least 3 m which would greatly increase the cost of river 
stabilization works. Alternatively, if barges with a draught of, say, 
1.5 m were to be used on the river, provision for transhipment to coastal 
vessels would be required and again introduce additional costs and 
journey times. Use of a rail link from Mutarara to Beira or Nacala was 
considered but if a partial rail solution were contemplated it would 
probably be preferable to use rail transport over the entire distance. 
Such a solution would obviate the need for river navigation. 
The GPZ reports cited above indicate the continuing commitment of 
the Portuguese planners to the idea of river navigation up to the end 
of colonial rule. Further technical alternatives were considered 
including a mineral railway or cableway, over part of the distance, in 
particular past the dam, a 'mineral pipeline' over the whole distance 
to the chosen port138, and the containerized barge system known as 
'Lash' (Lighters aboard ship)139. In each case, however, the economic 
viability depended on a very rapid expansion of mineral extraction 
and trade. 
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Developments in the Zambezi valley since independence 
1. The Cabora Bassa Project: The political significance of the 
Cabora Bassa Project was dramatically changed by the fall of President 
Caetano following a left -wing military coup d'etat in Lisbon eight 
months before the date scheduled for the closure of the dam. Immediately 
following the signing of a general Agreement in Lusaka, in September, 
1974, between representatives of Frelimo and the new authorities in 
Portugal guerrilla attacks on the project area ceased. Construction 
work was then supported by Frelimo. Indeed, the interim Prime Minister 
of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, speaking in Songo: 
castigated some of the labourers for not working overtime, 
and exhorted the rest to surpass all previous efforts to 
finish the dam on schedule for the state of independent 
Mozambique140. 
Details of the Lusaka Agreement were elaborated in discussions 
between Portuguese and Frelimo delegations which lasted from late January, 
1975, until Independence Day, 25 June, 1975. The future status of the 
Cabora Bassa Project featured prominently in these negotiations141. 
Western governments and financial institutions which had invested heavily 
in the project were as concerned about the agreement as was Portugal 
which had guaranteed their loans. A mutually acceptable solution was 
found in the creation of a Portuguese registered operating company, 
Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa (HCB), which would be responsible for 
the generation of electrical power, the sale of that power to Escom 
and the scheduled repayment of the investments. Under such an agreement 
Escom was prepared to honour the original contract to purchase power *. 
HCB was granted a concession to operate the project, with the 
status of a public utility, for an agreed period dependent on the loan 
repayment schedule. The terms of the concession are set out in the 
Contracto de Concessáo do Aproveitamento de Cahora Bassa. The provisions 
of this document govern financial aspects, the generation and supply 
of electrical power, the status and conduct of HCB's staff and the 
* Further details of the terms under which the HCB operates and 
the financial aspects of the agreement with Escom are given in 
Chapter 4. 
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number of foreign personnel which may be employed at any one time. 
In addition, the following two provisions are of particular interest 
to the present study: 
a) Article 14 states that HCB is required:. 
to organize operating schedules for the hydroelectric station 
and for the utilization of water stored in the reservoir and 
to undertake rainfall and hydrological measurements, as 
determined for them, supplying the authorities with this 
operating information and statistical data as required of 
them by the regulations in force. (writer's translation) 
This single article governs HCB's obligations in the operation of the 
project in all respects other than power generation. Its general terms have 
led to confusion, and consequently, to disputes between HCB and various 
government agencies. This is particularly true as regards flood alleviation 
and flood warning. HCB has been accused of failing to provide adequate 
flood warning, and of failing to adopt operating procedures which would 
minimize the flood risk. HCB's Directors replied by demanding better access 
to hydrological information both upstream and downstream of the dam. 
The control of aquatic vegetation provided another area of dispute. 
The HCB position was that the Mozambican authorities were obliged to 
take any steps necessary to prevent weed infestation from threatening 
power production, including the funding of a commercial weed control unit 
employing foreign expertise. This was contrary to the views of 
Government officials who believed that it would be sufficient to establish 
a monitoring unit, within the Ministry of Agriculture, and accused HCB 
of exacerbating the problem by their failure to ensure proper maintenance 
of the two weed control booms which protect the turbine intakes. 
In both instances HCB appeared to be using the disputes to clarify 
and, if possible, broaden its sphere of responsibility. Proposals were 
also put forward by HCB for a more active participation in the management 
of fisheries, reservoir navigation, utilization of the shore line and 
scientific investigations around the reservoir142. 
b) Provisions were made which governed the development of further 
projects and, specifically, the proposed North Bank Station: 
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The undertaking of additional investments by the concessionaire, 
for the purpose of increasing the installed capacity of the 
Cabora Bassa Hydroelectric Project will depend on previous 
authorization by the Government of Mozambique. (Article 19, 
writer's translation) 
Article 2, however, states that, subject to such authorization, the 
construction and operation of the North Bank Station would be included 
within the terms of HCB's present concession *. In this respect, at 
least, HCB could expect to increase its responsibilities should this project 
proceed. These provisions have, therefore, assumed considerable signif- 
icance since July, 1980, when the Government invited international 
consortia to submit initial tenders for the construction of the North 
Bank Project. (For details see Appendix 5) 
The present attitude of the Mozambican Government to the Cabora 
Bassa Project is determined by its desire to transform it from a symbol 
of colonialist and capitalist exploitation to a symbol of independent 
self- determination - the resources of Mozambique working for the 
people of Mozambique. Since the present agreement to sell power to the 
RSA does little to further that objective the authorities have sought 
to derive other benefits from the project and to publicize these as 
widely as possible. In a major speech in August, 1979, President Machel 
said: 
We cannot irrigate without energy. The electrification of the 
Centre -North and of the South of our country is a fundamental 
condition needed to enable us to respond to the needs of 
agriculture. We must tame the 'white elephant' which CAHORA 
BASSA is. This 'elephant' must give our agriculture and 
industry the ivory of electrical energy and irrigation ... 
The next decade will demand the entry into operation of the 
North Bank Station and the building of numerous dams for 
irrigation and electrification143. 
2. Other developments in the Zambezi valley: None of the other hydro- 
electric projects proposed for the Zambezi valley are under active 
consideration. By contrast there have been some important changes 
affecting agricultural production since independence: co- operative 
production has been stimulated, albeit on a relatively small scale144; 
* Whether this would also apply to other projects on the Zambezi 
downstream of Cabora Bassa was not specified. 
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production in the family sector has been encouraged both of food crops, 
such as maize and millet, and of commercial crops, such as cashew nuts 
and cotton145; and a number of new projects have been started, including 
small -scale poultry production in parts of Quelimane District146 and 
around the city of Tete. The biggest changes have, however, been in 
the state sector which is based on former Portuguese and foreign owned 
farms and plantations. In Angônia, for example, an agro- industrial 
company produces maize, fruit, potatoes and other vegetables147. A new 
administrative commission was appointed in, May, 1976, to manage the 
lands of the Companhia do Boror after the former proprietors had fled 
the country148. The commission is now attempting to re- establish coconut 
and livestock production at pre- independence levels149. 
The case of the Sena Sugar Estates merits closer study. Since 
the 1930s Sena Sugar Estates Ltd has owned two plantations, one at 
Luabo on the north bank of the Zambezi and the other at Marromeu on the 
south bank. Both plantations are served by processing factories and 
the total area planted has been increased to about 24 000 ha. From 
1930 to 1960 the average annual employment on the two plantations was 
30 000, the majority of whom were migrant workers who lived and worked 
under extremely harsh conditions on six month contracts150. In the early 
1960s, international pressure compelled the Portuguese authorities to 
revise its labour recruitment policies, which had included the use of 
various forms of coercion. This intervention led to the Sena Sugar 
Estates being threatened by labour shortages. In response, the management 
attempted to decrease its labour demand by mechanization and by providing 
permanent employment for a smaller, settled, labour force. The 
recruitment of seasonal labour, however, continued. 
During the period of transition to independence labour suddenly 
became more plentiful and as a result the company decided to forego 
previous guarantees of employment and to rely solely on casual labour. 
This policy together with poor economic management and moves by the 
proprietors which were interprets as attempts to obstruct the 
commissioning of new equipment led to accusations of 'economic sabotage' 
against the company. The resulting conflict with the Government led 
to State intervention in August 1978151. The two plantations retain 
considerable economic importance for Mozambique. They comprise 
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approximately half of the total area of sugar plantation in the country. 
The capacity of the two processing factories, as reported in 1979, 
was an annual output of 180 000 t and the total employment provided by 
the plantations and factories was 12 000 
152, 
Agricultural plans for the Zambezi valley include proposals to 
implement various large -scale irrigation projects in the near future. 
In the documents for the 3rd Party Congress, which listed planning 
objectives for the period 1977 -80, the Frelimo Central Committee 
resolved: 
To begin immediate studies with a view to construction of 
irrigation systems in the Zambezi valley153. 
In September, 1981, it was reported that studies were in progress for 
five projects covering a total of 210 x 103 ha in the regions of 
Marromeu, Mopeia, Caia, Mutarara* and Morrumbala154. The projects 
range in size from 30 x 103 ha to 60 x 103 ha and all lie on the 
alluvial plain in situations where irrigation could be provided from 
the Zambezi. It should be noted that each project is larger than 
the combined area of the existing plantations of the Sena Sugar 
Estates. Looking further ahead, the plans appear to be even more 
ambitious. A number of officials in Maputo envisaged a total 
irrigated area on the alluvial plain of 1.5 x 106 ha with additional 
irrigation over large areas of the Luia, RevÓboé and Luenha basins. 
Such plans appear to derive directly from those contained in the 
Esquema Geral and the Plano Geral. 
Other plans for the Zambezi valley include a rapid expansion 
of coal production at Moatize, this is considered further in Chapter 4. 
The MFPZ's navigation plans have not been neglected since inde- 
pendence; the main features were discussed in an article (prepared by 
the DNA), which appeared in a technical journal155. Olivier156 attempted 
to re- awaken interest in the Zambezi as a transport route by suggesting 
* The Mutarara project is, almost certainly, located on Ilha de 
Inhangoma much of which was naturally irrigated by floods from the 
Zambezi before the construction of Kariba and Cabora Bassa Dams. 
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that the use of hover barges would create a rapid, economic system 
without the need to undertake extensive channel modifications. His 
concept was directed towards the provision of an alternative transport 
link for Zambia, Malawi and, presumably, Zimbabwe. Such a solution to 
transport problems implies relatively low density /high value cargoes 
rather than the low value bulk mineral cargoes envisaged by the MFPZ 
planners. Mitchell (1981) also discussed the possible benefits to 
Zimbabwe of a transportation system along the Zambezi, and recommended 
that technical and economic aspects of such a scheme should be more 
thoroughly investigated with reference to the proposal to build a dam 
at Mpata Gorge. 
The Mozambican authorities now appear to be moving towards a less 
ambitious approach to the planning of transportation in the region. 
For the export of coal from Moatize the emphasis is now on improving 
the rail link to Beira and the cargo handling facilities at that port157. 
Transport links with Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi are also being discussed 
as one of the priorities of the SADCC158. Here, too, the emphasis, at 
present, is on improving existing facilities, in particular the rail 
links and ports, rather than on creating alternative transportation 
systems. Of the MFPZ's plans for navigation along the Zambezi, only 
one aspect is currently being implemented - navigation on Lake Cabora 
Bassa. Yet even this project appears to be on a fairly small scale; 
no details of the role of the shipping company recently formed with 
Bulgarian aid159 have been published but it is unlikely that it will be 
required to transport any large quantities of cargo in the foreseeable 
future. 
The present chapter has provided a general introduction to the 
factors which have shaped social and economic change in the Zambezi 
basin since the arrival of the first European settlers. Although 
numerous proposals have been made for the expansion of European 
agriculture and the development of river navigation in the basin few 
have been implemented. Much of the basin still lacks an adequate 
system of transport and communications, few areas have been left with 
a sustainable form of mechanized or irrigated agricultural production. 
Traditional agriculture has, nevertheless, suffered considerable 
123 
disruption as a result of the continuous demand for labour under the 
colonial regime and, more recently, the changes which have been brought 
about by the creation of the large hydroelectric projects (see Chapter 
6). However, earlier proposals for the spectacular development of the 
lower Zambezi, based on agriculture and navigation, continue to exert 
an influence over the authorities in Mozambique. 
The demand for hydroelectric power has had a dominant influence 
over the development of all parts of the basin for much of the present 
century. The Kariba, Kafue and Victoria Falls projects, together with 
a number of smaller projects, were built solely to meet that demand. 
For the Cabora Bassa Project, despite initial suggestions that the dam 
would bring multiple purpose benefits, the production of hydroelectric 
power became the dominant factor in its implementation and has remained 
so in its subsequent operation. The discussion of these projects in 
this chapter has highlighted some important technical and political 
aspects of the regulation of the Zambezi, and, in particular, of the 
Cabora Bassa Project. Many of these aspects have a bearing on the 
development of the remaining chapters in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYDROLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DESIGN AND OPERATION 
OF THE CABORA BASSA PROJECT 
The techniques of engineering hydrology 
Hydrology, in its broadest sense, refers to the science of water 
but, although water has been regulated to meet human needs since pre- 
historic times, the theoretical basis of hydrology has only been 
established relatively recently. Ancient works were designed from 
accumulated practical experience, some of which was gained at consider- 
able cost160 Although the Roda gauge on the Nile provides a record 
of peak annual river levels for a period of over a thousand years few 
attempts were made to measure hydrological phenomena (precipation, 
evaporation, river discharge) before the seventeenth century161. In 
Britain, the first book on hydrology was published in 1862 and the first 
systematic river discharge records were begun at about the same time. 
Thus, few systematic river records cover a period of more than a 
hundred years. 
Linsley (1967) provided the basis for a simplified history of the 
development of surface water hydrology from the late seventeenth century 
until the present. The period until 1930 he termed the era of empiricism 
when lack of adequate data prevented the development of rational theories. 
That development was achieved during the period from 1930 to 1955 which 
Linsley termed the period of correlation. Since 1955 considerable 
emphasis has been placed on the analysis of hydrological processes by 
numerical modelling which is now largely accomplished with the aid of 
electronic computers. This period has, therefore, been termed the 
computer era. 
Bruce and Clark (1966, pl) suggest that it is only since about 
1940 that it has been possible to make practical use of meteorological 
data in the design of water resources projects. In the ten or twelve 
years after 1955 a number of major texts on hydrology were published 
which have been widely used by engineers concerned with the development 
of water resources162. In 1964, an International Hydrological Decade 
was initiated, under the auspices of UNESCO, with a view to improving 
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the worldwide collection and exchange of hydrological data. The 
Institution of Civil Engineers in London (ICE) marked the end of the 
decade with a special conference on engineering hydrology163. The 
contributions to this conference indicated some recent areas of 
development, particularly the study of applied hydrology by scientists 
and engineers in the UK. A number of the points raised in general 
discussion are of interest. Various speakers164 suggested that the 
heavy bias of the conference papers towards British problems and 
experience reflected a more general bias amongst researchers in the 
UK away from the special problems of applied hydrology in other parts of 
the world. This was despite the fact that the value of overseas contracts 
for water resources projects being undertaken by British firms was two 
or three times greater than for projects in Britain. There was also 
some discussion about the practical application of theoretical advances: 
for example, W L Jack suggested that the conference had shown 'a healthy 
scepticism of the escalation of mathematical modelling' and that a pre - 
requisitefor any improvement in hydrological analysis was an improvement 
in the collection and publication of 'good quality data' 
During the 1970s, a large number of hydrologists and engineers in 
Britain became involved in the preparation and interpretation of a major 
report on flood evaluation - the Flood Studies Report165. The work 
behind the report was intended to provide nationally accepted techniques 
for the estimation of floods, from the available hydrological, meteorolog- 
ical and topographical information, for application throughout the UK 
including areas for which the available river discharge records are, by 
themselves, inadequate. The preparation of the report entailed the 
collection of large quantities of data which were used both in the 
preparation of 'regional envelope curves', for use in areas of inadequate 
data, and in the development and calibration of new analytical techniques 
and numerical models. The concept of a physical upper limit to precip- 
itation, the probable maximum precipitation (PMP), was given prominence. 
Techniques for the analysis of flood hydrographs were also developed by 
means of which values of probable maximum flood (PMF) could be determined, 
at any point on a river system, from previously calculated PMP values. 
Alternative methods of analysis, including the statistical analysis of 
river discharge records, were also described in the report. 
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Five years after the publication of the Flood Studies Report, 
a conference was organized by the ICE to discuss experience in the 
practical application of the report and consider new developments in 
the evaluation of floods. As in the conference at the end of the 
International Hydrological Decade, cited above, a number of speakers 
were concerned about the heavy bias in the report towards British 
conditions and experience although, as Sutcliffe166 pointed out, the 
report was not specifically intended to be applicable overseas. Hall, 
referring to Linsey's description of the historical development of 
hydrological methods, suggested that in the estimation of floods the 
availability of computer facilities had made less impact than in other 
branches of hydrology and that: 
the influence of the era of empiricism and the era of 
correlation are still very evident in present -day practice167. 
This, he continued, was particularly true in developing countries which 
lack 'an adequate data base'. An illustration of the difficulties 
encountered in sub -Saharan Africa was provided by Lynn168 from his 
experience of a project in western Nigeria. 
One of the principal areas in which the Flood Studies Report has 
been applied is in the design and operation of reservoir spillways to 
prevent catastrophic dam failures. British engineering practice, 
since the 1930s, had been based on an interim report made by a committee 
of the ICE1n1933 . That report set out design procedures based, primarily, 
on the analysis of existing river discharge records which were to be 
extrapolated to provide an adequate factor of safety. In the event, a 
wide variety of design practices came to be adopted, many of them based 
on the empirical formulae of individual consultants. To achieve wider 
concensus, the adoption of standard procedures was proposed in a report 
prepared by the ICE (1978) following the publication of the Flood Studies 
Report. This report proposed that spillway design be based on the 
theoretical PMF as calculated from the Flood Studies Report or, where 
the reservoir presented less hazard, on the PMF reduced by a suitable 
factor. A number of engineers, however, held that these procedures, 
which involved scaling down from a theoretically determined maximum, 
annealed less to, their engineering judgement and appeared to be less 
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conservative than the earlier procedures169. A further area of discus- 
sion was the report's suggestion that the results of economic studies 
could, in certain circumstances, be used in the design of reservoir 
spillways. The suggestion had been made, in an earlier discussion paper, 
that economic analysis be given priority in the design of most reservoir 
spillways. This was, however, given less emphasis in the final report 
following suggestions that, in many cases, the results of economic 
evaluations of the damages which might result from catastrophic floods 
were unreliable and subjective170. Lying behind much of the unease 
expressed about economic analysis and, indeed, of any form of categor- 
ization of dams according to risk was a more fundamental issue. Many 
engineers were of the opinion that unless legally accepted guidelines 
were produced the design engineer would bear the responsibility for 
assessing the level of risk and that if, in a particular case, he chose 
to adopt a design flood less than the PMF, he would be culpable should 
excessive damages result from a catastrophic flood171. British engineers 
remain divided about a suitable method for incorporating the statistical 
analysis of risk into their design of flood spillways. A number have 
advocated an economic approach similar to that used in the USA which may 
include the placing of an economic value on the risk of human fatality172. 
The interest in short- duration flood hydrology in Britain arises 
from the considerable hazard posed by floods in a relatively densely 
populated country which is heavily cultivated and urbanized, and in which 
there are numerous old reservoirs of small capacity. Other hydrological 
factors which are less important under British conditions have been studied 
more extensively in other parts of the world, particularly in the USA. 
These factors include the operation of multiple purpose reservoirs and 
multiple reservoir systems, the operation of large capacity reservoirs, the 
hydrology of arid and semi -arid regions, the hydrology of regions which 
experience tropical or seasonal rainfall or catchments in which substantial 
changes in the natural vegetation are taking place, the hydrology of large 
natural floodplains and the problems posed by heavy evaporation losses. 
The techniques which have been developed for studying some of these are 
considered in the rest of this section. 
The basic tool which has been developed to assist in the operation 
of reservoirs is the rule curve. It is most commonly applied to single 
hydroelectric reservoirs which experience a seasonal pattern of inflow173. 
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but combined rule curves for multiple reservoir systems have also been 
used174. In general, an energy, or lower, rule curve indicates the 
minimum reservoir levels which can be tolerated throughout the year if 
sufficient water is to be stored to guarantee the required energy (or 
other, primary) output. Surplus capacity, represented by reservoir 
levels below the maximum storage level and above this lower rule curve, 
may either be used to store water for additional outputs, such as 
increased power production or irrigation releases, or it may be held 
vacant in order to regulate flood inflows. Energy rule curves are 
generally established by simulating the operation of the reservoir for 
a selected critical series of inflow data - either the data from the 
driest year on record or a synthetic data series representing the most 
severe conditions which the hydrologist anticipates. Such rule curves 
serve only as approximate guides to reservoir operators; special 
circumstances, such as the need to undertake maintenance work on 
discharge gates, or additional information, such as a forecast of above 
average inflows, may cause the operator to deviate substantially from 
the established curve. With more complex inter -connected reservoir 
systems, and where there are facilities to provide rapid access to 
hydrological and meteorological data from all parts of a catchment, 
frequent adjustments may be made to reservoir discharges in order to 
optimize outputs in a way which would be impossible simply by strict 
adherence to the rule curves. TVA engineers make such adjustments 
daily or, sometimes, more frequently. 
In many reservoirs an upper, or flood, rule curve is also constructed. 
Such a curve is required where the discharge capacity of the dam is 
insufficient to pass the full design flood discharge, some of which will 
require temporary storage to prevent over- topping of the dam. Where the 
critical flood is of short duration and might occur in any season, as 
in most small catchments in temporate climates, a single limit, the normal 
maximum storage level, is applied throughout the year. Where floods are 
seasonal, and where the possibility arises that inflows will exceed dam 
discharge capacity over a long period, a flood rule curve must be used. 
The curve specifies the maximum reservoir levels, through the year, 
which can be tolerated if sufficient storage capacity is to be reserved 
to prevent over -topping the dam. In general, the principal feature of 
the flood rule.cúrve will be a requirement to draw down the reservoir to 
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a specific level, by a particular date each year, in advance of the major 
flood season. The maximum levels of the flood rule curve should be 
strictly adhered to since to neglect them may result in extensive damage 
to, or even catastrophic failure of, the dam. The flood rule curve is 
calculated by simulating the operation of the reservoir taking appropriate 
values of the design flood as the input data. The ICE (1978) report 
provides procedures for the selection of suitable values of the design 
flood under various conditions. 
Rule curves may need revising, from time to time, as new data or 
techniques of analysis become available or as the demand for the project's 
principal output changes. Numerical models, which simulate the operation 
of the reservoir, are frequently used both to assess the effects of 
such changes and to optimize the project's operation for primary and 
secondary outputs. Young (1968) provides an example of this type of 
optimization exercise for a reservoir whose required primary and secondary 
outputs are flood control and low flow augmentation, respectively. The 
major problem in undertaking any such simulations is how to take account 
of the natural stochastic variations in reservoir inflows. For example, 
a project designed to give certain irrigation benefits solely on the 
basis of the mean annual inflow may experience, say, three years out of 
ten when there is insufficient water to provide these benefits. Yevdjevich 
(1965) has provided a useful introduction to the methods which may be used 
to account for stochastic variations in annual inflows for the design 
of independent reservoirs. The methods include empirical analysis, data 
generation and analytical methods. Empirical analysis is the simplest 
and requires that recorded inflow data are studied to identify the median 
year, and other years of selected frequencies, which are then used as 
inputs in a reservoir simulation model. Alternatively, the whole series 
is fed into the model and a statistical analysis performed on the results. 
Data generation is used to extend a short series of recorded data with 
data which exhibits similar statistical properties. Fiering(1965) 
provided a realistic assessment of the limitations and applications of 
this technique. Analytical techniques involve fitting a mathematical 
curve to the recorded data series and using this curve as the basis for 
analysis of the reservoir's operation. Analytical methods are generally 
considered to be more accurate and the Flood Studies Report placed 
considerable emphasis on them in the estimation of floods. It should 
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be noted, however, that the accuracy of any of these methods depends 
on the length and accuracy of the existing data records. Data 
generation and analytical methods appear to offer techniques for 
obtaining greater accuracy when using short data records but they can 
only do so by making assumptions about the statistical characteristics 
of the natural data - assumptions which are not necessarily valid. The 
likelihood of error may, however, be reduced by using additional data 
from adjacent or similar catchments when determining these characteristics. 
The reservoir simulation models referred to above constitute a 
simple form of systems analysis. The input to the system is the 
reservoir inflow data, the system is the reservoir and dam with its 
particular storage and discharge characteristics and the output is the 
dam discharge data which, for a hydroelectric project, may, be expressed 
in terms of power output. The numerical analysis is based on a simple 
mass balance for the system using discrete time intervals which may vary 
from less than an hour to more than a week, depending largely on the 
capacity of the reservoir and the area of its catchment. The time inter- 
vals chosen for the analysis may also depend on the quality of the input 
data and on the purpose for which the analysis is being undertaken. 
Even in a simple system, such as that outlined above, there are 
many factors which could influence the results of the analysis. In 
many underdeveloped countries, the lack of accurate long -term hydro- 
logical records may make it very difficult to derive a reliable set of 
input data. Furthermore, even where reliable data are available, 
existing records rarely provide a basis for assessing the possible 
effects on the future pattern of reservoir inflows of changes in 
catchment characteristics or climatic factors. Evaluation of the para- 
meters of the system itself generally presents fewer difficulties. The 
relationship between storage capacity and reservoir level can be 
determined provided that accurate maps of the area were made before the 
reservoir was impounded. Nevertheless, this relationship will change 
appreciably should rapid siltation of the reservoir occur. For the 
purposes of analysis, evaporation and seepage losses from the reservoir 
may be taken as negligible. But, in cases where the losses are believed 
to be too large to neglect, accurate assessment of their magnitude is 
extremely difficult. For a given set of system parameters and inputs 
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the calculation of outputs is straightforward. Nevertheless, if 
output values are required in terms of the quantity of hydroelectric 
power generated, further relationships must be included in the analysis 
to define the turbine operating characteristics. In the analysis of a 
reservoir's response to flood inflows, the discharge characteristics 
of the dam's spillways and gates must also be specified. For a reservoir 
which is operational, the system analysis may be conducted in the reverse 
direction as a means of calculating actual (ungauged) inflows from 
recorded reservoir discharges and levels or, where inflows, outflows 
and reservoir levels have been accurately determined, of providing 
estimates of seepage and evaporation losses. Olivier (1972) notes a 
possible source of error in this type of analysis: 
... in flood routing operations where inflow is calculated 
from changes in reservoir level, and where the reservoir 
is of appreciable length ... the changes in reservoir level 
must be measured at the null point of oscillation of the 
lake to ensure seiches do not lead to spurious flood 
predictions. (p64) 
The analysis of single reservoirs may be extended to inter -connected 
reservoir systems. Amongst the more interesting published accounts of 
the analysis of multiple reservoir systems is that described by Speers 
(1976) for the operation of the hydroelectric stations at thirty -eight 
dams on the Columbia River. Speers envisaged a radical change, before 
the end of the century, in-the pattern of hydroelectric demand from 
the system: from that of base -load operation, for which the project's 
were designed, to that of providing peak. power to supplement base -load 
thermal and nuclear power stations. The analysis enabled the hydrological 
implications of such a change to be considered and provides the basis 
for calculating a completely new set of operating procedures. Clearly, 
the analysis of such a complex multiple reservoir system involves a 
considerable amount of numerical analysis which could only be undertaken 
with the aid of an electronic computer. 
The system may also be extended in other ways, each of which, however, 
results in numerical models of greater complexity. The most common 
extension considered is that of including in the system not only the 
reservoir but also the whole of its catchment area. Since the records 
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of meteorological data required as inputs to this enlarged system are 
generally more reliable and cover longer periods than the records of 
river flow required for analysis of the single reservoir system there 
are certain advantages to be gained through such a modification. On 
the other hand, the whole hydrological cycle within the catchment is, 
in effect, included within the system175 with the reservoir operation 
comprising only one small sub -system. This inevitably increases the 
complexity of the analysis. For example, a rigorous analysis would 
have to take account of evapo -transpiration effects, the interaction 
between surface water and ground water, areal differences in the 
distribution of rainfall over the catchment and time factors related 
to runoff, including the effects resulting from temporary storage 
in river channels, floodplains and natural lakes. The accurate 
modelling of such characteristics demands a considerable amount of 
data and information from the catchment and .may, in some cases, 
require further studies to be undertaken of the hydrological processes 
involved. Since. in most instances, it is unlikely that such 
information would be readily available for a catchment where river 
discharge records are considered to be inadequate, the direct applications 
for such a model are limited. In practice, hydrologists develop hybrid 
models which are appropriate to the available information and data. 
Thus, where river discharge records are available for part of the 
catchment, the correlation between meteorological and hydrological 
data for gauged tributaries may be investigated to provide simplified 
runoff relations which are then assumed to apply over the whole catch- 
ment. Alternatively, if a limited number of hydrological records are 
of significant length for detailed analysis, correlations between such 
records and shorter records may be investigated with a view to using 
the relationships obtained in extending the length of the shorter 
records. In some cases random number generation may be used in 
association with such techniques to produce more realistic stochastic 
variations in the river discharges generated by the model. Numerical 
models, such as these, are widely applied in the investigation of many 
of the hydrological questions referred to above. 
A further increase in complexity results when attempts are made 
to include biological and environmental relationships and responses in 
the analysis. The present state of the art in such 'ecological modelling' 
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may be judged from a study of the papers edited by du Bois (1981). 
Many of the models presented would be applicable to various, aspects 
of stream regulation. At the present time, organic and inorganic 
pollution are the principal areas of interest but it is commonly believed 
that satisfactory ecological models can be developed to investigate 
changes in the vegetation of reservoir catchments, the effects of 
reservoir operation on fish communities and downstream effects of river 
regulation including the effects on floodplains and estuaries. One 
of the principal problems with such models, and, indeed, with all 
numerical models, is the difficulty of assessing their level of accuracy. 
Such assessments are rarely even attempted. Fedra (1980) showed how 
such assessments might be made by sensitivity analysis. The probable 
error in each piece of input data and in each assumption about the 
system's characteristics was assessed and, by repeated analysis of the 
system, the effects of these errors were studied in terms of the 
probability distribution of the output data. Clearly, such analysis 
again increases computation time by a considerable factor. 
The system could be extended still further, for optimizing the 
design of projects, to include economic factors as well as social and 
political factors related to the development of the available water 
resources. Consideration of such a broad system has been strongly 
advocated in various of the publications by G F White and in the paper 
by Webb and Hufschmidt cited in Chapter 1. Considering the present state 
of the art, the simplifications and approximations which would be 
necessary to analyse such a comprehensive system wholly by numerical 
methods, particularly for river basins in underdeveloped regions, would 
almost certainly render the results less reliable than those based 
largely on 'subjective' engineering judgement. 
The study of hydrological phenomena in Africa 
A considerable number of hydrological studies have been undertaken 
in various parts of Africa176. No attempt will be made here to provide 
a comprehensive review of this literature but a number of the more 
important areas of investigation, particularly those of immediate relevance, 
are considered. 
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A large number of studies have been undertaken to investigate the 
runoff characteristics of small catchments under tropical vegetation, 
both natural and cultivated, particularly in East Africa. The best 
known work is probably that of Pereira177 which began in the 1950s. 
Other published studies from East Africa include the estimation of 
floods in small catchments whilst in various areas, including Zambia, 
attempts have been made to assess the behaviour of large ungauged 
basins from studies of small catchments178. 
Of the major river basins in Africa, the Nile has been the most 
intensively studied by hydrologists. The long period for which records 
are available has enabled hydrologists to consider in detail the idea of 
long -term storage and regulation, and also provided the necessary data 
for the important statistical study by Hurst (1951) from which the 
concept of the 'persistence effect'* in river discharges and other 
natural phenomena originated. The climatic cycles which give rise to 
this effect have been studied in other parts of Africa from records of 
the fluctuations in the levels of natural lakes, see, for example the 
study of Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi) by Cochrane (1957). 
Although a large number of hydrological studies have been undertaken 
in the design of reservoir projects in Africa the analyses have generally 
been relatively simple and have been restricted by a lack of adequate 
data. Van Cauwenberghe (1960) provided a general review of the problems 
of designing and operating hydroelectric reservoirs in the tropics with 
particular reference to projects in the Katanga region of Zaire. He 
identified, as potential problems, rapid siltation and the calculation 
of the probable reservoir yield in dry years. The calculation of minimum 
yields is more difficult in areas outside the equatorial belt, where 
rainfall is generally confined to one season, or in areas where the mean 
annual rainfall is low, because, in such areas, variability of rainfall 
from year to year tends to increase179. Olivier (1969) made reference to 
computer studies which indicated the large differences which occur in 
reservoir design parameters to achieve the same degree of river regulation 
in different basins. The studies showed that, in order to provide a 
* Hurst showed that individual events do not occur randomly in nature 
but that there is a tendency for them to occur in groups; for example, 
a series of wet years is followed by a series of dry years. 
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safe yield of 80% of the mean annual runoff (with a recurrence interval 
of 50 years), reservoirs on the Vaal would require a storage capacity 
200% of the river's mean annual runoff whereas, for the Blue and White 
Niles, the figure would be only 10 -40 %. Attempts have been made to 
devise general formulae for the prediction of reservoir yield in 
particular areas; for example, a set of relations produced by Mitchell 
(1965), for reservoirs in Zimbabwe, was used in the assessment of the 
country's water resources undertaken by the Ministry of Water Development 
(1972). 
The lack of adequate hydrological data has proved a major problem 
in the design of many reservoir projects in Africa including some of 
the largest. Abiodun (1973) indicated that the inflows to Lake Kainji 
in Nigeria had, in the first few years of the project's operation, been 
smaller than those anticipated in the pre- impoundment hydrological studies. 
A similar short -fall was noted by Kumi (1973) for the Volta River Project 
in Ghana. In both cases the hydrological records were not sufficiently 
long to show whether the drier inflows were likely to be a short -term or 
long -term phenomenum. 
Numerical models for use in areas in which hydrological data are 
inadequate have been developed in the Hydrological Research Unit of the 
University of Witwatersrand. The model by Pitman (1973) uses meteorological 
data, together with various coefficients which are related to particular 
catchment characteristics, to generate monthly river discharge data. 
Recorded discharges, where available, are used to improve the calibration 
of the model. This model appears to be relatively simple to use and to 
have wide application; it provided the basis of a study of inflow data 
to Lake Kariba undertaken by the CAPC in the late 1970s. 
In the Zambezi basin the principal hydrological investigations 
which have been undertaken have been related to the larger hydroelectric 
projects - Cabora Bassa, Kariba and Kafue. From a hydrological point 
of view the Kafue Project is the most complex of the three. The discharges 
of the Kafue are considerably smaller and show greater inter -annual 
variations than those of the Zambezi, although the seasonal fluctuations 
are smaller. In addition, there are few suitable reservoir sites in the 
Kafue basin. The FAO Multipurpose Survey of the Kafue Basin (1968) 
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contained a detailed report on climatology and hydrology (Volume 3). 
Further studies were undertaken, from 1967 to 1971, by the Swedish 
engineering consultants, SWECO, for the design of the hydroelectric 
project and, more recently, the Dutch constultants, DHV, have under- 
taken a specific study of the hydrology of the Kafue Flats180. This 
last study entailed the use of a rather complex numerical model* to 
simulate the flow of water through this vast floodplain and the 
evaporation losses which occur there. 
Hydrological studies of the Cabora Bassa Project 
For almost the entire period from 1956 to the present some form of 
hydrological study of the Cabora Bassa Project has been in progress. 
The results of these studies, published in numerous reports, have led, 
over the years, to markedly different conclusions about the characteristics 
and potential of the project. Such differences arise from the methods 
of analysis, available data and operating assumptions on which the 
studies were based. The Portuguese firm of consulting engineers 
Hidrot6cnica Portuguesa was closely associated with all hydrological 
aspects of the work of the MFPZ /GPZ and, as a result, acted as consultants 
for all the major studies published prior to 1975. 
The earliest studies of the hydrology of the Zambezi at Cabora Bassa 
were estimates of its hydroelectric potential. The estimates published 
by Manzanares (see Appendix 4) and in the Relatório Preliminar, 3, were 
based on estimated values for the mean annual discharge of the river 
and the mean gross head, together with an approximate relationship for 
the efficiency of generation. 
The study published in 1961 in the Esquema Gera1181 was not, 
primarily, concerned with energy potential but with the project's 
capacity to regulate the Zambezi for navigation downstream. A simple 
numerical model was developed which simulated the operation of the 
reservoir by calculating the change in the volume of water stored from 
the difference between the reservoir inflow and outflow in time intervals 
* At the time of the study Zambia did not possess computer facilities 
which could have handled such a model. 
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of one month (a monthly water balance model). The analysis was 
conducted on two extreme sets of hypothetical inflow data: a critical 
two year dry period (probability 1 in 100 years) and a year containing 
the estimated design flood. Instead of reservoir operating rule curves, 
the study recommended the use of a single target reservoir level (310 m 
on 1 November each year) which would provide the required regulation of 
discharges over the critical dry period as well as enabling the 
reservoir to control inflows with the magnitude of the design flood *. 
An approximate value for the project's guaranteed energy potential was 
obtained from the numerical model using values for the mean regulated 
discharge and the mean reservoir level during the critical dry period. 
The studies for the Plano Gera1182, published in 1965, led to a 
more elaborate numerical model and sought to improve the quality of 
the inflow data. Again, the regulation of discharges for navigation 
was considered to be the primary objective and, as before, two extreme 
cases were used to provide the hypothetical input data required for the 
simulation: the design flood and a single critical dry year of probability 
1 in 20. From these simulations two operating rule curves were produced, 
see Figure 10a. For reservoir levels between the two curves the required 
constant discharge could be maintained; for levels above the upper 
curve additional (flood) discharges would be required; and for levels 
below the lower curve discharges would have to be reduced. A rudimentary 
calculation of energy potential similar to that in the Esquema Gera? 
was again undertaken. 
Two short reports on energy potential183 published after the Plano 
Gera? do not appear to have been based on an improved method of 
calculation. The source of an increased estimate of the project's 
guaranteed energy potential, in the second report, was not explained. 
Further attempts to improve the quality of the inflow data together 
with various amendments made to the reservoir system parameters resulted 
in the need for a new study to re- evaluate the upper rule curve and 
the capacity of the dam's discharge gates. The study has been described 
* The maximum flood discharge envisaged from the dam, 4 400 m3 /s, was 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in detail by dos Santos (1968) and the form of the new rule curve which 
was calculated is shown in Figure 10b. 
The first detailed investigation of Cabora Bassa's energy potential 
was completed in 1969 but was not available for the present study184. This 
work, which was undertaken in order to estimate the additional capacity 
which could be installed in a future North Bank Station, sought to 
determine the guaranteed energy potential at two levels of probability - 
1 in 20 years (95 %) and 1 in 100 years (99 %). For the latter it was 
found that an analysis of the effects of reduced inflows over a three 
year period was required. In the course of this study, a new flood rule 
curve was obtained and is shown in Figure 10b. This curve is less 
conservative than that published by dos Santos and the difference may 
be attributed to the increase in discharge capacity which would result 
from the proposed operation of additional generating units, in the North 
Bank Station, as well as from a small increase in the capacity of the 
discharge gates in their final redesign prior to construction. 
The last of the hydrological studies, undertaken prior to 
independence, by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1973), introduced several 
significant innovations. Firstly, the principal conclusions were 
based on the results of an analysis using 10 000 years of generated data 
although recorded data were also examined to assess the validity of the 
results obtained. Secondly, the study represented the first attempt to 
investigate, specifically, the possible conflicts between, and optimal 
combination of, two desired outputs - power generation and river regu- 
lation for navigation. Thirdly, the analysis was performed with the 
full data series rather than with data from selected critical years. 
Fourthly, a more accurate representation of turbine operating character- 
istics and of the variation of tailrace level with discharge was used, 
thus allowing a detailed study to be made of the effect on power output 
of losses of hydraulic head. Finally the regulated river discharges 
were specified for Lupata Gorge (200 km downstream of the dam) rather 
than the dam itself. The analysis, therefore, took account of the 
varying contributions to the discharge of the lower lambezi from the 
tributaries downstream of Cabora Bassa. The results of this study are 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Following independence, the first significant reassessment of the 
hydrology of the Cabora Bassa Project was undertaken, by consulting 
engineers Rendel, Palmer and Tritton (RPT), for the design of a flood 
warning system which had been proposed after the 1978 floods. RPT 
submitted three reports (1978, 1979 and 1980), the first was a short 
interim report containing a hydrological analysis which, because of 
poor data and certain invalid approximations, was totally superseded 
by the two subsequent reports. 
The RPT (1979) report contained a study of alternative operating 
procedures, for Cabora Bassa, which would enable increased flood relief 
downstream to be achieved whilst meeting all existing commitments to 
power supply (principally, those specified in the agreement with [scorn). 
The numerical analysis was based on a monthly water balance model for the 
reservoir similar to that used by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1973) and 
utilizing many of the same system parameters. However, the flood rule 
curve of dos Santos (1968) was adopted in preference to the 1969 curve. 
For their model RPT calculated a new set of input data, a forty -eight year 
series of monthly inflows, which was used to simulate the continuous 
operation of the project. An energy rule curve was derived, see Figure 
11a, which would guarantee the firm power output required over the full 
period of the simulation. The purpose of the curve was different from 
that proposed in the Plano Geral. Rather than indicating the reservoir 
levels below which power output (or regulated discharges) would have to 
be reduced, RPT's curve indicated the reservoir levels above which 
additional discharges from the dam could be made without jeopardizing 
future power production. In the Plano Geral analysis it had been 
assumed that no additional discharges would be made until the level of 
the flood rule curve was reached, after which the gates would be fully 
opened, whereas RPT proposed that, for reservoir levels above the 
energy rule curve, discharges should be made up to a chosen 'threshold' 
in order to reduce the need for higher discharges at a later date. The 
threshold was to be chosen as the maximum discharge which could be made 
without causing serious flooding downstream. Three further refinements 
were included in the RPT (1979) study. Firstly, a detailed simulation 
of the operation of the Kariba Project was made in order to improve the 
quality of the input data for the Cabora Bassa simulation and to 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































from Cabora Bassa. Secondly, an analysis was made of the potential 
for generating 'secondary energy' *. Thirdly, daily input data were 
used for the simulation of a single year of the project's operation in 
order to assess whether the results would be significantly different 
from those of the monthly analysis used in the rest of their work. 
The last of these was not included in subsequent studies. 
The third report by RPT (1980) was a supplement to the 1979 report 
and contained an analysis which was, in outline, similar. Nevertheless, 
some important changes were made including calculation of an entirely 
new set of input data (a fifty -four year series), consideration of the 
effects of river regulation on the Kafue and re- evaluation of the 
flood rule curve for Cabora Bassa**. As a result of these changes it 
was also necessary to calculate a new energy rule curve - both curves 
are shown in Figure 11a. A summary of the results obtained from this 
simulation is presented in Table 6. 
Following the publication of RPT's 1979 report, engineers of the 
Secçáo de Hidrologia of the DNA in Maputo were unhappy about RPT's use 
of the flood rule curve of dos Santos and undertook an independent study 
which was described in an internal report, DNA (1980a). The study was 
based on a reassessment of the data used by dos Santos and the application 
of revised techniques for estimating the magnitude of extreme floods. 
Flood rule curves based on two alternative methods of analysis were 
proposed. These are shown in Figure 11b. 
The most recent hydrological studies of the Cabora Bassa Project 
have been concerned with the energy potential available for the proposed 
North Bank Station and with the possible hydrological and ecological 
effects of such a development. In one of these, Hidrotécnica Portuguesa 
revised its previous reports and included new proposals for operating 
rule curves185. Independent studies were also initiated, about the 
* 'Secondary energy' is the possible output from the present generating 
plant in excess of that required to fulfil firm power commitments. 
** In a recent paper written by the principal engineers involved in the 
preparation of the RPT (1980) report, Haws et al. (1982), a further 
modification of the flood rule curve is presented which removed the 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































same time, by the Swedish consulting engineers, SWECO, as part of the 
pre- investment programme of investigations for the North Bank Project 
commissioned by Electricidade de Moçambique. The report on hydrology 
and water management, SWECO (1982), provides some new and interesting 
results and conclusions. The method of analysis was based on a monthly 
water balance model, similar to that used in previous studies, with 
the input data once more reassessed and certain system parameters 
modified. One of the principal purposes of this study was to investigate 
the hydrological implications of attempting to attain various levels of 
continuous power output from additional installed capacity in the 
North Bank. The results, which present reliability of output and 
availability of secondary energy as functions of the target level of 
power production, are shown graphically in Figure 12a. The dramatic 
decrease in these outputs in SWECO's simulation, once the target output 
exceeds a certain value, results from loss of hydraulic head and 
consequent loss of turbine efficiency as the reservoir approaches its 
minimum operating level. In order to avoid a sudden loss of that output 
SWECO proposed that the adopted energy rule curve should be similar to 
that of the lower rule curve in the Plano Geral so that when the 
reservoir level falls below the rule curve the power output would be 
reduced by a given percentage. The extent of this reduction would be 
such that, with the data used in the simulation, no further loss of 
output would occur. If it were decided that only a small percentage 
reduction in output could be tolerated the corresponding rule curve 
would have higher levels, and reductions in output would occur more 
frequently than if a higher percentage reduction were permissible. Four 
alternative rule curves were produced by SWECO for energy reductions 
ranging from 12% to 30 %. The rule curve for a 20% reduction in output 
is shown in Figure 12b. 
A further part of the SWECO study was a re- evaluation of the flood 
rule curve. An initial curve, shown in Figure 12b, was similar in form 
to that of DNA (1980a). SWECO suggested, however, that if the maximum 
discharge capacity of the dam were to be increased by about 25% 
(3 600 m3 /s), by the construction of an additional spillway, it would be 
possible to replace the flood rule curve by a single normal maximum 
operating level for the reservoir. The change, which would provide 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































peak flood discharge downstream of the dam and thereby increase the 
flood risk in the floodplain. Nevertheless, SWECO demonstrated that 
the peaks could be partially attenuated, during flood months, by 
reserving storage capaicty in Lake Cabora Bassa so that spilling 
from the dam could be reduced when the downstream tributaries were in 
flood *. The rule curves proposed for achieving this form of operation 
are also shown in Figure 12b. 
One final aspect of SWECO's study which deserves particular 
note is the consideration which was given to the possible ecological 
effects downstream of the dam of different operating policies. Special 
consideration was given to the possibility of providing flood 'freshets' 
(short -term high discharges) from the dam, during dry years, to 
reproduce the conditions caused by natural floods in the lower valley. 
Discussion of the hydrological studies 
From the foregoing descriptions of the principal hydrological 
studies which have been undertaken for Cabora Bassa, it is readily 
apparent that there are significant differences both in the methodology 
and conclusions of these studies which make comparisons difficult. This 
means that it is difficult to derive some form of guidance for the 
formulation of policies in respect of the future operation and development 
of the project. Nevertheless, the studies have provided valuable 
information about the hydrological characteristics of the project and 
its response to variations in input data and operating procedures. 
Such information indicates that the first priority in the operation 
of the Cabora Bassa Project must be the evaluation of a flood rule 
curve to prevent catastrophic overtopping of the dam. This need arises 
because the present spillway capacity is insufficient to pass the design 
flood. Only the study of SWECO (1982) suggested that the spillway 
capacity could be increased in order to avoid the necessity of drawing 
down the reservoir level in advance of the normal flood season. The 
remaining studies, based on the assumption that the spillway capacity 
* This operating procedure, first suggested in the Plano Geral, 
55.1, p7 and examined in some detail by RPT (1979 and 1980), has 
been termed the 'virtual storage' of tributary flows. 
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will remain unchanged, used a variety of methods to calculate the 
flood rule curve, and derived results which vary considerably. In 
the light of the need to adopt the most suitable flood rule curve, a 
thorough investigation of the origins of these differences and their 
implications for the operation of the project is included later in the 
present chapter. 
Having determined a suitable flood rule curve, the majority of 
studies proceeded by simulating the operation of Cabora Bassa as a 
single purpose project either for power generation or, prior to 1969, 
for river regulation to provide navigation downstream. Operated in this 
manner, the principal hydrological constraint is the extent to which 
the discharges may be regulated, by long -term storage, so as to maintain 
output over a long period of below- average inflows. With the present 
installed capacity there is little likelihood that power output from the 
Cabora Bassa Project will be curtailed due to a shortage of water unless 
the form of the flood rule curve finally adopted requires an annual 
drawdown greater than that in any of the studies considered above. On 
the other hand, if, as it appears at present, construction of the North 
Bank Station is under serious consideration a study of the most critical 
sequence of inflows is requred to determine the maximum power production 
which could be sustained *. Again, the studies which address this problem 
differ considerably in their conclusions. This question is also 
examined in greater detail later in the chapter. 
A limited number of the studies considered the implications of 
attempting to operate Cabora Bassa as a multiple purpose project; this 
is another subject which is given more detailed treatment later in 
the chapter. The study by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1973) is of particular 
interest because it demonstrates that even with the two more -or -less 
compatible outputs, of hydroelectric power and river regulation down- 
stream, any policy which seeks to maximize either output leads to reduced 
levels of the other, see Table 5. 
A potential conflict clearly exists between procedures designed 
to maximize the level of guaranteed power output from Cabora Bassa 
and those designed to provide maximum flood alleviation downstream. The 
* This assumés that Cabora Bassa will contune to provide mainly base - 
load power. 
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conflict is not, however, readily apparent in the results of the RPT 
studies of flood alleviation because a single level of power output 
was used for most of the simulations *. In fact, with the present level 
of power output, RPT demonstrated that appreciable flood alleviation could 
be achieved by adopting the proposed policy of 'threshold' discharges 
described above. This conclusion is undoubtedly important for the 
operation of the project as it stands. 
SWECO also investigated another possible objective in the operation 
of the Cabora Bassa Project - the preservation of an annual peak in the 
discharge hydrograph of the lower river during the natural flood season. 
The floodplain inundation which this would cause would, it has been 
suggested, be environmentally and agriculturally beneficial. Again, 
reservoir simulation analysis indicated that the objective could only 
be achieved at the cost of power output. 
The input data used in the hydrological studies of Cabora Bassa 
described above show considerable variation and have given rise to 
significant differences between the results of the several simulations. 
There are relatively few long -term records of river discharge available 
for the Zambezi and although a wide variety of techniques of data analysis, 
synthesis and correlation have been used, in an attempt to improve the 
quality of the inflow data, none has been entirely satisfactory. In 
addition, the studies have all been undertaken on the assumption that 
the rainfall and runoff characteristics of the catchment have long -term 
stability, an assumption which does not appear to be consistent with a 
number of the hydrological records available. A detailed discussion of 
the factors which might affect the quality of input data used in the 
analysis of the Cabora Bassa Project forms a separate study which is 
included in Appendix 6. This appendix contains an examination of the 
possibility that changes have occurred in hydrological characteristics 
of the basin during the fifty -year period for which records exist and 
includes comparisons between rainfall records and discharge records for 
three important catchments. A more detailed application of the techniques 
of runoff estimation using meteorological data and information about 
* RPT (1979) Table 4.3 includes the results of a simulation for 
'enhanced energy production' (energy output increased by 4 %) which 
resulted in a significant increase in flood discharges. 
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catchment characteristics would, however, be very difficult to achieve 
for Cabora Bassa's catchment in view of its size and the inadequate 
meteorological data and catchment information currently available. 
For the Cabora Bassa Project the analysis of recorded data is of 
particular importance because the operating procedures for the project 
have been heavily dependent on the rule curves so obtained. The operators 
of Cabora Bassa have direct access to very little current hydrological 
information about the reservoir catchment apart from information about 
the discharges from the Kariba Dam. In the past, poor communication 
between HCB and CAPC has, at times, deprived HCB of this vital 
information. Thus, information which might have allowed a more flexible 
application of the chosen rule curves, by providing an indication of 
impending low or high inflows, possibly a month or more in advance, has 
not been available. 
The operators of the Kariba Project have been better served in this 
respect having at an early stage, established a network of telemetered 
river gauges with the first three, located in north -west Zambia, entering 
operation in 1963. Nevertheless, they continued to use other hydrological 
and meteorological data from Zambia and Angola. By 1976, the supply 
of this data had virtually ceased not only from Angola but also from 
stations in Zambia many of which the government was no longer willing to 
finance. The CAPC was compelled, therefore, to accept financial 
responsibility for the operation of a number of key hydrological stations 
in Zambia and also to introduce a number of telemetered rainfall stations 
although these, at first, proved unreliable 
Direct participation in the collection of data, in this way, is not 
possible for the Cabora Bassa Project. No more than 3% of Cabora Bassa's 
catchment area lies in Mozambique whereas the approximate proportions 
within Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola are 60 %, 20% and 15% respectively. 
Thus, Mozambique, by itself, can do little to improve the hydrological 
network for the benefit of those operating Cabora Bassa; telemetered 
rainfall stations located solely within Mozambique would be of little 
value in predicting the total runoff of the catchment whilst telemetered 
river gauges would provide, at most, a few hours' warning of large 
inflows to the reservoir. On the other hand, over 60% of Cabora Bassa's 
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catchment area is regulated by the Kariba Project and approximately 
15% by the Kafue Project the remainder being made up of largely 
unregulated tributaries distributed, as approximate proportions of the 
total catchment, as follows: Zambia, 16% (comprising mainly the Luangwa 
basin); Zimbabwe, 4°6; and, Mozambique, 3 %187. A knowledge of discharges 
from the Kariba and Kafue projects together with telemetered levels 
from, perhaps, two gauges on the Luanqwa would allow fairly reliable 
estimates of inflow to be made three or four days in advance. More 
detailed information about projected discharges from Kariba and Kafue, 
based on hydrological data from their own catchments, would enable the 
engineers nt Cabora Bassa to obtain an approximate indication of 
expected inflows as much as a month in advance. 
An exchange of data, such as that proposed above, has not previously 
occurred although the operators of the Kariba Project undertook, initially, 
to supply the authorities in Mozambique with warnings of impending 
changes in the rate of discharge from the dam up to two weeks in advance. 
Throughout the 1960s it was the normal practice for the CAPC to send such 
warnings, together with calculations of the date and magnitude of the 
expected changes in river level at various points downstream, to various 
agencies including the Governor General of Mozambique, the headquarters 
of the MFPZ and the Sena Sugar Estates188. During the construction of 
the Cabora Bassa Dam, the CAPC's engineers modified their regular 
operating procedures to suit the construction schedule and, prior to that, 
the CAPC appears to have responded to appeals from the Sena Sugar Estates 
about excessively high or low flows. After Mozambique's independence 
warnings were not issued so prolifically, although the CAPC continued 
to advise the HCB headquarters in Lisbon of intended discharge gate 
operation at Kariba. Thus, even during the disasterous flood of 1978, 
two weeks' warning of flood discharges was given189. Thereafter, HCB 
approached the CAPC for a comprehensive reappraisal of recorded data 
and for a weekly supply of current hydrological data form Kariba190. 
The hydroelectric projects at both Kariba and Kafue are of 
considerable importance not only in the supply of hydrological information 
to Cabora Bassa but also in their capacity to regulate the inflows to 
Lake Cabora Bassa. The effects of such regulation on the flood rule 
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curve at Cabora Bassa and the energy potential of the project are 
considered below, but the extent of the effect should not be over- 
estimated. For example, it has been suggested that during the most 
critical period of the 1978 flood only 40% of Cabora Bassa's inflow 
originated from Kariba191. Nevertheless, RPT (1980) concluded that: 
The influence of the Kariba operating policy on Cabora 
Bassa is dominant. (p3) 
It was for this reason that RPT's(1980) report included: 
the major new recommendation ... that communication 
between the authorities responsible for controlling 
the water resources on the Zambezi must be improved. 
(p9) 
According to RPT, communications should include not only the exchange 
of information relevant to the day -to -day operation of Cabora Bassa 
but also discussion of the operating policy and design of planned 
future projects. 
Before concluding this general introduction to the hydrology 
of the Cabora Bassa Project it is necessary that reference should be 
made to the current operating porcedures being adopted by HCB. In fact, 
it is extremely difficult to discover what these policies might be 
either by approaching HCB directly, or by studying records of the 
reservoir's operation. RPT (1979) assumed that HCB had adopted the 
flood rule curve of dos Santos (1968) which has been derived for the 
operation of the project without a North Bank Station. Furthermore, 
RPT assumed that, in order to provide maximum security of power output, 
HCB was using an energy rule curve which was co- incident with this 
flood rule curve. If RPT were correct about HCB's use of the 1968 flood 
rule curve, reservoir operating records indicate that it has not been 
rigidly adhered to. In two of the six flood seasons from December 1974 
to December 1980 the levels of the reservoir were allowed to exceed 
those specified by dos Santos, on one occasion by over 3 m192. In the 
same period the reservoir level reached 326.0 m in three of the years 
an event which, dos Santos had suggested, would occur extremely rarely 
(probability considerably less than 1 in 100 years). 
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The explanation of their operating procedures given to the writer 
by HCB staff in Songo was less than satisfactory; it appeared as if new 
rule curves were drawn each year by the hydrologists in Lisbon. The 
rule curves in use in 1979 are reproduced in Figure 13 but no explanation 
of their method of application is available. The upper rule curve 
appears to be a flood rule curve yet, until 1 May, its levels are 
appreciably below those of dos Santos' curve. Furthermore, the target 
drawdown level for 1 January, 1979, was 314.0 m (a considerable discharge 
of water was made towards the end of 1978 to achieve this target) 
whereas the target level for 1 January, 1980, was the dos Santos level 
of 320.0 m. Such variations are not fully consistent with the normal 
understanding of flood rule curve operation. 
Description of the numerical model adopted 
In order to investigate more closely certain hydrological 
characteristics of the Cabora Bassa Project further analysis of the 
system was undertaken. The numerical model adopted was based on the 
water balance simulations previously undertaken and of which the principal 
details are described below. 
Time intervals of one month were adopted for the analysis, the 
input data being based on the fifty -four year series used in RPT (1980) 
which gives monthly inflows to Cabora Bassa derived from existing 
records. The initial studies by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa had placed the 
primary emphasis on annual, rather than monthly, discharge data, with 
monthly discharges being derived from these by applying distribution 
coefficients. Although the assumption of a constant pattern of seasonal 
distribution, on which this method was based, is unrealistic it facil- 
itated the use of a long series of generated (synthetic) annual discharge 
data in a later study which, in turn, facilitated a more precise* 
evaluation of the reliability of selected outputs. Another variation 
adopted by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa in the study reported by dos Santos 
was the incorporation of appropriate time -lags, in the evaluation of 
monthly discharges from records from different locations, to allow 
* It was not, necessarily, more accurate since the accuracy of the results 





























































































































































































































































































for travel times. Both these alternatives were rejected for the 
purposes of the present study although the possible benefits of 
incorporating time -lags has been noted. Various system parameters, 
defined graphically, are used for the present model. Algebraic expressions 
were also developed by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1973) for certain 
relations, but these have not been used here. In the calculations the 
following characteristics have been used: reservoir storage capacity, 
Figure 14; tailrace level, Figure 15; capacity of the discharge gates, 
Figure 16; and turbine characteristics, Figure 17. It has been assumed 
in this, as in all previous studies, that the reservoir storage character- 
istics remain constant. This assumption ignores the long -term effect 
of sediment accumulation which will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5. 
In the earliest studies tailrace level and turbine characteristics 
were ignored in the calculation of energy production and this resulted 
in serious inaccuracies. Recently, SWECO (1982) has undertaken a re- 
assessment of the tailrace characteristics which suggests that the 
curve in Figure 15, as used in this study, may lead to a slight under- 
estimation of tailrace level for a given discharge. No evaluation of 
the losses in the hydraulic circuit of the power station has been 
published. The assumption, made by RPT, that they will be equivalent to 
a loss of head of not more than 3 m, is used in the present model 
although SWECO has assumed the losses to be half this value. In 
calculations for the flood rule curve no allowance has been made for 
evaporation losses from the reservoir. Evaporation may, however, be 
critical in calculations of energy potential and suitable allowance has 
been made. The method adopted is the use of 'net evaporation'* co- 
efficients used by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1973) and given as mm /month 
in Table 7 below. 
Table 7: Coefficients of net evaporation from Lake Cabora Bassa 
(mm /month) 
JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC. 
17 19 98 157 149 123 134 179 206 256 202 78 
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In order to apply them in the simulation, the surface area character- 
istics of the reservoir must also be known, see Figure 18. Earlier 
studies had adopted various approaches to the calculation of evapor- 
ation; for example, in the Esquema Geral it had been totally ignored 
whilst in the Plano Geral it was assumed to be constant. Recently 
SWECO attempted to derive new estimates of net evaporation losses 
taking account of the pre- impoundment runoff and evaporation. The 
coefficients which SWECO obtained are remarkably similar to those of 
Table 7. The conceptual and empirical difficulties involved in 
estimating evaporation are discussed in Appendix 6. 
For the flood rule curve analysis and the initial investigation 
of energy potential, specification of the energy output demanded by 
the contract with Escom is required. For this, the values used by 
RPT (1979) have been adopted: a mean power output of 1 605 MW, at 
turbine shaft, (equivalent to a rate of production of electrical energy 
of 14.07 TWh /yr or 1.17 TWh /month), and a possible peak power demand 
of 1 960 MW for 46 hours per week. The mean values are similar to 
those used by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1973) but the peak power criterion 
was not included in that report. 
In the simulations which have been undertaken it is assumed that 
discharges from the reservoir can be regulat6d with precision in 
accordance with the operating procedures specified. In practice, such 
regulation would require frequent adjustments to be made to the spilling 
level of the discharge gates. This may, in fact, be unnecessary in 
most situations since larger changes made less frequently would produce 
a similar result. Frequent adjustments would also be difficult to 
achieve with the present organization of HCB where all information has 
to be communicated to Lisbon where the operating decisions are taken. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested193 that HCB's current policy seeks 
to avoid operation of the discharge gates at partial openings so as 
to avoid damage to the sills from cavitation. If this is the case, 
discharges can only be increased or decreased in units of approximately 
1 500 m3 /s. Such a policy makes it difficult to adhere strictly to rule 
curve operating procedures and may affect conclusions derived from 
simulations in which continuous variations in dishcarge have been 
assumed. 
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The flood rule curve 
The concept of a flood rule curve and its application in the 
operation of the Cabora Bassa Dam have been mentioned earlier. 
Various alternative curves which have been proposed for Cabora Bassa 
are shown in Figures 10 -13. Strictly speaking it is only necessary to 
define a flood rule curve for the critical months of, say, January 
to May but in practice the curves are extended to cover the whole 
year in order to achieve a gradual and controlled drawdown to the 
level required at the start of the critical period. Except in the 
study by SWECO (1982) it has always been assumed that the discharge 
capacity of the dam cannot be increased. Undoubtedly, it would be 
difficult to provide extra discharge gates now that the dam is in 
operation, particularly in view of the narrowness of Cabora Bassa Gorge. 
Nevertheless, the SWECO study showed the considerable benefit which 
could be achieved through relaxation of the flood rule curve conditions 
were it feasible to increase the maximum discharge capacity of the dam 
by 25 %. On this basis the original designers of the dam might be 
criticized for not having provided the necessary discharge capacity. 
The original design has, however, been defended by Quintela et al. (1979) 
both on economic grounds and because increased discharge capacity would 
increase the problem of dissipating the energy of the spill water and 
preventing serious erosion in the narrow gorge downstream. Increased 
capacity would also increase the potential flood hazard in the lower Zambezi 
valley through the increased river flows-which would occur. 
Some of the important questions which remain unresolved in the 
evaluation of the flood rule curve for the Cabora Bassa Project must 
now be examined as numerical analysis indicates some sensitivity of 
the flood rule curve to possible amendments arising from consideration 
of these factors. 
a) The effects of overtopping: The majority of previous studies failed 
to discuss possible overtopping of the Cabora Bassa Dam. It is not 
clear, therefore, whether the various writers considered limited 
overtopping to be admissible should their flood rule curve have 
proved to be inadequate for the control of design flood inflows. It 
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is likely that most did not, but SWECO (1982) suggested that over- 
topping: 
might not be as catastrophic as if it had been an 
embankment dam. (p23) 
For any dam, the most serious consequence of overtopping would be the 
possibility of its destruction resulting in almost total loss of the 
investment and releasing an extremely destructive flood wave *. In the 
case of an earth dam, overtopping of the unprotected embankment would 
result in its rapid erosion and virtually inevitable distruction. With 
a concrete arch dam, such as Cabora Bassa, immediate failure is less 
likely to occur but prolonged periods of overtopping might result in 
its failure particularly if the spilling water, falling directly to 
the foot of the dam, causes sufficient erosion to endanger the stability 
of the dam's foundations. 
Even if failure of the dam does not occur, overtopping could result 
in unacceptable levels of damage either from the extra downstream 
flooding, which would result from exceeding the maximum discharge 
capacity of the dam, or from damage to the electrical installations. 
Should the North Bank Station be built overtopping would also cut off 
the only means of access to it - across the crest of the dam. 
For these reasons, in the absence of a more detailed study of 
the possible effects, it will be assumed that overtopping of the 
Cabora Bassa Dam should be regarded as unacceptable in the evaluation 
of the flood rule curve. 
b) Method of analysis of design flood data: The UK Flood Studies Report, 
referred to earlier, recommends the use of values of probable maximum 
flood obtained from estimates of extreme precipitation in the study of 
flood routing effects. In Britain, where few dams have catchments 
* Evidence from other dam failures quoted by Kirkpatrick (1977) 
suggests that complete failure of a dam the size of Cabora Bassa 
would result in a peak flood discharge of the order of 150 x 103 
m3 /s - a factor of ten greater than the present maximum discharge 
capacity of the dam. 
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greater than 100 km2, this approach offers distinct advantages. Fob 
basins larger than 500 km2, however, Sutcliffe (1975) has warned that 
the technique 'should be used with care'. Despite the fact that 
Moraes et al. (1979) have used this approach in designing the spillway 
of the Itaipu Dam (between Brasil and Paraguay) which has a catchment 
area of 8.2 x 105 km2, only slightly less than that of the Cabora Bassa 
Dam, 9 x 105 km2, the techniques cannot be considered to have proven 
suitability for the present study. The ,study of extreme floods at 
Cabora Bassa must, therefore, be made by means of frequency analysis 
of existing river discharge records. 
Unfortunately, in the past, frequency analysis of flood discharges 
has been undertaken, almost exclusively in relatively small catchments 
where discharges of short duration (less than a day) are the most 
critical in their flood impact. For Cabora Bassa, by contrast, because 
of the large catchment and the storage and discharge characteristics 
of the dam, the duration of the most critical flood inflows has been 
found to be of the order of three months. In previous studies of the 
Cabora Bassa Project the unsubstantiated assumption has been made 
that statistical techniques developed for short duration floods are 
equally applicable to floods of such long duration194. It has been 
necessary to accept this assumption for the present analysis, in the 
absence of further evidence, but it must be recognized that the 
suitability of techniques developed for the analysis of short duration 
floods to those of longer duration requires closer investigation. 
The statistical study of floods depends on the assumption that 
flood frequency at a given location is defined by a unique relationship 
expressed, most commonly, in the form: 
x = f (y) 
Where x is a hydrological or meteorological parameter which measures 
flood intensity (see below); and y is a measure of the probability that 
a flood of intensity x will occur. For the analysis of streamflow data 
the parameter x is usually taken as a peak river flow (m3 /s) or the peak 
discharge in a given (short) time interval although peak river gauge 
levels have sometimes been used. The analysis is undertaken, most 
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commonly, on the annual maximum series; that is, the series formed 
from the maximum value of x from each year for which records exist. 
Other alternatives have been used such as the peaks over threshold 
series which comprises all the recorded peak values of x over a 
selected threshold. This approach is more difficult to apply in 
practice because of the need to ensure that the peak values used are 
from hydrologically distinct events and that the threshold is not set 
too low 
As graphical analysis was the first to be developed it was found 
convenient to express the parameter y in a logarithmic form. It is 
now common practice to refer to y as the reduced variate and to define 
it by the expression: 
y = -ln (-ln (Px)) or Px = exp (-e-y) 
Where Px is the probability that a flood of magnitude x will not be 
exceeded. Px can, in addition, be given as (1 - 1 /T) where T is the 
return period, iti years, of a flood of magnitude x*. 
As a result of the availability of electronic computers techniques 
of numerical analysis have gained prominence over graphical methods in 
recent years. But, as Cunnane (1975) argues in comparing the two 
approaches, the initial assumptions which are necessary in order to 
perform either numerical or graphical analyses should not be overlooked: 
The graphical method is said to be subjective because 
independent analysis would get different estimates from 
the same data; this is not true of numerical methods 
which are therefore said to be objective. Since 
objective methods are always preferable it is therefore 
customary to denounce the graphical method. However, 
the fact that some distribution has to be assumed is 
often overlooked in this comparison and the choice made 
between distributions must always have an element of 
subjectivity in it, notwithstanding the use of goodness - 
of -fit tests. If the true distribution were known (which 
is never the case) numerical methods would be preferable 
... In the absence of such knowledge graphical methods 
* For T < 5 the simpler expression y = ln (T -0.5) gives values of y 
correct to three figures. 
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should not be lightly dismissed; a degree of difficulty 
tends to generate veneration for a method while simplicity 
tends to breed the familiar contempt. (p44) 
In order to undertake a graphical analysis an initial assumption 
must be made about the most suitable value of y to assign to each 
member of the annual maximum series under study. If the annual 
maximum series extends over N years and takes the values xl ... xi ... xN 
in order of ascending magnitude then the probability that a flood will 
not exceed the magnitude of the representative element, xi, will lie 
between (1 -1) /N and i /N. A number of alternative plotting positions 
in this range have been proposed; the one favoured by the Flood Studies 
team being that due to Gringorten (1963) which gives the estimated non - 
exceedance probability for element xi as: 
P. = (i-0.44)/(N+0.12) 
This expression was chosen to ensure that the largest value lies as 
close as possible to the straight line relationship: 
x = u + ay 
Where u and a are parameters whose values are to be determined for 
each case. This relationship was, in the past, commonly referred to 
as the Gumbel distribution. Pi may be substituted for Px in the 
previous expressions used to define the reduced variate in order to 
obtain values of yi against which values of xi may be plotted on 
linear graph paper. Unfortunately, it would be incorrect to assume 
in all cases that the x, y data will adhere to the linear relation 
given above. The writers of the Flood Studies Report, however, after 
investigating a number of alternatives, concluded that if the 
curvature of the x, y relation is 'mild' then the Gringorten plotting 
positions would be sufficiently accurate196. It is shown in Appendix 6 
that for the flood data at Cabora Bassa the curvatures are 'mild' and 
this plotting rule has, therefore, been applied in preparing flood 
frequency graphs for this thesis. 
Numerical analysis is based on the assumption that a particular 
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mathematical expression for the relation x = f (y) will adequately 
represent each set of data once certain parameters have been evaluated. 
Various expressions were investigated by the Flood Studies team 
using data from the British Isles but none was found to be ideal. In 
general the three parameter functions were preferred and one of these, 
the general extreme value (GEV) distribution197 was recommended for 
general use. 
The GEV distribution takes the form: 
x= u + a ( I - e-ky )/ k 
where u and a are parameters, as used above, and k is the curvature 
which must also be determined for each set of data. It can be seen 
that as the value of k approaches zero the expression reduces to the 
Gumbel linear relation. This is now referred to as the GEV type -1 
distribution. Negative values of k give rise to a curve which tends 
towards the lower limit of x = u - 10a/3 whilst the upper values of x 
are unbounded. This is referred to as a GEV type -2 distribution. The 
GEV type -3 distribution, which occurs with positive values of k, is 
unbounded at the lower end but tends towards the upper limit, 
x = u + 10a/3. 
Jenkinson (1969) has drawn attention to the limitations of the 
GEV method, particularly in cases where evaluation of the three para- 
meters indicates that a type -2 distribution should be used. The 
unbounded flood peaks are, he suggests, a physical impossibility. He 
proposes that, in such cases, the relation may be complex beginning, 
perhaps, as type -2 but changing to type -3 as y increases. 
Application of the GEV distribution involves the use of the 
maximum likelihood procedure to determine values for the three parameters. 
If rigorously applied this procedure requires considerable computation 
which is rarely undertaken except on a large electronic computer. There 
are, however, simpler techniques which can be used to provide approximate 
results. Jenkinson (1969) found the most reliable of these to be the 
method of sextiles *. The annual maximum series, arranged in order of 
* Full details of the method together with tabulated values to be used 
in its application may be found in the reference. 
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ascending x, is divided into sextiles and the mean of each sextile is 
calculated. These are assigned the symbols w1 to w6. The value of the 
parameter k in the GEV function can be determined from a table in 
which theoretical values of k are related to values of the term 
(w2 - w1) /(w6 - w5). Part of this table is reproduced in Table 8 below 
and is used in Appendix 6 to justify the use of the Gringorden plotting 
positions in the flood frequency graphs contained in this thesis. The 
parameters u and a. can also be calculated from values of the mean and 
standard deviation of the data series. 
Table 8: Selected values of the curvature parameter, k, in the GEV 
distribution as determined by the 'method of sextiles'. 
k -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 
w2 - w1 
w6 - w5 
0.23 0.32 0.43 0.58 0.79 
Source: Jenkinson (1969) 
The discrepancies between the sets of data used in two important 
recent studies of flood inflows to Lake Cabora Bassa are highlighted 
in Appendix 6. It also draws attention to the scale of the possible 
error arising from the use of short data records for the estimation of 
extreme floods. For these reasons it is unlikely that numerical analysis 
would, in this instance, provide results which would be significantly 
more reliable than those obtained by graphical methods. Graphical 
methods are, therefore, considered adequate for the purposes of the 
present study. The results of graphical analysis of the frequency of 
extreme floods of one -, two- and three -month duration from the two 
separate sets of annual maximum data discussed in Appendix 6 are 
shown in Figures 19 to 21. 
c) Choice of design flood standard: The choice of the magnitude of 
design flood to be used in determining the appropriate operating 
procedures for a reservoir involves an assessment of the risk which 







Figure 19: Flood frequency analysis of annual maximum one -month 
duration Cabora Bassa 'natural' discharges. 
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few of the hydrological studies undertaken for the Cabora Bassa Project 
have discussed the basis on which the design floods adopted were 
selected. Studies undertaken prior to 1968 adopted design floods with 
return periods of 500 years, possibly in recognition that extrapolation 
of limited data to longer return periods was virtually meaningless. 
Dos Santos (1968) combined an estimated 500 -year flood from tributaries 
downstream of Kariba with a flood resulting from the maximum discharge 
from the Kariba Dam (estimated, by the designers of that dam, to have 
a return period of 10 000 years). The resulting design flood had an 
estimated return period rather less than 10 000 years. Studies by DNA 
(1980a), RPT (1980) and SWECO (1982) each adopted different procedures 
in an attempt to derive a design flood with a return period of 10 000 
years. The choice of a 10 000 -year return period appears to have been 
made because this standard had been adopted in the design of the Kariba 
Project* and is widely accepted as a suitable standard for such projects. 
Leaving aside the question of whether a realistic estimate of a 10 000 - 
year flood can be made from the data available (which is considered in 
detail in Appendix 6), it is necessary to enquire whether the 10 000 - 
year flood is an appropriate standard to adopt. 
In considering the risk associated with the adoption of a particular 
design flood standard a distinction is generally made between risk of 
fatality and economically quantifiable risk. Since the latter appears 
to offer a more objective basis for selecting a design standard it 
has recently received greater attention. As a result attempts have been 
made to express the loss of human life in economic terms in order that 
the two elements of risk may thereby be combined in a single 'objective' 
evaluation. 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, proposals to place 
greater emphasis on economic criteria have not, at present, found wide 
acceptance in the UK. Assessment of the risk of human fatality, therefore, 
* It should be noted that when questions were raised about the choice 
of this standard for Kariba, in the recorded discussion of the paper by 
Reeve and Edmonds (1965), the choice was defended on the grounds that 
adequate flexibility would be provided for future revision by increasing 
the drawdown of the flood rule curve should this be considered necessary. 
The Cabora Bassa Project is significantly less flexible in this respect. 
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retains priority in the selection of design flood standards. 
In the past, it has been widely accepted by engineers in the UK 
that, in the design of spillways, no loss of life can be contemplated 
and that, therefore, the PMF should be used in design flood calcul- 
ations198. Only where there is no foreseeable danger to human life 
would a lower standard based on the results of an economic appraisal 
be considered justified. Accounts of risk analysis in other spheres 
of human activity suggest, however, that the attempt to reduce the 
risk of fatality as close as possible to zero is unrealistic. For 
example, Pochin (1975) in a paper discussing health risks, particularly 
from radiation, argues that: 
in whatever we do and in whatever we refrain from doing 
we are accepting risk. (p184) 
His paper seeks to evaluate the risk of fatal and non -fatal injury from 
certain types of activity *. However, he questions whether such evaluations 
are necessarily of use to planning authorities who are faced with the 
question: 
if some degree of risk is unavoidable and if, as in all cases, 
the level of risk can to some extent be influenced ... what 
numerical level of safety should be required? Or, to put 
the question more brutally, what maximum number of deaths 
should be authorized? (p189) 
His answer is to propose that new risks should be: 
controlled so as to be at least as safe and therefore 
'acceptable' as in conventional activities. (p189) 
Quantitive application of Pochin's proposal would, however, be extremely 
* One of the categories of occupational risk which Pochin considers 
is, in fact, dam construction work. His approximate figures for Cabora 
Bassa (50 deaths in a workforce of 3 000 over a period of 5 years) and 
the Aswan High Dam (over 100 deaths per year in a workforce of 35 000) 
suggest rates of risk of the order of 3 500 deaths /million /year (d /M /y). 
This is very high in comparison with rates varying from 3 d /M /y to 
160 d /M /y for deaths attributed to 'accidents' in British industry 
during the 1960s and is comparable to those of one of the most danger- 
ous activities cited, deep -sea fishing. 
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difficult in the case of a dam such as Cabora Bassa. It would involve, 
amongst other things, assessing the risk of dam overtopping and the 
subsequent risk of dam failure, routing of the dam -break discharge 
through the floodplain, assessing the number of direct and indirect 
fatalities which might occur, given the emergency provisions currently 
available, as well as determining the 'acceptable' level of risk to 
inhabitants of the valley from existing causes such as drought, disease 
and 'natural' floods. 
A number of engineers have suggested that design flood standards in 
developing countries need not be as exacting as those in an industrial- 
ized country such as the UK199. Their arguments are based on the 
recognition that the population in such regions is already subjected 
to a high level of risk and that the construction of a dam would 
bring benefits such as irrigation which would reduce that risk. This 
suggestion highlights a dilemma, facing countries seeking to industrial- 
ize, concerning the risk which the introduction of new technological 
products and processes may bring. On the one hand, outside consultants 
or suppliers may 'take advantage' of less stringent control regulations, 
or less articulate public opinion in such societies, and advocate 
standards which are below those currently required in industrialized 
countries. On the other hand, to accept only the technologies which 
meet the highest safety standards involves the underdeveloped country 
in an extra economic burden which was not borne by the industrialized 
countries in the early stages of their own industrialization. Never- 
theless, it is unlikely that any industrialized country, in its early 
stages of development, possessed a single work of technology which 
could have produced consequences as devastating as those which would 
affect the people and economy of Mozambique should the Cabora Bassa Dam 
fail. Careful consideration of the choice of the design flood is, 
therefore, essential in such a case. 
In the absence of the detailed and costly studies which would 
be required in order to place the evaluation of flood risk for the 
Cabora Bassa Project on a more rational footing, engineers have been 
compelled to apply general standards from other countries. Of these, 
the report published by the ICE (1978), deserves particular note since 
it provides the basis for current practice in the UK. An important 
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feature of the report's recommendations is the categorization of dams 
according to the risk which they pose to human life. In this four - 
part classification the Cabora Bassa Dam would almost certainly be 
placed in category A, where a breach of the dam would endanger lives 
in a community downstream. The general design flood standard 
recommended for such dams is the PMF although 'if rare overtopping 
is tolerable' the design flood should have a return period of 10 000 
years or have a magnitude 0.5 x PMF whichever is larger *. It was 
concluded earlier in this chapter that overtopping cannot be assumed 
to be tolerable at Cabora Bassa without further investigation of the 
possible consequences. Thus, ideally, the PMF should be used as the 
design flood according to these criteria. 
In Britain the PMF is calculated from estimates of the maximum 
precipitation, a technique which, as noted above, would not be practicable 
in the Zambezi basin. Alternatively, engineers have, in the past, 
attempted to estimate values of the PMF from the results of a frequency 
analysis of annual maximum discharge series. Bass (1975) has shown 
how unsatisfactory many such attempts had been; chosen return periods 
varied from 100 000 to over a million years whilst, in response to the 
suggestion that the PMF could be obtained by multiplying the 150 -year 
flood by a given factor, factors varying from 2.8 to 8.9 had been 
proposed. Bass recommended the use of a return period of a million 
years and a factor by which the 150 -year flood should be multiplied of 
7.0. At the same seminar, however, Griffiths and Berry (1975) quoted 
values for the 'estimated maximum flood' corresponding to return periods 
of 35 000 years. The discrepancy between the various values suggested 
above in estimating the PMF may be illustrated by reference to the three - 
month duration annual maximum flood series for Cabora Bassa shown in 
Figure 21. In this and other studies values of the 10 000 year flood 
have been estimated for use in the flood rule curve calculations. If 
* Law (1980) includes a table 9. vìng & similar classification of dams which 
apparently provides the basis for design flood specification in Korea. 
For category A (which comprises dams financed by large international 
loans as well as those which might endanger communities), the general 
standard is, again, the PMF. However, the standard used for 'concrete dams' 
in this category is a 5 000 -year flood. In India, according to Gole and 
Krishnamurthy (1979), classification is based solely on reservoir capacity. 
For reservoirs of more than 50 x 106 m' capacity (Cabora Bassa's is 1 000 
times greater than this the standard applied is always the PMF. 
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one of the other flood standards, described above, had been used 
instead, the value of the three -month duration design flood would have 
been increased by the following, approximate, amounts: 35 000 -year 
return period, 10 %; 100 000 year return period, 20 %; a flood 2.8 times 
greater than the 150 -year flood, 80 %; a flood 7 times greater than the 
150 -year flood, 360 %. In the rule curve calculations which follow it 
will be shown that to accommodate a design flood 20% greater than the 
estimated 10 000 -year flood at Cabora Bassa would necessitate a draw - 
down so large that power generation would be impaired. A 30% increase 
would require drawdown below the reservoir's minimum operating level 
(295 m 0.D.). Thus the maximum flood which the Cabora Bassa Project 
could regulate, under present conditions, appears to be significantly 
smaller than values which would find general acceptance as realistic 
estimates of the PMF. 
Although the foregoing discussion may appear to be of little 
practical relevance in view of the impossibility of providing accurate 
estimates of even a 10 000 -year flood from the available data it should 
be noted that such a flood has a 1% probability of occuring if the dam 
stands for 100 years. Furthermore, in a number of cases, floods which 
were previously considered to have an extremely low probability of 
occuring have been recorded. Gruner (1963), for example, cites the 
case of a project in Uruguay which was designed to accommodate a 
1 000 -year flood on the basis of twenty -seven years of data. Within 
fourteen years of completion it had suffered a flood which would have 
been considered a 500 000 -year flood on the basis of the design data. 
In the simulations and discussion within this thesis estimated 
values for the 10 000 -year flood are used as the basis for the design 
flood at Cabora Bassa. Although this is in accordance with the standard 
adopted by all the major studies undertaken since 1975, and with the 
standard adopted at Kariba, the foregoing discussion illustrates its 
possible inadequacy. In particular, the design standards applied in 
the UK suggest that a more conservative standard should be adopted at 
least until such time as a more detailed assessment can be made of the 
possible effects of overtopping the dam. On the other hand, unless the 
discharge capacity of the dam is increased, an increase in the value 
of the design flood of only 20% could not be accommodated without 
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prejudicing power production. It seems probable, therefore, that the 
10 000 -year flood will be retained as the design flood standard for 
the time being. The additional risk could be reduced by provision of 
procedures for the evacuation of the population should the imminent 
threat of dam overtopping arise. Fortunately in such a large catch- 
ment it should be possible to provide adequate warning of a flood of 
this magnitude because of the long flood travel times. 
d) The influence of developments upstream: The value of the design 
flood at Cabora Bassa may be influenced in a number of ways by develop- 
ments in its catchment area. In the long -term, significant changes 
may occur in the runoff characteristics of the catchment as a result 
of changes in land use and vegetation. Such effects are discussed in 
Appendix 6. In the short -term the most important influence is the 
regulation of river discharges provided by reservoirs upstream. This 
effect is best illustrated by studying the changes which river regulation 
produces in the annual maximum flood series, such as those of Figures 
19 -21. For the purposes of this illustration it is assumed that the 
series of unregulated discharge data obeys a GEV type -1 (linear) 
distribution when plotted against the reduced variate, y. (This 
assumption will not affect the results). 
Upstream regulation will affect the flood discharges over almost 
the entire series. In the driest years regulation is likely to reduce 
the annual maximum three -month floods since the natural floods, such 
as they are, will be stored in the upstream reservoirs to provide 
electrical power at a later date. In the wettest years, assuming the 
reservoirs are operated according to a reliable flood rule curve 
procedure, the annual maximum three -month floods will also be reduced, 
the amount being equal to the total storage capacity reserved in those 
reservoirs for flood control. Between these extremes the effect will 
depend on the operating policy adopted for the upstream reservoirs. 
If, as RPT (1980) suggested might occur at Kariba, the annual drawdown 
is achieved by discharging excess water in the months of December and 
January, these discharges may augment the natural floods and produce 
an annual maximum three -month flood in excess of that which would have 
occurred in the unregulated river. These effects are shown schematically 









































































































































For the purpose of calculating a flood rule curve for Cabora Bassa 
it may safely be assumed that the design flood occurs within the range 
of values shown by that part of Figure 22 where the two curves are 
parallel. The regulated floods are smaller than the unregulated floods 
by a constant quantity, a, which represents the attenuation provided 
by filling all the allocated flood storage capacity of the upstream 
reservoirs. This attenuation would be provided even if one or more of 
the upstream dams were overtopped, provided that the reservoirs had previously 
been drawn down in accordance with the appropriate flood rule curve and 
provided that none of the dams were breached. If further projects 
were to be built upstream of Cabora Bassa the value of a would, presumably, 
be increased. This would result in a further reduction of the value 
of the design flood unless the projects resulted in a significant change 
in the time constants of the basin's runoff characteristics200. 
Under the present conditions of operation it is not readily apparent 
what value of a should be adopted since, to date, the Kariba Project 
has not been operated consistently according to flood rule curve 
procedures. For Kariba Reeve and Edmonds (1965) recommended the prov- 
ision of 28 x 10' m3 of flood storage, equivalent to a drawdown level 
of 484.1 m 0.D. on 1 February. RPT (1980) suggested that the drawdown 
level on 1 February should be 483.6 m (30.8 x 109 m3 flood storage) and 
on 1 March, 486.8 m (13.7 x 109 m' flood storage). SWECO (1982) quote 
a revised flood rule curve, produced recently by the CAPC, which has 
a drawdown level of 483.4 m on 1 January (31.8 x 109 m' flood storage) 
and 485.4 m on 1 February (21.4 x 109 m' flood storage). None of these 
curves, however, corresponds to the actual reservoir levels recorded 
in the ten years from 1971 to 1980; Table 9 shows the reservoir level 
on 1 February on each of these years. The smallest amount of flood 
storage provided during this period was in 1978, the year when devastating 
floods occurred downstream of Cabora Bassa. Had Lake Kariba been drawn 
down to 483.6 m on 1 February 1978, this would have provided an extra 
19 x 109 m3 of storage capacity which would have resulted in an 
appreciable reduction in the inflow to Lake Cabora Bassa. Clearly it 
is highly desirable for the operation of the Cabora Bassa Project that 
a consistent flood rule curve policy be adopted at Kariba and that the 
operators of the Cabora Bassa Project be informed of the flood attenuation 
which would thereby be provided. For the purposes of this thesis it has 
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Table 9: Reservoir levels at Kariba on 1 February 
1978 1979 1980 
(Source: 
YEAR 
CAPO Annual Reports) 








27.6 30.2 32.2 25.4 14.9 25.0 23.4 11.1 17.6 25.0 
(m3 x 109) 
* Assuming a maximum retention level of 489.3 m 
been assumed that the curve of RPT (1980) will be adopted thus providing 
17.1 x 109 m3 flood storage in the month of February and 13.7 x 109 m3 
in the month of March (30.8 x 109 m3 for the two months combined). It 
has been suggested, in RPT (1980), that without the use of such a curve 
the Kariba Dam is in danger of being overtopped. For this reason RPT 
suggested providing an extra 10 x 109 m3 flood storage capacity at 
Cabora Bassa to provide a small margin of safety which would, at least, 
allow extra time for the population downstream of Cabora Bassa to be 
evacuated should it be considered necessary. 
For the Kafue Project which provides the only other major storage 
capacity upstream of Cabora Bassa full details of its flood storage 
capabilities are not provided in any of the design flood studies for 
Cabora Bassa. Nevertheless, RPT (1980) assumed that a flood storage 
capacity of 5 x 109 m3 would be available at the Itezhitezhi reservoir 
on 1 February. This value has been adopted for the purposes of the 
present study. 
e) The maximum reservoir level: Previous studies of the Cabora Bassa 
Project assumed different values for the maximum retention level of the 
reservoir, see Figures 10 -12. In the Plano Geral the proposed level 
was 325 m 0.D. The majority of studies have used a value of 329 m 
(2 m below dam crest) whilst SWECO (1982) proposed a level of 330.5 m 
(0.5 m below dam crest). Even between the studies which use the 329 m 
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level there are differences: dos Santos (1968) maintained that this 
level would be reached very rarely, with a probability considerably 
less than 1:100 years, (326 m being the normal maximum), whereas in 
the studies of RPT (1979 and 1980) the operating procedures proposed 
would allow the 329 m to be reached relatively frequently. The 
difference arises because dos Santos assumes that large discharges 
will be made at levels below the flood rule curve whereas RPT assumes 
that only moderate discharges will be made until the flood rule curve 
levels are reached. The simulations in the present work are based on 
the latter assumption. 
The controversy over the maximum retention level of Lake Cabora 
Bassa has international implications. In December 1970, the Zambian 
Government stated its intention of seeking compensation from the 
Portuguese authorities on the grounds that: 
... it is obvious that Cabora Bassa will submerge the Mpata 
Gorge project site and no development will be possible in 
this gorge. It is also expected that a large area of Zambia 
will be flooded. The level of the tail water near Kariba 
may also rise at certain periods of the year affecting 
generation in the existing project201. 
In a reply, prepared by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa, it was stated that Cabora 
Bassa's normal maximum level would be 326 m, about 90 m lower than the 
level which the Zambian communication appeared to imply. Hidrotécnica 
Portuguesa admitted, however, that in the event of a 100 -year tributary 
flood coinciding with a 10 000 -year discharge from Kariba the level of 
Lake Cabora Bassa would reach 329 m. Nevertheless, it was argued that 
river levels at Zumbo would produce similar flood inundation from such 
flows even without the dam. 
Although during the first five years of operation of the Cabora 
Bassa Project the maximum reservoir level never exceded 328 m a 
significant change in the maximum water levels at Zumbo occurred. From 
the commencement of gauging at Zumbo, in 1950, until the closure of 
the Cabora Bassa Dam, in 1974, a water level in excess of 327 m was 
recorded on only two occasions202. From 1975 to 1979 the reservoir 
operation caused water levels at Zumbo to pass this level in three of 
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the five years, on one occasion for a period of two months, see 
Figure 23. 
Although the foregoing discussion suggests that the influence 
of Lake Cabora Bassa on water levels upstream may be greater than was 
initially supposed, it does not provide an adequate basis for deter- 
mining a suitable value for the maximum retention level of the reservoir. 
To do so would require a thorough survey of the area which would be 
affected in Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe at various reservoir levels. 
Study of the effects of the high reservoir levels in March and April, 
1978, would provide valuable information for such a survey. During 
that period there were suggestions that disruptive flooding had occurred 
in the Zambian town of Feira203. It is probable, therefore, that such 
a survey would reveal that frequent retention at levels of 329 m would 
not be acceptable without international agreement and without the intro- 
duction of measures to relocate or protect the population which would 
be affected. SWECO's suggestion of a 330.5 m retention level would be 
still less acceptable. It should be noted that the possible deposition 
of sediment at the head of the reservoir, see Chapter 5, would exacerbate 
the situation. 
The maximum retention level used in the present calculations is 
329 m. The possible effect on the flood rule curve of adopting the lower 
maximum retention level, of 327 m, is also investigated. Should the 
lower level be found to be necessary in order to prevent upstream 
flooding it would place a further constraint on the system and necessitate 
a thorough revision of the conclusions of the reports by RPT and, to 
a greater extent, SWECO (1982). 
f) Other factors: The following factors might also influence the form 
of the flood rule curve at Cabora Bassa. 
Short duration flood peaks: RPT (1980) noted the danger that, by 
using time intervals of one month in the numerical simulations, the 
possible effects of short duration flood peaks would be overlooked. 
To allow for such effects RPT increased the assigned flood storage by 
10% in preparing the final flood rule curve. This procedure has not 
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of allowing for such peaks. A sounder approach would be to increase 
the flood storage capacity in each of the critical months by a given 
amount, say 2 x 109 m3. Far greater accuracy could be achieved if it 
were possible to repeat the simulations using shorter time intervals 
but the available data does not allow this. 
Intra- annual distribution of the design flood: One of the reasons 
for the differences between the flood rule curves shown in Figures 10 
and 11 is that they are based on different assumptions about the intra- 
annual distribution of the design flood. For the curves of dos Santos 
and DNA (fixed month method) it is assumed that the maximum one -month 
duration flood will occur in March whereas for the curves of RPT and 
DNA (maximum month method) the one -month flood is assigned to February, 
see Table 11 below. The discussion in Appendix 6 shows how such 
differences have arisen from the analysis of different sets of input 
data. This approach provides an inadequate basis for resolving the 
uncertainty as to which of these two months should be adopted. Like- 
wise, there is some uncertainty as to whether the two -month duration 
flood would occur in February -March or March -April and whether the 
three -month flood would occur in January -March or February -April. The 
effect on the flood rule curves of these alternative design flood 
distributions has, therefore, been taken into account. 
Damage to a discharge gate: Floods and Reservoir Safety, ICE (1978), 
recommends that: 
checks should be made on potential flood levels with one gate 
immobilized. (p19) 
To allow for such a possibility would require a more conservative flood 
rule curve, as is demonstrated in the appropriate simulation given below. 
Maintaining a minimum net head for power generation: RPT (1980) 
recommended that the flood rule curve should be calculated so as to 
allow the required power output to be achieved at all times. The most 
critical factor is the need to maintain a minimum head sufficient to 
provide peak power when required. This is affected both by drawdown 
and by the rise in tailwater level during periods of high discharge. 
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Table 12 gives the results of the present flood rule curve calculations 
with the mean net head* as calculated for each of the critical months. 
According to RPT, these values should be greater then 99.5 m so as to 
ensure that the requirement for peak power can be met, and greater 
than 87.5 m to provide the continuous (baseload) output. Although not 
explicitly stated, the value of minimum head for peak power appears to 
be derived from RPT's most conservative assumptions about generating 
and electrical transmission efficiencies, whereas for the baseload 
calculations less conservative assumptions were made. On the basis of 
these less conservative assumptions the minimum head required to meet 
the peak demand should be reduced to 97.5 m. Whichever of the values, 
99.5 m or 97.5 m, is used it can be seen from Table 12 that inflows 
approaching those of the design flood would be likely to result in 
some restriction of the peak power output in almost every case 
considered. Restriction of baseload output also occurs in two of the 
calculations. 
Turbine discharges: The two flood rule curves shown in Figure 10b 
were calculated on similar assumptions except that the more recent one, 
which simulated the operation of the proposed power station in the north 
bank, was based on the assumption that the total discharge capacity of 
the dam would increase as a result of the additional turbine discharges. 
It may be seen from Figure 10b that this assumption led to a considerable 
relaxation of the flood rule curve conditions. 
Conversely, if power generation were interrupted the dam's discharge 
capacity would decrease and additional reservoir storage would be 
required if the dam were not to be overtopped by the design flood. This 
situation is investigated further in the rule curve calculations below. 
The assumption that turbine discharges should be ignored is by no means 
unreasonable. ICE (1978) recommends that such an assumption should be 
made in all flood rule curve calculations. In the case of Cabora Bassa 
there is a real possibility that complete shutdown of the power station 
might occur because of the project's dependence on the single major 
load centre in the RSA. On a number of occasions the transmission lines 
* It should be stressed that these values are monthly means and the 
head will fall below the stated value for short periods during the month. 
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to the RSA have been sabotaged, see Chapter 4, and, even if this 
possibility could be dismissed, there remains the risk that the 
meteorological conditions which would produce inflows of the magnitude 
of the project's design flood might cause damage to the electrical 
transmission system and prevent ready access to repair any faults that 
might occur. Of the previous studies, only SWECO (1982) draws attention 
to the possible danger of loss of load leading to shutdown of the 
turbines but even that report fails to investigate the possible effect 
that this would have on the flood rule curve. In fact the turbines may 
account for over 10% of the total discharge and to allow for their 
complete shutdown a large amount of additional flood storage would 
be required. 
Wave action: It is customary to allow additional 'freeboard' at 
a dam to prevent it from being overtopped by waves. At Cabora Bassa 
it is unlikely that such freeboard will be required over that already 
allowed for by the maximum retention level of 329 m, as specified 
above, since the dam is in a sheltered gorge isolated from the main 
body of the lake and the prevailing wind direction is away from the 
dam. 
g) Flood rule curve calculations: A series of flood rule curve 
calculations was undertaken to investigate the effect of the various 
factors discussed above. A set of conditions was selected for an 
initial calculation after which the effects of various changes in these 
conditions were assessed separately. A description of these calculations 
is given in Table 10. Details of the design flood values used in each 
calculation are given in Table 11 together with values used in previous 
studies. The method by which values of the corresponding flood rule 
curves were obtained from this data is set out in Appendix 7 using the 
conditions of the initial calculation as an example. A summary of the 
results obtained is given in Table 12 together with the flood rule curve 
values obtained from previous studies. 
The flood rule curve calculations were not intended to produce 
a new curve which should be used in preference to all curves previously 
proposed but, rather, to investigate the main characteristics of the 
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Table 10: Description of the flood rule curve calculations 
No. General discription Detailed descriptiom 
1. Initial calculation 
2. Allowance for error 
in estimation of 
10 000 -year flood 
10 000 -year flood, derived from Figures 
19 -21, attenuated by storage at Kariba 
(17 x 109 m3 in February and 13 x 109 m3 
in March) and at Itezhitezhi (5 x 109 m3 
in February); continuous power output of 
1605 MW; maximum retention level, 329 m 
Design flood based on the upper values 
of the 90% tolerance bands in 
Figures 19 -21 
3. Design flood with ' Estimated values of 10 000 -year flood 
return period greater increased by 20% 
4. than 10 000 years Estimated values of 10 000 -year flood 
increased by 30% 
5. Alternative intra- 
6. annual distribution 
of design flood 
7. 
8. Reduction in upstream 
attenuation of floods 
similar to the situat- 
ion in 1978 
9. Reduced maximum 
retention level 
10. Damaged discharge 
gate 
11. Loss of major load 
from electrical 
power system 
Maximum one -month flood in February 
Maximum two -month flood in 
March -April 
Maximum three -month flood in 
January -March 
No flood storage capacity reserved at 
Itezhitezhi and flood storage capacity 
reduced to 6 x 109 m3 in February and 
5 x 109 m3 in March at Kariba 
Maximum retention level, 327 m. 
One discharge gate immobilized 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: Results obtained from flood rule curve calculations 
Calculation 
Values of flood rule curve 
Mean net head in month 
- reservoir level on 1st of 
month (m 0.D.) 
Present study 
Jan Feb Mar Apr Jan Feb Mar Apr 
1 326 324 329 97 98.5 100.5 
2 317.5 318 328 90.5 95.5 100 
3 308 312.5 326 84 92 99 
4 (295)* 305.5 324 - 88 98.5 
5 326.5 327 329 98.5 99.5 100.5 
6 324 314.5 322 92 91 97.5 
7 325.5 326 324 329 97.5 97 98.5 
8 314.5 320.5 329 90.5 97 100.5 
9 323 321 326.5 96.0 95.5 98.5 
10 320 320 327.5 94.5 98 102 
11 319.5 319.5 327.5 
Previous studies 
dos Santos 
(1968) 320 320 325 329 
H.P. (1969) ** 323.5 323 326 329 
DNA (1980a) 
(maximum month) 319 316 319.51 329 
DNA (1980a) 
(fixed months) 319 315 320 327 
RPT (1980) 327.5 325 328 325 100.5 97.5 100.5 
* Drawing down the reservoir to the minimum operating level would still 
not provide adequate storage in this case. 
** The results of the study by Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1969) obtained 
from a later report H.P.(1973). 
This value has been amended to correct an error in the original report. 
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reservoir system which affect the flood rule curve and to determine 
the sensitivity of the system to various changes in operating parameters 
and procedures. The most important conclusion reached is that the 
system is, in fact, extremely sensitive to such changes. For example, 
the rule curve level on 1 February, from Calculation 1, is 326 m O.D. 
Allowing for possible errors in input data, on the basis of the upper 
90% confidence levels in Figures 19 -21 (see Calculation 2), results in 
a rule curve over 8 m lower on that date. The reason for this sensitivity 
may be clearly demonstrated using the operating procedures of Calculation 
1: of the total unregulated design flood for the three most critical 
months (160 x 109 m3), it is assumed that 22% is stored in reservoirs 
upstream of Cabora Bassa, 65% is discharged through the gates of the 
Cabora Bassa Dam, 8% is discharged through its turbines and only 5% is 
stored in the reservoir itself (requiring a drawdown level of 326 m 0.D. 
on 1 February - 3 m below the maximum retention level). Since the 
discharge gates are, under these conditions, already operating at maximum 
capacity small changes in the estimated size of the design flood, in 
the upstream regulation or in the discharge capacities of the gates or 
turbines require large changes to be made in the flood storage provision 
in Lake Cabora Bassa. 
A number of more specific conclusions may be drawn from these 
results: 
1. The question of whether or not limited overtopping of the dam would 
be tolerable must be resolved. If overtopping is found to be unacceptable 
a design flood substantially greater than the 10 000 year flood must be 
used. It is doubtful whether the project could be adequately protected 
against such a flood using flood rule curve procedures, unless additional 
discharge capacity is provided at the dam (Calculations 3 and 4). 
2. Small changes made to calculations of the magnitude of the design 
flood, or its inter -annual distribution, have a considerable effect on 
the rule curve (Calculations 2 and 5 -7). In view of the difficulty 
of undertaking accurate frequency analysis on short data records the 
rule curve should, therefore, provide a suitable margin of safety. None 
of the previous studies made such an allowance. In particular, the rule 
curve proposed by RPT (1980) should be viewed with some caution because 
the unusual assumptions about the distribution of the design flood on 
which it is based resulted in a remarkably low estimate of the unregulated 
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March inflow *. 
3. The amount of flood attenuation which is provided upstream has 
considerable influence over Cabora Bassa's flood rule curve (Calculation 
8). It is in the interest of Mozambique to obtain a firm commitment 
from the operators of the Kariba and Kafue Projects to provide as much 
flood storage as possible and to follow consistent flood rule curve 
procedures. 
4. The question of the maximum retention level of Lake Cabora Bassa 
must be resolved. The value of 329 m O.D. has been cited most frequently, 
but it may be necessary to adopt the lower value of 327 m if excessive 
upstream inundation is to be avoided (Calculation 9). Since this would 
entail increased flood discharges from the dam, which would result in 
increased downstream flooding, it would be necessary to assess the extent 
of both upstream and downstream flooding if the optimum benefit is to 
be obtained. The results obtained from simulations similar to those 
described below would assist in such an evaluation. The results of 
the SWECO (1982) study, which used a maximum retention level of 330.5 m, 
should be viewed with particular caution until such questions are resolved. 
5. Assumptions about damage to discharge gates or the inability to 
operate turbines as a result of loss of load also have significant effects 
on the form of the flood rule curve (Calculations 10 and 11). It should 
be noted that these and all other effects have been tested separately 
on the conditions of Calculation 1. Rigorous application of UK design 
standards would require several of the foregoing modifications to be 
made simultaneously. Under such conditions the amount of flood storage 
required would be greatly increased and 'safe' operation of the Cabora 
Bassa Project would be extremely difficult without provision of extra 
discharge capacity at the dam. 
Power Generation 
Following the agreement between the Portuguese authorities and 
Escom on the sale of electricity to the RSA, explicit recognition was 
given for the first time to the fact that power generation would be 
the primary output from the Cabora Bassa Project. To meet the requirements 
* This feature of the RPT curve was changed in the report on their 
study submitted recently, Haws et al. (1982). 
192 
of the Escom contract the five generating sets, each with a nominal 
output of 415 MW, must operate at a load factor of approximately 78 %. 
This requires a high level of reliability in the hydraulic and energy 
conversion equipment and places important constraints on the hydro- 
logical operation of the project. The purpose of the present analysis 
is to investigate the form of these constraints. 
From an initial survey of the turbine characteristics, Figure 
17, it is apparent that, to maintain the required output, the project 
must be operated in such a way that adequate values of hydraulic head 
are maintained, At the project's present installed capacity it is 
this requirement, rather than the need to store water to regulate the 
natural discharges of the river, which places the principal constraint 
on the project's operation. The constraint is made more exacting by 
the additional stipulation, within the terms of the Escom contract, 
that Cabora Bassa must be capable of increasing its output by approx- 
imately 20% of the mean value,whenever required,to meet peak load demands. 
Furthermore, these conditions must, at times, be fulfilled using only 
four of the five generating sets in order to allow repair and maintenance 
to take place. Thus, even from a brief study, it is apparent that any 
attempts by the Mozambican authorities to increase substantially the 
output from Cabora Bassa in order to supply their own country's demand 
for electrical energy will encounter serious difficulties. For this 
reason, attention has recently been directed to proposals to build the 
North Bank Station at Cabora Bassa in order to supply such domestic 
demand. 
Arising from these general considerations two specific questions 
are considered by means of numerical simulations of the project's 
operation. First, what are the implications of operating the project 
according to the conditions which currently apply? The results of 
simulations are used in later sections of the chapter to assess how 
the constraints from power generation affect other potential outputs 
from the project. Secondly, if a North Bank Station were to be built, 
what would be a reasonable value to adopt as the ultimate power capacity 
of the project? 
To assess the implications of both these questions it is desirable 
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to simulate the reservoir's operation over a long period, rather than 
to select typical values for the relevant hydrological paramenters 
or to single out shorter periods which are believed to be critical. 
The need to use a long period of simulation arises from particular 
characteristics of the system. Under the present operating conditions, 
where the need to maintain high values of hydraulic head is paramount, 
such a simulation is necessary to assess the conflict which arises in 
the regulation of flood discharges. If the reservoir is held at a 
high level to provide high values of hydraulic head it becomes necessary 
to make larger flood releases from the dam which cause the level of the 
tailrace to rise and, thus, lead to a reduction in the available hydraulic 
head - this rise in tailrace level was neglected in the earliest studies 
of Cabora Bassa. In the evaluation of the ultimate capacity of the 
project a long period of simulations is required in order to assess the 
effect of the project's operating characteristics on power production 
as the reservoir approaches its minimum operating level. Excessive 
drawdown of the reservoir leads both to a substantial reduction in 
hydraulic head and to a loss of turbine efficiency. As a result, 
considerably more water is required to provide the same output when 
the reservoir is approaching its minimum level than is required at higher 
levels and, therefore, once the reservoir has been drawn down to such 
levels there is a tendency for it to remain empty. In the studies 
undertaken prior to 1970, three years was the longest period selected 
for simulation of the effects of minimum inflows. The present work 
indicates that this is not sufficiently long to assess such effects. 
The general system characteristics used in the numerical simul- 
ations have been described earlier in the chapter - see, in particular, 
Figures 14 -18. An alternative representation of the turbine character- 
istics, see Figure 24, helps to clarify some of the generating 
characteristics considered above. Figure 24, which is derived from 
Figure 17, shows the total turbine discharge required to provide a 
given output at different reservoir levels (assuming that the tailrace 
level is not increased by flood releases). The figure shows the range 
of reservoir levels over which a given number of generating sets can 
provide the required output. It also indicates the number of sets 






























































































































































































































at different reservoir levels. High values of efficiency (the provision 
of a required output with the minimum turbine discharge) are important 
chiefly in respect of the simulations to determine the ultimate 
capacity of the project. However, in each of the following simulations 
it has been assumed, for the purposes of calculating turbine discharges, 
that the number of sets in operation is that which gives the greatest 
hydraulic efficiency. 
For the simulations the reservoir inflow data used are taken from 
the fifty -four year series on which the RPT (1980) studies were based, see 
Table 13. Following the practice adopted by RPT, the simulations were 
conducted using equal monthly intervals each of 730 hours. 
The discussion of flood rule curves, above, has indicated 
the wide range of values used in curves which have been proposed 
in previous studies. In the absense of a concensus on which rule curve 
should be applied two options were selected for the present study: 
the curve of dos Santos (1968), to which the operating procedures being 
followed by HCB appear to adhere most closely; and the rather more 
conservative curve of DNA (1980a), maximum month method. A modification 
of the latter curve was also used in an attempt to reduce the magnitude 
of drawdown releases in January and June -July. 
a) Simulations of the project under present conditions: Details of four 
simulations undertaken for this part of the study are given in Table 14. 
The first three simulations are undertaken on the assumption that the 
conditions of the present power agreement with Escom will be met at 
all times. An assessment is made of the operation of the system using 
a different flood rule curve in each of the three simulations. Simulat- 
ion 4 investigates the effect on the system of attempting to provide a 
modest increase in output, 100 MW, to supply demand within Mozambique. 
The figure of 100 MW was selected as a reasonable estimate of the 
maximum foreseeable demand over the next decade in central and northern 
Mozambique. Also, the total demand would then be the maximum firm 
output which could be obtained with the present installed capacity *. 
* In simulation 4 the output fell below 1705 MW in only one month, when 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 14: Details of numerical simulations of the operation of the 
Cabora Bassa Project 
Simulation Description 
Target power Flood rule 
Reservo 










PRESENT GENERATING CAPACITY 
Initial simulation. 
Alternative 
flood rule curves. 1 
Increased output from 





INCREASED GENERATING CAPACITY 
5 Operation of 1750 MW 2600 
North Bank Station 
6 at 0.57 l.f. 2600 
7 Investigation of 2000 
8 
maximum firm power 
2055 
9 2082 






13 Alternative flood rule( 2000 
curves for simulations] 
















Description of flood rule curves 
Reservoir levels at start of month (m 0.D.) Source 
Jan Feb Mar Apr 
A 320 320 325 329 dos Santos (1968) 
B 319 316 320 329 DNA (1980a) 
C 316 316 320 329 Modification of 
DNA (1980a) 
198 
Some important results from these simulations are summarized in Tables 
15, 16 and 19 and Figures 25 and 26. 
From Simulations 1 -4 it is apparent that the firm power output 
required by the Escom contract can be supplied from the present power 
station with little risk of shortages. Table 15 indicates, however, 
that some restriction is likely to arise in the peak power requirement 
of the contract. As may be seen from the results of Simulations 1 -3 
the extent of the restriction depends on the form of the flood rule 
curve finally adopted at Cabora Bassa. The amendment made to the DNA 
(1980a) rule curve (see Simulation 3) can be seen to have been beneficial 
in reducing the extent to which peak power output is restricted in the 
month of January. The additional output required in Simulation 4 
almost doubles the frequency with which shortages in peak power occur. 
The other important consideration in power generation is the 
ability to meet the required firm power output when one of the electrical 
generating sets is not in operation for reasons of repair or maintenance. 
Table 16 shows the frequency with which all five sets must be available 
in order to meet the required output. The influence of the flood rule 
curve on these results is again apparent. The increase in the firm 
power output in Simulation 4 is also seen to have a considerable effect. 
It should be noted that, to some extent, the results of Tables 
15 and 16 are determined by the assumptions on which the input data 
have been based and, in particular, on the assumptions made about the 
operating policy which will be adopted at Kariba. RPT, in preparing 
the data of Table 13, undertook a simulation of the Kariba Project. 
The operating procedures used in this simulation were relatively 
unfavourable to Cabora Bassa since RPT assumed that any discharges 
needed to achieve the annual drawdown of Lake Kariba would occur in the 
months of December and January. Had a more gradual drawdown been attempted 
there would have been an appreciable reduction in the values of inflows 
to Lake Cabora Bassa during these months, with corresponding reductions 
in the values of the data in Tables 15 and 16. Thus, the operation of 
the Kariba Project can be seen to have an important influence over the 
operation of the Cabora Bassa Project during the months of December and 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reservoir at its lowest drawdown level, flood discharges from the dam 
should be as small as possible. 
A number of conclusions about future operating policies may be 
drawn from these results: 
(i) the operation of the Cabora Bassa Project would be more flexible 
if it were possible to negotiate a relaxation of the peak power require- 
ment of the Escom contract; 
(ii) in the absence of such an agreement it will be necessary to 
recognize that a decision to increase the safety of the dam, by 
adopting a more conservative flood rule curve would increase the 
frequency with which the peak power requirement could not be met; 
(iii) there is a significant risk of the project failing to supply even 
the firm power output required should one of the generating sets be 
out of operation and, therefore, maintenance of these machines should 
be scheduled so as to ensure maximum availability in the months of 
December to February; and 
(iv) it would be desirable for the authorities in Mozambique to 
obtain agreement with the operators of the Kariba Project, on its draw - 
down procedures, with a view to reducing the inflow to Lake Cabora Bassa 
during the months of December and January. 
b) Evaluation of the ultimate firm power capacity at Cabora Bassa: The 
tender proposals for the North Bank Power Station, see Appendix 5, indicated 
that a nominal installed capacity of 1750 MW was being considered. No 
information was given about the anticipated load factor but it is unlikely 
that it would be as high as that of the present power station even if 
a new transmission link with the Escom grid were to be built. Neverthe- 
less, for financial reasons, it would be desirable to have a relatively 
high load factor. For the purposes of Simulations 5 and 6 it was, 
therefore, assumed that the firm power output required from the two 
power stations would be 1605 MW from the South Bank Station and 995 MW 
from the proposed North Bank Station (a load factor for this station 
of 57 %)* giving a total target output of 2600 MW see Table 14. For the 
purposes of these simulations it has been assumed that the equipment 
in the new station would have the same operating characteristics as 
* that is, that equivalent to full output for 5 000 hours per year. 
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that in the existing station. 
Even using the most favourable of the flood rule curves, it was 
found that attempting to achieve this level of output would result in 
the reservoir reaching its minimum operating level* in about 30 of 
the 54 years of the simulations, see Table 17. On such occasions it 
was assumed, for the purpose of the simulations, that power output 
would be reduced to the maximum which could be generated from the 
inflow at the time, thus preventing the reservoir level falling below 
the minimum. 
Simulation 6 was identical to Simulation 5 except that a higher 
value was used for the minimum reservoir level. The effect of this 
was to enable larger amounts of power to be generated in most of the 
years in which the minimum level was reached. It may be concluded from 
the results given in Table 17 that the attempt to obtain a target firm 
power output of 2 600 MW, under conditions similar to those in 
Simulations 5 and 6, would be most unwise. This is because, even with 
the favourable flood rule curve levels adopted, there is a mean energy 
deficit of between 11% and 14% and a maximum energy deficit in a single 
year of approximately 45 %. 
The results of Simulations 5 and 6 indicated that, using the 
input data of Table 13, the most critical period of minimum inflows 
covered a period of ten years from 1928/9 to 1937/8. Further simulations 
were undertaken, therefore, using this shorter period of data in order 
to determine the maximum firm power output which could be provided 
without deficit. For details of these, see Simulations 7 -14 in 
Table 14. In the majority of the simulations the most favourable 
flood rule curve, that of dos Santos, was used but was replaced for the 
final two by the modified DNA curve. The results of these simulations 
are presented in terms of reservoir levels in Figures 27 and 28. The 
maximum output which could be achieved without the reservoir reaching 
its minimum operating level would be 2082 MW and 2000 MW, respectively, 
* In the present study, it was found to be convenient to use the figure 
of 298 m O.D. rather than the more usual 295 m as the minimum level in 
Simulation 5 but the change does not have a significant effect on the 
results. 
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Table 17: Comparison of energy deficits in Simulations 5 and 6 
(Target output 22.8 TWh /yr) 
Minimum reservoir level (m 0.D.) 
Total energy deficit (TWh /yr) 
Mean energy deficit (TWh /yr) 
Number of years in which deficit 
occurred (minimum reservoir level 
reached) 
Minimum output in a single year 
(TWh /yr) 
Minimum output as % of target 
output 
Longest period during which 
reservoir remained at minimum 
operating level (months) 
206 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for the two flood rule curves. These values suggest that the maximum by 
which the present firm output of the project, as required by the Escom 
contract, could be increased would be no more than 25 -30 %. 
From the results discussed above the following conclusions may 
be drawn in respect of proposed increases in the installed capacity 
at Cabora Bassa: 
(i) the values of the flood rule curve adopted have a significant 
influence over the ultimate firm power potential of the project, since 
they determine the initial reservoir level at the start of the critical 
dry period; 
(ii) in this way the SWECO (1982) study arrived at a value of Firm power 
potential of over 2 200 MW by proposing an increase in the dam's discharge 
capacity which would allow a flood rule curve level of 326 m 0.D. to 
be used throughout the critical flood period, see Figure 12; 
(iii) since the critical dry period appears to last for ten years the 
operating policies of the Kariba Project are likely to have only a 
marginal effect on the results considered above; 
(iv) for the input data used, the critical dry period occurred during 
the 1930s and, for this reason, the simulation results are highly 
dependent on possible inaccuracies in the discharge data and changes 
in the pattern of runoff as discussed in Appendix 6 *; 
(v) the turbine characteristics diagram, Figure 24, suggests that a 
firm power output of 2 000 MW could be achieved with six sets generating 
and one in reserve or, if the minimum level does not fall below 310 m 0.D., 
with five sets generating and one in reserve (a new power station in 
the North Bank could, therefore, hardly be justified for this output); 
(vi) there appear to be long -term benefits for power production in 
fixing the minimum reservoir level at least 10 m above the value of 
295 m 0.D. previously advocated * *; and 
(vii) although the generation of secondary energy has been suggested 
as a possible source of additional revenue this aspect has not been 
* SWECO (1982) suggested that values of firm power capacity would be 
considerably higher if discharge data for the period prior to 1950 
could be disregarded. 
** The use of step -down energy rule curve, as advocated by SWECO 
(1982), is a more sophisticated development of the same principle. 
209 
considered in the present simulations since large quantities could 
only be used in a large inter -connected electrical grid, such as that 
of the RSA (very little secondary energy could at present be consumed 
in Mozambique as a result of its poorly developed transmission network 
and lack of alternative sources of electrical energy). 
Downstream flood mitigation 
In the early reports of the MFPZ the flood attenuation provided 
by both the Kariba and the Cabora Bassa dams was grossly overstated. 
In the Plano Geral flood mitigation was listed as the second most 
important reason for the construction of the Cabora Bassa Project204. 
In view of such expectations the major flood which occurred in 1978 
appears the more remarkable. 
In early April, 1978, the engineers of HCB, aware that the major 
blame for the extensive flooding then occuring in the Zambezi valley 
might be placed on them, attempted to persuade public opinion, both 
in Mozambique and Portugal, that the dam had not been mismanaged. 
António Martins, the chief engineer in Songo, published a statement in 
the Mozambican press in which he claimed that the flood was an extremely 
rare event (with a return period in excess of one hundred years), that 
without the Cabora Bassa Dam the port of Beira might have been flooded 
and that an important factor in the downstream flooding was the large 
discharges from tributaries below the dam. He also attached blame to 
what he called: 
the deficient hydrometric network on the Zambezi which did 
not allow the floods to be foreseen sufficiently in advance205. 
Although it would be wrong to suppose that the operating procedures, 
adopted by HCB in 1978, were the major cause of the floods, this defence 
of the company's activities was weak. The flood was not such a rare 
event. Frequency analysis of one, two and three -month duration annual 
maximum flood series, for either the regulated inflow data of Table 13 
or corresponding unregulated dishcarges, indicates that the flood had 
a return period of somewhere between fifteen and forty -five years. 
This is supported by the fact that in each of the three series for the 
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unregulated discharges the values reached in the 1958 flood were greater. 
Martins' second contention, that the port of Beira was saved by 
the regulation at Cabora Bassa appears far - fetched since Beira is not 
in the Zambezi valley. The notion has its origins in a belief within 
the MFPZ, and partially supported by events in 1958, that, during high 
floods, water from the Zambezi causes the direction of flow in the 
Zangoe to reverse and thereby providing a direct passage into the Púngoé 
basin. However, since Beira was not imperilled by the larger unregulated 
floods of 1958 it is unlikely that, even without the dam, the port would 
have been flooded in 1978. 
The suggestion that large flood discharges from tributaries down- 
stream of Cabora Bassa were partially responsible for the flooding is 
probably true, as it was for the floods of 1952 and 1958. Unfortunately, 
it is not sufficient simply to compare values of peak discharge in 
assessing the impact of floods; time factors must also be considered. 
Thus, in 1978, the dams at Kariba and Cabora Bassa undoubtedly reduced 
the magnitude of the peak discharge of the main river, but in so doing 
they delayed its occurrence in the lower valley with the result that 
it coincided with the tributary floods mentioned above. 
Finally, Martins' criticism of the deficient hydrometric network 
requires careful evaluation. Certainly the operation of the Cabora 
Bassa Project would be greatly facilitated if the upstream hydrometric 
network were to be improved. On the other hand,in 1978, HCB did not 
appear to act upon the information received. On, or about, 9 January, 
CAPC206 warned HCB that it was necessary to open discharge gates at 
Kariba. From 26 January three gates were opened at Kariba on successive 
days. Throughout this period only one gate was open at Cabora Bassa 
and it was not until 9 February, a month after the initial warning, that 
two further gates were opened. Furthermore, if HCB were to adhere 
strictly to rule curve operating procedures, such as those described 
in this chapter, there would be no need for it to rely on information 
from upstream. 
As indicated earlier, one factor which contributed to the need 
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for high discharges from Cabora Bassa in 1978 was the unusually high 
level of Lake Kariba at the start of the year - well above recommended 
flood rule curve levels. By contrast, the level of Lake Cabora Bassa 
was below the rule curve levels of dos Santos throughout the critical 
period. Strict adherence to this rule curve would, in fact, have allowed 
more of the inflow to have been stored in the reservoir and thereby 
reduce the downstream discharges. The effect may be seen in Table 18 
in which the operating conditions during the 1978 flood are compared 
with those which would have occurred if the rule curves of Simulations 
1 -3 had been applied to the same input data. The results show that 
although only a small reduction in the magnitude of the discharges 
could have been achieved during the peak month, April, in March and 
June substantial reductions could have been achieved. Smaller reductions 
could also have been achieved in May. In this way, the duration of 
the flood inundation could have been reduced. Nevertheless, HCB appears 
to have been attempting to prevent the reservoir level from exceeding 
326 m O.D. whereas in the three simulations it has been assumed that 
a level of 329 m would have been acceptable. The extra storage thus 
provided accounts for a large part of the difference between the 
magnitudes of the discharges. 
The influence of a chosen flood rule curve on the magnitude of 
downstream floods has been explored in greater detail and the results 
are presented in Table 19. As with the study of power generation, 
January is seen to be the most critical month because the increasing 
inflows usually experienced in that month coincide with the need to 
preserve a large value of drawdown. The discharges in January could 
be reduced by adopting a policy of more gradual drawdown at Kariba, 
as recommended above in the study of power generation. Although a 
large increase in the target level of power production (Simulations 
5 and 6) may be seen to bring a slight reduction in the frequency of 
large flood releases, it has little effect on the magnitude of the 
largest of these floods and is a far less significant factor than the 
choice of flood rule curve. 
The principal conclusion to be drawn from these simulations is 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with, the control of flood releases downstream of the dam. The operation 
of the Kariba Project is also a significant factor, particularly in 
the month of January. The adoption of a flood rule curve which reduces 
the long -term risk of dam failure results in larger and more frequent 
flood discharges which give rise to higher levels of risk, in the short - 
term, to lives and property downstream. This short -term risk can, however, 
be reduced by adopting the policy of 'threshold' releases advocated by 
RPT. The results obtained from adopting such a policy are summarized 
in Table 6 above and are presented graphically in Figure 29. 
Curve 1, in Figure 29, represents the assumed linear distribution 
of flood frequencies for the unregulated flows at Cabora Bassa whilst 
Curve 2 represents the flood frequencies after regulation at the Kariba 
and Cabora Bassa dams. Curve 2 demonstrates that, provided that the 
flood rule curve has been correctly evaluated (that is, no overtopping) 
there is a considerable reduction in flood magnitude for floods with 
return periods in the range 100 -10 000 years. Curves 3 -5, for which 
a policy of 'threshold' discharges has been used, show how further 
reductions in the magnitude of floods, with return periods in the range 
5 -500 years, may be achieved. Curves 3 -5 also show the relative merits 
of choosing particular values for the threshold. Up to return periods 
of approximatley 50 years the rule appears to be 'the lower the threshold 
the greater the flood attenuation'. However, with these lower values 
the threshold is more readily exceeded. Once this has occurred the 
frequency curves rise steeply to meet Curve 2 at return periods in the 
range 500 - 1 000 years. Attempts could be made to optimize the choice 
of threshold by considering the relative flood damage costs but, in the 
absence of adequate information to undertake the necessary rigorous 
economic study, the safest policy would be to select the highest threshold 
which could be sustained without causing major flooding downstream, 
probably 7 000 m3 /s. 
To sum up, the work of RPT has shown that floods downstream of 
Cabora Bassa could be further regulated without significant loss of power 
production, but that for the more extreme floods the flood rule curve 
becomes the sole determinant of the magnitude of these discharges. 



























































































































































































































































































































periods of the order of 500 years would result in discharges equal to, 
or in excess of, those experienced in 1978. Changes in the operating 
policy of upstream projects, or in the installed capacity at Cabora 
Bassa, would modify the curves in Figure 29 but their general form would 
remain the same. 
A further regulation of the less extreme floods could be provided 
by the 'virtual storage' of peak flows from tributaries downstream of 
Cabora Bassa. In the studies made by RPT, it was shown that the 
magnitude and duration of the tributary floods and their travel times, 
relative to wave travel times along the main river, were such that 
temporary reductions in the outflow from Cabora Bassa could produce 
appreciable reductions in peak discharge values downstream of Lupata 
Gorge. However, the operation of such a system would require a 
sophisticated telemetered network of hydrological stations in the 
tributary basins. 
Guaranteed discharges for irrigation and navigation 
The simulations described in this thesis were not specifically 
designed to assess the possible level of guaranteed discharge which 
could be provided for irrigation or navigation needs. For this purpose 
the most useful study to date is that of Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1973) 
described above (see, in particular, Table 5). This study shows the 
earlier assumption, that power output and the provision of guaranteed 
discharges for navigation are entirely complementary, to be inaccurate. 
Nevertheless, the results of Table 5 suggest that a guaranteed flow at 
Lupata of approximately 2 300 m3 /s could be maintained without prejudice 
to power production. A similar value has been obtained by the writer 
from a re- evaluation of the results of Simulation 13. This suggests 
that a constant discharge from the dam of approximatley 2 100 m3 /s could 
be provided throughout the critical dry period, These values are 
significantly lower than the discharge of 3 000 m3 /s anticipated, as 
the flow which could be guaranteed in 95% of years, in the Plano Gera1207. 
At present, navigation on the lower Zambezi is restricted to a 
few ferries, including the car ferry at Caia, which will soon be replaced 
by the new road bridge, and the barges used by the Sena Sugar Estates. 
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The prospects for future expansion of navigation depend partly on the 
minimum guaranteed flow of the river, but more significantly, on the 
morphological characteristics of the channel; these are examined in 
Chapter 5. However, even with the present low utilization of the 
river for navigation, the operation of the Cabora Bassa Project has 
created problems. For example, a public notice, published in Noticias 
de Beira, in June, 1980, apologized for the interruption to the Caia 
ferry which was caused by the unusually low river level. 
An engineer in the DNA offered the opinion that a minimum flow 
of 2 000 m3 /s was needed to ensure that navigation would be possible 
at Marromeu. He also said that HCB had been requested to discharge at 
a minimum rate of 1 600 m3 /s from Cabora Bassa208. Table 20 shows 
the number of occasions, between 1976 and 1979, on which the discharge 
from Cabora Bassa fell below 1 600 m3 /s. Failure to maintain this 
discharge during the period June to December would be most harmful to 
navigation since tributary discharges would then be low. Separate 
consideration has, therefore, been given to discharges in this period. 
Table 20: Minimum discharges from the Cabora Bassa Dam 
YEAR 
Days in which mean daily Days in period June -Dec. in which 
flow less than 1 600 m3/s mean daily flow less than 1 600 m3/s 
1976 248 131 
1977 61 41 
1978 30 24 
1979 97 6 
There appears to be no hydrological reason why a discharge of 1 600 m3/s 
cannot be provided. Yet, if the suggestion referred to earlier, that 
discharge gates are not operated at partial settings, is correct such a 
discharge might, in practice, be difficult to achieve. The results of 
Table 20 show that the situation steadily improved between 1976 and 1979, 
largely as a result of increased turbine discharges. Nevertheless, 
deficits, which could have been avoided, continued to occur. 
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At present, very little water is extracted from the Zambezi for 
irrigation. In fact, for the foreseeable future, water is unlikely to 
be a limiting factor in the possible expansion of irrigated agriculture. 
If at some later date large irrigation projects are created in the lower 
Zambezi valley a conflict between irrigation and navigation demands 
may arise. 
Flood 'freshets' 
The report by SWECO (1982) suggested that, in certain years, 
environmental damage in the lower Zambezi might be caused by the 
elimination, or partial elimination, of the natural pattern of flood 
discharges. For this reason the report investigated the possibility 
of providing a 'freshet' discharge of 7 x 109 m3 over a period of 
10 -12 days in February of each year. Simulations based on this mode 
of operation indicated that it might result in a 3 -4% drop in energy 
production once the North Bank Power Station is i full operation. 
However, no investigation was undertaken, by SWECO, of the possible 
implications of such an operating procedure on the project as it now 
stands. 
Fluctuation in reservoir level 
The question of the maximum reservoir level for the Cabora Bassa 
Project has been considered above but other aspects of the possible 
fluctuations of the reservoir, such as the range of operating levels 
and the seasonal pattern of fluctuations, have a significant effect 
on lakeside agriculture, and reservoir fisheries and navigation. The 
extent of possible fluctuations in Lake Cabora Bassa has generally 
been underestimated although as early as 1961, in the Esquema Geral, 
it was suggested that the maximum drawdown might be of the order of 30 
*209. 
In 1972 the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, in Mozambique, became 
*Although large, this value is not unique for hydroelectric projects. 
Data presented by Bowden (1949) for the operation of fifteen reservoirs 
in the TVA system indicates that one, the Fontana, has a drawdown 
of this magnitude although, of the remainder, nine had values of draw - 
down less than 10 m and six had values less than 3 m. 
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concerned about the question of drawdown and requested information 
from the GPZ210. In the reply, an annual fluctuation of only 5.5 m 
was forecast. Similarly, Jackson (1974a),in his investigation of 
fisheries potential, was led to believe that the drawdown would be 
no more than 6 m. 
The actual pattern of reservoir fluctuations experienced since 
the normal operating level of Lake Cabora Bassa was first reached, 
in April, 1976, may be seen in Figure 23. In two of the four years 
the drawdown exceeded 12 m. The fluctuation in 1978 was, in fact, 
14 m. The resulting change in surface area of the reservoir was of 
the order of 1 000 km2. The design of the dam allows a possible draw - 
down of 34 m but the likelihood of such a large fluctuation occurinq 
will depend on the operating procedures adopted. 
Operation of the project according to the procedures set out in 
the simulations above would reduce only slightly the magnitude of the 
annual fluctuations below the values experienced since 1976, see 
Figures 25 and 26. The most effective way to reduce the magnitude of 
the fluctuations would be to increase the capacity of the discharge 
gates of the dam as suggested by SWECO (1982), but the benefits of 
such a change would have to be balanced against the extra damage which 
would result from increased flood discharge downstream. 
For lakeside agriculture, not only the magnitude but also the 
seasonal pattern of reservoir fluctuations will have a considerable 
influence over the utilization which can be made of the drawdown zone. 
Actual operations since 1976, shown on Figure 23, have not exhibited 
a consistent pattern of fluctuation; for example, in 1978, the minimum 
level occurred in January and the maximum in April, whereas in 1977 
the minimum occurred in March and the maximum in July. The results of 
Simulations 1 -3, shown in Figures 25 and 26, indicate that a more 
regular pattern could readily be achieved by adhering to the rule curve 
operating procedures. In particular, a fairly dependable pattern of 
drawdown could be achieved in the period October to January. However, 
the maximum level is likely to remain highly variable and thus 
agricultural operations in the period February to September will continue 
to be difficult. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MINERAL PRODUCTION, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE SUPPLY OF, AND DEMAND 
FOR, ELECTRICAL ENERGY FROM THE LOWER ZAMBEZI 
The purpose of the first part of the present chapter is to examine 
plans for mineral exploitation and industrialization in the lower 
Zambezi and, their implications as regards the supply of energy from 
the Cabora Bassa Project. Following a description of established 
mining activities in the region, and a summary of the plans for mineral 
exploitation put forward by the MFPZ, a short study is made of the 
general characteristics and effects of large -scale mining operations in 
underdeveloped countries. The energy requirements for mineral processing 
are then examined in the context of the proposals for the lower Zambezi 
valley. This analysis is illustrated by selected outline studies of 
mineral extraction and processing in a number of underdeveloped countries. 
Turning to electricity supply systems, certain characteristics of 
the growth of such systems are identified by means of selected studies. 
The history of the electricity supply system in Mozambique is then 
traced and followed by studies of topics of particular relevance to 
this thesis: the growth in the demand for electrical energy in the 
Zambezi valley; the supply of power to Maputo; and the creation of a 
primary electrical transmission network to serve the central and 
northern regions of Mozambique. 
In the remainder of the chapter consideration is given to the 
various alternatives facing Mozambique in respect of meeting local 
demand for energy in the centre and north of the country, providing 
power to Maputo, ensuring continued consumption of the present output 
of energy from the Cabora Bassa Project and deciding whether or not 
the project should be expanded through the construction of the North 
Bank Station. In order to undertake this analysis detailed consideration 
has also been given to the financial and contractual arrangements 
currently governing the operation of the Cabora Bassa Project and 
to the possibility of finding new markets for electrical energy in 
the region. 
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Mining activity in the lower Zambezi valley 
Chapter 2 contains a description of the early history of mineral 
exploitation in the lower Zambezi valley and the influence which the 
trade in minerals, especially gold, had over Portuguese colonization 
of the region. The production of gold was, however, well established 
before the arrival of Portuguese settlers as was the extraction and 
smelting of iron ore. A thriving export trade of iron implements to 
India, based on mines in the mountains of Sofala, was recorded in the 
twelfth century211. The working of iron by the local population was 
still carried out in the nineteenth century when, according to 
Livingstone, the iron was of extremely high quality212. 
The Portuguese belief that, somewhere in the central region of 
Mozambique, a vast mineral wealth was awaiting discovery persisted for 
four centuries and was reinforced through the work of the MFPZ, albeit 
with reference to different minerals. The MFPZ not only envisaged the 
expansion of the established coal mine at Moatize but proposed the 
creation of mining and metallurgical industries, in the Zambezi valley, 
based on other minerals, such a titanomagnetites and bauxite, which 
had been discovered in the region. The products, which were sought as 
inputs for the industries of Metropolitan Portugal, demanded a cheap 
and abundant supply of electrical energy as well as an economical means 
of transportation to suitable ocean ports. 
Since independence, the Mozambican authorities have continued 
to emphasize the mineral potential of the region. Although, initially, 
their plans are confined to the expansion of'coal production at Moatize 
it is believed that, in the long -term, the minerals of the Zambezi 
basin will make a significant contribution towards the expansion of 
the national economy. 
From the early 1920s to the present the most important mining 
activity within the Zambezi basin in Mozambique has been the extraction 
of coal at Moatize. The Belgium owned company began by selling coal 
in the area close to the mine, the Sena Sugar Estates becoming a major 
consumer. In 1935, when the Trans- Zambézia Railway was built from 
Beira to Blantyre, this company also began purchasing coal from the 
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Moatize mine. However, it was not until the rail link to Moatize 
was built, in 1950, that the widespread supply of coal in large 
quantities became feasible. The growth in production at the mine from 
1952 to 1978 is shown by the data of Table 21. Supplementary data, 
not presented here213, indicate that, in 1962, 190 x 103 t (approx- 
imately 63% of output) was purchased for railway use, almost three - 
quarters of this on the line from Beira to Salisbury. Although, as 
Table 21 shows, the Moatize rail link acted as a stimulus to production 
after 1950, output stabilized during the late 1950s and 1960s. Further 
expansion did not occur until about 1970 when the effects of a new and 
expanding Japanese export market began to be felt. Since independence 
there has been a considerable effort to increase output in order to 
earn foreign exchange from sales abroad. The Government is committed 
to even steeper increases in the next decade with planned output rising 
to 2.5 x 106 t by the end of 1980214, 4 x 106 t by 1982 and 12 to 15 x 
106 t by 1990215. Whether such outputs will be achieved will depend 
on many factors of which the most immediate is the inability of the 
present rail and road network to handle this quantity of coal. 
In contrast to these ambitious plans coal has, until now, had a 
relatively minor influence on the economy and development of the region. 
In 1959 the mine employed only 1 000 workers216 and by 1978 this number 
had increased to 1 500217. Electricity consumption at the mine has 
also been small, in absolute terms, although the 2.4 GWh consumed there 
in 1959 was over 17% of the industrial consumption of the Zambezi basin 
and over 90% of the total consumption of Tete Province in that year *. 
Nevertheless, the Moatize mine has not been a significant factor in 
stimulating electricity supply systems in the region. In economic terms, 
it was estimated that, in the late 1950s, forestry and agriculture 
accounted for 50% of the gross internal product of the lower Zambezi 
basin. By comparison, the 20 x 103 contos revenue from coal mining 
contributed only about 11/2%, taking the region as a whole, or about 8 %, 
taking the Province of Tete by itself 
* Comparable figures for more recent years have not been published 
but, despite an increase in consumption at the mine resulting from 
increased output and mechanization, annual totals are now a much 
smaller proportion of the total consumption in Tete Province than in 1959. 
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Table 21: Coal production at the Moatize mine, 1952 -78 
Year 
Total Output 
(t x 103) 
Exports 
(t x 103) 





















1957 270 35(13%) Malawi 1 and 2 
1958 250 - 1 
1959 260 - 1 
1960 270 - 1 
1961 320 - 1 
1962 300 37(12 %)* Malawi 1 
1965 280 -300 - 3 
1970 350 100(29 %) Japan, Kenya 4 
Malawi, Angola 
1978 600 - N. Korea, Romania 5 
Malawi, Japan 
- indicates date not available from these sources. 
* not including coal used on railways in Malawi and Rhodesia. 
Sources: 1. Cabrita (1964) p88 -9 
2. Falco (1963) Table XIII 
3. Plano Geral, Texto, pI.8 
4. Martins (1974) Table 9 
5. Agencia de Informaçáo de Mopmbique, Information Sheet, 
Maputo, 23 May 1978. 
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Small quantities of various high value minerals have been mined 
in the Zambezi basin on a commercial scale. The Relatório Preliminar 
(2) suggested that, in 1954, these included radioactive minerals and 
corundum from the regions around Tete, asbestos, bauxite and gold from 
the regions around Beira and beryl, bismuth, columbite, mica and gold 
from the regions around Quelimane. The list, given by Falco (1963), 
for the late 1950s is substantially the same except that corundum, 
asbestos and bauxite were omitted and specific mention was made of 
samarskite* and rutile**. At that time the total annual revenue from 
all minerals except coal appears to have been less than 10 x 103 contos. 
In the Plano Geral219 the main mining concessions listed were for coal 
at Moatize, radioactive minerals near Tete and copper at Chidué. Of 
these only coal production was considered to be of commercial importance. 
In the late 1960s, the Portuguese authorities began a campaign 
to attract foreign investment to Mozambique which brought companies 
from the RSA, Japan, Europe and the USA to search for minerals in the 
Zambezi valley. Although few of these companies were able to achieve 
even an adequate preliminary survey there was, by the end of 1971, an 
increase in the published figures for total mineral output from this 
areat. These figures should, however, be viewed with some caution 
since it has been revealed that at least part of this increase can be 
attributed to covert marketing arrangements for minerals of Rhodesian 
origin - arrangements devised in order to overcome United ,Nations 
economic sanctions 
Mineral potential of the lower Zambezi valley 
Although a number of texts have been written on the geology of 
the lower Zambezi valley221, it is extremely difficult, from available 
information, to formulate an accurate assessment of the region's true 
mineral potential. Pelletier (1964) has concluded that 'Mozambique is 
poor in mineral deposits', and in respect of radioactive mineral deposits 
in the Zambezi valley he wrote: 
* a uranium columbium ore. 
** a titanium ore. 
t the figures include, for example, 8 x 103 t /yr fluorite for export to 
Germany (F.R.), Japan and Portugal, see Martins (1974) p135 -9. 
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The discovery of radioactive minerals at Mavuzi about 
30 miles north of Tete attracted a good deal of attention 
in 1948. The mineral however was davidite, a highly 
refractory mineral, and its occurrence was sporadic. 
A small quantity was sold to France. (p245) 
By contrast, the MFPZ painted a picture of the Zambezi valley as an 
unusually rich mineralogical area222. Apart from those minerals already 
mined, deposits of the following were reported: graphite, titanomagnetite* 
and ores of manganese, magnesium, barium, nickel,chrome and lead. Figure 
30 shows the type of map published by the MFPZ to indicate the locations 
of these deposits. Unfortunately, the size and quality of the deposits 
was not reported in detail and may not, in fact, have been known. As 
the intensity of Frelimo's resistance to the Portuguese regime increased 
it became impossible for geologists to undertake adequate field invest- 
igations. Furthermore, it was in the interests of the Portuguese 
authorities to allow exaggerated claims of mineral wealth to circulate 
in order to attract foreign companies to the region. Recently a more 
restrained assessment has been made in a report, by Obretenov (1978), 
which concluded that previous prospecting work in the whole of 
Mozambique: 
generally speaking ... can be considered as insufficient, 
non -systematic and incomplete. (2.2) 
Regarding mineral deposits the report states that: 
the existing documentation ... does not permit, at this 
time, an evaluation of their reserves. (5.5) 
Specific aspects of the MFPZ's plans are considered below. 
a) Coal: Coal from the mine at Moatize was, at first, largely burned to 
raise steam. As the export trade increased so the demand for coal of 
coking quality grew. In the early 1960s concern was expressed that 
the Moatize mine might not be able to provide sufficient coal of the 
required quality223. It was at this point that interest was first shown 
in coal deposits in the vicinity of rio Macanha, now partially submerged 
* from which iron, titanium and vanadium can be obtained. 
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Figure 30: Reported mineral resources of the lower Zambezi basin 
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(C) CARVAO 
along the north shore of Lake Cabora Bassa. By the time of publication 
of the Plano Geral, less than five years later, these deposits had come 
to be regarded as one of the three 'most hopeful poles of growth in 
the region'224. Further deposits have also been located in the region 
including deposits on the Malawi border southeast 4 Moatize. 
Thus, there is good reason to believe that there are fairly 
plentiful deposits of coal in the Zambezi valley, in Mozambique, 
including coal of coking quality. The single most important constraint 
on their exploitation is the lack of an adequate transportation system. 
However, the movement of coal, by itself, would be unlikely to 
generate sufficient revenue to justify the creation of a complete 
transportation network. The MFPZ planners concluded, therefore, that 
a rapid expansion of output could only be achieved as part of an 
integrated development plan for the region in which river -based transport 
would be given priority. This constraint remains of paramount importance 
for the future of bulk mineral extraction in the region and is of 
particular importance as regards extraction of the coal deposits of 
Mucánha. Other factors would also have to be considered if the MFPZ 
plans were to be implemented in the near future. Such factors include 
the difficulties which Mozambique might face in gaining access to the 
necessary mining capital, equipment and expertise. In addition consider- 
ation must be given to the possible advantages of conserving the deposits, 
to meet future demand for hydrocarbons in Mozambique, rather than allow 
them to be rapidly depleted to provide immediate export revenue. 
b) Other minerals which could be exported with little or no processing: 
In this category the fluorite deposits in the valley featured prominently 
in the Plano Geral. Such minerals will not be considered here in detail 
since their role in the development of the Zambezi valley is unlikely 
to be other than marginal. Successful exploitation would depend on the 
provision of adequate means of transportation and the provision of 
such inputs as energy and water. In addition, the mines would have 
the benefit of creating a demand for labour. However, their energy 
comsumption would probably be small, many of the skilled operators would 
be brought in from elsewhere and the operations would exist as enclaves 
dedicated to serving the needs of the export market rather than to 
integrating with, and providing linkage benefits for, the process of 
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industrial development within the region. In the Portuguese plans 
such characteristics had been recognized in that these operations would 
not have received government finance but would have to have been supported 
by foreign capital and operated with foreign expertise. The general 
characteristics of mineral exploitation by foreign companies in under- 
developed countries are considered below. 
c) Minerals which could be processed locally: The Plano Geral placed 
much greater emphasis on minerals which could be processed locally and, 
in particular, those which would require large quantities of electrical 
energy in the smelting and refining processes. The establishment of 
such operations would, it was believed, provide a market for the abundant 
energy from Cabora Bassa, reduce the bulk of materials requiring 
transport to the ports, provide valuable inputs to Portuguese industry 
and stimulate industrial development in the Zambezi valley. 
Of the suggested mineral -based energy- intensive industries the 
refining of the titanomagnetites of Machédua has been given greatest 
prominence. In the Plano Geral this was listed, with the coking coals, 
already mentioned, and the production of abundant and cheap energy, as 
one of the three 'hopeful poles of growth in the region'225. The ore 
consists of a mixture of magnetite and ilmenite in varying proportions. 
It contains, in the form of oxides, typically, 50% iron, 12% titanium 
and 0.3% vanadium226. Local smelting and refining, using low cost hydro- 
electric energy, was advocated not only for the reasons stated above 
but also because direct export of the ore could not compete, on the 
world market, with established sources* and because the presence of 
titanium in the ore would be seen, by many potential consumers, as an 
undersirable impurity. A smelting procRss, tested with co- operation 
from a North American firm, Strategic -Udy Process Inc., showed that 
coal from Moatize could be fused with the Machédua ore in a rotary 
furnace, without additional fluxes, and that reduction could then be 
continued in an electric arc furnace227. The principal inputs required 
to achieve a 500 x 103 t /yr output would be: ore, 1.2 x 106 t; coal 
* For example, the RSA claims to have iron ore reserves of 5 x 109 t at 
Gamagora at least 20% of which can be reached with open cast mines. The 
size of these reserves is twenty times greater than the iron ore reserves 
of the Zambezi basin reported in the Plano Geral (see The Times, London, 
Dec. 1980). 
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330 x 103 t; and electrical energy 925 GWh *. Earlier proposals, in the 
Esquema Gera1228, had suggested that a plant with four times this 
capacity would be built, eventually, whilst Falcáo (1963) believed that 
a 1 x 106 t /yr output could be achieved in the near future. In the 
event, the Plano Gera1229 recommended, initially, only the construction 
of an industrial scale trial plant. 
Following the decision to proceed with the building of the 
Cabora Bassa Dam doubts were expressed, within the GPZ, as to whether 
even a modest trial plant could be operated. Ironically, the problem 
arose from the, apparently, rigid terms of the agreement to supply power 
from Cabora Bassa to Escom which, it was feared, would not allow sufficient 
spare power for local consumption230. The terms of the original agree- 
ment, as recorded at the end of 1971, would have allowed only 55 MW for 
consumption in Mozambique in 1975 to be increased to 100 MW by 1980 and 
a possible 150 MW thereafter231. It is not clear whether a modification 
of this agreement was negotiated but, by April 1972, the GPZ was 
talking in terms of a supply to Tete which, by 1975, would be sufficient 
to meet the needs of an initial steel plant with four furnaces having 
a power demand of 120 MW232. Whether the agreement was modified or not, 
it is clear that both parties considered it to be an interim measure 
which would operate only until the North Bank Power Station had been 
built. Indeed, initial contracts for the construction of this station 
had been placed before work on the dam itself had been completed. The 
proposal for a steel works in Tete was not, however, implemented although, 
in March 1974, an announcement was made that agreement had been reached 
with the Companhia de Uranio de Mozambique to build the first phase of 
the smelter, with 25 x 103 t /yr capacity by 1975, which would be linked 
with a rolling mill in Beira233. Following the coup in Lisbon, and 
Mozambique's transition to independence, work on the project ceased. 
From published accounts it is not possible to determine the extent 
to which revenue from the transport of inputs and products for the 
proposed steel industry would have helped to finance the transportation 
network which would be necessary for its success. Nor has it been 
* Equivalent to a power demand of 130 MW at the projected load factor 
of 0.82 (7180 hours operation per year). 
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disclosed whether the electrical energy would have been charged at the 
same rates as those which apply to sales to Escom. Nevertheless, in 
the long -term, it was believed that economic benefits could be achieved 
through the refining of the two ore 'impurities', titanium and vanadium. 
Both are difficult and costly to refine and require large inputs of 
energy. Titanium sponge can be produced by electro- refining with each 
tonne of product requiring about 30 - 40 MWh, twice the energy require- 
ment for smelting a tonne of aluminium. The general characteristics 
of these and other energy- intensive processes are considered in more 
detail below. 
Mineral exploitation in underdeveloped countries 
In view of the emphasis placed on mineral exploitation in the 
Portuguese plans for the development of the Zambezi, it is worth consider- 
ing the general characteristics of such operations in underdeveloped 
countries or regions. The principal source on which these observations 
are based is a report prepared for the World Bank by Bosson and Varon 
(1977). Other studies to which reference has been made include Warren 
(1973), who provides a general description of the characteristics of 
the mining industry throughout the world including brief discussions 
of its impact in underdeveloped countries; Cobbe (1979), who examines 
the relationship between mining companies and the governments of under- 
developed countries based on case studies from various parts of the 
world; and Lanning and Mueller (1979), who concentrated on the effects 
of mineral exploitation in Africa. Whereas the majority of published 
studies are based on the premise that mineral exploitation, in the long- 
term, can bring benefits to both the producer and the host country, 
Lanning and Mueller consider such an assessment to be too sanguine in 
view of the many instances, which they document, of the heavy costs paid 
by African countries in exchange for mining technology and export 
markets. 
The work of Bosson and Varon draws attention to the unequal nature 
of the relationship which is involved when technologically advanced 
countries become involved in the exploitation of mineral resources in 
an underdeveloped country, particularly when this occurs through the 
agency of a large multinational company. Underdeveloped countries 
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encourage the mining companies in the expectation that they will bring 
the following benefits: 
(i) foreign exchange earnings; 
(ii) income from taxes and royalties; 
(iii) stimulation of the economy of depressed regions; 
(iv) introduction of new professional and technical skills; and 
(v) the possible formation of a nucleus for national economic growth. 
In many cases, such expectations are, at best, only partially fulfilled 
whilst, on the other hand, mineral exploitation may produce significant 
effects associated with the following features: 
(i) mining enterprises tend to remain as enclaves which are not 
integrated with the economy of the host country; 
(ii) they frequently show little concern for possible environmental 
damage; and 
(iii) the industry shows a highly skewed income distribution. 
The case of iron ore extraction in Liberia provides an extreme 
example of a mining enterprise which is totally detached from the national 
economy and which has failed to stimulate local industrial activity. 
The railways, which were built twenty years ago for the benefit of the 
mines, lead straight to specially constructed deep -water ports and are 
of little benefit to the rest of the Liberian economy. No local steel 
industry has been created and all the inputs required for the mines, 
apart from a little fresh food, are imported. Lanning and Mueller 
conclude that, after twenty years, 'Liberia ... is as far from industrial- 
ization as ever'234. 
Two characteristics of large -scale mining and mineral processing 
activities are particularly responsible for the social, economic and 
environmental dangers outlined above; firstly, they have become very 
capital intensive and, secondly, they carry a large element of risk. 
Throughout the twentieth century the capital input to the 
extraction of minerals has contributed an increasing proportion to 
production costs. Part of this has resulted from a deliberate policy 
on the part of producers to displace labour although other factors, 
such as the desire to achieve 'economies of scale' and the need to use 
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lower grade ores, have been significant. Since underdeveloped countries 
lack capital and technological resources, whilst being rich in labour, 
such a trend has made the minerals industry progressively more inaccessible 
to them except on the most disadvantaged terms. 
The high levels of risk arise from geological unknowns, changes 
in economic or commercial factors and political uncertainties. The 
risks are increased by the long periods of project evaluation and 
implementation which are required to obtain output from previously 
unexploited reserves. 
Against this background it can be seen readily that the objectives 
of industrially advanced countries and of underdeveloped countries are 
often in direct conflict. The industrialized countries are concerned 
to secure cheap and dependable supplies of raw materials. On the other 
hand, individual underdeveloped countries are seeking to increase their 
national income, influence the geographical pattern of development in 
their country, encourage backward and forward linkage effects in the 
economy, including an increase in industrial output, and limit adverse 
environmental consequences. Policies which reduce the risks and costs 
to the technologically advanced party inevitably involve each of its 
less developed trading partners in a disproportionately high share of 
the risks and costs. This is particularly true if the less developed 
countries remain as competitors with each other. 
From the foregoing discussion a number of conclusions may be 
drawn which would be relevant to any future attempt to expand mineral 
production in the Zambezi valley: 
(i) an improved and expanded transportation network would be essential 
for large -scale mineral production but, unless care were taken in its 
planning, such a system might not adequately serve other transport 
needs in the region; 
(ii) even where the existence of rich and plentiful reserves has been 
proved, which is not the case at present in the Zambezi valley, it is 
by no means certain that a country such as Mozambique could achieve 
substantial economic benefits from their exploitation because of the 
unequal nature of the relationship between that country and the 
233 
technologically advanced country or company from which the necessary 
capital and expertise must be obtained; 
(iii) as a result of this unequal relationship it is also unlikely 
that a country such as Mozambique could achieve its social, political 
and industrial objectives or exercise the control it would like over 
such matters as environmental protection and regional planning; and 
(iv) heavy reliance on the export of a small number of raw materials 
to markets over which the exporting country can exert little influence 
is likely to produce an unbalanced and potentially unstable national 
economy. 
Energy- intensive processes 
In much of what has been written, over the last two decades, on 
mineral production and industrialization in underdeveloped countries 
it has been suggested that the exploitation of large -scale hydroelectric 
sources close to rich mineral deposits offers an attractive route to 
economic development through the establishment of energy- intensive 
industries. Suitable sites for such projects have been proposed in 
various parts of Africa235. One of the minerals which has attracted 
interest in this respect has been copper. Prain (1975) suggested that: 
The ultimate constraint in the future production of copper 
is ... the availability and cost of future supplies of 
energy. (p"275) 
However, the large scale smelting of aluminium from alumina has become 
the most celebrated of the energy- intensive processes which has been 
considered for establishment in underdeveloped countries. Smith (1975), 
who worked with the Kaiser Corporation of the USA on the studies for 
the Volta River Project in Ghana, identified the Cabora Bassa Project 
as one which, in his opinion, would almost certainly become linked to 
an aluminium smelter, in view of its low electricity generating costs. 
Clearly, projects of this nature are of benefit to the main consumers 
of aluminium products in so far as they help to maintain a low market 
price for the metal. It has also been argued, for example by Wilson 
(1975), that producing countries benefit because, after smelting, the 
value of the product is considerably higher than that of raw or semi- 
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processed alumina. Both copper and aluminium were listed in the 
Plano Geral as being found in ore bodies in the Zambezi valley and, 
therefore, offering the basis for energy- intensive industries using 
power from Cabora Bassa. Before considering these proposals in more 
detail the general characteristics of high energy processes will be 
examined. The study by Schramm (1969) of these characteristics, in 
relation to low cost hydroelectricity in Canada, provides a useful, 
if somewhat dated, basis for this discussion. 
In Table 22, drawn largely from Schramm's work, the inputs of 
electrical energy required to give one tonne of product in various 
processes are compared *. The table also indicated the relative values 
of the outputs and the total output of each product in the USA in 1961. 
It is clear, from these figures, that, for an energy- intensive industry 
to gain in importance, not only must the product require a large input 
of energy per unit output but also the total annual demand for that 
product must be large. Thus, titanium, magnesium, phosphorus and zinc 
are all unlikely to provide the basis for a new large -scale industrial 
development because the annual demand for them is relatively small, 
whereas aluminium production appears to be attractive because the demand 
is high. Furthermore, because of the wide variations in the values of 
the products, those requiring the largest energy inputs are not 
necessarily the ones which show the greatest sensitivity to changes 
in the price of electrical energy. This may be seen by reference to 
Figure 31 which shows total costs as a percentage of product value 
for different energy rates. Finally, Schramm sought to identify other 
economic factors which might influence the location of processing 
industries. His conclusions, which are also included in Table 22, 
indicate that for all the processes considered, except the smelting 
of aluminium, closeness to a source of cheap electrical energy, although 
important, is not the dominant economic factor in project location. 
Even with aluminium smelters, the location of bauxite deposits and the 
provision of cheap transport, to supply alumina to the smelter, have 
a significant influence over their location. On all these counts, 
* These figures are only approximate since, in some cases, improvements 
in the processes have enabled energy inputs to be reduced since the 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































therefore, it is apparent why the smelting of aluminium has taken 
precedence over other energy- intensive processes in countries where 
abundant hydroelectricity is available. Although changes in the price 
of electrical energy and in the value of the products since Schramm's 
paper was written will affect the details of his analysis it is unlikely 
that his general conclusions would be changed significantly. In 
particular, he concluded that: 
Any attempt to determine most likely plant locations for 
specific processes will have to be based on more than just 
a comparison of power costs. In most cases a whole series 
of factors will mutually determine the best potential 
location for a plant. (p219) 
Furthermore, with the possibility that cheap energy would be available 
from nuclear power stations he concluded that: 
the location decisions of most electro- process industries 
are no longer power, but market, oriented and, as a result, 
it is unlikely that new aluminium smelters will be built 
at [large hydroelectric sources]. (p229) 
World production figures for bauxite, alumina and aluminium, in 1975, 
appear to confirm Schramm's conclusions. 'Less developed countries' 
produced the following percentages of the world totals: bauxite, 54 %; 
alumina, 23 %; aluminium 8.5 %236. Thus, the bulk of smelting occurred 
not in underdeveloped countries rich in bauxite or hydroelectric energy 
but in the industrialized countries, which form the principal markets. 
The proposal to locate an aluminium smelter in the lower Zambezi valley 
Reference has already been made to the Portuguese plans to produce 
both copper and aluminium in the lower Zambezi valley. The production 
of copper will not be considered in detail since evidence presented 
in the Plano Geral suggests that initial expectations that the region 
would become a new 'Copperbelt' were unfounded, despite discoveries 
of copper deposits at Chfdué and Messeca. Furthermore, there has been, 
over the last ten years, a net over -production of copper which has led 
to low prices and consequent economic problems for countries, such as 
Zambia, which are heavily dependent on revenue from copper production237. 
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The production of aluminium was considered in far greater detail 
by the MFPZ. In the Esquema ceral a plant with 30 x 103 - 100 x 103 
t /yr capacity, located near Milange on the Malawi border, was envisaged. 
Alternative sources of bauxite were discussed, including small deposits 
within Mozambique in the same vicinity, or possible imports from larger 
deposits in Malawi. Some reservations were expressed but these were 
played down: 
Although a tendency to reach a 'boom' in aluminium production 
has presently been observed in the market, interest has not 
been lost [in this project]. About 60 x 106 t of bauxite are 
known to exist although the aluminium c ntent is relatively 
low and the percentage of silica high23 °. 
The deposits referred to are presumably those in Malawi. The Portuguese 
authorities had taken shares in the Aluminium Corporation of Malawi with 
the intention, initially, of co- operating in a refinery and smelter 
project on the Shire River using power from Cabora Bassa. When the 
Malawi Government withdrew support, because it recognized the uncertain 
economic returns from such a project, the Portuguese planners examined 
the possibility of locating a smelter on the banks of the lower Zambezi 
and of bringing in the bauxite from Malawi239. During these studies 
it was revealed that the reserves were probably only half the size of 
those which had previously been reported. In the financial study for 
this project, which was completed in 1972, it was suggested that bauxite 
from deposits in Manica Province could possibly replace the Malawian 
bauxite after a number of years240. 
Without access to the details of the 1972 study it is only possible 
to speculate on its recommendations. The size of smelter used in the 
majority of modern plants has an output of at least 100 x 10' t /yr. 
Assuming a unit energy consumption of about 18 MWh /t, the electrical 
power demand of such a smelter would be of the order of 200 MW241. 
Smith (1975) suggested that, provided energy rates were below US $ 0.005/ 
kWh, a smelter located almost anywhere in Africa would have been feasible. 
Such a generalization is undoubtedly unwise in view of the economic 
importance of the location of bauxite deposits and the cost of transport- 
ing the smelter's inputs and outputs. Nevertheless, from the rates 
subsequently incorporated in the agreement to supply power to Escom, 
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it is probable that the energy costs from Cabora Bassa were considered 
to be appreciably less than Smith's figure. It is, therefore, reasonable 
to suppose that the report supported the conclusion that such a project 
would be feasible provided that an adequate and cheap transport system 
could be developed. 
How far the present authorities in Mozambique have considered 
implementing the MFPZ proposals is unknown. However, the production 
of aluminium is listed as one of the grandes projects selected for 
priority study when the State Central Plan for 1981 was discussed at 
the 7th Session of the Peoples' Assembly 
242. 
If a smelter of the 
size described above is under consideration its output would be far in 
excess of the current demand for aluminium products in Mozambique and 
must, therefore, be intended, almost entirely, as a source of export 
earnings. Similar projects have been built in other less developed 
countries for this purpose. A brief description of one of these, 
incorporated in the Volta River Project in Ghana, will illustrate some 
of the problems which may arise in the implementation of such a project. 
The following account is based largely on the study of the Volta River 
Project undertaken by Hart (1980). 
Construction of a 200 x 103 t /yr aluminium smelter at Tema, on 
the coast of Ghana close to Accra, was begun in 1964. The smelter, 
built and operated by Valco*, entered production in 1967 and draws its 
power from the Akosombo Dam - the principal element in the Volta River 
Project. This building of the dam could not have been justified at 
that time, without the smelter taking the bulk of its power output. 
The terms of the original agreement, between Valco and the Ghanaian 
Government, reflected the weak position of the Ghanaian State relative 
to the aluminium company. Ghana was required to provide generous long- 
term tax exemptions and concessions, and to sell the electrical energy 
at a price which, Hart suggests, was slightly below the cost of production. 
Furthermore, the Ghanaian request to the company to build a plant to 
refine the local bauxite into alumina, in order that an integrated 
aluminium industry could be created, was rejected by Valco. As a result, 
Volta Aluminium Co. Ltd. which is owned by two major aluminium 
companies - Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corporation (90 %) and 
Reynolds Metals (10 %). 
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the Ghanaian bauxite continues to be exported to Britain for refining 
while the alumina needed for the Tema smelter is imported from Jamaica. 
Presumably, the Government made concessions to Valco in the 
belief that the smelter and dam would bring other substantial benefits 
to Ghana's economy. Hart's study shows, however, that in ten years of 
the project's operation few, if any, of the initial expectations have 
been realized: there has been no appreciable change in the range of 
the country's export commodities; foreign exchange earnings from 
aluminium production have been offset, largely, by the import of 
alumina and of other inputs needed for the operation of the smelter; 
and the generation of new employment opportunities has been negligible *. 
Even in the wider economy, where it was hoped that the Volta power would 
stimulate industrial growth, Hart found little evidence that the 
Government's expectations had been fulfilled: backward linkage effects 
had been minimal; electrical power to other industries was not cheap 
because new transmission networks had to be built and because the 
smelter was buying its power below cost; and the electricity and water 
supply systems built for the smelter reinforced the existing regional 
concentration of industry rather than helping to distribute industrial 
centres as the Government had hoped. Nevertheless, Hart found no 
evidence of a deliberate desire to exploit the people of Ghana nor of 
'mistakes' or corruption amongst the officials who had formulated the 
policies and implemented the project. He concluded, therefore, that: 
the failure of the Volta River Project, as far as Ghana 
is concerned, must be attributed, not to ignorance, but 
to the basic clash of conflicting interests. (p104) 
The Ghanaian experience is not unique, Guyana has paid heavily 
for its decision to build a 150 x 103 t /yr smelter243. In this case 
the cost of the project and its associated hydroelectric station was 
so large relative to the national budget that the project had to be 
abandoned when the country ran into financial difficulties in 1978. 
* 2 000 jobs were created at the smelter and a further 5 000 in the 
electricity corporation but the investment per workplace, amounting 
to about US $ 75 000, would have been considered high even in a highly 
developed economy. 
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Attempts to restore the national economy, and proceed with the project, 
have resulted in the imposition of external controls, by the IMF, which 
are at variance with the domestic policies of the country's socialist 
government. 
More generally, the international aluminium companies have achieved 
a world -wide fragmentation of the industry which reinforces their already 
strong position. Of fourteen underdeveloped countries which Hart lists 
as having aluminium smelters only four produce bauxite244. Thus, the 
major companies control the supply of alumina, the supply of equipment 
and technical expertise necessary to smelt the alumina and the market 
for the aluminium produced. Recently Venezuela has encountered strong 
resistance to its attempt to break free of this control245. 
Presumably Mozambique, if it proceeds with a Zambezi smelter project, 
will have the option of obtaining the necessary equipment from the 
eastern European countries or the USSR'. Nevertheless, it is by no 
means certain that Mozambique could, in that way, avoid the difficulties 
which other countries have experienced: the capital investment required 
would still be large relative to the national budget; the country would 
still be totally dependent on imported technology and expertise and on 
the import of some, if not all, of the inputs to the smelter; the 
aluminium produced would still be sold in a market over which Mozambique 
would have little influence; and, to improve the viability of the 
project, it would still, presumably, be necessary to provide tax conces- 
sions and preferential power rates. If the other benefits resulting 
from the project turned out to be no more substantial than those which 
resulted from Ghana's smelter, such an arrangement would have done 
little to stimulate the development of Mozambique's economy, as a whole, 
or that of the Zambezi valley. 
The material in this chapter has so far been directed towards an 
assessment of various proposals for mineral extraction and refining in 
the Zambezi valley. Although these proposals formed an important part 
of the integrated development plan for the Zambezi valley, as devised 
by the MFPZ, very little had been achieved towards their implementation 
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at the time of independence. The failure to attempt to implement the 
proposals is due, in part, to the absence of an electrical power network 
and an adequate means of transport. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain 
that adequate geological surveys and economic feasibility studies had 
been undertaken in respect of many of the proposals. 
If the present authorities in Mozambique are seriously considering 
the exploitation of the mineral resources in the Zambezi valley they 
have only poor foundations on which to build, particularly as no pilot 
projects have been built to test the refining processes and train the 
necessary personnel. In addition, the Portuguese proposals were not 
specifically designed to benefit the economy of Mozambique but to meet 
the needs of the economy of Metropolitan Portugal. As indicated above, 
the implementation of similar projects in other underdeveloped countries 
has frequently led to adverse economic, social, political and environ- 
mental consequences which were not foreseen at the time of the project's 
inception. In order to ensure that the long -term interests of the 
people and economy of Mozambique are well served, a realistic 
assessment of such adverse effects must be made so that they may be 
balanced against the expected benefits which a particular project would 
bring. 
One of the principal benefits which has been canvassed has been 
the stimulus which mineral processing would provide to the development 
of the electrical power system in the surrounding region and, thereby, 
to the growth of manufacturing industry. The study of the Volta River 
Project has shown, however, that expectations in this direction may 
previously have been exaggerated. The remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to a study of the factors which influence the growth of electrical 
power systems and the conclusions which may be drawn therefrom 
regarding the future development and operation of the Cabora Bassa 
Project. 
Case studies in the growth of electrical power systems 
Before undertaking a study of the growth of the electrical power 
system in Mozambique, the characteristics of three selected systems 
will be considered with a view to formulating some general propositions 
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about the growth of such system. All three derive a large proportion 
of their supply from large hydroelectric projects. The systems 
operating in Quebec, selected for the first study, are now incorporated 
within a large highly developed inter -connected network; however, the 
present discussion will concentrate on their initial period of 
formation. The other two systems studied, in Uganda and Ghana, are 
still at a relatively underdeveloped stage and were, during the 1960s, 
of comparable size to that of Mozambique. Statistics for the production 
and consumption of electrical energy from these case studies are 
presented in Figures 32 and 33. The use of log- linear axes in these 
figures would result in constant gradient curves if consumption grew 
exponentially, as is usually assumed in forecasting future demand. The 
fact that constant gradients can be found only over relatively short 
periods, in any of the curves, indicates the limitations of such an 
assumption. 
a) Quebec Province in Canada: This case study has been selected because 
of the high proportion of electrical energy which was, until recently, 
supplied by large hydroelectric projects and because of the importance 
of energy- intensive industry attracted to the region. Much of the 
material is derived from the detailed and informative study of Dales 
(1957). Figure 32 shows total electrical energy production for the 
Province of Quebec as well as that of one constituent system, the 
Shawinigan Water and Power Comapny (SWPC), from 1908 until the 1940s. 
The curves show that the average annual growth in output in Quebec, 
which was just under 25% for the first twenty years, has gradually 
fallen and that two World Wars and the economic depression of the 1930s 
had an appreciable effect on production. The phenomenal growth in 
consumption of electrical energy up to the 1920s was associated with 
a rapid expansion in export- orientated industries, such as those 
producing aluminium and base metals, wood pulp and calcium carbide 
all of which require high inputs of energy. In addition, energy 
was exported directly to the neighbouring province, Ontario. The 
proximity of the large markets of the USA and strong established trading 
links with Europe, boosted by wartime demand, have been important 
factors in securing a relatively high rate of growth of output even 











































































































































































changed from an underdeveloped area, providing primary products for 
export, to a broader -based economy in which manufacturing and light 
industries, supplying domestic consumption, became established. Dales 
examined how far the availability of cheap hydroelectricity was a 
significant factor in this process of industrialization and concluded 
that other factors, including the ability to produce the bulk of the 
food necessary to support its population, were more important. 
The separate study of the SWPC is of particular interest since 
this power system was established in a totally undeveloped part of 
Quebec, with all generation initially being from a single site, the 
Shawinigan Falls. Also, the system supplied energy- intensive industries, 
in each of the categories listed above, as well as exporting power to 
Montreal. Like the output of the province as a whole, the load on 
the SWPC system grew erratically but at a remarkably fast rate until 
the late 1930s. The positive approach to marketing adopted by the 
company was an important factor in this growth. Energy- intensive 
industries were attracted to the region by the offer of cheap power 
including extremely favourable rates at which 'secondary energy'* was 
offered. Although little secondary energy can be used in the smelting 
of aluminium both the carbide industry and the pulp industry were 
able to use large quantities, when available, for the heating of boilers. 
In this way, a very high system load factor was achieved. Another 
important characteristic of the system was that the demand from the 
main consumers was not related so that if one industry began contracting 
its operations another usually absorbed the extra energy which became 
available. 
In the light of the comments on the modern aluminium industry, 
earlier in this chapter, three features of the aluminium producers 
supplied by the SWPC system are of interest: firstly, the smelter 
installed in 1906 was small by modern standards, requiring a power 
input of only 15 MW; secondly, the size of the smelter was then gradually 
increased resulting in a gradual increase in demand* *; and, thirdly 
* See footnote to P144-. 
** However, in the late 1920s, although the smelter capacity was 
increased, the power demand actually fell, for a time, as a result 
of the introduction of improved processes. 
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an integrated aluminium industry was created including local fabricating 
facilities. 
b) Uganda: Compared with Kenya, Ghana and a number of other British 
colonies in Africa, the development of the electrical power system in 
Uganda, before 1950, was relatively slow. Although there had been some 
speculation by early travellers on the hydroelectric potential of the 
Nile no serious study of this was made until 1935246. At that time the 
output from the most promising site, at the Owen Falls, was considered 
to be too large for the existing demand and further thermal power stations 
were, therefore, constructed. By 1947 the system load had grown 
sufficiently to justify proceeding with the Owen Falls Project. It 
was believed that it would provide cheap power in sufficient excess 
to stimulate industrial development. In its final form, the capacity 
of the project was increased from 90 MW to 150 MW (ten 15 MW sets) the 
first two sets being commissioned in 1954 and the remaining eight 
entering operation progressively until 1968. A policy of stimulating 
consumption prior to the commissioning of the first sets was successful, 
as can be seen in Figure 33. Thereafter, between 1954 and 1956, the 
growth in consumption fell to rates considerably below those on which 
the financial calculations for the Owen Falls Project had been based. 
The rapid industrialization which had been forecast was, apparently, 
not taking place and Amann (1969) studied the reasons for this slow 
response by industrialists. The industries which, it had been thought, 
would use the new hydroelectricity included iron and steel, chemicals, 
copper refining, cement, textiles and, following the example of the TVA, 
super phosphate fertilizers. Almost without exception, Amann found, 
the financial, administrative and technical difficulties of establishing 
these industries had been underestimated. In a number of cases the 
Government was forced to provide the major initiative but, even then, 
plans ran at least five years behind schedule. More important, in 
many of the industries considered, the cost of electrical energy did 
not have a major effect on the establishment of new industries because 
it accounted for such a small proportion of total production costs. 
Wilson (1967) concluded that, although: 
at that time the most optimistic expected that rapid 
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Figure 33: Gross consumption and production of electrical energy in 
Ghana and Uganda 1950 -79. 
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Source: UN (1976, 1978 and 1981). 
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Uganda economy ... it is now clear that this extreme 
optimism was unjustified and that electricity has had 
a surprisingly small effect on development. (p102) 
The Government's response to this situation was two -fold: firstly, 
in 1955, a long -term contract was signed with Kenya to supply power 
from Owen Falls to Nairobi; and secondly, a rural electrification 
programme was launched. In the event, although these initiatives 
increased the consumption of energy from the Owen Falls Project, as 
shown in Figure 33 *, neither made a significant contribution towards 
paying back the project's capital. Under the Kenya power agreement, 
the tariff rates were very low and provided little excess revenue for 
capital repayment (in 1959 Kenya took 41% of the project's output and 
provided 12% of its revenue). With the rural electrification programme, 
each new consumer connected to the system required additional invest- 
ments in distribution equipment which also had to be repaid from 
revenues. 
From 1959 to 1962 Uganda's consumption of electrical energy 
grew by 7.5% per year. Thereafter, until 1966, it grew by 11.5% per 
year. The sharp increase in 1962 can be attributed to the impetus 
which the country's independence gave to the economy. It is of 
interest to note that a study of Uganda's economy undertaken by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (1957) forecast, fairly accurately, the 
country's demand for electrical energy in 1970. It also predicted the 
energy shortages which occurred in the late 1960s and restricted 
further growth. It was at this point that the disadvantages of the 
50 year agreement to supply power to Kenya became fully appreciated. 
Attempts were made to obtain loans for a 600 MW hydroelectric scheme 
at the Murchison Falls downstream of the Owen Falls, but in view of 
the demand in Uganda at that time this would have required further 
agreements to export power if it were to be economically feasible. 
Kenya, the Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania were all approached 
for this purpose247. In the event the social, political and economic 
disruption which followed the army coup in January 1971, and which 
* Figure 33 shows two curves for Uganda for the period after 1957 - 
production and consumption. The difference between these curves 
indicates the amount of energy exported to Kenya. 
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brought to power Idi Amin, produced a steady decline in the consumption 
of electrical energy in Uganda throughout the 1970s. 
The example of Uganda is of interest because it is an example of, 
what Amann (1969) terms, 'unbalanced growth' - the policy of creating 
excess generating capacity in the belief that it will stimulate rapid 
industrialization. This pattern of growth is generally observed in 
systems linked to large hydroelecteic projects. For the policy to 
be successful the country must already have reached a certain level 
of economic development and be capable of directing the pressures 
created by having excess capacity into government initiatives to 
promote industry. However, cheap power is only one of many factors 
which determine the success of such initiatives. Alternative responses 
made by Uganda in the face of excess capacity, the export of excess 
power and the rural electrification programme, were both in the long- 
term, unsatisfactory. 
c) Ghana: The Volta River Project has been considered above. Before 
the completion of the project, in 1967, the consumption of electrical 
power in Ghana had grown at a steady rate which reflected increased 
comsumption for agricultural processing, by the gold and bauxite mines 
and also by the beginnings of a manufacturing sector. From 1950 to 
1957 the annual rate of growth was over 5% and, following independence, 
in 1957, a growth rate of almost 8% was established up to the mid 1960s. 
The completion of the Volta River Project brought an increase in 
consumption from 574 GWh /yr to 2 589 GWh /yr in just two years, but 
this was only possible because the building of the smelter had been 
planned to coincide with the completion of the dam. Since then electricity 
consumption has continued to grow although at an ever declining rate. 
From 1973 to 1979 the average annual growth rate was about 2 %. Output 
has grown at a slightly faster rate than this as a result of an 
agreement, brought into effect in 1973, to supply small amounts of 
power to the neighbouring states of Togo and Benin (Dahomey). 
As mentioned earlier, the building of the smelter enabled Ghana 
to acquire a large hydroelectric scheme which could not otherwise have 
been built but the arrangement did little to stimulate other industry 
in the country. Nor has the project helped to provide a long -term 
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solution to the problem ofmeeting rising demand for electrical energy 
in the country; with the bulk of its output committed, in a long -term 
agreement, to supplying the smelter there is little excess power 
available for other industrial consumers. It has, therefore, been 
necessary to find alternative sources of power to meet such demands. 
This has led to the building of a combined hydroelectric and 
irrigation project, at Kpong, downstream of Akosombo248. Construction 
of this dam began in 1977 and is now completed. It remains to be seen 
whether this new project will prove any more successful in stimulating 
industrial development in the country. 
The electricity supply industry in Mozambique 
Statistics, drawn from different sources, which relate to the 
supply of electrical energy in Mozambique are frequently incompatible249. 
Data drawn from, what are believed to be , the more reliable sources 
have been used to provide estimates of annual consumption of electrical 
energy from 1950 to 1979, see Figure 34. 
In the early years, private generation by industrial consumers, 
such as the Sena Sugar Estates, accounted for a significant proportion 
of the total electricity consumed in Mozambique. Up to the late 1950s 
over half of the consumption was produced privately. Thereafter, 
although the figures for private production continued to rise, the 
output from public systems grew at a much faster rate so that by 1970 
private production accounted for only about 15% of the total. A 
significant factor in the increasing growth of the public supply 
systems was the entry into production, in November, 1953, of the 
public supply company Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revu6 (SHER), created 
for the purpose of generating and distributing bulk power from the 
Revué River. This was followed, in September, 1959, by the first output 
from the system built by the Portuguese Colonial Development Corporation, 
Sociedade Nacional de Estudo e Financiamento de Empreendimentos Ultra - 
marinos ( SONEFE), which had been given the responsibility for generating 
and distributing bulk power supplies in the area around Maputo. In 
the case of SONEFE, production was mainly by thermal power generation 
using coal imported from the RSA* but as demand has grown, and the plant 
The cost of transportation made it uneconomic to use coal from Moatize. 
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has become older, the system has become increasingly dependent on 
bulk purchases of electrical energy from the RSA. SHER, on the other 
hand, was able to exploit the hydroelectric resources of the Revu6. 
These have been sufficient, not only to supply the needs of Beira 
and Chimoio (formerly Vila Pery), but also to provide excess for 
export to Mutare (formerly Umtali) in Zimbabwe. 
Until the building of the Cabora Bassa Dam the Revué was the only 
river in Mozambique on which hydroelectric energy was being generated 
in appreciable quantity. The main power station, at Mavúzi, operated 
as a run -of -river scheme, has an installed capacity which was increased 
from an initial 13 MW in 1956 to 66 MW by 1962. A dam was then 
constructed, upstream of Mavúzi, at Chicamba and this, by regulating 
the river discharges, increased the potential for energy production 
at Mavúzi. In addition, a power station was built into the dam itself. 
At a later date the height of the dam was raised increasing the rated 
capacity of this station so that, by 1972, the total installed capacity 
on the Revué had reached about 140 MW and the annual energy production 
had passed 250 GWh. With a second power station at Mavúzi and a new 
scheme at Tzate it has been suggested that the annual energy production 
from the Revu6 could eventually be increased to 830 GWh250. 
In the south of Mozambique, close to the area of SONEFE's major 
loads, there are no comparable hydroelectric resources. Thermal 
generation has provided, therefore, the only means of local energy 
production. The main power station of the SONEFE system had an installed 
capacity of 57 MW in 1965. In that year the public utility produced 
120 GWh of energy and required the importation of 68 x 103 t of coal; 
by the early 1970s these figures had doubled. A number of private 
and industrial generators were also operated in the region around 
Maputo. 
In other parts of Mozambique the consumption of electrical 
energy was relatively low. Demand was met, therefore, by small local 
generating units most of which were driven by diesel engines. 
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Feure 34: Gross consumption of electrical energy in Mozambique 1950 -79. 
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Sources: see note 249. 
growth of consumption, over the country as a whole, prior to 1962. 
From 1962 to 1967, a more regular pattern of growth was established 
with annual increases of approximately 6.5 %. From 1967 to 1974, 
consumption grew at the much more rapid rate of 15% per year. Unlike 
the situations described above, in Ghana and Uganda, this growth in the 
demand for electrical energy, like the growth of the national economy, 
was severely disrupted at Mozambique's independence for reasons given 
earlier. 
Figure 34 presents estimates of the total amount of electrical 
energy consumed in Mozambique but provides no information about 
regional differences in demand. An indication of the magnitude of 
such differences is given in the data of Table 23. As might be expected 
over 85% of all consumption occurred in the two regions in which the 
major supply systems, SHER and SONEFE, had been established. 
The regional differences such as those noted above were accepted 
and, indeed, strengthened by the Portuguese planners who held the 
belief that the economic development of Mozambique could only be 
achieved by concentrating the bulk of the available resources in 
selected development 'poles' or 'axes'251. These regions, it was 
argued, would act as nucleii for the development of the whole country. 
Short -term regional differences would be a price which would have to 
be accepted. Inevitably, the zones chosen as 'axes' contained 75% 
of the 'civilized' (ie. largely European) population but only 25% of 
the total population252. The three 'axes' were: 
(i) the city and port of Maputo together with the region served by 
the railway which linked it with the Incomati and Limpopo valleys; 
(ii) the city and port of Beira together with the region served by 
the railway to Chimoio and the border with Zimbabwe; 
(iii) the new port of Nacala together with the region served by the 
railway to Nampula including the agricultural area of Gurus and the 
mineral deposits of Alto Mol6cu6. 
The Zambezi valley was not considered to be sufficiently developed, 
by the mid 1960s, to be included. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































electrical transmission networks of SONEFE and SHER respectively. 
The SONEFE network, by the early 1970s consisted of about 90 km of 30 kV 
primary distribution line together with a 275 kV line which carried the 
bulk power imports from the Escom system. The SHER network, by that 
time, included about 300 km of 110 kV primary distribution line linking 
Mavúzi with both Beira and Mutare and a separate 66 kV line of about 
90 km to carry power to Chimoio, see Figure 36 below. 
The supply of electrical power and the establishment of industry in 
the Zambezi basin 
The first half of the present century saw little industrial, or 
commercial, activity in the lower Zambezi basin except in isolated 
enterprises which had been established to exploit single products - 
coal at Moatize, sugar at Marromeu and Luabo, coconut around Quelimane 
and timber around Inhaminga. Elsewhere, small urban centres acted as 
markets for the surrounding rural areas and as administrative and 
military headquarters. 
The data of Table 24 provide a clear picture of the low level of 
development of electricity production in the lower Zambezi, in 1965, 
and the marked influence of the isolated enterprises, referred to 
above, on the siting of electrical generating capacity; the three 
generating units larger than 1 MW were sited at Moatize, Marromeu and 
Luabo respectively. 
The least developed part of the basin was Tete Province where, 
if statistics for forty small generators not listed in Table 24 are 
included, the total installed capacity in 1965 was made up as 
follows: 7 publicly operated generators totalling 2.3 MW; and 39 
private generators totalling 0.95 MW253. The total production of 
electrical energy that year was: public generation, 4 000 MWh; and 
private generation, 63 MWh. All the generators in Tete Province were 
operated on liquid fuel despite the mining of coal nearby, although, 
in the late 1960s, a forty -year -old coal fired station was installed 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Information about the parts of the Zambezi basin within Sofala 
and Zambezia Provinces is less readily available because official 
statistics have generally been compiled only for complete provinces. 
Nevertheless, Falco (1963) estimated that, in the whole of the basin 
within Mozambique, the consumption of electrical energy in 1959 
amounted to 13.5 GWh, slightly over 10% of the total consumption in 
the country. Of this, the two large sugar factories, together with 
some small food processing units, consumed 10.5 GWh (78 %); the mine 
at Moatize consumed 2.4 GWh (18 %); the timber mills consumed 0.24 GWh; 
and other users, together, accounted for only 0.36 GWh. Equivalent 
figures for the whole region for subsequent years are not available 
but those for Tete Province by itself show some interesting features. 
In the 1950s the Moatize mine accounted for at least 90% of the energy 
consumed in the province. Thereafter, the proportion gradually fell 
reaching less than 65% by 1965. The fall was not due to a decrease 
in energy demand at the mine but to a dramatic increase in the demand 
by domestic consumers - especially the Europeans who arrived in Tete 
to work for the MFPZ. The trend continued until 1971 when only 36% 
of the 8.9 GWh consumed in Tete Province was for industrial use. Over 
the next year consumption quadrupled, to 37.1 GWh, as a result of high 
consumption of electrical energy associated with the construction of 
the Cabora Bassa Dam. As the dam neared completion, however, energy 
consumption fell back. The latest available published data show an 
annual consumption in Tete Province of 20 GWh of which only 43% was 
accounted for by 'industrial' consumption. 
Neither in these data, nor in the available data for those parts 
of the lower Zambezi within Sofala and Zambezia Provinces, is there 
any indication of a diversification or expansion of industrial activity 
between 1950 and 1974. There had been no stimulation of industrial 
consumption in advance of the completion of the Cabora Bassa Project, 
as had occurred in Uganda. Reports by the MFPZ, including the Plano 
Geral, had considered details of possible industries which could be 
established in the Zambezi valley and which could provide a market for 
Cabora Bassa's energy, see Table 25. However, apart from the provisional 
agreement to build a pilot steel plant, referred to above, little had 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































power to Escom had removed the urgency from attempts to create local 
demand for Cabora Bassa's energy. Study of the data in Table 25 
indicates that, even with a full -size steel plant, it would have taken 
a considerable period to establish a local demand for even 10% of 
Cabora Bassa's energy potential by means of the industries considered 
in the Plano Geral. 
The choice of d.c. transmission for the power supply from Cabora Bassa 
to the RSA and its implications for the power supply to Maputo 
When, after the publication of the Plano Geral, the RSA began to 
show an interest in the possibility of importing power from Cabora Bassa, 
Portuguese engineers realised that the construction of a high voltage 
transmission line for this purpose might also provide a solution to 
the pressing problem of supplementing the supply of power to the SONEFE 
system in the region around Maputo. Correia (1967) reported that a 
500 kV a.c. transmission line was under consideration. The proposed 
line would have had a substation at Massingir, from where power could 
be supported to both the Escom and SONEFE networks. A substation at 
Chimoio was also planned from where a link with the SHER grid could 
have been made. In this way the major electrical systems in southern 
Mozambique could have been linked together and to Cabora Bassa. Yet, 
for the foreseeable future, the total demand of the SONEFE and SHER 
systems would have been small relative to the output of the Cabora 
Bassa Project and, therefore, the benefits to Mozambique of such a 
system were considered to be less important than the need to obtain 
a firm commitment from Escom over the purchase of power from Cabora 
Bassa. For this reason, the alternative of using a d.c. transmission 
line, which would, effectively, have prevented links with the SONEFE 
and SHER systems from being created, was not dismissed. 
For a time, the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
a.c. and d.c. transmission systems were keenly debated by Portuguese 
engineers who were unable to reach a consensus on which should be adopted. 
Moura (1968), for example, after examining the technical aspects of 
the two alternatives and attempting an economic evaluation of them, 
found that: 
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For the transport of energy from Cabora Bassa to the Escom 
network it cannot be concluded that a.c. or d.c. would be 
the better solution. In the present phase of the studies 
neither the available technical information nor the 
indications of costs can be considered adequate, by 
themselves, to form the basis for a decision. (p192 
writer's translation) 
In the initial documents for the Cabora Bassa Project, tender estimates 
were, in fact, invited for each of the two alternatives. 
The principal factors considered in the debate on the technical 
and economic advantages and disadvantages of the two alternatives are 
summarized as follows 
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: 
(i) for line lengths of over, say, 500 km a.c. transmission gives 
rise, increasingly, to problems of dynamic instability and internal 
overvoltages which increase the likelihood of system faults and for 
which large reactive compensators must be provided; 
(ii) d.c. systems introduce problems as regards both voltage 
transformation and switching which, as a result, make the design of 
systems and equipment more complex and make the provision of tapping 
points along a transmission line extremely expensive; 
(iii) communications and protection equipment in a d.c. system is 
highly specialized and expensive; 
(iv) in the late 1960s, the end equipment required for high voltage 
a.c. systems was both better tested in service and more readily available 
than that for equivalent d.c. systems, as a result, it was likely to 
be cheaper and more reliable; 
(v) the cost of the line itself is lower for d.c. transmission because 
the insulation required for the same effective voltage is less and only 
two conductors are needed instead of three; 
(vi) for transmission of the same quantity of power through the same 
size of conductor the line losses are also lower for a d.c. system; 
(vii) if one conductor in a normal three -phase a.c. line develops 
a sustained earth fault the whole supply is lost whereas, provided 
that adequate earth points have been provided, a d.c. line can 
continue to operate at reduced power through a single conductor; and 
(viii) by using a d.c. link the primary a.c. transmission systems in 
the RSA and Mozambique remain independent and need not be operated 
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in sychronism. 
In economic terms it was generally agreed, at the time, that 
d.c. transmission would be preferable for very long lines but the 
various authorities differed on what the critical length should be; 
values from 750 km to 1 450 km had been suggested256. Thus, for the 
transmission distance involved in the Cabora Bassa Project, 1 400 km, 
it was thought that there would probably have been no great cost 
advantage from either type of system as far as Escom was concerned. 
For Mozambique, however, the a.c. alternative, by allowing tapping 
points for the supply of power to the southern part of the country, 
would have been more attractive since it would have saved further 
investment in generating and transmission equipment to meet the growing 
demand for power in that region. 
As mentioned above, the engineers of Escom had considerable 
influence over the design selected for the transmission system. It 
has not been possible to determine the reasons for their final choice 
of d.c. transmïssion. Nevertheless. the following factors were probably 
influencial in that decision *: 
(i) it isolated the Escom network from stability problems which might 
have arisen from being linked by a.c. to the Cabora Bassa Project and 
the existing a.c. systems in Mozambique; 
(ii) by preventing tapping points it made it less likely that, at some 
future date, the amount of power being sold to Escom would be reduced 
in order to supply increasing demand in Mozambique; and 
(iii) for the same reason, the d.c. link effectively prevented alternative 
markets for Cabora Bassa's power from being developed within Mozambique 
thus making the project more dependent on the RSA and, therefore, less 
likely to be affected by any changes which might occur in relations 
between the two countries. 
In other words, d.c. transmission was likely to give the RSA 
* The ZAMCO consortium which won the contract for the Cabora Bassa 
Project also had an interest in securing a decision in favour of a d.c. 
system. The German group of companies, Siemens -AEG -Brown Boveri, which 
was part of ZAMCO, had invested large sums in research into d.c. 
transmission without having won a single major contract. 
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greater control over its supply and to increase Mozambique's dependence 
on the RSA for the future operation of the project. Mozambique's 
dependence on the RSA was increased by the subsequent decision described 
below, to supply the SONEFE grid with power from Escom. 
In the 1960s the demand on the SONEFE grid grew rapidly as a 
result of the rapid industrial development which was occurìns in and 
around LourenÇo Marques (Maputo). By 1970, thermal power stations 
provided a total generating capacity of over 57 MW257. However, 
ageing equipment and ever increasing demand provoked an urgent need 
to supplement the supply. Possible hydroelectric sources had been 
considered including the addition of a power station to the proposed 
irrigation dam at Massingir on the Elefantes (250 km from Maputo) and 
a proposed scheme at Massangena on the Save (500 km from Maputo). 
Economic factors affecting the transport of power from these two 
sources were evaluated by da Silva (1964) who concluded that the Massingir 
scheme, at least, appeared to be feasible in this respect. A final 
decision was delayed, however, in the anticipation that the Cabora Bassa 
Project would provide a solution to SONEFE's supply problems. Thus, 
by the time that final agreement had been reached with Escom and the 
d.c. transmission system from Cabora Bassa selected, the need to find 
an alternative supply to supplement the capacity of the SONEFE system 
had become urgent. An early agreement with Escom was, therefore, sought 
whereby the SONEFE system would import electrical power from Escom 
along a new 275 kV a.c. transmission line which would be built from 
Komatipoort. The line was constructed before the Cabora Bassa Project 
had been completed and was in operation by 1972. 
In 1973, the SONEFE grid took 150 GWh of energy from Escom with 
a peak demand of 25 - 30 MW, and by 1976 purchases had increased to 
200 GWh /yr. Although a decline in consumption occurred subsequently 
a recent programme of electrification for the suburbs and villages 
around Maputo has created a maximum demand on the former SONEFE system 
of 50 MW, of which 35 MW is accounted for by the demand within Maputo258. 
The bulk of the energy is supplied from Escom but the Mozambican 
authorities prefer to regard it as a re- importation of energy from 
Cabora Bassa259. The ageing thermal power stations can still be 
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operated for limited periods. Their use requires coal to be imported 
and by far the cheapest source for such imports is the RSA. No details 
of the agreement whereby power is purchased from Escom are known, but 
it is understood that the maximum load is, at present, limited to 
75 MW both by the contract provisions and the capacity of the trans- 
mission line260. 
The Portuguese authorities regarded the arrangement to buy power 
from Escom as a temporary measure. They believed that, with the completion 
of the North Bank Power Station, the RSA would undertake to buy further 
quantities of bulk power from Cabora Bassa which would necessitate 
the building of a new transmission line. For this, the Portuguese, 
favoured an a.c. system which, by being operated in tandem with the 
existing d.c. line, would not suffer as greatly from dynamic instability 
as an isolated a.c. line whilst enabling the desired tapping points 
for the SHER and SONEFE grids to be made 
The problem of ensuring that Maputo's future demand for electrical 
power is met remains unresolved. The two simplest and cheapest 
options are to make increased purchases of power from Escom or 
to build a new thermal power station which would be supplied by coal 
from the RSA. In both cases dependence on the RSA would be increased. 
Nevertheless, a thermal power station could be supplied with coal from 
other sources, if this was considered desirable even,. though this 
would increase the cost of the energy produced. The possibility of 
building a power station at the Massingir Dam has been re- examined 
but reservations have been expressed about the hydrological aspects 
of this scheme262; again, it is dependent on the RSA which consumes 
large quantities of water from the Elephantes upstream of Massingir. 
Attempts to supply Maputo with power directly from Cabora Bassa would 
be extremely expensive at the present level of demand, whether it were 
achieved by building a new a.c. system or by attempting to tap 
the existing d.c. system. As well as presenting some technical 
difficulty, the latter course would also be strongly opposed by 
the RSA; besides the special equipment which would be required for 
the convertor station it would be necessary to install equipment to 
provide synchronous compensation to balance the effect of the a.c. grid 
on the supply263. If, at some future date, Escom ceased to buy power 
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from Cabora Bassa it might be possible for Mozambique to purchase some 
of the equipment from the Apollo substation and install it in a new 
substation within southern Mozambique. This would also give rise to 
high energy costs at the present level of consumption. For details 
of the d.c. system see Figure 35. 
The supply of power to the central and northern regions of Mozambique 
In 1967, before detailed agreement with Escom had been reached 
over the purchase of power from Cabora Bassa, Hidrotécnica Portuguesa 
published a paper in which the expected pattern of future consumption 
of the ouptut from Cabora Bassa was set out. At that time it was 
envisaged that Cabora Bassa would supply power both to Maputo and the 
region around Tete, see Table 26a. A provision was also made, in the 
proposals for the ultimate development of the project, for some power 
to be exported to other neighbouring countries, see Table 26b. It 
may be seen from these tables that, for each stage of the proposed 
development, the power demand within Mozambique was foreseen as being 
approximately 15% of the demand arising from the agreement with Escom. 
(In terms of energy consumption -the proportion would have been closer 
to 10% by virtue of the higher load factors of Escom's consumption). 
In the final agreement, signed in 1969, Escom was persuaded by 
the Portuguese authorities to take larger quantities of power at an 
early stage, than those forseen in the 1967 report, in order to provide 
increased revenue to finance the dam and the South Bank Station. In 
return, however, Escom stipulated that proposals to export power to 
other neighbouring countries must be curtailed and that the provisions 
for the supply of power to the Maputo and Tete regions must be revised. 
The supply of power to Maputo became regulated by the subsequent 
agreement to construct a supply line from the Escom grid, as described 
above. Few details of the allowance made for demand in the Tete 
region are known beyond those contained in accounts of discussions 
concerning the siting of a steel industry at Tete referred to earlier. 
It is worth quoting one such account at length since it presents the 
dilemma in which the Portuguese engineers found themselves as construction 
work on the Cabora Bassa Project started: 












220 kV busbar 
reactor 










Figure 35: Diagram of the electromechanical equipment of the 
Cabora Bassa high voltage d.c. transmission system. 
Source: Klein et al.(1974). 
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Table 26a: Predicted growth in power demand from Cabora Bassa based 




Area of supply 
Predicted power demand 
1974 1977 1980 
Escom 500 1000 1500 0.8 
Maputo 50 100 150 0.57 
Tete 30 50 75 0.46 
Table 26b: Predicted ultimate power demand and energy consumption 
from Cabora Bassa based on Hidrotécnica Portuguesa (1967) 
Area of supply 
Power demand 
(MW) (% of total) 
Energy consumption 
(TWh) (% of total) 
Escom 1760 59 12.3 65.5 
Maputo 200 7 1.0 5.3 
Tete 100 3.5 0.4 2.1 
Other export 650 22 3.5 18.6 
Losses (250) 8.5 1.6 8.5 
Total with losses 2960 18.8 
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industries in the Zambezi basin] the Cabora Bassa North Bank 
Station, which is not part of the present contract, will be 
required. However, its initial operation could only be 
envisaged if there is sufficient guaranteed consumption 
to allow it to operate economically. 
Until then, other solutions will have to be sought such 
as obtaining from the RSA an agreement to reduce its 
contracted power supply and to receive peak energy 
instead of'the base -load energy which it would relinquish. 
The management of these discussions with the RSA had 
seemed difficult because the agreements with Escom had 
been reached a short time before and this, the principal 
consumer, as is normal, had always stressed the need to 
include a reserve generator set in determining the price 
of base -load energy if it were to be properly guaranteed. 
On the other hand, in the final phase of the negotiations with 
the RSA, it was, in fact, the Portuguese delegation which 
insisted that Escom should take a contract for an increased 
amount of energy in order to obtain the maximum revenue 
possible from the operation of the South Bank Station and 
because the possible consumers in Mozambique had not given 
any guarantee of utilization. 
However, in contacts established since August [1970] with 
the Escom officials, in which a frank exchange of opinions 
took place concerning the benefit which the growth of 
consumption presented to the GPZ, an indication of principle 
was obtained from that organization to the effect that it was 
able to foresee an agreement being established which would 
allow the 415 MW corresponding to the reserve set to be 
considered for use by other consumers until the North Bank 
Station begins operating264, 
Officials of the GPZ who wrote the above passage suggested, in it, 
two ways in which the [scorn agreement might be modified to provide 
the required power for consumption in the Tete region. The first, to 
persuade Escom to relinquish a proportion of its bulk energy purchases 
and accept, instead, peak energy, is only applicable in situations 
where a project has insufficient storage capacity to guarantee the 
required firm power output but has excess installed capacity. This is 
certainly not the case with the Cabora Bassa Project, as it now stands, 
where there is little likelihood of a shortage of water but the contracted 
output constitutes a high proportion of the maximum which could be 
provided given the present capacity of the generation and transmission 
equipment (see Simulation 1, Chapter 3) *. The second suggestion is to 
* The RPT studies have shown that a certain amount of secondary energy 
could be generated for a few months of most years but this is unpredict- 
able and could, in no way, be regarded as a source of peak energy. 
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allow 'reserve' generating capacity to be used for other consumers. 
This suggestion will be considered below, in rather more detail, by 
reference to the simulations of Chapter 3. However, it should be noted 
both that such a suggestion was only considered to be a temporary 
arrangement until the North Bank Station could be built and that should 
any of the other sets require repair or maintenance the consumers 
relying on the output from the 'reserve' set would, presumably, lose 
their source of supply. 
The situation has been clarified through the results of the 
simulations described in Chapter 3. These simulations have shown 
that it is the very existence of a clause in the present supply agree- 
ment, allowing Escom to make peak energy purchases, which imposes the 
principal constraint on Mozambique's ability to obtain useful output 
for internal consumption from Cabora Bassa. If Escom were to relinquish 
this right and agree to purchase only the firm power component of the 
present contract (calculated as 1605 MW at turbine shaft) then, according 
to the results of Simulation 4, Mozambique could derive up to 100 MW of 
power from the Cabora Bassa Project with a relatively high degree of 
security. 
As the results of Table 16, in Chapter 3, indicate the concept 
of a 'reserve' generator is not very applicable: on the one hand, for 
a large proportion of the time, it is likely that an extra 100 MW could 
be generated from the four sets which are providing Escom's supply; and, 
on the other hand, for a small proportion of the time, operation of 
the 'reserve' generating set would be required even to supply the full 
output at present required by Escom. Whether or not an extra 100 MW 
of firm output is sought there will be periods, of up to three months, 
when all five sets must be operated to give the required output. Under 
such circumstances the schedule for the regular maintenance of the 
generating equipment at Cabora Bassa must be organized to ensure maximum 
reliability during the critical months. Furthermore, an agreement must 
be reached with Escom over a satisfactory procedure to adopt should a 
generator break down during a critical period, including possible 
compensation payments. It is almost certain that such an arrangement 
is included in the present contract, but it may need to be revised if 
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Mozambique begins to take appreciable amounts of power from the 
project. 
As far as the present authorities in Mozambique are concerned 
output is, at present, being sought from Cabora Bassa to meet increasing 
demand in the central and northern regions of Mozambique. Reference 
was made, in the introduction to this thesis, to some of the larger 
projects which have been proposed for these regions. However, many 
of the projects would be in areas already served by the SHER system. 
Of the remainder, the only new major consumers of electrical power 
would be a textile mill at Mocuba, the exploitation of mineral deposits 
at Alto Mol6cué and the Caia aluminium smelter which has been discussed 
in detail above. Such projects, if implemented, would bring a 
dramatic increase in demand in northern Mozambique but the increase 
would be unlikely to exceed 100 MW by the end of the decade if the 
aluminium smelter is excluded *. 
Since the Mozambican authorities have, apparently, opted to meet 
this expected increase in demand with power from Cabora Bassa it has 
been necessary for them to begin building an entirely new electrical 
transmission network in the region. Details of this network are 
shown in Figure 36. Construction began on the first phase, the line 
from Songo to Mocuba, in 1980 and is due to be completed by December 
1982. By this time it is hoped that some of the projects planned to 
use the power will have been completed. 
Before considering the details of the project, and its possible 
implications for the region, a brief account of earlier proposals for 
electricity supply is provided to set the background to current thought. 
Prior to independence the northern region of Mozambique, the 
provinces of Zambezia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa, was relatively 
poorly supplied with electrical energy. The data of Table 23 indicate 
that this region accounted for about 10% of the total consumption of 
* Tempo, Maputo (11 May 1980) reported that the planned textile 
mill would increase demand around Mocuba from the present level of 
2 MW to about 40 MW by 1987 but this may be an over -estimate. 
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Figure 36: The proposed a.c. transmission system for central and 
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electricity in the country. Moreover, this percentage appears to have 
been decreasing in recent years. The central region, by contrast, was 
rather better served since it includes the established hydroelectric 
projects and transmission network of SHER. However, even in this 
region, in towns not connected to the SHER system, as in the whole 
of the northern region, the main source of supply was from isolated 
diesel generators *. 
Although the development of the public supply systems in regions 
other than that served by the SHER grid was given a low priority, by 
the Portuguese authorities, technical and economic aspects of proposed 
developments were considered at some length by Portuguese engineers. 
Da Silva (1964), for example, after considering the characteristics 
of energy consumption in these regions, concluded that: 
The volume of investments needed for the transmission 
equipment and the corresponding capital costs together with 
the massive maintenance costs, by themselves, make a 
centralized system based on hydroelectric power ... 
economically prohibitive or, at least, inadvisable when 
compared with a dispersed system of supply based on thermal 
power stations of small capacity progressively adapted to 
the demands of a natural growth in consumption. (p108, 
writer's translation) 
Others reached different conclusions and, in particular, many 
Portuguese engineers believed that larger thermal or hydroelectric 
stations should be built to serve wide areas. Potential hydroelectric 
schemes were viewed with particular interest, as demonstrated by the 
emphasis placed on such projects in the Zambezi basin by the MFPZ. 
Other sites where hydroelectric resources might be exploited were 
sought throughout the central and northern parts of Mozambique. 
Cabrita (1964), for example, lists twenty -nine possible schemes in 
these regions with installed capacities ranging from 1 MW to 650 MW. 
The plans for two of these appear to have been so advanced that they 
were considered worthy of inclusion in the ICOLD World Register of 
Large Dams (1973). However, on closer inspection, the hydrological 
aspects of many of these projects may have proved as unsatisfactory 
* A few small hydroelectric schemes are in operation, for example in 
the Licango basin in Z_amb6zia Province. 
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as those of many of the projects proposed by the MFPZ, see Chapter 2. 
A coal -fired power station located by the mine at Moatize, was 
also considered in the Plano Geral and found to be more economical than 
the proposed hydroelectric schemes for installed capacities of up to 
50 MW and possibly up to 100 MW265. 
Thus, Portuguese engineers had considered a number of alternative 
sources of electrical energy which might have served an integrated 
transmission network. But, when work began on the construction of 
the Cabora Bassa Darn it was, naturally, assumed that any integrated 
grid would derive a large proportion of its supply from this project. 
In 1973, work began on building a 220 kV, a.c. line from Songo to 
Chipata in order to link Cabora Bassa with the SHER system. At that 
time it was intended that this line would carry up to 96 MW by 1981 and 
that half the energy would be for export to Mutare266. The line has 
been completed but its present pattern of use is unknown. In the 
northern regions it had originally been intended to establish local, 
150 kV, a.c. transmission networks based on hydroelectric schemes on 
the rivers Molócuè and LGrio267, but as early as 1968 a transmission 
line similar to that currently being constructed was proposed to link 
the major centres of consumption with Cabora Bassa268. 
The 220 kV transmission line under construction, as shown in 
Figure 36, will link Songo with Caia, Mocuba, Alto Mol6cué and Nampula, 
a total length of 1 000 km. Links would be provided to other load 
centres by means of 110 kV, a.c. lines. Work on the first part of 
this project, the line to Mocuba, has made considerable progress. This 
work, which is being undertaken by Italian and French companies, under 
the direction of Swedish consulting engineers, is expected to cost 
approximately US $ 120 million269. 
A number of questions about both economic and technical aspects 
of this project have not been resolved. On the economic side, the project 
requires a considerable investment in relation to the revenue it is 
likely to generate. On the basis of da Silva's work, in 1964, a 22 kV, 
a.c. line of 450 km length should carry at least 75 MW if it is to 
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transmit power at rates which would be competitive with local diesel 
generation270. The line to Mocuba will, in fact, be over 700 km in 
length and is unlikely to carry loads of this magnitude for a number 
of years. Although economic factors are likely to have changed since 
da Silva's study his results suggest that returns from the project are 
likely to be very poor in the first decade of its operation. (To take 
just one item out of the costs considered by da Silva, the cost of 
maintaining the area under the line free of vegetation would be 
considerable; it is known that the CAPC spends the equivalent of over 
US $ 100 000 each year on such work for the 500 km of line which it 
operates within Zambia271). The initial investment is also very high, 
in relation to the country's present capacity to earn export revenue. 
It seems, on the face of it, unwise to tie such a large capital sum 
into a project whose benefits may be realized only in the next decade. 
A number of technical aspects of the project have to be considered 
when the project goes into operation. Firstly, the transient stability 
of such a long a.c. transmission line (ultimately planned to reach 
Pemba, a distance of over 1 300 km), fed by a single source at one end, 
will call for the provision of large amounts of reactive compensation 
along the line272. Secondly, because of the high capacitance, a large 
energizing current will be taken by the line and will make the trans- 
mission of small amounts of power extremely costly. Thirdly, since 
power would be supplied from a single source at one end of the line, 
a sustained fault on the transmission line or in the substation 
equipment would deprive virtually the whole of northern Mozambique 
of its supply of electrical energy. Fourthly, there are, at present, 
very few Mozambican electrical engineers and, probably, none with any 
experience of operating and maintaining a large transmission system 
of this nature. Finally, it has been shown from the results of the 
simulations in Chapter 3 that, with the present installed capacity 
at Cabora Bassa, very little, if any, firm power could be made available 
to consumers in Mozambique without violating the terms of the power 
contract with Escom. If Mozambique wishes to pursue industrialization 
it must have a reliable and guaranteed high level of supply security 
from its single major source. Without the North Bank Station, this 
could only be achieved by ensuring that it is Escam's supply rather 
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than Mozambique's which is reduced should there be any drop in output 
from Cabora Bassa resulting, for example, from machine failure. Such 
an operating policy would entail compensation payments to Escom which 
would make Mozambique's supply significantly more expensive. 
There is a strong political motivation for the Mozambican auth- 
orities to seek to create an integrated electrical power system in 
the country which would help to bring tangible benefits to Mozambique 
from the Cabora Bassa Project and reduce its dependence on imported 
diesel fuel. Nevertheless, it is difficult to reach any other 
conclusion from the foregoing discussion than that the Mozambican 
authorities were ill -advised, at the present time, in undertaking the 
northern grid project. Furthermore, once the section to Mocuba is 
completed, it would be of clear advantage to make a careful re- assessment 
before proceeding rapidly to further stages of the project. 
Financial and contractual agreements governing the operation of the 
Cabora Bassa Project* 
Construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam, the South Bank Power Station, 
and the d.c. transmission line to the RSA were undertaken by the single 
consortium, ZAMCO, referred to earlier. The Portuguese Government, 
being in no position to provide more than a small proportion of the 
capital required for the project, stipulated that the consortium should 
provide the bulk of the capital, at interest rates of no more than 6 %, 
on the basis that loans would be repayed, through the sale of power 
to Escom, over a period of twenty years. Since commerical banks 
would have been unable to offer credit on such favourable terms the 
consortium members were obliged to seek it in the form of export credits 
from their respective governments, principally, France, Germany, and 
the RSA. The response of these governments was strongly influenced by 
political considerations. The French authorities, seeking greater 
political and economic involvement in Africa and wishing to provide 
overseas contracts for their civil engineering companies, readily 
* Published sources for this discussion are few and often contradictory 
The writen has perforce drawn extensively from the work of Middlemas 
(1975 and 1978) which is the most comprehensive published to date. 
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agreed to a loan of 560 million Francs (US $ 110 million)273. Germany 
despite some strong political protests from domestic groups, agreed to 
provide DM 400 million (US $ 95 million). Italy, however, approved 
export credits for the work to be undertaken by Societa Anonima Elect - 
rificazione (SAE) but, under pressure from President Kuanda of Zambia, 
refused to honour this commitment claiming that no funds were available. 
Thereafter, SAE's work was funded directly from the Portuguese Treasury 
to the extent of 32 x 109 Lire (US $ 51 million). When the Swedish 
firm, ASEA, was forced to withdraw from the consortium, for reasons 
explained in Chapter 2, the German Siemens- AEG -Brown -Boveri group 
which took over the ASEA part of the contract obtained 7 million Rand 
(US $ 10 million) through the Industrial Development Corporation of 
the RSA. The German group had to raise the remaining US $ 20 million 
from commerical banks. The RSA, whose involvement has been discussed 
in more detail above, not only provided export credits for its own 
member companies within ZAMCO and the German group mentioned above, 
but also provided the full finance for that part of the d.c. transmission 
system lying in the RSA as well as agreeing to provide loans to Portugal 
totalling R 35 million (US $ 50 million) over four years, to cover 
debts incurred in the period before full output became available from 
the project 
There is a general lack of clarity in the information which has 
been published concerning the financing of the Cabora Bassa Project. 
In some cases no clear distinction has been drawn between the initial 
capital and the subsequent interest charges, whilst few, if any, accounts 
state whether the totals are given at current or constant prices or 
whether an allowance has been made for discounted costs over the life 
of the project. According to Middlemas, the value of the contract as 
approved in September 1969, was equivalent to US $ 340 million275. 
However, this figure does not include the cost of financing the loans, 
the initial allowance made for inflation (which in the event was too 
small) nor the full cost of the d.c. transmission line to the RSA. If 
all these are included the sum reaches US $ 600 million276. High 
inflation rates, delays and the effects of9uerrilla activity brought 
the final total to over US $ 750 million. This figure, presumably 
includes the US $ 21 million allowed for resettlement in the initial 
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contract but may not include later contracts for the building of intakes 
for the future North Bank Station and the construction of the 220 kV 
transmission line to link with the SHER grid at Chipata, which together 
cost US $ 35 million277. It is also unlikely to include the cost of 
the survey and design work undertaken by the MFPZ /GPZ which, from 
1957 to 1970 was estimated to have cost 380 x 103 contos (US $ 13 
million)278. 
On the basis of the original contract and the results of 
negotiations with ZAMCO over liability for the effects of inflation, 
the Portuguese authorities accepted liability, in 1975, for a total 
cost, including interest payments, which was estimated to be equivalent 
to about US $ 640 million at the time279. (The cost of the d.c. 
transmission system within the RSA is not included in this total). The 
Portuguese treasury provided directly about 10% of the cost, and the 
remainder comprised credits from France, Germany and the RSA as well 
as from commercial banks and financial institutions280. If the cost 
of the transmission system within the RSA is included it is clear that 
the RSA's financial commitment to the project was greater than that of 
either France or Germany, individually, and was probably close to the 
combined export credits provided by these two governments281. 
The events leading up to creation of the Portuguese registered 
company, Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa (HCB), to operate the Cabora 
Bassa Project, have been described in Chapter 2282. The 10, share of 
the project's finance which had been provided from the Portuguese 
Treasury was converted into a 10% shareholding in HCB which was transferred 
to the State of Mozambique at independence. Creditors to the State of 
Portugal (for the project) were given the option of becoming either 
creditors to HCB or shareholders. HCB and Frelimo agreed terms whereby 
HCB would operate the Cabora Bassa Project on the basis of a lease - 
the Contracto de Concessäo. The company has been made responsible for 
all parts of the project - its operation and financing, the maintenance 
of its engineering works and equipment and the supply of power to the 
RSA for which it receives revenue at the rates set out in a separate 
agreement between HCB and Escom *. Whilst the Mozambican authorities 
*Responsibility for any renegotiation of these rates rests with HCB and 
not with Mozambique, see Contracto de Concessäo, Article 10. 
278 
monitor the company's activities, and are involved in certain aspects 
of the hydrological operation of the dam, they receive no direct 
revenue nor have they a right to levy taxes on the company or its 
employees. However, Mozambique's shareholding in the company is 
increased annually as shares are redeemed from other shareholders; 
the transfer is reported to be scheduled at a rate of 3% of total 
stock per year283 but this does not appear to have been laid down in 
the formal agreements. The Contracto de Concessáo (Articles 5 and 6) 
states, simply, that HCB's concession over the project will end three 
years after the company's financial obligations have been discharged. 
Thereafter, the State of Mozambique will be free to end HCB's concession 
or to draw up terms for renewal. Since the majority of loans were 
taken as export credits for a period of thirteen -and -a -half years, from 
the beginning of 1975284, the earliest date at which the concession 
might end would appear to be 1992, unless repayments are accelerated *. 
Decisions to reschedule the original loans, slowness by HCB in 
redeeming other shareholdings or the need to seek new loans, including 
those for the construction of a North Bank Station, would, automatically, 
postpone the date at which the concession would end; an outcome which 
be considered present employees of 
HCB. Delay might also be beneficial to other shareholders, including 
the Government of the RSA, since the Contracto de Concessáo makes 
provision for ex gratia dividend payments on shares with the exception 
of those given to the State of Mozambique which carry no entitlement 
to dividends until the initial concession period has ended. 
If the terms of these agreements have been correctly interpreted, 
HCB appears to have a considerable degree of flexibility in its handling 
of the project's financing. Since a number of the options open to HCB 
would not, necessarily, be in the best interests of Mozambique it is 
essential for the company's financial transactions to be monitored. 
Unfortunately, this was not possible for at least the first four years 
of the operation because HCB failed to produce annual reports and 
accounts285. Nevertheless, should disputes arise about the terms of 
the concession or the adherence to it by either party an arbitration 
* With transfer of shares at a rate of 3% per year the concession 
would not end until 2008. 
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tribunal may be called, the procedures for which are also specified 
in the terms of the original agreement. 
As stated above, Mozambique receives no direct revenue from the 
sale of electrical power to the RSA. However, the price paid by Escom 
to HCB affects the rate at which loan repayments can be made by HCB 
and, therefore, affects the date at which HCB's concession will end. 
According to the agreement of 1969, electricalnergy was to be sold 
to Escom at a price of 0.0030 R /kWh, for a period of twenty years, 
falling to 0.0020 R /kWh, or less, fora further fifteen years286 
(approximately US $ 0.0042 and US $ 0.0028, respectively, at 1969 
exchange rates). Despite suggestions, following independence, that 
a substantial increase in these rates was being negotiated, the present 
price appears, from the data in Table 27a, to be no higher than 0.0038 
R /kWh which, at the present rate of exchange is about US $ 0.0043 
/kWh - almost identical with the 1969 price. The revenue from sales 
is also given in Table 27a and can be seen to total about US $ 140 
million over the five years. Under the present contract sales should 
Table 27a: Estimated value of power sales to Escom 
Total Energy Total Revenue Apparent Mean 
Total Revenue 
Year (TWh) (Rand x 106) Cost (R /kWh) 
(approx. equivalent) 
(US $ x 106) 
1976 1.23 2.4 0.0020 3 
1977 4.24 15.5 0.0037 18 
1978 6.92 26.4 0.0038 30 
1979 10.39 36.1 0.0038 43 
1980 9.66 35.8 0.0037 43 
Source: Escom Annual Reports* 
by now have increased to 13.6 TWh /yr, at the Apollo substation, which 
would provide a revenue of US $ 60 million /yr. Allowing for maintenance 
and wage costs, and assuming that this level of output could be 
maintained, the debts could be fully discharged by about the year 1990 thus 
* The figures include small amounts of power imported to the RSA 
from other sources but their effect on the present calculations 
is negligible. 
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allowing renegotiation of the concession in 1993. The payment of 
enhanced dividends to shareholders or interruption of the supply to 
Escom would delay the date of renegotiation. Since December, 1980, 
repeated sabotage of the d.c. transmission line has occurred287; the 
supply was frequently interrupted in the first seven months of 1981 
and there were reports that, as a result, Escom had suspended its 
agreement to buy power from Cabora Bassa by August of that year288. 
The situation since that time has not been widely reported but, 
presumably, as soon as a reliable supply can be restored the purchase 
of power will proceed. 
The present tariff agreement appears to be extremely favourable 
to Escom. In 1969, when the original contract was signed, the mean 
price of electrical energy sent out by Escom, according to its 1980 
Annual Report, was 0.0056 R /kWh against an import charge of 0.0030 
R /kWh for Cabora Bassa's energy. Since then, Escom's average price 
per unit sent out has steadily risen until it now stands at over 0.0200 
R /kWh against the rate for Cabora Bassa's energy of 0.0038 R /kWh. It 
is, perhaps, more accurate to compare the Cabora Bassa tariff solely 
against Escom's fuel costs since Escom's transmission, administration 
and investment costs may not be appreciably lower as a result of the 
Cabora Bassa contract. Thus, in 1969, Escom's mean fuel costs were 
0.0014 R /kWh whereas, by 1980, they stood at 0.0055 R /kWh. The data 
of Table 27b provide an estimate of the savings, in fuel costs alone, 
which Escom made, from 1976 to 1980, through its purchases of electrical 
Table 27b: Savings in fuel costs by Escom through the purchase of 






unit fuel costs 
(TWh) purchased (R /kWh) 
(R x 106) 
Equivalent fuel 
cost of energy 
purchased 
(R x 106) 
Expenditure 
saved by energy 
purchases 
(R x 106) 
1976 1.23 2.4 0.00314 3.9 1.5 
1977 4.24 15.5 0.00356 15.1 -0.4 
1978 6.92 26.4 0.00382 26.4 0 
1979 10.39 36.1 0.00422 43.9 7.8 
1980 9.66 35.8 0.00547 52.8 17.0 
Total 1976 -80 25.9 
Source: Escom Annual Report, 1980, p56 -59. 
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energy from Cabora Bassa. Even on the unlikely assumption that Escom's 
fuel costs will rise no further in the next few years, the savings in 
fuel costs alone would be enough to repay the capital and interest 
costs of the investment, which the RSA made in the d.c. transmission 
line and the Apollo substation, in about another four years. Thereafter, 
at full output, savings in excess of R 20 million /yr could be made by 
the continuing purchase of energy from Cabora Bassa. 
Although tariff renegotiation is not necessarily in the best 
interests of HCB, it was reported289 in January, 1982, that the 
Portuguese Government, which ultimately remains responsible for the 
outstanding debts, was seeking a new agreement with Pretoria over pay- 
ments to HCB for energy from Cabora Bassa. Such a renegotiation would 
clearly be in Mozambique's best interests. On the other hand, Escom 
is unlikely to volunteer to increase the tariff, as the Governments 
of Portugal and Mozambique would have little power to compel such a 
change, unless recourse can be made to additional international pressure 
on the RSA. Escom's original motives for entering the agreement with 
Portugal were based on the political factors, discussed in Chapter 2, 
as well as on technical and economic considerations. This may be seen 
in the benefits identified by Olivier (1973): cheap energy; water 
conservation (the equivalent output from a thermal station requires 
140 x 103 m3 /day for wet cooling towers); and supplementation of thermal 
sources in the period before nuclear power could be introduced. Although 
the RSA still derives benefits in each of these respects from the 
purchase of energy from Cabora Bassa, provided that the supply is 
reliable, Escom has always been careful to avoid heavy dependence on 
an interruptable source. In the short -term, loss of the supply would 
increase Escom's costs and might cause minor power cuts290. However, 
reserve capacity, in the form of old less efficient thermal generation, 
is available to cover the ten per cent of Escom's sales purchased from 
Cabora Bassa. Moreover, in the terms of the original agreement, as 
reported by Middlemas (1975), there were penalty clauses which protected 
Escom against increased costs due to loss of supply: 
The agreement, signed in August 1969 provided (inter alia) 
that two monopolar lines would be erected, and that if one 
fell out of commission 80 per cent of the current had to be 
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directed through the other, with earth return. If power 
fell below the 80 per cent load factor there was a penalty 
of three times the cost per megawatt hour if in peak load 
time, and of less if at any other time. Destruction by 
force majeure would have provided temporary relief from 
this penalty. (p85)* 
Alternative markets for the energy from Cabora Bassa 
Throughout the period of planning which preceded the construction 
of the Cabora Bassa Dam attempts were made to find alternative consumers 
for the project's output from amongst the countries bordering on 
Mozambique, particularly Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The idea of exporting 
energy to Rhodesia was made at an early stage, see Appendix 4, but was 
then shelved following a visit to Salisbury, in 1961, by members of 
the MFPZ who reported that: 
The Federation is not at present interested, nor does it 
appear as if it will be interested, in the consumption 
of electrical energy produced from the Zambezi or its 
tributaries in Mozambique291. 
Following the break -up of the Federation and the imposition of 
UN economic sanctions, following UDI, fresh contact was made between 
officials in Rhodesia and the Portuguese authorities. In the event, 
these talks also failed to produce agreement. Vidigal (1970) reported 
that there were no immediate plans to supply Rhodesia or Zambia with 
energy although he believed that, in the long -term, energy would be 
supplied to Rhodesia in view of the fact that Cabora Bassa is very 
little further from Harare than is Kariba. The final agreement with 
Escom, however, restricted such sales as regards the output from the 
South Bank Power Station. 
Since the country's independence the authorities in Zimbabwe 
have again shown themselves interested in the possibility of constr- 
ucting an inter -connected regional electricity supply network and in 
* It would be interesting to know whether the recent incidents of 
sabotage of the transmission line have been interpretted as 'force 
majeure', particularly in view of the widespread belief amongst officials 
in Mozambique, and a number of independent observers, that the guerrillas 
who undertook the raids are supported by, and trained in, the RSA. 
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purchasing power from Cabora Bassa. One of the eight accords between 
the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe on the occasion of President 
Machel's visit to Harare in August, 1980, stated: 
In the field of Energy, Mozambique and Zimbabwe will gather 
information relating to the development of the electrical 
energy sector taking account of the principle of complement - 
arity and rational utilization of human and material 
resources. The two countries will study the best way to 
optimize their respective hydroelectric resources with 
particular attention to the potential of their contiguous 
hydrographic basins. 
Some of the work for the inter -connection of the electricity 
networks between the two countries has already been started 
and the viability of further lines will be studied. 
In the conversations, Mozambique informed Zimbabwe that it is 
going to begin Phase Two of Cabora Bassa and both sides 
agreed that it is viable to use energy from Cabora Bassa in 
Zimbabwe292. 
The possibility of supplying power to three neighbouring countries 
is considered in more detail below in the light of the statistics, 
presented in Figure 37, for the total consumption of electrical energy 
in these three countries from 1964 to 1979. 
a) Zimbabwe: Although Zimbabwe provides by far the most promising market 
for power from Cabora Bassa it is clear that it could not provide an 
immediate alternative market for the power sold to Escom, if such an 
alternative were needed at some future date. Nor could Zimbabwe be 
relied on to take sufficient energy to ensure the economic success of 
the proposed North Bank Station. With the transmission link in 
éxistence, via Mutare, Zimbabwe could already import up to 100 MW 
of power from Cabora Bassa, if it were available, but it would be 
unlikely to take substantially more power in the near future, even if 
the necessary transmission lines were built. The reasons for this 
are easily identified. 
Firstly, the market in Zimbabwe is small relative to the output 
of Cabora Bassa. In 1956, when final plans for the Kariba Project 
were being prepared, an official report293 predicted that consumption 
of electrical energy in Zimbabwe and Zambia would increase at a rate 
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Figure 37: Gross consumption of electrical energy in Zimbabwe, Zambia 





íL'i mc : 
Tnjz 
ctl=dlhm 




p - E N O N -
: ::= __. W: M :M _ .MM:=- - ----- -- ó Us: i ` ... .. .-_ . U:::- - - ..... w:::: EE~-.-:: ë° - . . .H.H.. 




xH / x MIMI= 
um WwnNÑ~I NNñIIIH....INWi /NNNIMpwM/WNNH -BIN NqINIIIBN NIMMIN VW IN/1 WIINIIIINI/IIIIIIIIIIWNHINNINNINEn /WIYüINW K;CINIYy71 INNINIHNIIW/IHNINMIIHINNINM N11 NW NNIHQ 1IiüQ1Ili;A-AI11U1 WHmH1IHIIII11HN11mIHWHIll111HHINHW IWINM 
H11111WUIIINNIHIIININ1111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIHUIU111NIH11111NmN111111II1NNNN11 NIIINNINNI MINIM IIMN111i111111111 Hm11/IIIIIIIHII.I11111IIII1nUU1111n11111nIINlmllmm11111 nN1NmNNINmNNIM INIIIIIII IIUIUIH NW IHII UUIHIII IUU111111111111111 NN1H1111111111N1 N1111111111111111111NNUNINN1N111NINN111 
111111111111111N111UN111NIn1U111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111NIN11111111111111111W NN111UINIUHIH11111 HIIIIIIII IIIIIIIHI ñIH11111u11111111 H111111H 1111111111111HHH11H1111111111HIH11111u11111 NHINNIIIUIHIIIUHINIII 
111111111111111N111 WH1111111111111111111111H111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111HHIHNIHH111111N1111H11 





















NMI. . . rr . INNION Milano slowsilAMOOM .. ...N Ñ:::-:ÑÑ:::_ ..H/ M . 
wWsiM._.. 
.. . ».-.~ .-a.-Ñ 
..MIYNNNMI MI ::.MNN.rÑRM.IM. ..N MH H MI.M ..H..H .N. ....r..MIrMHMHH...NMI.MHHH.HMH rN M= x.urM ñúwMW --w_== /IIIIM NMIHMI/MNMNW 7-I.IIÑW1nM:-ê  
: E :HH:.s .» 
7:_.....Ç::. :_:: .::::' 
:. 
.-.:::.: :. ....-' Ñ :...,:..::: :, ==:::N =. ÑNr -::M_ __ =s ° Ñr- y . : . ...rr..r.M : . : =. :.:: :. 1 w -MMir =iúnMH!-N.YH. /I HNNiiiM .-www.W.. I ...... .W%» If HwOMp.ÌwN WxxW NNwNI=M IwMawCM aN EkWMM min IxINNNIwIr I/W W IBM INNNINW NIN MNINNINI/ IIIIN INW N NNIIINWIHINN I INNIIWNININIIWNNw IH 
I 
HMI WIIII IN IN/ BIM IIUININN NII IMWII I1/ II IHqry WNHNHIN INNHWNINNIININ rNHtlgwIHHHH nllNl NNIIIN NHIWHNIIWIHH UN= 
. 
- 
IHIINNHIflININNW NlWwApUiuInN11m n1nnH1HINNnfINHN111NHINN1HHInuHIW IH11111111U11NINNIN II INIIHN1111NIN1111111111U11111IUUNIp1111lNUIINNNNIIINIIIININN IU1111111HIUNNINNI NNIIIII ulli11fn1Mï1111HNW11NIN11I1111IlUNNHIwpINUI NNIIIIIIIIHIIIIN IIHIIIIIIHNININ IM IIIIIHIIIIIUI NIIIINIHHIIIHINHIIINNIHII mm11H11NllllllN 
. 
ÌÌ Ì ÌÌÌlÌIÓHIÑiÌ IIIIMi111111 Ú ÌI ÌpppIÌ IIINIÌ IHIiriÑñ1í111i0111i1iíIi1111UÌ1H1ÌÌ1iíI ÌÌIiiÌ iin IIIIIIIIIIIIIII811 U111U111IIIIIIIIIIIIR11N111WIIUUIIIUIIIIIIIIIIIII1IIIn11111I1UU1II1IIlU11Unl 
IlllllllllUUU WNW UIIIUIUIIUIIIIIIIIIIIUIUIIUIIIIUIIIIIIIUIIIUIII111U1111IIIIlI1111U11111IIUUIIIUI 
11IInu1IIIauU gU1IIUIIIIIIU1IIUlUIIUIII111NIU1IIIIInU111111111111II111UI1I111I11U11U11i11111111111Up MEMO glNffillIWIlI8II111_IUlu1IIUIIMINI IuIInII~IIIIIIIInIIIWIIIIIUIIIIIBIIIIIIUIN111N « - ..:.:-: ' L.T'.3'CR' ::3L::.-:.LLS:::LL3LL:....L...M - w6SS:.::35._::ß:H.........-..5.:... I:.. 
E -hr-a=:;,.:-.r--- ..T .-- ...- . . -.:C. .. .. :.:: JÉ::::°............i°.::r:.°°r-::::.. .... ..:::::» :s ...... _=_::  - 
` .....---- ::.: :.::».:::-:-.... .... ..-......I s L::C _pm .. ..... :::: .... .i Ñ. MI.:« : : ...........e. r... :::: 's::::::s. r : :a- ° N.M. .....-...N:I:N °: ... ... ..N. Nam= HH......... :«::.:.:::.: .r....» .. . N.N.H...NN-.r.. ..,WNM ..M. . M.MIN.H: . ..NNNN.NMIMMMM.MM.I .r...H..NWN HNHMH NMNH-N.NN MH NMI HN HMM NNHH II= ENSI 
Source: UN (1976, 1978 and 1981), see also notes 294 and 300. 
285 
of 8% until 1971 with consumption in Zambia remaining higher than that 
in Zimbabwe. The prediction was remarkably accurate up to 1967 when 
the consumption in Zimbabwe was 2.4 TWh /yr and that in Zambia 3.2 TWh /yr. 
Thereafter, however, under the stimulus to its economy provoked by UN 
economic sanctions, consumption in Zimbabwe rose by over 12% per year 
causing the combined consumption of the two countries to rise at 10.5% 
per year. This growth slowed considerably in the mid -1970s when the 
economic disruption caused by the war in Zimbabwe finally halted further 
growth in consumption. At that time, the annual consumption in Zimbabwe, 
6.5 TWh, was slightly higher than that in Zambia. It was predicted 
shortly after independence that consumption in Zimbabwe would, within 
a short period, resume its previous pattern of growth294. Nevertheless, 
the most optimistic estimates foresaw an annual rate of consumption no 
higher than 8.5 TWh /yr, by 1982, and a rate of growth of consumption 
no higher than 10% per year. Even if such predictions are correct, 
which seems at present to be unlikely, and, moreover, if Zimbabwe were 
to meet all future growth in demand by purchasing energy from Cabora 
Bassa, it would be the end of the decade before the supply of energy 
to Zimbabwe would reach a level in excess of one -half the present energy 
sales to Escom. 
Secondly, it is almost certain that the solution to the expected 
growth in demand suggested above, involving increasing heavy dependence 
on imported supplies of electrical energy, would be unacceptable to the 
authorities in Zimbabwe. The country is at present heavily dependent 
on energy imported from Zambia; in the period from 1977 to 1980 between 
2.5 and 3.0 TWh /yr were imported - accounting, in one year, for over 
45% of the energy consumed295. Despite having a relatively high degree 
of control over this supply, through the operation of the inter -connected 
CAPC grid, officials in Zimbabwe were unhappy about such heavy dependence 
on imported energy and have, apparently, resolved to import no more 
than 15% of the country's total consumption in future296. Moreover, if 
Zimbabwe were to import even this proportion of its consumption it 
would require guarantees that the supply would not be interrupted either 
through, technical failures or through sabotage attacks similar to 
those in Mozambique on the d.c. transmission line. This might involve 
additional investments in duplication of the main transmission links 
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which would add considerably to the cost of the energy. 
Thirdly, and decisively, Zimbabwe is now committed to obtaining 
its future energy requirements from domestic sources. Phase One of 
the power station near to the Wankie coal mine is under construction 
and is expected to add 480 MW of generating capacity to the national 
grid by the beginning of 1983 *. Further contracts are now believed 
to have been signed for the construction of Phase Two of this project 
which will add a further 1 200 MW by the middle of 1985. In addition, 
further hydroelectric projects on the Zambezi are being actively 
investigated as described in Chapter 2. The Zimbabwe supply system 
would then have adequate internal sources for both base -load and peak - 
load energy. 
Under these circumstances it is extremely unlikely that Zimbabwe 
would agree to purchase energy from Cabora Bassa in the near future. 
b) Zambia: Many of the above observations concerning the sale of energy 
from Cabora Bassa to Zimbabwe also apply to Zambia297. However, the 
rate of growth of consumption of electrical energy in Zambia has not 
been as high as that in Zimbabwe although from 1964 to 1975 a steady 
growth of 7% per year occurred. Higher growth rates have also been 
inhibited by the low income level of the majority of the population 
and the lack of diversification of the economy. For example, for the 
year 1977/78 over 55% of consumption was accounted for by sales to 
the Copperbelt Power Company298. Energy demand is, therefore, strongly 
affected by the level of output from the copper mines. Furthermore, 
Zambia is unlikely to meet the foreseeable growth in demand by purch- 
asing energy from Cabora Bassa: for a number of years it will be able to 
use output at present exported to Zimbabwe; it will also benefit from 
any new hydroelectric projects which may be built jointly with Zimbabwe 
on the Zambezi; a further stage of the Kafue Project could also be 
built; and, thereafter, should Zambia wish to import energy, it could 
do so more readily over the existing 220 kV a.c. link with the Shaba 
* This project was begun secretly during the period of UDI but was 
stopped following the discovery of agreements with French and German 
firms to supply equipment in contravention of the UN sanctions. 
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Province in Zaire, which is now receiving power along a d.c. trans- 
mission line from the Inga Project299. 
c) Malawi: A glance at the present level of consumption of electrical 
power in Malawi, see Figure 37, shows that there is no prospect of it 
importing large blocks of power from Cabora Bassa for the foreseeable 
future. Moreover, the country has considerable untapped hydroelectric 
resources of its own which could be developed as required, provided 
that the necessary capital is available300. The original suggestion, 
prior to Mozambique's independence, that Malawi might import power 
from Cabora Bassa was made in connection with the proposal, later 
rejected, to build an aluminium smelter on the Shire, as recounted 
earlier in this chapter. 
The options open to Mozambique 
At the beginning of this chapter the Portuguese proposals for 
mineral exploitation in the Zambezi valley were examined. It was 
concluded that the plans were unrealistic in view of the lack of accurate 
survey information, the remoteness of the region, the lack of adequate 
transport facilities and the lack of consideration which had been 
given to the social, political, environmental and economic consequences 
of similar projects in other underdeveloped regions. Special study 
was also made of possible energy intensive processes* but, here too, 
the projects envisaged by the MFPZ appear to offer no guarantee, at 
present,of achieving rapid economic growth, of providing a base for 
further industrialization or of stimulating the growth of the electricity 
supply industry. In particular, the plan to establish an aluminium 
smelter in the Zambezi valley, which is the project in which the 
present authorities have shown greatest interest, appears, on the basis 
of experience in other underdeveloped regions, to offer very limited 
benefits. At the same time, it would impose considerable constraints 
on the Government's freedom to exercise control over the national 
economy and to achieve its stated social and political objectives. 
* Portuguese interest in such projects was based on the need to 
provide finance for the Cabora Bassa Project. This motive was removed 
with the signing of the power agreement with Escom. 
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Selected case studies of the growth of electricity supply 
systems in other regions suggest that the supply of cheap electricity, 
by itself, is not a sufficient precondition for rapid industrial 
development even when adequate security and reliability of supply 
can be assured. Furthermore, attempts to achieve a rapid growth in 
the demand for electrical energy, either through attracting energy - 
intensive processes or by exporting power to neighbouring regions, 
have, rarely brought long -term benefits to the economy of the energy 
producing region. The exception to this, amongst the cases considered, 
is the Province of Quebec, but the circumstances which brought succes- 
sful industrial development to that region are very different from 
those which pertain in Mozambique today. 
From a detailed study of the development of the electricity 
supply industry in Mozambique, and study of various factors governing 
the operation and development of the Cabora Bassa Project, two important 
questions arise which may or may not be interrelated: 
1. How can Mozambique derive the maximum benefit from the Cabora Bassa 
Project; and 
2. How can the projected increase in demand for electrical energy 
within Mozambique be met? 
An attempt might be made to treat the two issues entirely 
separately. In this case the basic agreement to supply Escom from 
Cabora Bassa might well be justified. This does not exclude the 
possibility of Mozambique attempting to modify certain aspects of 
its agreement with HCB and, in particular, the contract between HCB 
and Escom, the energy tariff and the aspects of the project's hydrolo- 
gical operation, such as flood control, which are discussed in other 
parts of this thesis. However, to achieve even these changes would 
require a measure of co- operation between the principal parties, since 
Mozambique could do little to impose such changes. The supply of power 
to consumers in Mozambique requires new initiatives to be made in the 
near future. Maputo and the southern region require either a new 
thermal power station or a further agreement to import power from Escom; 
Beira and the central region could probably be supplied by further 
development of the region's hydroelectric resources; and the northern 
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region could be supplied from a combination of small hydroelectric 
and thermal power stations. With the new transmission line from Songo 
to Mocuba in operation the region surrounding that line could be 
supplied from a single coal -fired power station at Moatize, but over- 
reliance on a single source for the northern region would be unwise 
because of the vulnerability of such a supply to system failures. If 
isolated power stations were built with local distribution systems, 
these could be inter -connected at a later date to create an efficient 
and reliable supply network. 
An approach could be made to Escom to seek a reduction in the 
level of output supplied to it under the terms of the Cabora Bassa 
contract. If in the initial stages, Escom were simply to relinquish 
its entitlement to peak power, this would allow Mozambique to obtain 
up to 100 MW from the project as indicated by the results of Simulation 
4 in Chapter 3. However, since this would increase the risk of lost 
output should one of the project's generating sets require repair or 
maintenance, Escom might also be called upon to agree to Mozambique 
being given first preference over the remaining output from the project 
during periods of shortage. Such an arrangement might be operated under 
the existing contract on the payment of agreed compensation but the 
price paid by Mozambique for its energy might then be prohibitively 
high. For the supply of power to northern Mozambique, the transmission 
line could be extended beyond Mocuba, creating an elongated transmission 
system supplied by a single source of generation located at one end, 
but this would bring with it the risk of a single fault causing wide- 
spread loss of supply. 
The situation might arise whereby no further power would be 
supplied to Escom from Cabora Bassa by action on either side. For 
Mozambique to take such action would be unwise since there is no prospect 
in the foreseeable future for alternative markets to be found for more 
than a small fraction of Cabora Bassa's output. In addition such action 
would, almost certainly, evoke retaliation from the RSA in the form of 
halting the export of power to Maputo, which would be exceedingly 
damaging to the economy of Mozambique. On the other hand, the RSA 
might act to end its purchases of power from Cabora Bassa, either 
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directly or indirectly through support for saboteurs, without 
sustaining excessive or prolonged damage to the operation of the Escom 
system. Clearly, if Escom were to cease buying power from Cabora Bassa 
there would be an abundant output available for consumption in those 
parts of central and northern Mozambique which could be readily connected 
to a centralized distribution network. Nevertheless, even if consumption 
could be increased dramatically Mozambique would have no direct means 
of earning the hard currency needed to repay the outstanding loans. 
The North Bank Power Station at Cabora Bassa might be built; it 
has been reported301 that Sweden had agreed to finance the North Bank 
Station provided that Zimbabwe would agree to purchase its output. 
Such an arrangement would have allowed the operation of the South Bank 
Station to continue on the basis of existing agreements whilst the new 
station would provide sufficient excess power to supply demand in 
northern Mozambique, albeit through the existing unsatisfactory 
transmission system. Furthermore, in due course, large markets for 
power, linked to Cabora Bassa, would have been established which would 
have been capable of using output from the South Bank Station should 
the power supply to Escom have been halted. Recent power supply policy 
decisions in Zimbabwe have prevented the project from proceeding in 
this way. Mozambique cannot, at this stage, contemplate building the 
North Bank Station, even with sequential expansion of the installed 
capacity in line with demand, because the investment needed for the 
initial excavation of the power house and water conduits would be 
prohibitive. 
It is clear that Mozambique is entirely dependent on the RSA 
regarding the operation of the Cabora Bassa Project. On balance it 
seems likely that both countries will favour a continuation of the 
supply of power to Escom: Mozambique, despite its wish to reduce its 
dependence on the RSA would fear losing the supply to Maputo and would 
be placed under strong pressure from France, Germany and Portugal if 
investments in the project could no longer be repaid; the RSA would not 
only welcome Mozambique's continued dependence but would wish to see 
its own investments in the project repaid and to continue obtaining the 
very cheap energy which Cabora Bassa provides. It seems doubtful, 
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however, that any substantial renegotiation of the terms of the 
agreements governing the operation of the project could be achieved 
at present. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the North Bank Station 
will be built in the near future *. 
In respect of the supply of electrical energy to consumers 
inside Mozambique it appears that, for the foreseeable future, it would 
be best to plan the country's power systems entirely independently 
from the Cabora Bassa Project. There appears to be no particular 
economic or political virtue, at this stage, in seeking to promote 
energy- intensive industries although modest amounts of power would be 
required if some or all of the plans for the following are implemented: 
textile manufacture, fertilizer production, timber and paper industries, 
and steel production in small electric -arc furnaces. The northern 
region is likely to remain relatively underdeveloped for a long time 
but the development process will not necessarily be speeded up by the 
creation of an inter -connected electricity supply network at this 
stage. Gradual development of smaller local generating units will 
lead, in the long -term, to a more balanced and manageable network and 
probably provide more linkage benefits, including training opportunities 
for Mozambican staff, than would the centralized system which has been 
proposed. 
* It has been suggested that Escom might agree to buy increased 
amounts of energy from Cabora Bassa if the North Bank Station were 
built particularly if, as du Toit (1975) foresees, Escom begins 
generating base -load energy from nuclear fuel. Cabora Bassa could 
then provide increasing amounts of peak energy. However, it is very 
unlikely that such an agreement would be made in the present political 
climate. In addition the project would require a new transmission 
line and a change of operating procedures from base -load to peak -load 
which would have considerable impact on the river downstream. 
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